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The article focuses on the 1943 American military operation "Operation Vengeance," which sought to kill Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto during the Solomon Islands campaign of World War II. The author discusses how Allied codebreaking was in jeopardy because of this mission and examines several published works that reflect on or avoid the event, including "Islands of Destiny," by John Prados, "Operation Vengeance," by Dan Hampton, and "We Killed Yamamoto," by Si Sheppard.

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The contributions of Papua New Guinean labourers in the brutal Kokoda Track campaign of 1942–3 have long been acknowledged, yet firsthand accounts are extremely rare. During fieldwork in Maisin villages of Collingwood Bay in Oro Province in 1982–3 and 1997, the author recorded 22 extended reminiscences from former labourers and women about their war experiences. This article draws on these narratives to reconstruct the course of the labourers' engagement in the war, to give voice to the dangers they faced and sacrifices they made, and to probe their perceptions and moral evaluations of their compelled alliance with Australian and American forces in the fight to defeat the Japanese. Focusing on the voices of Papuan veterans and their families, this article contributes to recent research contesting the stereotype of the 'Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels' and seeking a more complex and richer understanding of the Indigenous experience of the war and its legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The arrival of Japanese bombers and torpedo planes over Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a complete shock to Americans. This was not only because the two nations were at peace, but also because the Japanese naval striking force seemed to have possessed a near miraculous ability to support and supply its carriers on the long journey to and from the Japanese home islands into the heart of America's Pacific defenses. It was Japanese mastery of the logistical challenges as much as their audacity that produced the strategic surprise. The ability to keep task forces at sea refueled, regardless of weather, was a capability of which the United States Navy could only dream as the war in the Pacific began. In reality, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), in the war's early years, maintained a near monopoly on large-scale, underway refueling, contributing to its "heady" early success over its American and British naval opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Battle of Britain (1940) is the focus of much historical controversy. We show here how the statistical technique of weighted bootstrapping can be used to create a new quantitative basis to help address such controversies. Bootstrapping facilitates the exploration of alternative campaign possibilities with different tactics. This results in comparative probabilities of "victory" for the actual and various counterfactual campaigns, providing a quantified assessment of the likelihood of German achievement of air superiority, thereby facilitating invasion. We And this more likely had the Luftwaffe targeted airfields more heavily, and greatly more likely had Germany brought forward its air campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay at hand covers the operations on the southern flank of the German front in Yugoslavia from October 1944 to April 1945. During this period, the Germans managed to extricate their XXI Mountain Corps from virtual encirclement on two occasions (in Montenegro and the Bosna River Valley) and ultimately reinforce their hard-pressed main line in the Balkans with this battered, but still battle-worthy, formation. This article will provide the reader with a brief description of this little-known campaign and explain the reasons behind what was probably the Yugoslav Partisans’ greatest “lost victory” of the war. The main argument is that such an outcome was largely the result of the Yugoslav leadership’s refusal to award sufficient attention to this sector of the front and the internal political considerations, but also of the German army’s skillfully conducted defense. The article will also dwell on the battlefield effectiveness of both sides, and the Partisans’ efforts to become a regular army in both their outlook and operational manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exiled navies of many Allied nations came under British operational control in World War II. Six of these contributed significant proportions of their submarine fleets to the Mediterranean, where there was great need for them, yet troubled relations meant multinational naval cooperation (MNC) was often extremely difficult. British attempts to establish structures to improve this were frequently hampered, while perceived differing strategic "worth" led the British to treat their new allies in an unequal manner. Ultimately, while MNC was broadly successful in the British home theatre, it was much less effective in the Mediterranean and valuable resources subsequently went underused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the failure of the Japanese Army and Navy to use Hong Kong to control the South China coast between 1942 and 1945. This was the result of their inability to cooperate at the strategic and operational levels and also of their shortage of resources. In addition, the flawed shipping-protection tactics adopted by the Japanese Navy, the incomplete control of the Japanese forces over the South China coast, and the resistance of Allied guerrilla and intelligence units, all helped prevent Hong Kong from becoming a useful base for the Japanese. The Japanese sought to dominate the South China Sea through a huge land offensive, but the costly campaign did not alter the course of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay follows Primo Levi's journey home to Italy after the liberation of Auschwitz, as narrated in his 1963 memoir The Reawakening [La tregua]. Levi's repatriation convoy bound for Italy under Soviet guard traveled inexplicably east instead of south, traversing and being detained within the landscape of the Pripet Marshes. As Europe's largest wetlands, the nearly impassible Pripet Marshes had stalled a Nazi advance into Russia and saw partisan fighting in both World Wars. This essay examines Levi's journey into the Pripet Marshes through two temporal frames--both its haunted legacy of genocidal pogroms, as well as its near future: the site of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Traumatic overlays resonate across Levi's memoir of the cease-fire interval after the war, an uneasy peace Levi terms a "parenthesis of unlimited availability" (p. 206). Thinking through Levi's writing on the afterlife of trauma, Freud's concept of the "uncanny" is employed alongside trauma theory to illuminate a traumatic anamorphosis emerging from Levi's text. This essay pursues an ecological reading of trauma to gather traces strewn across human, nonhuman, and inhuman landscapes of annihilation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the work conducted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the development of tactical air power in the interwar period. It analyses the RAF's theoretical doctrinal thinking during the period along with exercises conducted on a joint Service basis to further develop these ideas in practice. It will argue that, rather than neglecting tactical air power during this period as is the accepted view, much good theoretical work was done that formed a theoretical and intellectual basis for the further development of tactical air power in the light of operational experience during the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the communication difficulties faced by the British Expeditionary Force during the France campaign of 1939–40 and determines the extent to which they were self-inflicted. Among the many assessments of the German invasion of May 1940 and associated collapse of the French, the British acceptance of long-standing deficiencies in vital systems has been overlooked. The Phoney War encouraged unrealistic expectation and insatiable demand, which compounded flawed equipment, personnel, and procedure. Opportunities to ease vulnerabilities, via efficiencies and best practice, were missed. Combat and, in particular, mobile operations, were the final straw, prompting immediate collapse and, eventually, evacuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

George S. Patton is a well-known American Army commander of the Second World War. The personal diary he kept from 1942 to 1945 is a must-read source to understand the history and the performance of the US Army in the war. However, the conflicting versions of this diary and the many after-the-fact additions can lead to significant misinterpretations of Patton's performance. This article examines the editorial evolutions of the diary, details what were the most significant modifications, and shows how they distorted what Patton thought of fellow officers as well as his role in the Normandy campaign and the Battle of the Bulge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The First Canadian Army's Operation Veritable, launched in early February 1945, aimed to drive the Germans from between the Maas and Rhine Rivers in order to establish the jumping off point for the Allied assault into the Rhineland. To support this attack, over a thousand guns were assembled from Canadian and British artilleries to smash and suppress the German defenders as the Anglo-Canadian manoeuvre forces advanced. Through innovation, guile and the use of new and more effective equipment, the gunners in support of First Canadian Army overcame challenging terrain and a weakened but nonetheless resolute enemy to enable the largest offensive operation of Canadian arms in the Second World War with what one Canadian Army historian referred to as a "calculated and terrible efficiency.". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the important role that food played in providing 'comfort' to the service personnel of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) serving in East Anglia during the Second World War. Current theories on comfort food will be discussed before an examination of letters, diaries, and memoirs held by the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library (2ADML), Norwich, UK. It is clear that food played an important role in maintaining morale. Certain foods had the ability to evoke nostalgic thoughts of home. Not only did the food provide solace, it also reminded the troops of what they were fighting for. This article also demonstrates that USAAF personnel in East Anglia had a wide selection of foods from which they could gain comfort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reappraises the experience of the civilian crews aboard Manx personnel vessels engaged in Operation Dynamo, and the contested aftermath. More than 20,000 troops were retrieved by nine ships of the Isle of Man Steam Packet Company, three of which were sunk in and off Dunkirk. There is more than enough material for a heroic narrative to emerge, yet a sense of scandal seems to cling to these particular civilian crews. Various political, social and cultural forces foster distinctly separate narratives between the United Kingdom and Isle of Man. However, empirical research in Manx and UK archives, including access to a hitherto closed file, reveals a different story: that the official Admiralty narrative of Operation Dynamo was intentionally weaponized against the Manx civilian crews for political reasons. This was achieved through the creation of reports that were false, misleading or unsupported by evidence, the provocation of the Isle of Man's Lieutenant Governor into acts of reprisal, and through the work of an unseen editorial hand in Admiralty archives. The influence of this hostile narrative, which continues to be reinforced, has obscured the contributions of the true civilians of Dunkirk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late summer of this year, Dr. John McLaughlin contacted me to express his displeasure at Dr. Jim Lacey's piece on Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, "World War II's Real Victory Program," which appeared in the July 2011 number of the JMH. Dr. McLaughlin is the author of a biography of the general, entitled General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America's Unsung Strategist in World War II. He had drafted an article-length rebuttal to the Lacey article, which he wished us to publish. I informed him that it was not our practice to print articles of this sort and proposed that, instead, he write a ten-page rejoinder to which Dr. Lacey would be asked to reply. He agreed to do so, Dr. Lacey subsequently fell in with the plan, and the result lies before you. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to examine communist education in occupied Greece (1944–1945) in combination with anti-communist education in Greece in the Cold War era (1950–1967). It discusses, on the one hand, the intentions of the Popular Liberation Front/the Greek Communist Party in establishing Slavic-Macedonian schools and their features and, on the other, it defines the characteristics of the American anti-communist educational model and its impact on the Greek one, as the redefinition of the Greek nation, the constitution of the anti-communist legislative framework, the promotion of educational reform or the need for modernisation and the demand for technological and economic progress. Finally, it evaluates both communist and anti-communist education and their consequences for Greek society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although no real battle was fought in Nigeria during the Second World War (1939–1945), the burden of the war was much felt by Nigerians. They made significant contributions to the war effort; a method through which the British shifted the burden of the war onto their colonial subjects. This strategy had caught the attentions of many scholars, and various discussions have centered on its origin, purpose and operation at provincial and Nigeria wide level. Thus, contributions at the Districts and Division levels have always been subsumed into colony-wide studies, and by that fact remained unresearched. This paper focuses the effects of the imperial coping strategy on the Yoruba society with Osun Division as a case study. The study adopts historical approach, which depends on written, oral, and archival sources. However, it is hoped that, with due attention being given to the efforts of the people at a local level, the impact of the Second World War on African social order will be better understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks afresh at the decision by Britain to despatch an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941 to oppose the much-anticipated decision by Hitler, to end by German invasion the inept Italian campaign against Athens. The existing work on this topic emphasises the geo-political motives behind the campaign, especially Churchill's need to impress American public opinion by going to the aid of the Greeks, often with an assumption that British military leaders committed themselves to the venture against their better judgement. What these accounts overlook is what British planners thought was operationally possible. This article is based on new archival research, which indicates that key British leaders, throughout the chain of command, thought Greek topography would prevent the Wehrmacht from repeating the success of armoured warfare achieved by the Germans in France. In considering this material, the article sheds new light on the failure of British military leaders to fully understand the possibilities of armoured warfare, and thus adds to our understanding of the doctrinal reasons for poor British battlefield performance in the 1940-42 period more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the importance of the German invasion of Greece in 1941, relatively little research has been conducted into the campaign's operational aspects, and a number of misunderstandings or misinterpretations have developed. One of the most powerful misconceptions was that the huge disparity in airpower, particularly dive-bombers, made it impossible for British and Dominion troops to hold the German advance. This article demonstrates, however, that despite its complete dominance of the Greek skies, the terror it inspired, and its almost continual operations against Allied positions, the Luftwaffe did not have the decisive role in the campaign that has so often been ascribed to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the U.S. military forces' treatment of civilians in 1944 during the battle for Saipan, the first central Pacific island on which American forces encountered large numbers of civilians. Thousands of civilians, including Japanese and Korean migrants and "native" islander Chamorro and Carolinian peoples, died during the battle. The Pacific war literature overlooks the impact of the war on noncombatant island populations, preferring to focus on the actual fighting. This article extends the boundaries of the Pacific campaign's military history to include the experience of civilians, contextualizing the debate within what John Dower has described as "war without mercy." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

B-29 sorties during the American strategic bombing campaign against Singapore in 1944-45 were the longest daylight bombing missions mounted to that point during the Second World War. Despite the campaign's historical significance, a comprehensive account incorporating the perspectives of American aircrew, Japanese occupiers, local civilians, and internees who lived through the bombings remains to be written. This lacuna is reflective of the scant scholarship on the impact of Allied bombing on friendly civilians in enemy-occupied territories in the Far East. Although the combat results were mixed, Allied bombing raised the morale of civilians and internees in Japanese-occupied Singapore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British colonial regime in India was heavily dependent on the Indian Army, whose rank and file were Indians but whose officers were British. Despite the apathy of the Indian populace and the hostility of the Indian political parties, the Indian Army remained loyal to its colonial masters during World War II. This article examines the extent of that loyalty and the reasons behind it. Focusing principally on the Indian units that fought in Burma, it analyzes combat motivation and loyalty throughout the war. The article also considers the British elite's concern about the Indian soldiers' loyalty and whether it would change during postwar demobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Combined Operations organisation and British Army and Royal Marine Commandos conducted three large-scale raids against the Norwegian coast in 1941 and a series of smaller operations in 1942 and 1943. This article examines the reasons for the shifts in British raiding policy during this period and places the Norwegian raids in their wider strategic context. Although these raids had little material consequence and were conducted on the periphery of the main theatres of operations, they proved beneficial in terms of experience gained in triservice operations and the subsequent overcommitment of German resources to Norway in response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers an interpretation of the United States strategic bombing campaign against Japan in March 1945. Information on the B-29 aircraft program; Details of the plan to attack Japanese cities and civilians; Information on the report 'Economic Objectives in the Far East,' submitted by the Committee of Operations Analysts in May 1944.

Provides information on the military campaign Operation Eclipse during the European War and the occupation of Germany. Factors which affected the implementation of the Eclipse military campaign; Details on the initiation of the postconflict war planning under the code name Rankin on May 22, 1943; Discussion on the plan for Operation Eclipse.