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This monograph addresses the question: Do the planning staffs at the Unified Combatant Commands have the personnel resources and training to conduct crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other organizations? The Unified Combatant Commands are responsible for deliberate planning, Theater Engagement Planning and Crisis Action Planning, which often occur simultaneously. All of these activities plus required administrative tasks require personnel that possess the right training and education. When the Unified Combatant Command does not have the capability to conduct Crisis Action Planning it must get that expertise from elsewhere. Recent U.S. military operations have demonstrated a trend where the planning for crises is executed by an organization external to the Unified Combatant Command. This monograph focuses on the many doctrinal tasks that the Unified Combatant Commands must execute as identified in Joint Doctrine. It then discusses organization of the Unified Combatant Commands, requirements of Joint Military Professional Education, requirements for joint staff officers as established in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the School of Advanced Military Studies(SAMS) education process. This monograph then analyzes Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Restore Hope to identify why external planning organizations were used. The conclusion identifies that the combination of many doctrinal tasks, organization of the command, mission of the command, training and education of the staff and statutory guidance have resulted in the inability to simultaneously conduct crisis action and deliberate planning. This monograph recommends that this problem could be improved by restructuring the service mix of the commands, requiring SAMS graduates in key planning positions, and reformation of the JPME process to include elements of the SAMS curriculum.

The logistics support structure of the U.S. Army has evolved continuously in order to provide efficient and effective support to Army forces. Logistics officers are critical in providing decisions that allocate support to Army forces. In the past, these logistics officers specialized in one of three basic logistics branches: Transportation, Ordnance or Quartermaster. Recent developments in doctrine, organizational change and technology require logisticians to understand the entire combat service support system. This monograph examines whether the U.S. Army should consolidate the officer corps of the Transportation, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps into one multifunctional branch. This monograph analyzes changes in: logistics doctrine, organizations, technology, and historical analysis of the efforts of other organizations to consolidate elements of there combat service support structure. This analysis will determine whether the conditions exist that support the formation of a multifunctional logistics officer corps and if this action can provide added efficiency to the U.S. Army. The Army could consolidate the officer corps of the Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster corps into a Multifunctional Logistics Officer Corps to gain efficiency in combat service support. The recent changes in doctrine, organization and emerging technology indicate that logistics officers are performing in this role now. Conducting the consolidation could combine resources of the three branches and result in a training program that would result in thoroughly trained multifunctional logisticians at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

The logistics support structure of the U.S. Army has evolved continuously in order to provide efficient and effective support to Army forces. Logistics officers are critical in providing decisions that allocate support to Army forces. In the past, these logistics officers specialized in one of three basic logistics branches: Transportation, Ordnance or Quartermaster. Recent developments in doctrine, organizational change and technology require logisticians to understand the entire combat service support system. This monograph examines whether the U.S. Army should consolidate the officer corps of the Transportation, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps into one multifunctional branch. This monograph analyzes changes in: logistics doctrine, organizations, technology, and historical analysis of the efforts of other organizations to consolidate elements of there combat service support structure. This analysis will determine whether the conditions exist that support the formation of a multifunctional logistics officer corps and if this action can provide added efficiency to the U.S. Army. The Army could consolidate the officer corps of the Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster corps into a Multifunctional Logistics Officer Corps to gain efficiency in combat service support. The recent changes in doctrine, organization and emerging technology indicate that logistics officers are performing in this role now. Conducting the consolidation could combine resources of the three branches and result in a training program that would result in thoroughly trained multifunctional logisticians at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

This monograph addresses the question: Do the planning staffs at the Unified Combatant Commands have the personnel resources and training to conduct crisis action planning for contingencies without augmentation from other organizations? The Unified Combatant Commands are responsible for deliberate planning, Theater Engagement Planning and Crisis Action Planning, which often occur simultaneously. All of these activities plus required administrative tasks require personnel that possess the right training and education. When the Unified Combatant Command does not have the capability to conduct Crisis Action Planning it must get that expertise from elsewhere. Recent U.S. military operations have demonstrated a trend where the planning for crises is executed by an organization external to the Unified Combatant Command. This monograph focuses on the many doctrinal tasks that the Unified Combatant Commands must execute as identified in Joint Doctrine. It then discusses organization of the Unified Combatant Commands, requirements of Joint Military Professional Education, requirements for joint staff officers as established in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the School of Advanced Military Studies(SAMS) education process. This monograph then analyzes Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Restore Hope to identify why external planning organizations were used. The conclusion identifies that the combination of many doctrinal tasks, organization of the command, mission of the command, training and education of the staff and statutory guidance have resulted in the inability to simultaneously conduct crisis action and deliberate planning. This monograph recommends that this problem could be improved by restructuring the service mix of the commands, requiring SAMS graduates in key planning positions, and reformation of the JPME process to include elements of the SAMS curriculum.