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Law schools have a reputation, and are often criticized, for being liberal. Yet, their reputation notwithstanding, law schools are traditional, orthodox institutions, teaching and instilling in students a version of the law devoid of justice and morality. One might be tempted to assume law schools merely reflect the conservatism of the legal profession, which generally serves the interests of powerful clients and sustains the status quo, but this account does not withstand scrutiny. Law schools and law professors are relatively insulated from the intense competitive pressures of the market for legal services. Whatever the explanatory power of lawyers' usual excuses for ignoring justice and morality--"the adversary system made me do it," or "clients made me do it"--they do not apply to and do not explain the conduct of law professors. This Article makes three points. First, it explains how law schools are orthodox and why they continue to be a-liberal in the twenty-first century, preaching a great divorce between law and justice and morality although they have the power and ability to become more liberal. Second, it argues that law schools must be more liberal, that is, they must pursue a model of legal education which integrates law, justice, and morality. Third, the Article advances a liberal model of legal education and responds to several criticisms of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal ethics of class actions is a mess, with many lingering, unresolved questions and conflicting answers. The culprit is a fundamental lack of agreement regarding the identity of the client, without which it is impossible to consistently resolve concerns about conflicts of interest and determine the scope of lawyers’ duties of competence and communication to the class, class representative, and class members. This Essay offers a simple solution to this disagreement: the class lawyer represents the class as an entity, not the class representatives and members, who are constituents of the class client. While conceptually simple, treating the class as the client is but the first step on the road to untangling the legal ethics of class actions. The representation of entity clients requires a well-developed governance structure, complete with authorized constituents who can make decisions and communicate on behalf of the entity. Current class action law does not yet include such a governance structure for class actions. Instead, the class representative and class members are sometimes treated as clients and sometimes as authorized constituents, while class lawyers and courts are called upon to make decisions for the class as if they were its constituents. This Essay outlines a way out of this mess. It argues that we ought to keep things simple by treating the class as the entity client and developing governance structures to allow the class to act via authorized constituents, reducing its reliance on class counsel and judicial supervision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with mounting pressitre to permit national law practice and increase access to legal services for those who cannot allbrd to pay .jor them and critiques about growing inequality and its.failure to lead the battles for greater gender and racial justice, the legal profession's response has been to resist re.form proposals by invoking its independence. Lawyers and lawyers alone, asserts the profession, ought to determine the pace and details ofnationalizing law practice, set the conditions under which nonlawyers and artificial intelligence can offlar legal services, and respond to growing inequality among lawyers and concerns about the role lawyers play, and fail to play. in the quest for a morejust society. Any outside interference, cautions the profession, would undermine lawyers ' independence and our commitment to the Rule of Law. Asserting the independence ofthe bar has proven to be an effective rhetorical ploy, success®lly disarming criticisms and weakening calls for reformbecause who can argue against the Rule of- Law? This Article argues that in debating the complex challenges of access, equality, and justice, the American legal profession's claims of independence must be carefidly scrutinized rather than deferred to, and that, ifthe prolkssion cannot meet the burden of showing that particular reform proposals undercut its independence, its claims must be dismissed. In support of its thesis, the Article advances theoretical and comparative claims. Theoretically, it draws on distinctions between types of legal projessions-mature and emerging-and between types of independence claims-from the state and from powerful clients-to establish that claims by mature legal professions, such as the American legal profession, of independence from the state deserve little deference. If the profession cannot or will not address the access, equality. and justice challenges facing it, state and .federal legislatures ought to take appropriate regulatory action unencumbered by the independence claims ofthe bar. Comparatively, the Article shows that a mature legal profession can be too independent in the sense that it takes advantage of its independence from the state not only to defeat reform proposals but also to advance its selfinterest at the expense of the public interest. O.Nering a detailed study of the Israeli legal profession, the Article documents how-in response to the opening Of new law schools and a significant increase in the number of lawyers, and to increased competition in the market for legal services *om nonlawyers and artiticial intelligence-the Israeli Bar Association, which exercises exclusive control over the practice oflaw in Israel, took advantage ofits independence.from the state to reduce the number of new lawyers and stifle competition. Among other measures, the Israeli Bar Association made the bar exam harder to pass, extended the mandatory internship period, and aggressivelv asserted unauthorized practice of law rules against nonlawyers and artificial intelligence companies. The experience ofthe Israeli legal profession, an independent.from the state mature legal profession, should serve as a cautionary tale for its American counterpart. Left unchecked. a projkssion can be too independent and advance its self-interest at the expense of the public interest. To address access, equality, and justice challenges, the American legal protession must engage in reform proposals iii good faith and avoid hiding behind empty assertions of threats to its independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a brief summary of the Carnegie Report's key insights, including its advocacy for professional identity formation in the U.S. Topics include how lawyers actually experience the responsibilities and values of the profession in their diverse practices; professionalism movement to legal education, exploring the professional identity formation efforts of law schools; and developing an integrated model of legal education relying on the abstract professional identity.

The article offers information on the emerging trajectories of in-house lawyers and triumph over big law in a zero-sum game for power, prestige, and money.

The article discusses the alleged overrepresentation of Jewish lawyers in the legal profession in the U.S. in the 20th century due to the Confluence of Circumstances theory. Also cited are the features of the American law, the ideologies, discrimination, and competition in the legal profession, the cost of legal education, and the relationship between the lawyers' personal and professional identity.