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Contemporary studies of civil conflict focus heavily on combatant treatment of civilians. Research on human rights (HR) abuses committed by states has benefitted from several widely available datasets on state violations. By comparison, researchers and policymakers have been limited by a dearth of data on violations committed by rebel groups. We introduce a new resource, the Rebel Human Rights Violations (RHRV) dataset, which measures the frequency with which rebel groups engage in eight HR abuses. The data include information for all rebel groups around the world between 1990 and 2018, and capture a wide range of violations, including arbitrary killing, detention, forced recruitment, property damage, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement and movement restriction. The RHRV provides new opportunities for researchers and policymakers to analyze an important aspect of civil conflict: the abuse of civilian populations by rebel groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power-sharing is a recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements among rivals. However, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side grabs power. We examine public perceptions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a survey experiment, we investigate if -individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under power-sharing versus power-grabbing treatments, which vary the authority held by distinct factions of the counter-ISIS coalition. The public is more likely to support power-grabbing than power-sharing in matters of policing and security. In the case of power-grabbing, there are also important moderating effects of conflict-related victimization. Unlike nonvictims who favor ingroup power-grabbing to enhance local -sectarian control, victims place a premium on stability, welcoming even external, out-group control over power-sharing among groups who might be at odds. Our results underscore the challenges of institutionalizing power-sharing mechanisms for peacebuilding after conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors impact how people mobilize against state human rights abuses? Drawing on Image Theory, we examine how perceptions of an out-group, government abuse, and sociopolitical orientations impact political action. Using an online survey-embedded experiment with a sample of 2,932 U.S. adults, we manipulated two factors: (1) the level of government abuse and (2) the risk of punishment for taking action against the state, while also including social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) as covariates. Participants indicated their propensity to engage in and justify both protest and violence. Participants rated the out-group as oppressive and evil. State abuse of human rights was associated with more oppressive and evil out-group images. Oppressive out-group images increased protest engagement and justification, whereas evil out-group images increased violence engagement and justification. Abuse increased all forms of action and justifications for them. Oppressive and evil images mediated many of the relationships between abuse, SDO, and RWA on one hand and political action on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the costs of conflict influence public support for the use of force? Existing research finds that weapons that eliminate the possibility of military casualties, such as drones, increase popular support for engaging in conflict. We argue that this effect may be overstated because the choice of weapons technology is endogenous to conflict. Leaders may select to use drones in conflicts where the risk of harm to ground forces is especially high. To address this, we replicate and extend the research design of Walsh and Schulzke across three survey experiments. The key innovation in our experiments is that subjects are led to believe that the choice of attack type – drones or ground troops – is determined by weather conditions rather than strategic considerations. We find that support for military action does not differ across treatments in which subjects are told that the attack involves drone strikes or ground troops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why would individuals engage in or support contentious politics? This question is challenging to answer with observational data where causal factors are correlated and difficult to measure. Using a survey-embedded experiment, we focus on three situational factors: grievances, risk, and identity. We also explore how individual differences in sociopolitical orientations—social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)—impact action. Grievances influence engagement in and support for protests. Risk influences engagement in protest, but not support for it. Regardless of condition, SDO and RWA help explain why some people engage in protest while others do not, particularly within the same context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]