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This paper considers an e‐commerce supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform and investigates the manufacturer's pricing decisions without and with platform coupons and the online platform's coupon decision under different power structures. In the manufacturer (platform) Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons cannot (can) always stimulate the demand and benefit the manufacturer, the online platform, and the entire system. In the vertical Nash power structure, issuing platform coupons can always stimulate demand and benefit the manufacturer and the entire system but cannot always benefit the online platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the rising price and the shrinking demand caused by the inflation. To manage these above risks, the firm has a chance to place two types of orders in each period, viz., the firm order and the put options order. This paper formulates a multiperiod ordering model, either without or with put option contracts. Based on stochastic dynamic programming, this paper studies the optimal ordering policy structure in each period and provides an approximation to evaluate the corresponding policy parameters. By taking the case without put option contracts as a benchmark, put option contracts are demonstrated to prompt the firm to enhance the service level and improve the performance.

This study aims to explore how traceability affects quality and price competition in a duopoly. A theoretical model is developed in which both enterprises are liable to recall low-quality (defective) products identified by traceability and compensate consumers for the disutility caused by unidentified low-quality products. The equilibrium results are derived by determining the optimal product quality and sales price decisions. The key findings are highlighted below. (1) Traceability affects product quality primarily through the expected social cost (the sum of expected recall cost and expected consumer disutility), i.e., higher (lower) expected social cost induced by increased traceability of each enterprise leads to higher (lower) product quality for both enterprises, enhancing (reducing) quality competition. (2) If an enterprise's improved (decreased) product quality is driven by its own increased traceability, it will result in lower (higher) consumer demand and profit, while it will result in higher (lower) consumer demand and profit if caused by its competitor's increased traceability. (3) If an enterprise's increased traceability results in higher expected social cost, the enterprise's sales price falls while the competitor's sales price rises; otherwise, both enterprises' sales prices fall, leading to greater price competition. (4) Quality competition is unaffected by product liability but is improved by increased recall cost and consumer disutility, whereas price competition is intensified by increased consumer disutility but is reduced by increased product liability and recall cost. Managerial insights are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier who manufactures one type of perishable products characterized by a long lead time and a retailer who purchases the products from the supplier and sells them to end consumers. In order to hedge against the risks of price and demand caused by inflation, portfolio contracts with put options, namely, a combination of wholesale price contracts and put option contracts, are adopted by the retailer to obtain the products from the supplier. We characterize the optimal ordering and production policies for the retailer and the supplier in the presence of put option contracts under inflation. By comparing with the case without put option contracts, we discuss the effect of put option contracts on the supply chain and prove that the usage of put option contracts benefits these two members under inflation. Through several numerical examples, we illustrate the effect of inflation on the supply chain with and without put option contracts. On this basis, we design a feasible supply chain coordination strategy based on put option contracts under inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Inflation causes an increase in the retail price and a decrease in the market demand, both arise from the problem of seasonal product management and occur during the long production lead time. As an effective tool for hedging against the risks, option contracts, including call, put, and bidirectional option contracts, have been proved to benefit two members in a one‐supplier and one‐retailer supply chain under inflation. The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of different option contacts on the decisions and performances for both the supplier and the retailer under inflation. Our results suggest that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts with bidirectional options under inflation, whereas the supplier is inclined to provide call option contracts under inflation. Our study also reveals that call option contracts are implemented ultimately by the supply chain under inflation because of the supplier's market dominant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]