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Dynamic analysis and especially fuzzing are challenging tasks for embedded firmware running on modern low-end Microcontroller Units (MCUs) due to performance overheads from instruction emulation, the difficulty of emulating the vast space of available peripherals, and low availability of open-source embedded firmware. Consequently, efficient security testing of MCU firmware has proved to be a resource- and engineering-heavy endeavor. EmbedFuzz introduces an efficient end-to-end fuzzing framework for MCU firmware. Our novel firmware transplantation technique converts binary MCU firmware to a functionally equivalent and fuzzing-enhanced version of the firmware which executes on a compatible high-end device at native performance. Besides the performance gains, our system enables advanced introspection capabilities based on tooling for typical Linux user space processes, thus simplifying analysis of crashes and bug triaging. In our evaluation against state-of-the-art MCU fuzzers, EmbedFuzz exhibits up to eight-fold fuzzing throughput while consuming at most a fourth of the energy thanks to its native execution.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) embedded in IoT devices provide a deployable solution to secure IoT applications at the hardware level. By design, in TEEs, the Trusted Operating System (Trusted OS) is the primary component. It enables the TEE to use security-based design techniques, such as data encryption and identity authentication. Once a Trusted OS has been exploited, the TEE can no longer ensure security. However, Trusted OSes for IoT devices have received little security analysis, which is challenging from several perspectives: (1) Trusted OSes are closed-source and have an unfavorable environment for sending test cases and collecting feedback. (2) Trusted OSes have complex data structures and require a stateful workflow, which limits existing vulnerability detection tools. To address the challenges, we present SyzTrust, the first state-aware fuzzing framework for vetting the security of resource-limited Trusted OSes. SyzTrust adopts a hardware-assisted framework to enable fuzzing Trusted OSes directly on IoT devices as well as tracking state and code coverage non-invasively. SyzTrust utilizes composite feedback to guide the fuzzer to effectively explore more states as well as to increase the code coverage. We evaluate SyzTrust on Trusted OSes from three major vendors: Samsung, Tsinglink Cloud, and Ali Cloud. These systems run on Cortex M23/33 MCUs, which provide the necessary abstraction for embedded TEEs. We discovered 70 previously unknown vulnerabilities in their Trusted OSes, receiving 10 new CVEs so far. Furthermore, compared to the baseline, SyzTrust has demonstrated significant improvements, including 66% higher code coverage, 651% higher state coverage, and 31% improved vulnerability-finding capability. We report all discovered new vulnerabilities to vendors and open source SyzTrust., Comment: To appear in the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P) 2024, San Francisco, CA, USA

Nowadays, IoT devices integrate a wealth of third-party components (TPCs) in firmware to shorten the development cycle. TPCs usually have strict usage specifications, e.g., checking the return value of the function. Violating the usage specifications of TPCs can cause serious consequences, e.g., NULL pointer dereference. Therefore, this massive amount of TPC integrations, if not properly implemented, will lead to pervasive vulnerabilities in IoT devices. Detecting vulnerabilities automatically in TPC integration is challenging from several perspectives: (1) There is a gap between the high-level specifications from TPC documents, and the low-level implementations in the IoT firmware. (2) IoT firmware is mostly the closed-source binary, which loses a lot of information when compiling from the source code and has diverse architectures. To address these challenges, we design and implement UVScan, an automated and scalable system to detect TPC usage violations in IoT firmware. In UVScan, we first propose a novel natural language processing (NLP)-based rule extraction framework, which extracts API specifications from inconsistently formatted TPC documents. We then design a rule-driven NLP-guided binary analysis engine, which maps the logical information from the high-level TPC document to the low-level binary, and detects TPC usage violations in IoT firmware across different architectures. We evaluate UVScan from four perspectives on four popular TPCs and six ground-truth datasets. The results show that UVScan achieves more than 70% precision and recall, and has a significant performance improvement compared with even the source-level API misuse detectors., Comment: Accepted as a full paper at USENIX Security '23

In recent years, REST API fuzzing has emerged to explore errors on a cloud service. Its performance highly depends on the sequence construction and request generation. However, existing REST API fuzzers have trouble generating long sequences with well-constructed requests to trigger hard-to-reach states in a cloud service, which limits their performance of finding deep errors and security bugs. Further, they cannot find the specific errors caused by using undefined parameters during request generation. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel hybrid data-driven solution, named MINER, with three new designs working together to address the above limitations. First, MINER collects the valid sequences whose requests pass the cloud service's checking as the templates, and assigns more executions to long sequence templates. Second, to improve the generation quality of requests in a sequence template, MINER creatively leverages the state-of-the-art neural network model to predict key request parameters and provide them with appropriate parameter values. Third, MINER implements a new data-driven security rule checker to capture the new kind of errors caused by undefined parameters. We evaluate MINER against the state-of-the-art fuzzer RESTler on GitLab, Bugzilla, and WordPress via 11 REST APIs. The results demonstrate that the average pass rate of MINER is 23.42% higher than RESTler. MINER finds 97.54% more unique errors than RESTler on average and 142.86% more reproducible errors after manual analysis. We have reported all the newly found errors, and 7 of them have been confirmed as logic bugs by the corresponding vendors., Comment: Accepted as a full paper at USENIX Security '23

Currently, the development of IoT firmware heavily depends on third-party components (TPCs) to improve development efficiency. Nevertheless, TPCs are not secure, and the vulnerabilities in TPCs will influence the security of IoT firmware. Existing works pay less attention to the vulnerabilities caused by TPCs, and we still lack a comprehensive understanding of the security impact of TPC vulnerability against firmware. To fill in the knowledge gap, we design and implement FirmSec, which leverages syntactical features and control-flow graph features to detect the TPCs in firmware, and then recognizes the corresponding vulnerabilities. Based on FirmSec, we present the first large-scale analysis of the security risks raised by TPCs on $34,136$ firmware images. We successfully detect 584 TPCs and identify 128,757 vulnerabilities caused by 429 CVEs. Our in-depth analysis reveals the diversity of security risks in firmware and discovers some well-known vulnerabilities are still rooted in firmware. Besides, we explore the geographical distribution of vulnerable devices and confirm that the security situation of devices in different regions varies. Our analysis also indicates that vulnerabilities caused by TPCs in firmware keep growing with the boom of the IoT ecosystem. Further analysis shows 2,478 commercial firmware images have potentially violated GPL/AGPL licensing terms.

Facilitated by messaging protocols (MP), many home devices are connected to the Internet, bringing convenience and accessibility to customers. However, most deployed MPs on IoT platforms are fragmented and are not implemented carefully to support secure communication. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic solution to perform automatic security checks on MP implementations yet. To bridge the gap, we present MPInspector, the first automatic and systematic solution for vetting the security of MP implementations. MPInspector combines model learning with formal analysis and operates in three stages: (a) using parameter semantics extraction and interaction logic extraction to automatically infer the state machine of an MP implementation, (b) generating security properties based on meta properties and the state machine, and (c) applying automatic property based formal verification to identify property violations. We evaluate MPInspector on three popular MPs, including MQTT, CoAP and AMQP, implemented on nine leading IoT platforms. It identifies 252 property violations, leveraging which we further identify eleven types of attacks under two realistic attack scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate that MPInspector is lightweight (the average overhead of end-to-end analysis is ~4.5 hours) and effective with a precision of 100% in identifying property violations., Comment: Accepted as a full paper at USENIX Security '21