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I. Introduction 138 II. The Origins of China's Policy Experimentations: Competing Theories 141 III. Laboratories of Authoritarianism: The Theoretical Framework 147 A. Constitutional Structure 147 1. "Two Initiatives": The Constitutional [...], One of the most commonly cited virtues of American federalism is its "laboratories of democracy "--the notion that decentralization and political competition encourage states to become testing grounds for novel social policies and ideas. This study argues that this concept is not exclusive to federal democracies. Indeed, similar mechanisms can prosper under a regime that is formally unitary and politically authoritarian. By analyzing significant transformations in China, such as marketization and the introduction of competitive elections, this study shows how the party-state systematically utilizes subnational policy experiments to modernize its communist institutions and adapt to the changing political and social landscape. Like in the United States, experiments in China result from the interaction between its constitutional structure and competition among political elites. However, contrary to the United States, China's center-local constitutional relationship is characterized by a unique combination of decentralized policymaking powers and centralized appointment/removal powers. It is under this arrangement that various Party factions compete for political supremacy. Amid such competition, faction members in subnational leadership positions use their broad policy discretion to pilot new ideas that conform to the faction's policy objectives. Such innovation often spread either by peer-to-peer learning or through national adoption pushed for by the faction's central leadership. This cycle of experimentation has become a frequently utilized method for political elites to expand their policy and political influence and is responsible for many institutional innovations critical to the communist country's modernization and eventual rise as a global superpower. However, the top-down nature of China's center-local structure means that its "laboratories of authoritarianism" are subject to the vicissitudes of factional politics in the center, making them less stable than their democratic counterparts. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.' Louis Brandeis

Scholars consider deficient local accountability mechanisms a key shortcoming of China's response to environmental issues. Through empirical analysis of the new procurator-led public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study examines whether – and to what extent – this shortcoming can be remedied by empowering the juridical institutions. It concludes that thanks to the procuratorates' political insider status, relative autonomy from local politics and extensive resources, procurators have generally found ways to maintain a delicate balance between holding executive agencies environmentally accountable and managing local governments' resistance to the PIL system. However, reliance on top-down political support may ultimately hinder the expansion and stability of the procuratorial PIL system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The local party-state has always been a major source of extrajudicial influence in China. Drawing on interviews with judges, this article examines the impact of Xi Jinping's ambitious judicial centralization reforms, which are aimed at enhancing judicial autonomy by transferring authority over local court personnel and finances from local to provincial level. It finds that the reforms have achieved limited results. Although many appointment and budgetary powers were formally transferred to the provincial level, the local party-state retains considerable influence in both areas owing to its superior manpower, local knowledge and, in the case of developed regions, financial resources. Moreover, the local party-state maintains significant informal influence over the courts, which require many forms of discretionary assistance from various state organs – ranging from appropriating land for new courthouses to providing police protection for remote tribunals – in order to function. This setback highlights the depth and complexity of the courts' political and economic embeddedness and serves as a reminder of the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing judicial autonomy, however limited, in a large and diverse party-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]