Search

The objective of this paper is to emphasize the differences between a call and a warrant as well as the different valuation methods of warrants which have been introduced in the financial literature. For the sake of simplicity and applicability, we only consider a debt-free equity-financed firm. More recently a formal distinction between structural and reduced form pricing models has been introduced. This distinction is important whether one wishes to price a new warrant issue or outstanding warrants. If we are interested in pricing a new issue of warrants, e.g. in the context of a management incentive package, one has to rely on a structural model. However most of practitioners use the simple Black-Scholes formula. In this context, we analyze the accuracy of the approximation of the "true" price of a warrant by the Black-Scholes formula. We show that in the current low interest rate environment, the quality of the approximation deteriorates and the sensitivity of this approximation to the volatility estimate increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Referring to the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, individual freedom and security of person appear to be inviolable, unless criminal proceedings have been initiated against the person. Crime is that state of affairs which brings a high degree of danger to society. It consists in committing criminal acts with guilt, punishable by a criminal fine and/or deprivation of liberty. Preventive measures have the role of helping in the criminal process by meeting or removing situations of danger that could prevent the court from finding out the truth, as well as restricting the freedom of persons who have committed crimes or about whom there is reasonable suspicion that they are going to commit an act provided by criminal law. The deprivation of liberty of individuals who have committed crimes is a necessary measure for their re-education and aims to prevent the commission of other criminal acts. Among preventive measures, the most serious form is pre-trial detention. This is one of the most severe custodial measures by which the accused is interrupted from performing certain actions that could hinder the criminal process or its purpose. Pre-trial detention may be implemented only after the substantive conditions of the pre-trial detention warrant have been cumulatively met. Therefore, the arrest is a procedural measure without which pre-trial detention could not be ordered. It is a procedural act of particular importance because it presents, concretely, the act(s) of which the accused is accused and through this prism the necessary measures are taken to charge the defendant. The arrest warrant is the main document that makes the difference in order to establish a person's guilt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Warrant is a type of security that gives the right to buy or sell a certain financial asset or indicator at a predetermined price at a certain maturity. The right to buy or sell a certain financial asset or indicator, which is offered to the investor over a warrant, can be exercised within the maturity or at the end of the maturity period depending on the type of the warrant, with dematerial delivery or cash settlement according to the agreed settlement method. Warrants can be issued on the basis of assets or indicators such as foreign currency, commodities and indices, with the shares of partnerships traded or to be traded on the stock exchange. Warrants, which also have leverage in terms of offering the right to buy or sell financial investment instruments at a very low price compared to the current market price in which they are traded, depending on their type; It can attract the attention of investors with its various features such as increasing demand for supply, offering price assurance, hedging against risk and speculation. At this point, there is a need to evaluate the legitimacy of warrants in terms of Islamic jurisprudential criteria, which is wondering whether they can be an investment alternative for investors with Islamic sensitivities. In this research, warrants, which are accepted in the capital markets as a financial investment alternative, are discussed from a jurisprudential perspective in terms of their contract and transaction characteristics, and in this context, their potential to be an investment tool in Islamic terms is analyzed. As a method, the study is structured in two parts, and in the first part, some introductory information such as the structure of warrants, types, transaction characteristics, opportunities and risks involved are included, and then the subject is evaluated by considering the classical and modern Islamic jurisprudential acquis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Toulmin model has been proved useful in law and argumentation theory. This model describes the basic process in justifying a claim, which comprises six elements, i.e., claim (C), data (D), warrant (W), backing (B), qualifier (Q), and rebuttal (R). Specifically, in justifying a claim, one must put forward 'data' and a 'warrant', whereas the latter is authorized by 'backing'. The force of the 'claim' being justified is represented by the 'qualifier', and the condition under which the claim cannot be justified is represented as the 'rebuttal'. To further improve the model, (Goodnight, Informal Logic 15:41–52, 1993) points out that the selection of a backing needs justification, which he calls legitimation justification. However, how such justification is constituted has not yet been clarified. To identify legitimation justification, we separate it into two parts. One justifies a backing's eligibility (legitimation justification1; LJ1); the other justifies its superiority over other eligible backings (legitimation justification2; LJ2). In this paper, we focus on LJ1 and apply it to the legal justification (of judgements) in hard cases for illustration purposes. We submit that LJ1 refers to the justification of the legal interpretation of a norm by its backing, which can be further separated into several orderable subjustifications. Taking the subjustification of a norm's existence as an example, we show how it would be influenced by different positions in the philosophy of law. Taking the position of the theory of natural law, such subjustification is presented and evaluated. This paper aims not only to inform ongoing theoretical efforts to apply the Toulmin model in the legal field, but it also seeks to clarify the process in the justification of legal judgments in hard cases. It also offers background information for the possible construction of related AI systems. In our future work, LJ2 and other subjustifications of LJ1 will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experienced provers employ a host of skills when assessing the validity of a justification, often without names for those skills. This paper offers an introduction to a lens called Toulmin analysis that can help make sense of this process. Then this paper describes both an in-class module to help students learn to apply Toulmin analysis and multiple ways this module can be integrated into courses for mathematics majors and non-majors. Toulmin analysis has helped us bring human dimensions of proving to the surface in our classrooms, and it helps us build stronger and more inclusive entryways for students into mathematical communities. Learning about Toulmin analysis helps our students connect mathematical reasoning to other thinking, supporting transfer in both directions, and it has changed our thinking about the teaching and learning of mathematics even in contexts where we do not devote class time to this model overtly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceptual beliefs that categorize objects can be justified by demonstrating basic properties (eg shapes) of the objects. In these justifications, perceptual justifiers have different contents to the beliefs they justify. I argue that the justifications are not inferential. Subjects are unlikely to have bodies of beliefs adequate to inferentially justify the beliefs they actually form on the strength of their object recognition abilities, especially when recognition depends on stimulus-dependent retrieval of visual memories. Instead, I argue, the justifications exploit a partial awareness that subjects have of states and processes involved in object recognition. As such, they show that subjects have a degree of internal access to the principles of externalistic perceptual warrant, and to the features of perceptual states that give them justificatory force on externalistic accounts. The justifications themselves are evidential, but in order for them to have any justificatory force, they have to be placed in an externalistic framework for perceptual justification. I conclude that this form of justification shows that subjects have a degree of insight into why their perceptual experiences justify their beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The teachings of Jesus consist to a great extent of parables. There is, however, no unanimity on what each parable means or how it should be interpreted. I argue that modern argumentation analysis is the key to understanding the parables and their effect on the reading or listening public. Irrespective of the length of the parable or the imagery used, the aim of each one is to persuade its audience. The parables operate with a common, hidden argumentative structure. By cracking this code, one can assess the meaning and function of the parables in a reliable way. Example texts discussed and analyzed are some crucial parables in Matt. 24–25. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bell and Wang acknowledge in Just Hierarchy that the persuasive power of their arguments is likely to be much higher in Confucian societies. But what exactly do the 'Chinese/Confucian experiences' of the readers, Chinese or Western, deliver in their learning process? I argue that writers rely on their readers' familiarity with and ability to access validating references as well as rationalizing inference licenses to bring the new knowledge to life. Drawing on recent progresses in Western philosophy about language, reasoning, and argumentation, I examine how references and inferences work in this profoundly challenging and uniquely exciting cross-civilizational communication process between China and the West and discuss measures that would advance our epistemological and methodological endeavours in this direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surveillance capability is rapidly advancing. What is being captured is more than just stock footage. Powerful artificial intelligence software that uses facial recognition technology can track details about people and their behaviour patterns. This technology is being used to crack down on people in authoritarian states and to extensively monitor citizens in many democratic states. So far, the regulation over how this technology is to be used has largely been absent, leading to tremendous violations of privacy rights in some cases. The use of this type of technology by the state, specifically the police, could constitute an unconstitutional breach of the reasonable expectation of privacy. Canadian courts have so far held that individuals do not enjoy a right to privacy in any public places. What rights should an individual have over their face and the collection of their information by the state? This paper first examines the collection of biometric identification data as compared to previous biometric identification collection and use. Secondly, this paper examines some of the capabilities and pitfalls of state surveillance. Finally, this paper suggests that as dangerous as state surveillance can be, it should be a staple of effective policing, if there is sufficient oversight. The police should have access to the most modern and efficient technology available to serve the public effectively. However, the dangers of a complete dissolution of privacy necessitate oversight for the police. There must be an independent body to collect and utilize this technology that the police may access through a judicially operated warrant-like system. Effective policing and privacy can coexist and serve the public good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of our beliefs are acquired online. Online epistemic environments are replete with fake news, fake science, fake photographs and videos, and fake people in the form of trolls and social bots. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the threat that such online fakes pose to the acquisition of knowledge. I argue that fakes can interfere with one or more of the truth, belief, and warrant conditions on knowledge. I devote most of my attention to the effects of online fakes on satisfaction of the warrant condition, as these have received comparatively little attention. I consider three accounts of the conditions under which fakes compromise the warrant condition. I argue for the third of these accounts, according to which the propensity of fakes to exist in an environment threatens warrant acquisition in that environment. Finally, I consider some limitations on the epistemic threat of fakes and suggest some strategies by which this threat can be mitigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non‐evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti‐skepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. It argues that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, the paper presents an axiology that helps entitlement theorists to address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti‐skeptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for inquiry. Lastly, the paper argues that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. It explains why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work (such as Cassam Quassim, Keith Harris, and M. Guilia Napolitano), yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers (myself included) like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue that there are features of certain conspiracy theories which license suspicion of such theories. I will also argue that these features only license a limited suspicion of these conspiracy theories, and thus we need to be careful about generalising from such suspicions to a view of the warrant of conspiracy theories more generally. To understand why, we need to get to the bottom of what exactly makes us suspicious of certain conspiracy theories, and how being suspicious of a conspiracy theory does not always tell us anything about how likely the theory in question is to be false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I argue that Hume's naturalistic explanation of religious belief in the Natural History of Religion has significant epistemic consequences. While he argues in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (and in other works) that belief in God is not justified on the basis of testimony or philosophical argument, this is not enough to show that religious belief is not warranted. In the Natural History, Hume provides a genetic explanation for religious belief. I contend that the explanation of religious belief in the Natural History, given Hume's conclusions in his other works, provides grounds to reject religious belief. Thus, I conclude that the Natural History plays an important role in Hume's overall critique of religion insofar as it is a necessary component in Hume's arsenal against the warrant of religious belief.

A prima facie plausible and widely held view in epistemology is that the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of testimonial knowledge are stronger than the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Conservatives about testimony hold that we need prior justification to take speakers to be reliable but recognise that the corresponding claim about perception is practically a non-starter. The problem for conservatives is how to establish theoretically significant differences between testimony and perception that would support asymmetrical epistemic standards. In this paper I defend theoretical symmetry of testimony and perception on the grounds that there are no good reasons for taking these two belief forming methods to have significant theoretical differences. I identify the four central arguments in defence of asymmetry and show that in each case either they fail to establish the difference that they purport to establish or they establish a difference that is not theoretically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to analyze the effect of the announcement of warrant listing on the stock price movement on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The data used in this study is secondary data on companies that warrant listing from 2011 to 2018. The number of samples used is 10 with a purposive sampling technique. The analysis technique used in this study is the study of events, by using ten windows before and after the warrant listing. To prove the hypothesis proposed by conducting a t-statistic test. Based on the results of the analysis it was found that there were significant differences an abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns before and after the announcement date of the warrant listing on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, and it could be indicated that the Indonesia Stock Exchange was called the semi-strong form efficiency.

Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for philosophers and linguists since antiquity. There is no generally accepted semantic analysis. The prevalent view, developed in varying forms by Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, and others, enriches the idea of strict implication by the idea of a "minimal revision" of the actual world. Objections mainly address problems of maximal similarity between worlds. In this paper, I will raise several problems of a different nature and draw attention to several phenomena that are relevant for counterfactuality but rarely discussed in that context. An alternative analysis that is very close to the linguistic facts is proposed. A core notion is the "situation talked about": it makes little sense to discuss whether an assertion is true or false unless it is clear which situation is talked about. In counterfactuals, this situation is marked as not belonging to the actual world. Typically, this is done in the form of the finite verb in the main clause. The if-clause is optional and has only a supportive role: it provides information about the world to which the situation talked about belongs. Counterfactuals only speak about some nonactual world, of which we only know what results from the protasis. In order to judge them as true or false, an additional assumption is required: they are warranted according to the same criteria that warrant the corresponding indicative assertion. Overall similarity between worlds is irrelevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of justifying a generalized theoretical conclusion from a specific empirical analysis continues to elude us. In this article, we suggest that this stems from an incomplete understanding and specification of how arguments are structured. Most importantly, in addition to empirical data, a generalized conclusion hinges on the application of various rules and principles of reasoning that British philosopher Stephen Toulmin labeled warrants. In this article, we apply Toulmin's model of argument structure to empirical management research by examining in particular the roles of four types of warrants: theoretical, inferential, procedural, and contextual. Based on our analysis, we suggest that making warrants and their backings explicit paves the way toward a more comprehensive understanding of how arguments are structured and how claims are justified. Importantly, an examination of warrants reveals that the choices researchers make are not limited to matters such as choosing the research topic or a particular research design, but they also extend to how we produce our claims. If we wish to understand argument structure, we must understand these choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

تتناول هذه الدراسة الاتهام السياسي في سياق المناظرة الرئاسية الأولى لأوباما ورومني 2012. يستغل المشاركون في الخطاب السياسي استراتيجيات براغماتية مختلفة من أجل السيطرة على حجج خصومهم. يتم التعامل مع الاتهام السياسي هنا على أنه عملية وليس نتاجًا لعملية تحليل البيانات قيد الدراسة. إنه سياسي من حيث المبدأ أنه يعالج القضايا السياسية. وبناءً على ذلك ، تحدد هذه الدراسة نفسها مهمة التحقيق في كيفية حدوث الاتهام السياسي في السياق المذكور أعلاه. يهدف ، أولاً ، إلى تحديد البنية البراغماتية للاتهام السياسي ، وثانيًا ، الكشف عن الاستراتيجيات البراغماتية المستخدمة من قبل المرشحين الرئاسيين في البيانات الخاضعة للتدقيق ، وثالثًا ، تتبع ما إذا كانت الاستراتيجيات البراغماتية للمرشح مختلفة أم لا عن الاستراتيجيات البراغماتية للمرشح الآخر. فيما يتعلق بالاتهام السياسي. الفرضيات التي تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى اختبارها هي: أولاً ، يتكون الهيكل البراغماتي للاتهام السياسي من مرحلتين: مرحلة الهجوم ومرحلة الدفاع ، والثانية ، تتحقق كلتا المرحلتين عبر استراتيجيات براغماتية مختلفة ، وثالثاً ، استخدام استراتيجيات براغماتية تختلف من مرشح لآخر. لتحقيق أهداف الدراسة واختبار فرضياتها ، تم تطوير نموذج انتقائي على أساس نماذج أخرى متنوعة تقدمها دراسات أخرى. يستخدم هذا النموذج لتحليل بيانات الدراسة بشكل عملي. إلى جانب ذلك ، يتم إجراء تحليل إحصائي عن طريق معادلة النسبة المئوية لدعم نتائج التحليل البراغماتي كميًا. كشفت تحليلات البيانات قيد الدراسة أن الفرضيات المعتمدة قد تم التحقق منها.

Proper functionalism claims that a belief has epistemic warrant only if it's formed according to the subject's truth-aimed cognitive design plan. The most popular putative counter-examples to proper functionalism all involve agents who form beliefs in seemingly warrant-enabling ways that don't appear to proceed according to any sort of design. The Swampman case is arguably the most famous scenario of this sort. However, some proper functionalists accept that subjects like Swampman have warrant, opting instead to adopt a non-standard account of design. But critics of proper functionalism hold that this strategy comes at a high cost: the design-plan condition now seems explanatorily superfluous. James Taylor construes cases like Swampman as posing a dilemma for the proper functionalist: either deny warrant in these cases and concede that proper functionalism doesn't capture our intuitions, or affirm warrant and undermine the explanatory power of the design-plan condition. Proper functionalists have replied to both horns of this dilemma. Recently, Kenny Boyce and Andrew Moon have argued that warrant-affirming intuitions on cases like Swampman are motivated by a principle that has a clear counter-example. Also, Alvin Plantinga presents a set of cases that supposedly cause problems for any analysis of warrant that lacks a design-plan condition. In this essay, I present a counter-argument to Boyce and Moon's argument, and show that a more robust reliability condition can accommodate Plantinga's problem cases. I conclude that we're left with no good reason to doubt that cases like Swampman raise a troubling dilemma for the proper functionalist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to James K.A. Smith, contemporary epistemology is overly focused on the noetic. Smith offers a counter-epistemology drawn from pentecostal spirituality that is narrative, affective, and embodied. Richard Davis and Paul Franks criticize this model and argue that it succumbs to story-relativism and arbitrariness. This article defends Smith against their critiques through three steps. First, it exposits Smith's narrative, affective epistemology in order to identify areas that are relevant to their critiques. Second, it outlines and analyzes their critiques, reveals areas in which they fundamentally misunderstand Smith, and presents their commitment to epistemological objectivism. Finally, utilizing Alvin Plantinga's externalist warrant model, it argues that Plantinga's Reformed epistemology can assist Smith's epistemology in consistent ways. If the following argument is successful, then Smith's postmodern pentecostal epistemology can be reimagined as an externalist epistemology that overcomes the charges of relativism and arbitrariness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dynamic development that modern corporate relations are facing with a constant trend of internationalization of the investment undertakings followed up by a time extension of completion of the obligations have led to the rapid growth of the popularity and the meaning of the bank guarantee as a mean of security. The mass usage of the bank guarantees in domestic and international legal transactions opens the question of whether the domestic laws can adequately answer the needs of the business sector or the development and usage of the bank guarantee will be determined by the autonomic business practice. The author of this paper through a normative analysis of the legal regulation of the bank guarantee in the domestic legal system will give adequate critics regarding the applicability of the domestic laws vis a vis the real needs of the business practice. The growing diversification of the types of the bank guarantee with the related institutes for providing a bank guarantee as well as the fact that this institute is a regular accessory to every serious financial undertaking demand the author to analyze the comparative and international sources of the law that are related to the bank guarantee as a method of securing the claims. Therefore, the author of this paper will make a short analysis of the comparative solutions in the legal systems close to the Macedonian legal system as well as on the Model Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give rise to successful counterexamples to the immunity of the target class of self-ascriptions. In the second part of the paper I turn to defend a Metasemantic Explanation of why the immunity thesis holds. The Metasemantic Explanation rests on a reference-fixing story about the mental 'I' whose key contention is that introspective impressions play an essential role in fixing its reference. It is part of my argument in favour of the proposed reference-fixing story, as well as of the Metasemantic Explanation, that they respect the paradigmatic features of self-ascriptions of inserted thoughts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to point to the shaky status of the agreement on deductions from salaries and other incomes that the instrument experienced as a result of recodification of the Czech private law and labour law, without any substantive changes in the legal status of the agreement on deductions from salaries in the enforcement proceedings. The author argues with standard interpretation methods to preserve the exceptional nature of the agreement on deductions from salaries and other incomes from the point of view of the enforcement law in the Czech Republic.

Alvin Plantinga is a well-known defender of Reformed epistemology. The main thesis of the Reformed epistemology argues that faith in God is rational and justified without the aid of arguments or evidence. In this paper, we intend to describe Alvin Plantinga's perspective, more precisely, the A / C model (Aquinas / Calvin) proposed by him, in which faith in God is innate and does not need arguments or evidence, and then to analyze the objections on this model, in order to determine whether faith in God can be considered basic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience (or testimony, or memory) enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are indeed basic beliefs with default entitlement status, typically the kind of default entitlement they possess is primarily a matter of the evidential support that accrues to them, both synchronically and diachronically, from wider mental states beyond the specific sensory-perceptual experiences (or memory experiences, or testimonial experiences, etc.) that spawn them. We will call this status evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement—as distinct from entitlement as commonly understood in the literature, which we will call evidentially insular. Epistemic entitlement normally is characterized in the manner set forth in the first paragraph above, viz., as a form of default epistemic warrant that a given belief possesses independently of any other beliefs. We suggest that not all evidential support is managed at the level of belief. Thus, leaves room for the possibility of an epistemically embedded kind of entitlement. Here we develop the needed conception of entitlement drawing on Henderson and Horgan's ideas of a kind of "iceberg epistemology." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When disagreements arise about the quality of arguments, arguers frequently rely on coherence. Argumentative coherence is mainly manifested in accusations of incoherence and in the production of analogies. With the help of the elements of warrant and of rebuttals in Toulmin's model, it is possible to give a first analysis of this notion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this research is to analyze the discrepancies of textual laws of arrest in Bangladesh which substantially differ from the actual application. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 is the key piece of law currently in place in Bangladesh allowing police to arrest anyone who breaches the existing laws of the state. Generally, the police can arrest a person who has been given an arrest warrant by the competent court. But section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the police to arrest a person without a warrant of arrest. It is the exception to the arrest rule. However, police are alleged to abuse this section in various ways by using the section's ambiguous wording. Bangladesh's constitution granted certain fundamental rights that must be upheld in every way. Having regard to the Bangladesh Constitution, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued some guidelines as a form of directives that a police officer requires to follow at the time of the arrest. Although the good laws are in place to function, the realistic or actual implementation of these laws is still in question. Therefore, there is a significant difference existing between the laws in books and the laws in action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We begin by arguing that the continuing dominance of 'evidence‐based' thinking in educational policymaking does serious harm to the notion of evidence itself; also that it brings a loss of coherence to education as a practice that might wish to be regarded as a coherent and research‐informed one. The second section of the article suggests that the invidious consequences of 'evidence‐based' thinking are likely to continue unless energetically challenged by a vibrant and robust understanding of education as a practice in its own right. In elucidating such an understanding, we investigate closely the notions of practice and practitioner, and their intrinsic connections, drawing on landmark researches on practice by authors like Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph Dunne. Building on the understanding of education as a practice in its own right, the third section argues that the Dewey‐inspired notion of justified warrant, rather than proof or replicability, is more appropriate to research claims made in education. Here we focus in particular on action research, which has experienced recurring difficulties in having its research credentials recognised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]