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The purpose is to study Ukrainian-Polish relations in the context of the international situation, to trace the development of relations between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Polish Republic from their inception at the end of 1918 to the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, to determine its essence and assessments by the figures of that time, and to analyze the impact on the further development of interstate relations. The methodological basis is the principles of historicism, scientific, problem-chronological, and historical-systemic. The scientific novelty lies in the systematic and detailed coverage of events, processes, and phenomena in Ukrainian-Polish relations from the establishment of consular offices in both countries to the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent breakdown of cooperation after the signing of the Riga Treaty in 1921. The author comprehensively analyzes the diplomatic and military-political aspects of these events, which allows for a deeper understanding of their impact on the further development of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Th e main results. The author analyzes the stages of the formation of interstate relations, identifies the main goals and objectives of establishing diplomatic cooperation for Poland and the UPR, as well as their leaders, J. Piłsudski and S. Petliura, finds out the reasons for the complication of political dialogue between the two states, reveals the main points of negotiations on the way to the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, and investigates the reasons for its non-realization. Conclusions. The establishment and development of Ukrainian-Polish relations were determined by the final acts of the World War I. Poland declared state independence, and Ukraine restored the republican form of government. The former gained favor with the victorious Entente powers, while the latter tried to get rid of the odium of a satellite of the Quadruple Alliance. The realization by the leaders of both republics of the danger posed by Bolshevik Russia became a consolidating factor on the path to mutual understanding. The goals pursued by both states were significantly different. For S. Petliura, the western neighbor was not only a political but also a military ally, while for J. Piłsudski, the existence of an independent but Polish-oriented state in the east was vital to avoid having a common border with Russia. The situation was complicated by the formation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian-Polish war in Eastern Halychyna, and the existence of the Volyn Front. The unsuccessful course of Ukrainian military operations against the Bolsheviks in the first half of 1919 contributed to Ukraine's rapprochement with Poland. In turn, by signing an agreement with the UPR, Warsaw officially tried to get the UPR to give up its claims to Eastern Halychyna. Th e culmination of the Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic dialogue was the forced conclusion of the Warsaw Pact. However, the joint military campaign against Kyiv not only failed but also inspired a successful Red Army offensive in the western direction, causing considerable concern not only among the Polish government but also among the leaders of European states. The Riga Treaty concluded in 1921 between Poland and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic / Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, effectively amounted to the denunciation of the Warsaw Pact and dashed hopes for the independence and unity of Ukraine for many years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article shows the role and influence of the socio-political activities of Pope John Paul II on the socio-political processes in Poland, which led to the fall of the socialist system in Europe. The article provides answers to the following questions: How did John Paul II, based on his personal political beliefs, use the influence of the religious factor of the head of the Roman Catholic Church on socio-political processes in Poland? What was his role in changing the constitutional order in the Polish People's Republic? How did the change of the socio-political system in Poland affect the collapse of the socialist camp in Europe? Was there a relationship between the socio-political activities of John Paul II and the processes of "perestroika" in the Soviet Union? The answers to these questions will make it possible to understand the origins of socio-political changes in Eastern European states, primarily in Poland, and the USSR in the late 1970s and early 1990s.

Albania’s inclusion in the Warsaw Treaty was a key moment in Albania’s international relations after the Second World War. Joining this treaty “cemented” Albania’s ties to the communist bloc and its Eastward orientation. During the Cold War, this membership reflected the Albanian communist government's particular political, military, and social orientation. Albania’s relations with the Warsaw Pact should be seen as satellite relations conducted through the Soviet Union. This study investigates an event that has already been studied by several Cold War researchers, exposing the dissenting ambitions within this coalition, particularly focusing on Romania’s efforts to build bridges of cooperation with Albania in 1965 with the assistance of communist China and in opposition to Moscow. The subject is not new to Romanian studies of the Warsaw Pact. The examination of documents from Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive on how the Albanian communist leadership saw this event at the time, on the other hand, is innovative. The comparative approach, which paired data from the archives of former Warsaw Pact members, revealed that attempts to create fluid alliances amongst them were in embryo but did not threaten their vassalage to Moscow. Likewise, contrary to the perception of communist regimes, Cold War scholars have recently classified Albania and Romania as allies without any strategic weight within the Pact, debunking the myths of communist historiography with nationalist undertones in both countries.

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During the Cold War, information in Western open sources about Bulgarian Land Forces’ war plans, organisation, and order of battle was absent or very general, until the last years of the 1980s. Yet there is much more information now available after 30 years, and this is a very valid topic for research. Bulgaria was drawn into Soviet war planning for the elimination of capitalism. Bulgaria’s planned part in this was helping to seize the Turkish Straits, either with or without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It now appears that there would have been two Fronts advancing in this area, one predominantly Soviet Odessa Military District forces to seize the Turkish Straits, and the other more heavily Bulgarian in composition attacking towards central Greece. Both would have been supported by tactical air forces and, if the circumstances dictated, nuclear weapons. Later, with the commitment of strategic reserves, it was hoped to develop the offensive in depth towards the Syrian border. The forces formed to carry this mission out were reorganized repeatedly from 1945-55, as the Communist Party tightened its control over the country. The organisation of the Land Forces was much more settled after the early 1960s. Bulgarian history will be better served by more open debate over these issues.

Copyright of Codrul Cosminului is the property of Codrul Cosminului and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Warsaw Pact (UW) was an instrument of the Soviet Union’s military influence on the so-called Eastern Bloc during the confrontation of the East with the West. The purpose of this article is to present the activity of the Polish Armed Forces in the composition of the United Forces of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s (in the final period of its operation). The most important fact was the lack of operational independence of Poland, which was limited by the Soviet Union. Due to the changing political and economic situation, the Polish authorities saw no point in further participation in the “Allied” organization, which was dissolved on July 1, 1991. The most complete study on the subject is a publication by J. Pałka (2022) which presents the operational participation of the Polish Army in the Warsaw Pact based on the archival sources of the Central Archives of the Military Historical Bureau. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes and compares the impact of the 1968 Prague Spring on military and strategic thinking in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A great change in the Czechoslovakian military caused Memorandum 68, a proposal of domestic military doctrine which consistently took into account the vital security interests of Czechoslovakia in international relations at that time. The document was mainly based on the inviolability of Czechoslovak territory and the right of its nations to defend their own existence regardless of the superpower interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time Yugoslavia began to develop its own doctrine of the General People's Defence and Social Self-Protection, which emphasized its total nature, creating the reality of the concept of a "nation in arms," which attached great importance to soldiers and the art of soldiering in Y ugoslavia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War the “Gorizia Gap” was one of the keys to the defence of Western Europe against a hypothetical invasion by the Warsaw Pact. Taking this emblematic place as a starting point, this essay investigates the problems connected with the defence of the eastern Italian border in the first post-WW2 decade. The analysis starts at the end of 1945 and follows the evolution of the defence plans drawn up by the Anglo-American allies, the Italians and Nato to face first a localised Yugoslav aggression, and then a large-scale Soviet attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, the Soviet military carried out an ambitious mapping programme, which resulted in a global series of topographic maps. Although recent advances in scholarship have increased our knowledge of the production of these maps, we still know little about the organization behind them. Based on information from a set of 466 1:50 000-scale Soviet military topographic maps of Denmark, this article examines the Soviet mapping practices related to the large-scale mapping of Denmark. Results show that the Soviet military compiled large-scale topographic maps of Denmark between the 1950s and the 1980s. The maps were initially based on Danish maps, but later the Soviets began to prefer remote-sensed data from satellite imagery. This allowed the Soviets to capture information about concealed military infrastructure. The article also shows the potential for using information from the map sheets in a transnational analysis of the Soviet mapping during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contains a brief retrospective assessment of the reasons given by various scholars and observers for the breakdown of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership and it situates that crisis in the larger context of history and the imperial legacy of the Russian state. It particularly looks at the issue of nationality as an ethnic, cultural and linguistic concept vis-a-vis the universalistic notion of empire as a community of destiny among diverse people. The author compares the Soviet Union’s structure as a ‘non classical’ empire to those of other European states and especially to Germany’s which has also evolved from being a loose Central and East European ‘Reich’ inspired by the Roman and Carolingian heritage – to becoming a federal nation surrounded by smaller countries that share with it ancient civilisational and political legacy. Whereas Germany is gradually asserting leadership among many of its former dependencies and in the post-Brexit European Union as a whole, Russia is led by geographical and strategic compulsions to rebuild a Eurasian confederal association with erstwhile Soviet Republics and possessions of the Tsarist Empire, in conformity with its location between the ‘West’, the Islamosphere and the Chinese world. Will Russia be able to create a synthesis between the Slav Orthodox Oikoumene envisioned by Nikolay Danilevsky and the Eurasian syncretistic model promoted by Lev Gumilyov?

The article describes the organizational changes and modernization of the operational troops of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic in the first 15 years of the existence of the Warsaw Pact. In the structure of the Polish Army, the aforementioned troops constituted the most important component intended for military operations at the operational level as part of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. During the war, the operational troops were to create a higher operational union (the Polish Front), which was to include three Land Force Armies, the Air Force Army and operational forces of the Navy. The units of the first throw were constantly in combat readiness, thanks to which they could start combat operations almost immediately, in accordance with the operational plans of the Warsaw Pact Command. The changing and growing requirements of the battlefield forced the command of the Polish Army to modernize the structure and equipment of opera-tional troops. These issues are described based on literature and archival documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term cooperation in reference to its Polish-Soviet dimension has few adherents today. The dominant terminology emphasizes our across-the-board dependence on the eastern "partner"; many of those people write and speak of "Soviet occupation". I think it is a consequence of a certain historical policy, which, on the one hand, aims at obliterating the real image of the People's Republic of Poland in the memory of contemporary generations, and, on the other hand, takes recourse to a quite common opinion about the hostility of the USSR (also of the Russian Federation) in order to shape anti-Soviet and anti-Russian attitudes of Poles. The political and military reality of the years 1945-1989 was more complex, also in the area of the Polish-Soviet naval cooperation, and hence I intend to reflect on it in order to deepen its understanding beyond the known and oft-repeated political clichés. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Espionage driven acquisition of Western technology played a key role in the development of computer science and technology for Warsaw Pact services during the Cold War period. US, UK, and other Allied nations, recognized this new field was inextricably linked at its creation to cryptography, navigation, weapons guidance, and a host of other military and dual-use applications. As a result, the Free World powers imposed export control restrictions that were intended to embargo the transfer of equipment and knowledge, in order to preserve hard-won advantage that recent wartime experience had taught could be fleeting under the intense pressures of innovation and adaption in combat. Despite such controls, Soviet foreign intelligence services provided critical early access that led to duplication of systems that were to some degree comparable in purpose and quality from the outset, and loomed larger still in the long shadow of intended future R&D pathways. Western intelligence services were not blind to this behavior; through unique collection approaches and sustained analytic efforts, they sought to track the state of Soviet computing and its role in strategic, military, and economic applications. This effort was effectively the dawn of the cyber intelligence mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The timeliness of the article lies in describing historical and political specifications of Eastern Europe formatting at time of communism regimes taking into consideration the role of the USSR in political sphere of East European countries. The methodological base of the paper consists in historisism and objectivism principles that allow considering the facts in their historical and spatial relationships. The analysis of integration processes in Eastern Europe in 20th century is combined with the attempt to define a space, that is considered to be the novelty of the paper. The conclusion proves the timeliness defining the USSR effection in the region in 20th century and concentration of East European countries in soviet communism ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the study is to show how diplomats and military representatives of the Western countries evaluated the course of the Polish-Bolshevik War of the 1920 at the moment of the events and during the post-war period, to find out whether the reports of direct observers and participants of the events in Poland in 1920 influenced the policies of the western governments with regard to the Polish state, to depict the general image of Poland and the Poles of this period on the basis of the analyzed sources, as well as the mood of the Polish society, all of which were in a momentary transition from a state of anxiety and indifference to fear of a Bolshevik counteroffensive. The methodology of the research is based on the method of philological analysis of the studied texts, as well as the comparative method. The scientific novelty of the article is that the Polish-Bolshevik War of the 1920 was first analyzed on the basis of memoirs, personal notes, reports, letters from Western participants and observers. Conclusions. Western observers of the events of the Polish-Bolshevik War of the 1920 critically evaluated the decisions and actions of the Polish authorities during this period, both in political and military matters. They mainly drew attention to the widespread chaos and political controversy, as well as to mistakes in commanding the Polish forces. However, in the majority of cases, they expected their governments to give Poland much more support in the fight against the Bolsheviks. While being there in Warsaw, they understood its meaning much better than politicians from London or Paris. Their military reports there were dominated by a pessimistic assessment of the possibility of protecting Warsaw against the Bolshevik invasion, the belief that the Polish capital would be inevitably seized by the Bolsheviks, and considered the possibility of transferring the residence of the authorities to another city. At the same time, all reports emphasized the great patriotic disruption of the Poles and their calm in the face of the threat. In the analyzed texts the figure of J.Piłsudski is very often mentioned. On the one hand, it emphasizes his greatness in comparison with other Polish leaders, but on the other hand it does not criticize his traits or lack of military knowledge. Notably interesting are the observations on J.Piłsudski's complex relations with Western countries. The authors of the analyzed reports draw their attention to the significant decrease of J.Piłsudski's popularity among the Polish society at the time of the deterioration of the situation at the front. In most of the analyzed texts, J. Piłsudski's role in the victory over the Bolsheviks near Warsaw is minimized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Warsaw Pact was created in 1955 and for almost 40 years it played an important role in maintaining international security. Poland, due to its military and economic potential, was the second-largest member of this alliance. For this reason, it sought to ensure a real impact on its functioning, which was reflected in its active participation in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the political, military and economic levels. Poland's political activity was expressed in numerous initiatives to ensure peace and in active par-ticipation in international cooperation. Military commitments were implemented through the preparation of modern operational troops, from which a strategic and operational union was created in the form of a Maritime Front, ready to act as part of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact throughout the period of membership in this alliance. In turn, economic cooperation was manifested in close cooperation in the production of various weapon systems and military equipment, as well as the development of defence infrastructure for both its own needs and allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attempts of the Romanian leadership to put on the first plan their view about vital matters for the Soviet Union (economic cooperation between CMEA members, Sino- Soviet split, arms race, disarmament, abolition of military blocs) trigger a negative attitude on the part of the Soviets. As a result, Romania became in Moscow's eyes a dissident who constantly tried to ignore many of the Warsaw Pact rules. Yuri V. Andropov, who became on 12 November 1982 General Secretary of CC of the CPSU after the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev, strongly believe that any dissent is a danger for the monolithic unity of the socialist bloc and might be rooted out immediately. This was the main reason for Andropov's distant and unfriendly attitude towards Romanians communist leadership, which increased when he was elected General Secretary of CC of the CPSU. In this short period (1982-1984), Andropov met tête-à-tête with Nicolae Ceauşescu twice, on 21 December 1982 and on 4 January 1983. Romanian archives don't preserve the records for this meeting, but we have found the Soviet records in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) in the Fond Yuri V. Andropov. We are publishing a Romanian translation of these two documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hileya: Scientific Bulletin / Gileya is the property of GILEYA Publishing and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper deals with one of the most significant issue of the Cold War, – the plan “Dropshot”. The article analyzes the content and history of the creation and adoption of the US national war plan “Dropshoot”, as well as how it was reflected in Soviet and contemporary Russian researches. It is determined that both in the USSR and in modern Russia, the same theses (developed in the works of several Soviet researchers) are applied to “Dropshot” plan. Obviously, this is done in the interests of propaganda and justification of specific political interests, that have not changed in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. One of the more fascinating aspects of the plan that its target was Soviet (Russian) society which are very sensible concerning “belligerent the USA and the West phobia”. The article is built on comparative analysis of the key documents which are reviewed and evaluated in the context of Russian and US approaches concerning the issue. It also explores the ways of fulfillment of the plan as they were imagined in the USSR. After a detailed comparison of these Russian theses with the contents of the “Dropshoot” plan and an analysis of the events, in the context of which the plan was elaborated, a conclusion is drawn about their inconsistency. Both in the USSR and in Russia, the data on the decision to create mass armies for rapid offensive operations in Europe, adopted in early January 1951 in Moscow with the direct involvement of Stalin, remain secret. Instead, the “Dropshot” plan planned military operations against the USSR and its allies after their conquest of continental Europe. We prove here that the plan was mostly defensive and its offensive features were invented by Soviet propaganda. The Pentagon did not possess enough nuclear bombs to make it a reality and such called “preventive war” against the USSR was not possible. The only Soviet strategists and Stalin personally had strategic views to expand Soviet influence in Europe by all means.

From the beginning of 1960s, an occupation of Denmark was a theme in the Warsaw Pact military exercises and manoeuvres in the so-called Cold War. This is connected to a struggle for a maritime offensive strategy, as well inside the USSR as internal among Soviet allies with the aim of securing the fleets of the Warsaw Pact access to the North Sea and the Atlantic in case of war with NATO members. In the GDR and Poland these plans were very important in the national military strategies. However, the Soviet navy also played an important role in abovementioned maritime strategy. But was it really so great in different occupation plans of Denmark? Or was it first and foremost a local strategy of the Warsaw Pact countries in the western part of the Baltic Sea area? The article provides answers to these questions. There is also given a description of the strategic importance of Denmark in the Baltic Sea, and its influence on the Danish foreign politics in decades.

The system of secrecy of documents of operative-strategic planning which worked in the armed forces of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War the author analyzes based on his experience with archival documents. On the basis of the author’s experience with work with archival documents, this article analyzes the systems of classification of operational and strategic planning documents of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. A comparison of documents’ classification levels and works of the regime-secret (classification) bodies is made. It is determined which secrecy classification levels and additional code words were used for different documents depending on the nature of the information contained in them: nuclear planning, mobilization planning, operational plans at the theaters of war. After a detailed comparison, it is concluded that despite the widespread view of extraordinary secrecy in the USSR, in fact, the US regime-secret system was more advanced, demanding and rigid. The Soviet system included three levels of document secrecy. In addition, the US system had additional restrictions due to acronyms listing a narrow range of document users. The aim of the article is to investigate documents that reveal the preparation for war in Europe during the Cold War.

The Cold War versions – 'AirLand Battle', 'AirLand Battle 2000', and 'Follow-On Forces Attack' – of the 'Deep Battle' concepts developed by Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, caused the flare-up of rare criticism within the community of defence experts and, in particular, friction between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army and, on a broader spectrum, between the USA and its European allies. Thanks to recently declassified documents, we can now also add the CIA to the chorus of critical voices; the CIA's scepticism provoked serious disagreements with General Rogers, the then Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The likely inadequacies of the various forms of Deep Battle for fighting the Soviet threat, along with the total or partial absence of external factors that normally drive the changing of military doctrines, suggest the existence of more prosaic, parochial reasons for their ideation and adoption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beginning of the third millennium was marked by the desire of the leader countries (USA, China, and Russia) to geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic redistribution of spheres of influence. The collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the end of the Cold War did not bring the world closer to stability and security. Military force capabilities continue to be considered as one of the most powerful factors in world politics. Proof of this is the intensification of the struggle of the world›s superpowers for regional and global leadership, control over oil, gas and energy flows. It is worth mentioning the Transnistrian conflict, Russia-Led wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the civil war in Syria, the intensification of Islamic extremism within the ISIS, Russia›s annexation of Crimea, the hybrid war unleashed and continues to wage by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. In this connection, it is becoming increasingly important to provide corresponding levels for the defense budget funding. Thus, the study of the peculiarities of defense financing in Ukraine and powerful military superpowers is of considerable scientific, practical and political interest. Comparing the defense expenditures of different countries makes it possible to identify key problem issues in the defense financing of Ukraine and bring the corresponding costs to international standards. This indicator is one of the most important criteria that characterize the state›s desire for development, relevant combat readiness of the armed forces and other military forces in the face of new challenges. The last years of the previous century were characterized by global geopolitical changes and growing contradictions, which resulted in: the transformation of the bipolar model (USA - USSR) into a multipolar (powerful military superpowers - the USA, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, France, Japan, Germany, India, Brazil)); globalization of world economic processes; erosion through «hybrid wars», which are a new kind of global confrontation in today›s destabilized international security environment, the facets of the division between war and peace. The availability of weapons of mass destruction and high-precision weapons in the third millennium, the growth of their capacity, the complexity of military equipment and combat assets, the use of new methods and means of warfare have led to significant changes in the functions and tasks of the armed forces, increasing their number and government spending on defense purposes. Today there are about 200 armies in the world with a total number of 24-25 million people (about 0.4% of the world›s population) (Military..., 2002). The state of the troops of any state must correspond to its economic capabilities and at the same time ensure the implementation of national security tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]