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The rise of populism has reignited scholarly interest in the paradox of societal advancement leading to frustration and social tension. Globalization and digitalization have increased social opportunities for parts of the population, but a substantial portion of society feels disadvantaged, resulting in discontent. This study, rooted in Boudon's model of relative deprivation, examines the mechanisms that fuel this frustration. We conducted an online experiment involving 2114 US-based MTurk participants, in which we manipulated the availability of status positions to create varying degrees of upward social mobility. We also varied group sizes to ensure robustness. We assessed relative deprivation with structural, subjective, and behavioral measures. For example, frustration was measured using the "joy-of-destruction game," in which subjects had to make the costly decision to destroy part of another player's winnings. Contrary to the model's prediction, we found that the proportion of individuals who were worse off, the losers, decreased consistently as mobility increased. This outcome can be attributed to overentry in conditions of low mobility and underentry in conditions of intermediate or high mobility. The losers displayed increased frustration and hostility towards noncompetitors and winners. Intriguingly, winners also exhibited heightened hostility. However, at the aggregate level, hostile behavior did not surge as conditions improved. In our exploratory analyses at the individual level, we identified several distinct patterns. Risk-tolerant individuals and women were more likely to enter competition. Conversely, those with advanced education levels showed a decreased inclination to competitiveness. Risk-tolerant individuals reported greater feelings of frustration and displayed increased hostility. This effect was also observed particularly among politically right-leaning individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experiments as Code (ExaC) is a concept for reproducible, auditable, debuggable, reusable, & scalable experiments. Experiments are a crucial tool to understand Human-Building Interactions (HBI) and build a coherent theory around it. However, a common concern for experiments is their auditability and reproducibility. Experiments are usually designed, provisioned, managed, and analyzed by diverse teams of specialists (e.g., researchers, technicians, engineers) and may require many resources (e.g., cloud infrastructure, specialized equipment). Although researchers strive to document experiments accurately, this process is often lacking. Consequently, it is difficult to reproduce these experiments. Moreover, when it is necessary to create a similar experiment, the "wheel is very often reinvented". It appears easier to start from scratch than trying to reuse existing work. Thus valuable embedded best practices and previous experiences are lost. In behavioral studies, such as in HBI, this has contributed to the reproducibility crisis. To tackle these challenges, we propose the ExaC paradigm, which not only documents the whole experiment, but additionally provides the automation code to provision, deploy, manage, and analyze the experiment. To this end, we define the ExaC concept, provide a taxonomy for the components of a practical implementation, and provide a proof of concept with an HBI desktop VR experiment that demonstrates the benefits of its "as code" representation, that is, reproducibility, auditability, debuggability, reusability, & scalability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]