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The paper uses examples of environmental cooperation between American states to examine assumptions about the necessary conditions for and barriers to effective cooperation. The limited success of interstate compacts to control water pollution raises questions about liberal and neorealist explanations of cooperation. First, although interstate compacts are enforceable, having the status of federal law, few compacts had binding provisions and few made use of this enforcement capacity. States appear to be at least as wary of binding themselves, as they are fearful of defection by others. Second, effective action appears to have been inhibited by concerns about distribution of benefits and potential implications for competitiveness. This suggests that the obstacles posed by distributional issues are not reducible to security-based fears about relative gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions will governments permit the collection and dissemination of performance data that permits benchmarking and international scrutiny? Constructivist IR theorists argue that monitoring has an impact on state behaviour, independently ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their controversial book, The Limits of International Law, Goldsmith and Posner claim that customary international law merely codifies behavior that results from states’ pursuit of self-interest. Thus, they claim international law does not constrain st ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ten years ago, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was adopted, as a concession to American activists concerned about the environmental impacts of NAFTA. Activists feared Mexico would become a North American pollution haven because its standards were perceived to be lower and/or less strenuously enforced. There was also a concern that all parties might weaken their environmental standards, to prevent capital flight, to attract new investment or to reduce costs for exporters. Activists wanted guarantees that the NAFTA signatories would not weaken their environmental laws and regulations. What they got was a commitment by the parties to enforce the laws already on their books.The Citizen Submission on Enforcement Matters (CSEM) mechanism is intended to remedy the deficit in public participation and transparency in trade and economic integration. The CSEM allows individuals and NGOs to bring complaints of persistent failure to enforce national legislation to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation for investigation. To the extent the CSEM has any power, it is through sunshine enforcement, by exposing the actions of national governments.This paper will argue that, in practice, the CSEM has come to be used in ways quite different from what was originally envisioned. The impetus for the CSEM would predict many cases being brought by American NGOs, against Mexico. However, the largest category of cases involve Canadian or Mexican NGOs and individuals bringing cases against their own governments, with very few instances of involvement by American ENGOs. This presents a paradox: why would national NGOs turn to a relatively weak international panel to raise environmental issues against their national governments? In theory, national governments are more transparent and directly accountable than the CSEM. Without a doubt, national institutions such as the courts are far more authoritative than the CSEM, which will, at most, investigate a case and present findings. The paper will test two hypotheses on the use of the CSEM: domestic civil society and transnational civil society hypotheses. The former claims that local and national environmental groups use the CSEM as an accountability tool against their own national governments, because of a lack of access to or the unresponsiveness of national political institutions.The transnational civil society hypothesis claims that cases are brought to CSEM by transnational NGOs (or coalitions), in order to name and shame national governments before an international audience. A transnational civil society is emerging and legitimacy is becoming an international, not national, construct. NGOs use the CSEM because shaming is more effective before a larger international audience. The paper will contribute to the broader literature on the motives for legalization in international affairs and also the impacts of greater transparency and public participation in global governance. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]