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Forests play an essential role in climate change mitigation by absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing carbon in biomass. Carbon sequestration can be increased by the extension of rotation cycles in existing plantation forests. This study examines the cost‐effectiveness of the remuneration scheme employed by Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), a commonly used carbon accounting method based on the average amount of carbon stored in the forest. We compare the net present value of carbon remuneration under VCS with that of a scheme that remunerates actual carbon storage in each year which we call "current carbon accounting." We use data for an Acacia mangium plantation in Indonesia where the forestry sector is expected to contribute more than half of the reductions of carbon emissions according to Indonesia's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. For our baseline scenario, we find, first, that the payments needed to incentivise additional carbon storage under VCS are considerably higher than under current carbon accounting. Second, the inefficiency is more pronounced at lower discount rates. Third, recent prices reported for VCS forest credits are not sufficient to incentivise forest managers to lengthen the forest rotation in Indonesian plantation forests. Recommendations for Resource Managers: Older forests store more carbon. Using a multiple rotations model our study determines how carbon payments incentivise forest managers to lengthen the forest rotation and, hence, to sequester and store more carbon. Forest managers should consider carbon remuneration options in their forest management decisions, in particular when choosing the length of the rotation period.Optimal forest management is impacted by the design of the remuneration scheme. It matters in particular whether carbon sequestration or carbon storage is paid for.Fund managers can incentivise larger amounts of carbon storage through careful design of the carbon remuneration scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.2010.01300.x Byline: Silke Gabbert (1), Hans-Peter Weikard (1) Keywords: Risk management of chemicals; toxicity testing; prioritization for testing; decision analysis; Value-of-Information analysis; European chemicals policy Abstract: Abstract Risk management of chemicals requires information about their adverse effects such as toxicity and persistence, for example. Testing of chemicals allows for improving the information base for regulatory decision-making on chemicals' production and use. Testing a large number of chemicals with limited time and resources forces a prioritization of chemicals. This paper proposes a decision model that provides a ranking of chemicals according to 'urgency to test'. The model adopts a value-of-information approach describing the expected welfare gains from regulatory actions that respond to test information. We determine the value-of-information of tests revealing chemicals' levels of toxicity and persistence. We compare our findings to the prioritization of chemicals in the new European Chemicals Regulation 'REACH', where several tens of thousands of chemicals are to be tested in order to fill existing information gaps and to implement more effective risk management. We find that the main lines of chemicals' prioritization under REACH receive backing from our decision model. However, prioritization for testing can be further improved by accounting for testing costs and the sensitivity of regulatory action with respect to the test information. Author Affiliation: (1)Wageningen University Social Sciences Department, Wageningen, Netherlands Article note: Silke Gabbert and Hans-Peter Weikard are at Wageningen University Social Sciences Department, Wageningen, Netherlands. Email: hans-peter.weikard@wur.nl.

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02111.x Byline: HANS-PETER WEIKARD (1) Abstract: In this paper I analyse the stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and externalities. I introduce a class of sharing rules for coalition pay-offs, called 'optimal sharing rules', that stabilize all cartels that are possibly stable under some arbitrary sharing rule. To illustrate the impact of optimal sharing with heterogeneous players and positive externalities I analyse a public goods game. In contrast to games with identical players that are common in the study of international environmental agreements, my results show that large coalitions may well be stable when optimal sharing is applied. Author Affiliation: (1)Wageningen University

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2005.04.023 Byline: Rolf Groeneveld (a)(b), Hans-Peter Weikard (a) Abstract: This paper presents a spatially explicit bioeconomic analysis of species conservation in agricultural areas. Wild species in fragmented agricultural landscapes are best approached as metapopulations consisting of a finite number of local populations. Economic analysis of species conservation in fragmented habitat needs to deal with metapopulation theory and its theoretical implications. This paper presents a spatially explicit bioeconomic model consisting of a straightforward economic land use model and an applied metapopulation model. This paper demonstrates that multiple equilibria and multiple local optima in metapopulations might lead to nonconvexities in the production possibilities set of agricultural profits and species conservation. Author Affiliation: (a) Wageningen University, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Hollandseweg 1, NL-6706 KN, Wageningen, the Netherlands. (b) Present address: Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), p/a Droevendaalsesteeg 3, NL-6700 AA, Wageningen, the Netherlands. Article History: Received 29 January 2004; Revised 7 March 2005; Accepted 14 April 2005