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C. Distribution of Material Goods to the Public 1. Distribution of Material Goods to the Public The decision concerning the authority of the Committee for the National List of Reimbursed [...]

As conservatives have come to dominate the U.S. Supreme Court, originalist interpretation methods will determine constitutional disputes. While the Court rejects the use of comparative constitutional law to interpret the Constitution, even its conservative members accept the legitimacy of resorting to British sources, if the language of the Constitution was derived from the U.K. This practice of reliance on British precedents seems natural yet perplexing. It is natural because the U.S. seceded from the U.K. It is perplexing because the U.S. constitutional revolution stands for rejection of the British model of parliamentary sovereignty. This Article intends to redefine the relationship between the U.S. and U.K. constitutional models. While the literature perceives the two as polar-opposites, I suggest that there is, in fact, a common Anglo-American constitutional model, which has been informing the United States' character since its founding. It is not that we misunderstood the American model of popular sovereignty and constitutional supremacy. Rather, we did not realize that parallel developments were taking place in the U.K. The political actors on both sides of the pond were aware of this reality, but the jurisprudence missed it. Shifting the paradigm and accepting the existence of this common model will enable us to grapple with the most burning current dilemmas of our time on both sides of the Atlantic. It lends new legitimacy to examining British sources to better understand American constitutional law, even if the textual provision per se is not attributable to the U.K. We may now study how the common model intended the dynamics between the different constitutional actors to play out. While the U.S. felt powerless to deal with a President who has treated constitutional norms with little to no respect, the Article reveals how the model designated enforcement mechanisms for constitutional norms and conventions, including court packing and judicial review. British debates on reforming an obstructionist second chamber resonate with current American discourse on reforming the U.S. Supreme Court and the Senate. Both American institutions were modeled after the House of Lords. The Article develops the two types of court packing justified in the U.S. under the common model to remedy breach of constitutional norms. It further discusses the inevitability of filibuster reform. Similarly, while Brexit is incomprehensible in a parliamentary sovereignty system, Parliament's reluctant adherence to the 2016 "consultative" referendum's results is a natural outgrowth of the common Anglo-American rule of the people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on highly controversial appointment process to the U.S. Supreme Court during the 2020 presidential election season, scholars caution against the wisdom and utility of resorting to courtpacking. It mentions American Civil War did the Senate confirm a Supreme Court Justice in a presidential election year without bipartisan support. It also mentions embedded constitutional convention undermines fundamental principles of popular sovereignty.

States compare asylum and immigration policies with one another. The Israeli immigration and asylum regime influenced American law, and was also directly influenced by it. This Article offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the Israeli case law on the rights of undocumented entrants, at the core of which is a series of cases on immigration detention. Three times within a two year period, the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated immigration detention laws and the legislature complied with increasing frustration. Our argument is that although the Court courageously protected the undocumented entrants' rights, it also resorted to strategic ambiguity as a means of institutional survival in light of legislative threats to incorporate a general legislative override clause and executive attempts to "pack" the Court with conservative justices through appointments. This high-stakes dialogue is unprecedented in the Israeli context and uncommon in comparative law. We argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional and international human rights of undocumented entrants, but also bring the political branches to accountability. They should force states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes. They should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a prolonged presence of an undocumented entrant in a country. The Article discusses the Israeli judicial techniques used to reduce the conflict with the representative branches, including the use of constitutional avoidance and comparative law, and juxtaposes them with the American approach evident in Zadvydas v. Davis and Jennings v. Rodriguez. The harsh implications of a policy that leaves people in an indeterminate state of mere protection from removal are manifest in the Israeli story and should serve as a warning to the U.S. courts as they formulate their reaction to the recent asylum ban. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevalent approach suggests that constitutions are silent about secession and may even implicitly allow it. But an examination o f world constitutions reveals that the overwhelming majority of countries vigorously protect territorial integrity. This is true even o f countries classified as consociational or consensus democracies. Scholars further point to the existence of secessionist political parties as proof that secession may align with constitutionalism. This Article, however, explains how democracies engage in a delicate game to chase and eliminate secessionist political mobilization. Democracies have been able to conceal their fight against secessionists by creating a large gap between "the law on the books" and "the law as practiced." Some constitutions also use doublespeak to declare territorial integrity inviolable while nevertheless setting procedures for territorial change. In fact, democracies employ the most unconventional constitutional weapons to fight against secession. These include a ban on secessionist political parties from participating at elections and a constitutional eternity clause that makes territorial integrity an eternal value, not subject to constitutional amendment. These tools raise democratic paradoxes so extreme that democracies appear to be using the tools of authoritarian regimes. Militant democracy must be re-characterized to capture not just bans on political parties, but also eternity clauses. It serves to protect existential needs of states, not just their democratic regime. Even when democracies allow for secession, they set such hurdles that secession becomes all but impossible to achieve. Countries' total prohibition on secession may be explained on strategic as well as principled constitutional law considerations. This Article argues that constitutions' treatment of secession reveals that "We the People" is a territorial concept. The Canadian landmark Reference re Secession of Quebec decision's precedential value for world constitutionalism must thus be qualified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]