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Part I of the article provided an analytical review of the latest developments of domestic regulatory reform on foreign investments, the external pressures of the China-United States and China-European Union (EU) bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations, the establishment of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and China's participation in the Regional Comprehensive Partnership. Part II will address how these developments promoted China to adopt a g·radual dual-tmck position for the legislative process of reforming foreign investment law. This Part will focus on how China used BIT negotiations to place pressure internally and improve domestic law to conform to global standards of investment liberalisation. With that in mind, this Part argues that China has achieved consensus over how investment liberalisation could be achieved in the legislative process of China's foreign investment law. This Part further argues that regarding sensitive areas such as the scope of market entry in the negative list, intellectual property, competitive neutrality, labour standards and environmental protection, the basis of legislative considemtions should be set scientifically and with due process, with considerations given to the external pressures of the investment liberalisation standards established by the EU and the United States. In all, this article concludes that the ideal approach of China's foreign investment liberalisation is to connect China's reality with the investment standards of the world, where the uniqueness of the Chinese characteristics of market governance are embraced but not overemphasised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After over two decades of development, Chinese statutory directorial duties have evolved into two segments: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. However, the duty of care is still difficult to apply. While an abstract and vague drafting style is a common characteristic of Chinese legislation, a survey of existing Chinese laws and administrative rules should assist in clarifying the duty of care requirements expected of directors. Considering the increasing significance of judicial precedents and the exemplary function of administrative sanctions, analysing recent duty of care cases is conducive to supplementing further information and deciphering myths surrounding the application of the duty of care mechanism in China. However, this analysis demonstrates that there are inconsistencies in the standards of care applied by courts and by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The article finds that a clearer statutory standard of care should be introduced into the People's Republic of China Company Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The duty of loyalty is a core duty under the legal framework for directors' duties. The concept as borrowed by China originates from the UK and has further developed into many variations across common law jurisdictions. The different legal environments and development history lead to divergences in elaborating the duty in common law jurisdictions. The divergences can provide useful references for countries that have adopted and intend to improve the duty so as to enrich the content of the duty and plug any gaps. Chinese company law is still struggling to deal with the abstract nature of the duty, its scope of application and the test to apply in determining whether it has been breached. In practice, the Chinese judiciary is attempting to understand the duty. Nonetheless, their efforts are not entirely successful because the law omits several core aspects of the duty: the test for determining whether the duty has been breached, the ability to contract out of the duty and an applicable definition or understanding of a conflict of interest. The common law literature can be used as a starting point to sketch out a reasonable structure for the design of a better duty of loyalty in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The weighted voting rights (WVR) structure enables company founders to retain their majority control even though their shareholdings are diluted when mi*sing capital through an initial public offering (IPO). This ability to retain control has incentivised several Chinese companies to consider the WVR availability when selecting a juTisdiction in which to list, and accordingly, the competition is estab. lished among these jurisdictions for the listing of these companies. However, the WVR structure introduces entrenchment and exploitation risks. The quest to achieve a balance between management entrenchment and minority shareholder protection has been a hotly debated issue, which, ifnot properly handled, will result in a "race to the bottom" in IPO regulation to attract listings. This article offers fresh insights into how this issue is resolved by analysing the new WVR listing rules of two financial centres in Asia: the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Singapore Exchange. In an environment of regulatory competition between the two jurisdictions, the article reveals their diferent positions l)7 comparing the safeguards introduced by these two stock exchanges. The comparison, combined with the regulatory position in the United States as supporting evidence, suggests that the regulator)1 competition has not resulted in a race to the bottom as both jurisdictions have adopted a number of unique protections. Despite this, further reforms in these jurisdictions are needed to compete with those in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and the United States (US) signed the China–US trade agreement in early 2020 as a means to pause trade tensions between these two large economies. The protection of trade secrets is a priority issue that the trade agreement aims to address. In this regard, the current article examines the implications of the China–US trade agreement in relation to civil protection of trade secrets in China. This article first analyses the traditional civil protection method of trade secrets in China, which relies on the European approach of anti-unfair competition law. It then decodes several different and improved protection measures for trade secrets provided in the China–US trade agreement. Lastly, this article identifies some implications of the trade agreement for China's legal practices. China has amended its Anti-Unfair Competition Law and enacted relevant judicial interpretations regarding preliminary injunctions in an endeavour to fulfil its commitments. Arguably, according to provisions in the China–US trade agreement, the protection of trade secrets in China faces a game changer from the traditional unfair-competition approach to the intellectual property approach. Additionally, the authors of this article believe that China's current provisions in the Anti-Unfair Competition Law are not sufficient. Rather, China needs to enact a standalone trade secret law containing provisions of trade secret protection and the legal use of trade secrets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]