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Copyright of Wirtschaftsrechtliche Blätter is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Transfer: Zeitschrift für Kommunikation & Markenmanagement is the property of Deutsche Werbewissenschaftliche Gesellschaft and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Current research on the long-term influence of ordoliberal and neoliberal ideas is hampered by an overly static and generalised picture of the Freiburg School. To address this gap, the paper analyses all articles published in ORDO, the flagship journal of the Freiburg School, between 1948 and 2014. This makes it possible to distinguish three phases of post-war ordoliberalism, to identify personal continuities and breaks, and to summarise thematic, methodological, and conceptual developments. Since the analysis utilises text mining methods, such as keyword identification and Topic Modeling, and validates the results of distant reading with close reading and external data, the paper also highlights some general methodological insights for using Digital Humanities in the historical sciences.

Copyright of Nachhaltigkeitsrecht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (ÖZK) is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Rijeka / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci is the property of Pravni fakultet Sveucilista u Rijeci and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Rijeka / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci is the property of Pravni fakultet Sveucilista u Rijeci and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Das Verhältnis von Wettbewerbsrecht und Ökonomie gibt Anlass zu fortwährender Reflektion. Die Europäische Kommission will das Recht gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen mit dem more economic approach stärker an ökonomischen Einzelfallanalysen ausrichten. Ein zentraler Ausdruck dieser Herangehensweise ist der sog. as efficient competitor test, wonach die Wettbewerbsregeln – vereinfacht gesprochen – nur auf solche Verhaltensweisen angewandt werden sollen, die für die Verbraucher ökonomisch nachweisbar schädlich sind. Die Intel-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs hat verdeutlicht, dass das Erzielen ökonomisch richtiger Einzelfallergebnisse über das Wettbewerbsrecht bereits in einer analogen Wirtschaft an Grenzen stoßen kann. Dies gilt umso mehr in der digitalen Ökonomie des 21. Jahrhunderts, schon weil die entsprechenden Geschäftsmodelle wettbewerbstheoretisch noch nicht voll durchdrungen sind. Auf der Grundlage einer juristisch-wertenden Interpretation des Wettbewerbsrechts sind unternehmerische Verhaltensweisen auch dann unzulässig, wenn sie die berechtigten Freiheitspositionen der Marktteilnehmer und die daraus erwachsenden Wettbewerbsprozesse unangemessen beeinträchtigen, ohne dass im konkreten Fall ein ökonomischer Verbraucherschaden nachgewiesen werden muss. Die praktische Bedeutung einer Ausrichtung der Wettbewerbsregeln an rechtlichen Kriterien zeigt sich am Beispiel des Facebook-Falls des Bundeskartellamts, in dem ein Missbrauch von Marktmacht aufgrund eines Verstoßes gegen grundlegende Prinzipien der Rechtsordnung in Rede steht, namentlich gegen das Allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht. The relationship between competition law and economy provides reason for a continuous reflection. As commonly known, The European Commission aims to orientate competition law towards assessments on an economic case-by-case basis by implementing the more economic approach. The central expression of this approach is the as efficient competitor test , according to which the competition rules – in simple words – can only be applied to a conduct, which is evidently harmful for consumers. The Intel- decision of the European Court of Justice has shown that achieving economically correct individual case results by applying competition law may already come to its limits in an analogous economy. These limits are more apparent in the digital economy, since the relevant business-models are not yet fully assessed in terms of competition law's perspective. Based on a juridical interpretation of competition law, business conducts are inadmissible as soon as they impair the eligible freedom positions and the resulting competitive processes. Therefore, it is not necessary to prove an economic damage to the consumers in a specific case. The practical significance of the competition rules' orientation towards legal criteria becomes evident in the German Federal Cartel Office's Facebook -case, where the question arises, if a breach of fundamental legal principles, especially the general right of privacy, constitutes an abuse of market power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Rijeka / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci is the property of Pravni fakultet Sveucilista u Rijeci and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Rijeka / Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci is the property of Pravni fakultet Sveucilista u Rijeci and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper is concerned with the question of how to deal with Google Shopping's position on online markets in order to prevent harm to public welfare. From the perspective of sellers and buyers of goods and services in Germany, Google can be seen as a gatekeeper to the Internet and thus as an essential facility. It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good. Therefore, welfare-optimal rules must be adhered. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among the sellers to get the maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The proposed solution in this paper provides a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product for which a quantitative independent contribution should be required instead of a fee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)