Search

In this note, I respond to a recent article by Irene van Staveren (2007) in this journal, where she presents a case for virtue ethics, rather than deontology or consequentialism, as the most appropriate philosophical foundation for economics. Rather than taking issue with her positive arguments for virtue ethics, I argue in defense of deontology - or, more specifically, the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I argue that, when properly understood, Kantian ethics should not be associated solely with formal rules and obligation, but that Kant's moral system can accommodate many of the concerns of virtue ethics, such as social relations, real-world context, and human fallibility, as well as embodying a unique emphasis on human dignity and judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the Pareto standard, by which policy changes are approved if they benefit at least one person and harms no one, is ethically questionable despite its nearly universal acceptance among economists and philosophers alike. As usually implemented, the Pareto standard bypasses actual consent, relying instead on hypothetical consent based on imputed measures of preferences or wellbeing. By so circumventing actual choice, the Pareto standard violates the respect for the dignity of autonomous agents, as emphasized by Immanuel Kant. If actual consent is obtained, however, the independent relevance of the Pareto standard is endangered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines a critique of neoclassical law and economics based on the ethics of Immanuel Kant, focusing on four central topics: efficiency as the sole evaluative criterion for policy-making, hypothetical compensation in Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the instrumental nature of rights and the assumption of reciprocal causation, and the role of punishment to both society and the individual. This overview addresses issues of concern not just to Kantians, but to anyone dissatisfied with the utilitarian foundations of law and economics and the amoral view of law upon which it is based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a Kantian model of decision-making, one that incorporates moral duties alongside standard preferences and constraints, can account for the complexities of actual ethical choice within a model with a single (constrained) preference ranking. Multiple utilities are required only to explain the failure to make appropriate decisions. Such occasions, often referred to as cases of weakness of will or akrasia , are easily explained with this approach, which is also consistent with the recent work of philosopher John Searle on action theory and rational choice. More generally, this paper highlights the need for discussion of the will in economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including the argument on the failure of the Pareto standard to respect dignity of agents and an evaluation on the ethical theory of Stoics.