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Successful civil resistance requires an enduring commitment to nonviolent selfdiscipline, often in response to repressive and provocative government tactics. We examine dedication to nonviolent collective action using the case of recent protests in Baghdad, Iraq. Based on a sample of 300 activists from 2019 anti-government protests across different locations in Baghdad, we find that those who have been exposed to violence by government forces are more willing to justify violent responses. However, more experienced protesters, reflected in present and past protest activity, display greater commitment to nonviolent activism and less willingness to reciprocate violence despite government provocations. We attribute this to possible socialization effects within activist communities which help transcend identity cleavages and associational divisions within the movement, reinforcing protest commitment and dedication to nonviolence. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for civil resistance as an alternative to violence in conflict-prone environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What effects do contentious elections have on partisan appraisals of democracy? We consider the case of the November 2020 US election, a highly polarized partisan contest but also an objectively free and fair election by credible accounting. We conducted a panel study embedded within two nationally representative surveys before and after the election. Results indicate a familiar but underexamined partisan gap, in which satisfaction with democracy decreases among Republicans and increases among Democrats relative to nonpartisans. We find that the gap is fully mediated by partisan shifts in satisfaction with elections and the news media that cover them. Our results underscore how eroding institutional confidence can undermine democratic legitimacy in hitherto consolidated democracies. To overcome partisan divisions following contentious elections, we highlight the need to bolster confidence in democratic institutions to reduce partisan fears and uncertainties—both rational and irrational—that electoral losses may trigger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cyber operations ranging from deception and espionage to disruption and high-end degradation have become a central feature of modern statecraft in the digital age, yet we lack a clear understanding of how decision-makers employ and respond to cyber operations in times of crisis. Our research provides theoretical mechanisms and empirical evidence for understanding how decision-makers react to cyber triggers and utilize cyber responses during crises. Specifically, we argue that the availability of cyber response creates off-ramps for non-escalatory engagement. Based on experimental wargames involving rival states with power parity in militarized disputes and randomized cyber triggers and response options, we find the availability of cyber response options reduces escalatory behavior via a substitution mechanism. In the absence of cyber response options, however, participants pursue more conventional, escalatory actions, regardless of the triggering mechanism. Our findings underscore how enhancing the availability of cyber response options might reduce strategic escalation risks and offer the space to bargain during periods of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our research considers the relationship between historical memory and political evaluations of the past and present. We first examine how historical reflection on the Soviet Union under Stalin is influenced by memories of familial suffering during World War II and victimization under the widespread Soviet gulag prison system. Based on a 2019 representative survey of Ukraine, we show that respondents who recall family members being injured or killed fighting during World War II and those who recount families being imprisoned in Soviet gulags have increased positive and negative appraisals of the Soviet Union under Stalin respectively. However, we also find that favorable opinions of Stalin are strongly predicted by approval of Vladimir Putin, who has actively promoted rehabilitation of Stalin's legacy to bolster personalist rule at home and justify revisionist agendas abroad, including in Ukraine. Our results underscore interactions between the present and past in shaping historical memory such that what appears as enduring legacies of the past could also be a function of present political circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00273.x Byline: Sam Whitt (1), Rick K. Wilson (2) Abstract: This study considers the effects of ethnic violence on norms of fairness. Once violence is a foregone conclusion, will cooperative norms ever (re-)emerge beyond ethnic boundaries? We use an experiment that measures how fairly individuals in a postconflict setting treat their own ingroup in comparison to the outgroups-in this case, examining the behavior of 681 Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. To assess fairness, we use the dictator game wherein subjects decide how to allocate a sum of money between themselves and an anonymous counterpart of varying ethnicity. We find that the effects of ethnicity on decision making are captured by our experiments. Although results indicate preferential ingroup treatment, the incidence and magnitude of outgroup bias is much less than expected. We conclude that norms of fairness across ethnicity are remarkably strong in Bosnia, and we take this to be a positive sign for reconciliation after violent conflict. Author Affiliation: (1)University of Tennessee (2)Rice University Article note: Sam Whitt is visiting assistant professor of political science, University of Tennessee, 1001 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN 37996-0410 (swhitt3@utk.edu). Rick K. Wilson is professor of political science, MS 24, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251-1892 (rkw@rice.edu).

Our research speaks to the ongoing debate over the extent and severity of partisan political divisions in American society. We employ behavioral experiments to probe for affective polarization using dictator, trust, and public goods games with party identification treatments. We find that subjects who identify politically with the Democratic or Republican Party and ideologically as liberals and conservatives display stronger affective biases than politically unaffiliated and ideological moderates. Partisan subjects are less altruistic, less trusting, and less likely to contribute to a mutually beneficial public good when paired with members of the opposing party. Compared to other behavioral studies, our research suggests increasing levels of affective polarization in the way Americans relate to one another politically, bordering on the entrenched divisions one commonly sees in conflict or post-conflict societies. To overcome affective polarization, our research points to inter-group contact as a mechanism for increasing trust and bridging political divides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]