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Quotas, including youth quotas for representative institutions, are usually evaluated from within the social justice discourse. That discourse relies on several questionable assumptions, seven of which I critically address and radically revise in this contribution from a libertarian perspective. Temporal justice then takes on an entirely different form. It becomes a theory in which responsibilities are clear and cannot be shifted onto the shoulders of the weak and innocent. I shall only briefly sketch some outlines and general implications of such a theory, arguing that it offers too little guidance for our imperfect world. While that implies more tolerance for quotas, I nevertheless propose an alternative more suited to a representative, deliberative democracy: veto rights., Intergenerational Justice Review, Vol 1, No 1 (2015): Youth Quotas

AMITY Volume 2:1, Animals are now widely accepted as subjects of justice: not equal but deserving equal consideration; not free but deserving liberties (that is, selfconstraining human duties). But liberty and equality are not all there is to a flourishing society – how about amity and reciprocity? Isn’t a minimal degree of friendship or amity between human and animal on the one hand, reciprocity of feelings or reciprocal benefits on the other, needed to ensure that justice will last? It is, I shall argue, possible to interpret some human-animal relations as reciprocal, even as mutually beneficial (symbiotic) exchanges (and not necessarily exchanges of goods or services). Human-animal amity, on the other hand, is excluded, since it demands the impossible of animals: identification with a joint project. The ‘best’ we can get is quasi-amity, the one-sided and dubious belief that animals benefit from and enjoy being part of the basically purely human enterprise, the joint venture that society is. Ultimately then, in relation to animals, justice remains a cold, jealous and calculating virtue.

Este capítulo indaga en la relación entre democracia y medio ambiente

Entre los círculos de los teóricos políticos verdes, el liberalismo, en cuanto teoría política, es visto a menudo como un factor que contribuye a la persistencia de los problemas medioambientales. Frente a esta extendida ¡dea, el autor mantiene que existen formas mediante las que la filosofía política liberal dominante puede enriquecerse con el tipo de premisas que permiten discutir sensatamente cuestiones medioambientales. En este sentido, considera siete posibilidades: mejorar el componente democrático del pensamiento liberal; reconsiderar las condiciones lockeanas; incluir a la naturaleza y a las generaciones fiíturas como sujetos de la justicia; transformar el cuidado medioambiental en un objetivo de la justicia liberal; reinteipretar el principio de ahorro de John Rawls y, por último, introducir el denominado «principio de moderación» como una restricción medioambiental de segundo orden para la atribución de derechos en la sociedad. Aunque «teñir de verde» el liberalismo es una condición necesaria, pero no suficiente, para un mundo más verde, el autor intenta demostrar que puede existir algo así como un liberalismo verde.