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Two decades after the US invasion of Iraq, the civil war of the years that followed and the ravages of the Islamic State have faded into the background. Yet the country remains shaken by internal cleavages, torn apart by corruption, and vulnerable to influence operations by external actors. Overcoming economic crisis and infrastructural shortcomings could contribute to greater political stability. Oil production has doubled over the past two decades. The historical underdevelopment of the Iraqi oil sector has been reversed, yet the federal oil law has been contested between Baghdad and Erbil. Natural gas production has grown in recent years as well, but still falls short of providing enough energy to the power grid. The country is a net importer of natural gas, relying on supplies from Iran. Oil remains paramount for the Iraqi state, its budget, exports, and its economy. Heavy industries like fertilisers and petrochemicals could enhance the value chain of Iraq's primary resources that include the second-largest phosphate reserves worldwide. Population growth in Iraq is still high. Beyond hydrocarbons, economic diversification in other areas is urgently needed. This could include alternative energies, light industries, education, services, water management, and a reorientation of agriculture. Iraq ranks 157 out of 180 in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. Its consociational muhasasa system, which allocates power along sectarian lines, is abetting such corruption and thus requires reform. Iraq can be a vital partner for European energy cooperation and not only in hydrocarbons, but competition from China is stiff. Europe is already eyeing collaboration with Middle East and North Africa countries on the production of green hydrogen. Interconnectors of electricity grids within and beyond the region as well as storage solutions are needed to increase the share of renewables involved in power generation.

As a region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's largest grain importer. Approximately 30 per cent of global exports of wheat and barley, 20 per cent of corn, and a whopping three-quarters of sunflower oil come from Ukraine and Russia. The aggression against Ukraine is thus disrupting global food trade and affecting food security in the MENA. The war is also raising questions about future food systems and their water footprint. In the Arab world, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for imports of wheat, the world's largest source of calories, is at 50 per cent - among the highest globally. The greatest vulnerability exists in Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan. Imports will actually need to rise from pre-war levels if population growth and dietary changes towards meat and dairy products are taken into consideration. For lack of water, food self-sufficiency is not an option in the MENA. Food imports constitute "virtual water" - that is, the water used to produce a commodity and thus embedded in it. Virtual water can be imported by MENA countries via the food trade and has mitigated water scarcity by adding a "second Nile River" to the region's water balance. The global food crisis of 2007/2008 spurred MENA countries to attempt to alleviate their import vulnerabilities bilaterally, via investments in land and in value chains, but reliance on the multilateral international trading system remains. The reaction to the current crisis can build on lessons learnt since then, with coping capacities unevenly distributed between the region's richer oil exporters and poorer countries. Avoiding new export restrictions such as those that occurred during the global food crisis of 2007/2008 is crucial. Western attempts to stabilise the multilateral food trade could help the MENA to source alternative supplies. This might also offer an opportunity to mend fences between the West and MENA at a time when closer energy cooperation is essential and an ambivalent stance in the MENA towards Russia has caused irritation in the West.

There have been three different kinds of reactions to the coronavirus crisis: those from early movers, with extensive measures taken (Israel, Jordan, Gulf countries, Morocco); those from states that initially struggled to acknowledge the magnitude of the crisis out of concern about its economic impact (Iran, Turkey, Egypt); and, those from countries whose ability to react to the crisis is in doubt because of civil war and internal disarray (Yemen, Libya, Syria). The capacities of regional health systems are lagging in comparison to international peers. The median age of the population is relatively low. However the number of vulnerable elderly is still substantial, as the region has been undergoing a demographic transition for several decades now. Other at-risk groups are the poor, labour migrants, the prison population, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The economic impact of COVID-19 will affect domestic spending and threatens to undermine the social contract and political stability. The pandemic also has the potential to shake up geopolitical dynamics, as it will reduce the ability of key actors to intervene regionally (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia). The coronavirus crisis requires government intervention on a large scale. Such intervention will be used to further the political goals of authoritarian regimes, too. It will be integrated into their repression strategies - including cyber surveillance - and will likely outlast the health crisis itself. The pandemic is thus reinforcing trends towards populism and authoritarian restoration in the Middle East and North Africa. The European Union is currently preoccupied with its own coronavirus crisis, and struggling to find coordinated approaches to the tackling of it. Yet it should not overlook the unfolding socio-economic crisis in its southern neighbourhood. If Europe wants to be a serious geopolitical actor, it needs to find the wherewithal to provide assistance - and advertise that fact - to match similar efforts undertaken by China as part of its "mask diplomacy" in the region.

MENA countries’ integration in processes of economic globalization has trailed behind many emerging markets in Asia, but also Latin America. This applies especially to the “bunker states” and “bully praetorian states” of the Arab republics and Iran, less so to Lebanon and the “globalizing monarchies” of the GCC, Morocco, and Jordan and even less to the OECD countries of Israel and Turkey. Against this heterogeneous backdrop, this paper identifies seven areas where some MENA countries show pronounced embeddedness in economic globalization processes: (1) petrochemicals and heavy industries, (2) financial services, (3) logistics and airlines, (4) light manufacturing, (5) high-tech, (6) arms trade, and (7) agriculture and food imports. In sum, MENA countries show considerable integration in economic globalization processes in selected countries and key areas, such as petrochemicals in the Gulf, high-tech in Israel, and light manufacturing in Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia.