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Hans Kelsen was one of the most important legal thinkers of the 20th century, and he is known for mounting an elaborate defense of liberal party democracy at a time when the latter was hardly the most popular form of regime. This article examines how Kelsen responded to two major political movements he experienced in his intellectual prime: political Catholicism, which he was confronted with in interwar Austria, and Christian Democracy, which became a hegemonic political force in Western Europe after World War II, when Kelsen was already in exile. The article reconstructs Kelsen's complex critique of these two religious movements and ends by reflecting on what we can learn from his arguments about current attempts to revive Christian political thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent times, representation theory has become one of the most productive and interesting sub-fields in democratic theory. Arguably, the most important theoretical innovation are the so-called 'constructivist' approaches to political representation. These approaches play a central role in Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation and The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation, two impressive volumes that take stock of the state of the art in representation theory. I discuss the two volumes by focusing on three broader and interconnected themes: the problem that constructivism is meant to respond to, the tendency of representation theorists to expand the possibilities of representation as broadly as possible, and the normative aspects of political representation and how constructivists deal with them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracies come in many different forms with significant variations in their institutional architecture, and some supposedly well-functioning democracies have no (or very weak) constitutional courts (e.g., the Scandinavian countries; see Larsen, [52]; Wind, [79]).[2] Arguably a useful general account of democratic backsliding must be able to explain deteriorations of democracy in such "nonconstrained" democracies, too. The system of rights is an abstract framework for positive democratic constitutional law that, as Ingeborg Maus puts it, is intended to leave room for the "political autonomy of constitutional lawmaking and law-giving citizens who first develop rights from their own vantage point, bring them historically to consciousness, and enact them into positive law" (also see Habermas, [26], pp. 160-162; Habermas, [27], p. 90). Much recent political commentary suggests that a "backlash", "revolt", or "counter-revolution" is unfolding against liberal constitutional democracy (e.g., Eatwell & Goodwin, [18]; Galston, [23]; Mounk, [58]; Norris & Inglehart, [61]; Zielonka, [82]). So long as citizens' rights to an equal opportunity to participate in political law giving are protected in other ways,[7] Habermas' system of basic rights does not even require that democracies hold elections. I speak of a "particular species of regressions" because the relevant regressions concern those fundamental constitutional rights that correspond to the basic rights Habermas sketches in the system of rights: as I will explain more below, at issue is either the outright suspension of those rights or that the exercise of those rights is obstructed without them being suspended. [Extracted from the article]

In recent times, it has become increasingly common that elected parties and leaders systematically undermine democracy and the rule of law. This phenomenon is often framed with the term democratic backsliding or democratic regression. This article deals with the relatively little-studied topic of resistance to democratic regressions. Chief amongst the things it discusses is the rather central ethical issue of whether resisters may themselves, in their attempts to prevent a further erosion of democracy, transgress democratic norms. But the argument advanced in the article is not merely about the ethics of resistance. It begins, perhaps unconventionally, by addressing the affective dimension of resistance to democratic regressions, looking in particular at the powerful feelings of anger and despair that pro-democratic citizens living under a regressive government are likely to experience. As the article argues, these feelings have not only motivational but also epistemic potential, which must be adequately theorized in order to understand how resisters can respond to the ethical challenges facing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of 'Christian Europe' has returned with a vengeance in recent times. It figures prominently in the political rhetoric of conservative nationalists, who link appeals to Europe's Christian heritage and identity to avowedly illiberal political projects. This article examines this revived idea of Christian Europe by contrasting it with the meanings that prominent Christian Democratic leaders ascribed to the term in the post‐war era. This contrast is insightful because it reveals what is distinctive about present understandings of Christian Europe, and it is politically relevant because some of the most committed contemporary proponents of Christian Europe claim to be 'true' Christian Democrats. Using Ernst‐Wolfgang Böckenförde's work on the emergence of the modern state as a broad analytical frame, I show that today's visions of Christian Europe are more modern, statist and secular than their post‐war counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attempting to reconcile the diverse immigration policy demands of the 'old' working class and the 'new' middle class, social democratic parties struggle to take a clear position on immigration policy. Adopting more restrictive policies is a possible way forward, but this is likely to lead to electorally costly intra-party conflict. This article illuminates the conditions under which social democratic parties can unite behind more restrictive immigration policies and promote them consistently. Employing a most-similar systems design, it presents a comparative case study of the Austrian and Danish social democrats, from the 2015 'refugee crisis' to 2020. The article argues that low levels of territorial decentralisation enabled the Danish social democrats to promote a restrictive stance on immigration top-down, while the Austrian social democrats' federal party structure exacerbated internal disagreements between urban and rural leaders. These findings highlight the importance of internal party characteristics in explaining how parties respond to strategic trade-offs. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1975211. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]