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Baseado em uma análise de livros de boas maneiras, datados desde 1890, em quatro países ocidentais, este artigo descreve como "processos civilizadores" continuaram nos séculos XIX e XX. O artigo concentra-se, primeiro, em três funções centrais de uma "boa sociedade" e de seu código de costumes e maneiras e, em seguida, descreve como, em um processo de longa duração de formalização dos costumes e maneiras e de disciplinamento de pessoas, emoções "perigosas", como aquelas relativas à violência física (incluindo a sexual), passaram a ser controladas de modos cada vez mais automáticos. Sendo assim, um tipo de personalidade de segunda natureza ou de consciência dominada tornou-se predominante. O século XX, por sua vez, assistiu ao aumento dos constrangimentos sociais em favor de condutas descontraídas, além de reflexivas, flexíveis e alertas. Tais pressões coincidiram com uma informalização dos comportamentos e uma emancipação de emoções: emoções que haviam sido negadas e reprimidas recuperaram acesso à consciência e maior aceitação nos códigos sociais. No entanto, foi somente a partir da "Revolução Expressiva" da década de 1960 que, cada vez mais, os padrões de autocontrole têm habilitado as pessoas a admitirem, para si mesmas e os outros, a possibilidade de se sentir emoções "perigosas" sem incitar vergonha, mais especificamente, o receio de perder o controle e a dignidade. À medida que se tornou "natural" perceber os impulsos e as demandas de ambas, da "primeira natureza" e da "segunda natureza", bem como os perigos e as oportunidades, de curta e longa duração, em qualquer situação ou relação, tem se desenvolvido um tipo de personalidade de "terceira natureza". Exemplos ilustrativos dessas tendências também nos ajudam a entendê-las como um processo de integração psíquica desencadeado por um processo de integração social continuada.Based on an analysis of manners books in four Western countries since 1890, this paper describes how "civilizing processes" have continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The paper first focuses on three central functions of a "good society" and its code of manners, and then describes how, in a long-term phase of formalizing manners and disciplining people, "dangerous" emotions such as those related to physical (including sexual) violence came to be controlled in increasingly automatic ways. Thus, a second-nature or conscience-dominated type of personality became dominant. The twentieth century saw rising social constraints towards being unconstrained, and yet reflective, flexible, and alert. These pressures coincided with an informalization of manners and an emancipation of emotions: emotions that had been denied and repressed regained access to consciousness and wider acceptance in social codes. Yet it has been only since the "Expressive Revolution" of the 1960s that standards of self-control have increasingly enabled people to admit, to themselves and others, to having "dangerous" emotions without provoking shame, particularly the shame-fear of losing control and face. To the extent that it has become "natural" to perceive the pulls and pushes of both "first nature" and "second nature", as well as the dangers and chances, short-term and long-term, of any particular situation or relation, a "third nature" type of personality has been developing. Examples illustrating this trend also help us to understand it as a process of psychic integration triggered by continued social integration.

Dans Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (1939), publié en France en deux volumes, sous les titres La civilisation des mœurs (1973) et La dynamique de l’Occident (1975), Norbert Elias étudie les transformations des régimes de mœurs et d’émotions en Europe de l’Ouest entre les XVe et XIXe siècles. Dans ce chapitre, je présenterai une esquisse de ces transformations et la prolongerai jusqu’à la fin du XXe siècle. Le résumé qui suit est redevable à l’œuvre d’Elias de deux points de vue. Tout d’abo...

Until recently, discussion of the criteria relevant to studying civilising processes focused mainly on the balance of controls (that is, between Fremdzwänge and Selbstzwänge). This paper starts by focusing on the ‘triad of controls’, a concept that Elias presents as one of the ‘criteria of social development’. It refers to ‘three fundamental controls of people in society – the control of humans over extra-human natural events, the control of people over each other, and the control of each person over him or herself.’ This triad has not received the acclaim it deserves, and it is brought to life only in the work of Johan Goudsblom. The paper shows and discusses how Elias himself presented the triad of controls in his work. It differentiates the triad by distinguishing seven different yet interconnected balances – the balances of competition and cooperation, power and control, formalisation and informalisation, the we–I balance, the balance of involvement and detachment, and the lust-balance. They are presented as universally applicable guidelines for analysing social and psychic processes. Together, the triad of control and the seven balances offer a research manual and summarise the theory of civilising processes as a ‘workable synthesis’

Norbert Elias’s theory of civilising processes has been received only marginally in the USA, one of the obstacles being the absence of figurational or process studies of American society. In the first decade of this century this situation was changed by the publication of Stephen Mennell’s The American Civilizing Process (2007) and Cas Wouters’ Sex and Manners (2004) and Informalization (2007). By 2012, Randall Collins had reviewed the first and the third books in two essays (2009, 2011). His claims and criticism of civilising and informalisation theory are discussed in this paper by placing them in the context of the reception history of Elias’s work since the 1960s, when a first round of discussion centred on criteria to be used for determining the direction of civilising processes. A second round was in the 1990s, and in this paper we contribute to a new round by presenting a summary of earlier critical discussions in an attempt to establish a more solid and subtler body of criteria for studying civilising processes. We use this in critically discussing Collins’s contributions, linking them to symbolic interactionism, American National Ideology, and blind spots in American sociology. Norbert Elias’s theory of civilising processes has been received only marginally in the USA, one of the obstacles being the absence of figurational or process studies of American society. In the first decade of this century this situation was changed by the publication of Stephen Mennell’s The American Civilizing Process (2007) and Cas Wouters’ Sex and Manners (2004) and Informalization (2007). By 2012, Randall Collins had reviewed the first and the third books in two essays (2009, 2011). His claims and criticism of civilising and informalisation theory are discussed in this paper by placing them in the context of the reception history of Elias’s work since the 1960s, when a first round of discussion centred on criteria to be used for determining the direction of civilising processes. A second round was in the 1990s, and in this paper we contribute to a new round by presenting a summary of earlier critical discussions in an attempt to establish a more solid and subtler body of criteria for studying civilising processes. We use this in critically discussing Collins’s contributions, linking them to symbolic interactionism, American National Ideology, and blind spots in American sociology.

The oneliner ‘No sex under my roof’ is used to reinforce the rule of premarital abstinence of sexuality until teenage children marry or move from home. In the USA, most parents still stick to this norm, whereas in the Netherlands since the late 1960s, a new rule developed, allowing teenage children to have sex, provided they ‘feel strongly for each other’ and feel ‘ready’ for it. This paper describes and compares developments in the USA and in the Netherlands since the 1880s, focusing on the social regulation of teenage sexuality, and based mainly upon such sources as reference books and sexology studies. The paper proposes an explanation of the two trajectories from national differences in the functioning of good societies, particularly in the regulation of social competition and social mobility.The rise in the USA of a highly competitive dating system and a complicated sexual morality indicates a smaller decline of power differences between classes, genders and generations, which partly explains the persistence of the old rule. Further explanation is found in America’s lower level of social integration and more open competition between various centres of power and good societies.The build up to the rise of a new rule among Dutch parents was an informalization of ‘getting engaged’, the diffusion of verkering (going steady) and of parental policies to stay ‘in the scene’, indicating higher levels of social integration and larger declines of power differences between classes, genders and generations. Yet, the long preservation of a homogeneous good society created a widening gap between a facade of decency and backstage realities. When this gap was washed away in the 1960s Expressive and Sexual Revolutions, it also washed away the old rule, and increasing numbers of parents allowed their teenagers openly to have sex, even at home. The oneliner ‘No sex under my roof’ is used to reinforce the rule of premarital abstinence of sexuality until teenage children marry or move from home. In the USA, most parents still stick to this norm, whereas in the Netherlands since the late 1960s, a new rule developed, allowing teenage children to have sex, provided they ‘feel strongly for each other’ and feel ‘ready’ for it. This paper describes and compares developments in the USA and in the Netherlands since the 1880s, focusing on the social regulation of teenage sexuality, and based mainly upon such sources as reference books and sexology studies. The paper proposes an explanation of the two trajectories from national differences in the functioning of good societies, particularly in the regulation of social competition and social mobility.The rise in the USA of a highly competitive dating system and a complicated sexual morality indicates a smaller decline of power differences between classes, genders and generations, which partly explains the persistence of the old rule. Further explanation is found in America’s lower level of social integration and more open competition between various centres of power and good societies.The build up to the rise of a new rule among Dutch parents was an informalization of ‘getting engaged’, the diffusion of verkering (going steady) and of parental policies to stay ‘in the scene’, indicating higher levels of social integration and larger declines of power differences between classes, genders and generations. Yet, the long preservation of a homogeneous good society created a widening gap between a facade of decency and backstage realities. When this gap was washed away in the 1960s Expressive and Sexual Revolutions, it also washed away the old rule, and increasing numbers of parents allowed their teenagers openly to have sex, even at home.

Resumo

Le processus de civilisation marque sans doute les sociétés contemporaines. Encore fautil saisir les modalités de ce processus. En s’appuyant notamment sur les manuels de savoir-vivre diffusés en Occident, Cas Wouters propose un schéma interprétatif. L’état de nature aurait progressivement été dominé par une logique de contrôle, dont l’époque victorienne marque à certains égards l’apogée. Mais la marche du temps aurait modifié les comportements : une « troisième nature », ouverte et tolérante, émergerait au 20e siècle, faisant désormais appel à une « régulation par la conscience ».

polemische reactie op Hanneke de Graaf’s bespreking van mijn artikel ‘Over seksuele ontwikkeling en opvoedstijlen’ in het Tijdschrift voor Seksuologie 36/2 (reeds opgenomen in Metis en Igitur)

Sinds 1880 is de jeugd van tegenwoordig grondig veranderd, samen met de verhoudingen tussen de generaties, de seksen en de sociale klassen. Dat bracht ophef en soms morele paniek teweeg, zoals over seksualisering: van krimpende roklengtes en naveltruitjes, seks voor het huwelijk en ongehuwd samenwonen, tot terloopse seks met onbekenden en seks als ruilmiddel. Maar de ongelijkheid tussen ouders en kinderen verminderde en hun band werd intiemer en vertrouwelijker. Zo wilden steeds meer ouders hun kinderen leren zichzelf te sturen en daartoe vonden ze liefdevol bijsturen belangrijker dan het afdwingen van gehoorzaamheid. Het was een emancipatie van jongeren en die ging gepaard met een emancipatie van hun seksualiteit en met opschuivende geilgrenzen. Hier wordt verteld hoe de seksuele ontwikkeling van jongeren de afgelopen honderddertig jaar is veranderd, en hoe dat past in de maatschappelijke ontwikkeling van seksualiteit. Gegevens over sociale klassen, over nieuwe Nederlanders en over de USA worden met elkaar vergeleken, en reeksen levendige voorbeelden geven een spannend beeld van de omgang met liefde en lust van ‘de jeugd van tegenwoordig’. Cas Wouters laat zien hoe veranderingen in de machtsverhoudingen kunnen verklaren waarom we in Nederland informeler en seksueler zijn geworden dan in andere westerse landen.