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Learning from others allows young children to acquire vast amounts of information quickly, but doing so effectively also requires epistemic vigilance. Although preschool-age children have some capacity to engage in such processes, they often have trouble resisting information from misleading informants. The present research takes a novel

Research has explored age-related and cultural differences in moral evaluations of dishonesty; however, this has not yet been examined in an aging context. The present study provided a novel account of how younger and older adults (in Canada, Singapore, and China;The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-03785-6.

Lying is a prevalent and normative behavior in young children. Conceptually, it is strongly linked with children’s theory-of-mind development. However, empirical studies show that the link between children’s lying and theory-of-mind is heterogeneous. This study examined whether parental control and parental warmth moderate the link between children’s lying and theory-of-mind understanding. Three- to six-year-old Singaporean children ( N = 116, Mage = 59 months, 59 male, 81.0% Chinese) participated in the temptation resistance paradigm, in which they were asked to guess the identity of a toy but instructed not to peek at it when left alone. Parental control and parental warmth were assessed via a parent–child interactive game. Results showed that the relation between children’s maintenance of their initial lie and general theory-of-mind understanding was moderated by parental warmth. Specifically, there was a negative relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind for dyads with high parental warmth, but a positive relation between children’s lying and theory-of-mind for dyads with low parental warmth. Overall, the findings suggest that children’s lying behavior is the outcome of a complex interaction between cognitive and social factors.

Early childhood is a crucial period for human development that has long-term implications for one’s life trajectories. During the years before formal schooling, brain size and structures, as well as cognitive abilities, undergo rapid development. Children’s cognitive abilities develop by leaps and bounds and show great malleability. Cognitive development during early childhood exerts a long-lasting influence on children’s life chances in adulthood. In China, however, there is no established reliable early childhood achievement test that can be used in a study. This study validates an achievement test for Chinese preschoolers. We analyze data from a nationally representative sample of children aged three to six who participated in the Zhang-Yeung Test of Achievement for Chinese Children (ZY-TACC) in 2012. The instrument consists of a 28-item verbal test and a 24-item numeracy test. Our evaluations indicate a satisfactory level of difficulty, as well as high internal consistency and reliability. This instrument exhibits ample ability to distinguish among children of different ages and varying family backgrounds in ways consistent with previous literature. Children’s test scores are also found to correlate in the expected direction with their behavioral indicators. We demonstrate that the ZY-TACC is a psychometrically robust, culturally and contextually appropriate instrument for assessing Chinese preschool children’s achievement. The instrument can make a significant contribution to research on early childhood development in China.

The present study examined the role of executive function in lying for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The temptation resistance paradigm was used to elicit children's self-protective lies and the Hide-and-seek task was used to elicit children's self-benefiting lies. Results showed that children with ASD told fewer lies in the two deception tasks compared to children with intellectual disability (ID) and typically developing (TD) children. Furthermore, children with ASD's lying were positively correlated with their working memory, but not with their theory of mind. These findings demonstrate that the mechanisms underlying deception for children with ASD are distinct from that of TD children.

Scientific research on how children learn to tell lies has existed for more than a century. Earlier studies mainly focused on moral, social, and situational factors contributing to the development of lying. Researchers have only begun to explore the cognitive correlations of children's lying in the last two decades. Cognitive theories suggest that theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) should be closely related to the development of lying since lying is, in essence, ToM and EF in action. Yet, findings from empirical studies are mixed. To address this issue, the current meta-analysis reviewed all prior literature that examined the relations between children's lying and ToM and/or between children's lying and EF. In total, 47 papers consisting of 5099 participants between 2 and 19 years of age were included, which yielded 74 effect sizes for ToM and 94 effect sizes for EF. Statistically significant but relatively small effects were found between children's lying and ToM (r = .17) and between lying and EF (r = .13). Furthermore, EF's correlation with children's initial lies was significantly smaller than its correlation with children's ability to maintain lies. This comprehensive meta-analysis provides a clear picture of the associations between children's ToM/EF and their lying behavior and confirms that ToM and EF indeed play a positive role in children's lying and its development.

To fully participate in the human information-sharing ecosystem that allows for efficient knowledge dissemination and creation, children need to be able to teach others effectively. The current research is the first to investigate links between children’s teaching abilities and their developing theory of mind abilities in a non-Western sample. In a sample of 4- to 6-year-old Singaporean children (N = 49), we examined relations between specific components of theory of mind abilities and teaching ability on a social cognitive task. We found that both false belief understanding and the ability to make mental state inferences in a teaching context were associated with effective teaching even after controlling for age and language ability. These findings provide a nuanced picture of the links between mental state reasoning and teaching ability. More broadly, they provide evidence that these links extend beyond Western cultures and generalize to social-cognitive teaching contexts.

Previous studies showed that the cortical reward system plays an important role in deceptive behavior. However, how the reward system activates during the whole course of dishonest behavior and how it affects dishonest decisions remain unclear. The current study investigated these questions. One hundred and two participants were included in the final analysis. They completed two tasks: monetary incentive delay (MID) task and an honesty task. The MID task served as the localizer task and the honesty task was used to measure participants’ deceptive behaviors. Participants’ spontaneous responses in the honesty task were categorized into three conditions: Correct-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing correctly), Incorrect-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing incorrectly), and Incorrect-Lie condition (tell lies after guessing incorrectly). To reduce contamination from neighboring functional regions as well as to increase sensitivity to small effects (Powell et al., Devel Sci 21:e12595, 2018), we adopted the individual functional channel of interest (fCOI) approach to analyze the data. Specially, we identified the channels of interest in the MID task in individual participants and then applied them to the honesty task. The result suggested that the reward system showed different activation patterns during different phases: In the pre-decision phase, the reward system was activated with the winning of the reward. During the decision and feedback phase, the reward system was activated when people made the decisions to be dishonest and when they evaluated the outcome of their decisions. Furthermore, the result showed that neural activity of the reward system toward the outcome of their decision was related to subsequent dishonest behaviors. Thus, the present study confirmed the important role of the reward system in deception. These results can also shed light on how one could use neuroimaging techniques to perform lie-detection.

Recent evolutionary, cultural, and economic theories have postulated strong connections between human sociality and complex cognition. One prediction derived from this work is that deception should confer cognitive benefits on children. The current research tests this possibility by examining whether learning to deceive during early childhood promotes more advanced theory of mind and executive function skills during a time when these skills are undergoing rapid development. A total of 42 children (Mage = 40.45 months; 22 boys and 20 girls) who showed no initial ability to deceive were randomly assigned to an experimental condition or a control condition. In both conditions, they played a hide-and-seek game against an adult opponent on 4 consecutive days, but only the children in the experimental condition were taught how to deceive the opponent in order to win the game. Unlike children in the control condition, children in the experimental condition significantly improved their executive function and theory of mind skills, providing the first evidence that learning to deceive causally enhances cognitive skills in young children.

The current study investigated the development of second-order lying and its relation to theory of mind and executive function. Previous studies have examined only first-order lying, in which a child makes an untruthful statement to intentionally deceive an unsuspecting opponent. As opposed to first-order lying, second-order lying requires the use of both lies and truths to deceive an opponent because the opponent is fully aware of the liar’s deceptive intention. Here, we used a modified hide-and-seek task, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either one of their hands for opponents to find. In this task, the opponents did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children. Thus, children could not win the desirable reward if they only told lies to deceive; they needed to switch between telling lies and telling truths (i.e., second-order lies) to deceive opponents. The results showed that children could tell second-order lies by 4 years of age, and their ability to do so was significantly related only to the second-order ignorance scores (early second-order theory of mind understanding). The current findings suggest that second-order ignorance, but not second-order false belief understanding, contributes to children’s second-order lying.

Past research shows that parental mental state talk (MST) is closely associated with children’s theory-of-mind (ToM) understanding. The current study extends previous work by investigating whether parental MST is also associated with children’s ToM in action (i.e., lying). A total of 90 Singaporean 3- to 5-year-olds participated in this study with their parents. Parental MST was measured using a storytelling task with a wordless picture book. Mediation analysis revealed an indirect effect: Children’s ToM understanding served as a mediator in the path between parental MST and children’s lying, whereas there was no significant direct effect of parental MST on children’s lying. This study is the first to focus on the relation between parental MST and ToM in an applied setting. Our findings suggest that parental MST can help children to develop sociocognitive skills, which in turn can help children to gain the insight that lying may be used as a strategy for personal gain.

This study explored whether children's (N = 158; 4- to 9 years old) nonverbal facial expressions can be used to identify when children are being deceptive. Using a computer vision program to automatically decode children's facial expressions according to the Facial Action Coding System, this study employed machine learning to determine whether facial expressions can be used to discriminate between children who concealed breaking a toy(liars) and those who did not break a toy(nonliars). Results found that, regardless of age or history of maltreatment, children's facial expressions could accurately (73%) be distinguished between liars and nonliars. Two emotions, surprise and fear, were more strongly expressed by liars than nonliars. These findings provide evidence to support the use of automatically coded facial expressions to detect children's deception.

Starting in early childhood, children are socialized to be honest. However, they are also expected to avoid telling the truth in sensitive situations if doing so could be seen as inappropriate or impolite. Across two studies (total N = 358), the reasoning of 3- to 5-year-old children in such a scenario was investigated by manipulating whether the information in question would be helpful to the recipient. The studies used a reverse rouge paradigm, in which a confederate with a highly salient red mark on her nose asked children whether she looked okay prior to having her picture taken. In Study 1, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark was temporary and the confederate did not know it was there. In Study 2, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark could be concealed with makeup. These findings show that for children as young as age 3, decisions about whether to tell the truth are influenced by the likelihood that the information would be helpful to the recipient.

Prior research has suggested that bilingual children demonstrate reduced social bias relative to their monolingual peers. In particular, they exhibit less implicit bias against racial outgroups. However, the cognitive determinants of racial bias in bilingual children remain unclear. In the current study, relationships between racial bias and three cognitive factors (inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and perspective-taking ability), along with language proficiency and parental education, were investigated in a sample of bilingual preschoolers (N = 55). Children were bilingual learners of English and Mandarin. Results demonstrated that implicit bias was predicted by cognitive flexibility, independent of variation in inhibitory control, second language vocabulary, perspective taking, and parental education. In contrast, explicit bias was predicted by parental education alone and not by cognitive or linguistic factors. Findings suggest that increased cognitive flexibility, often thought to be an outgrowth of bilingual experience, may also be associated with a reduction in implicit bias. Findings are discussed in terms of specific mechanisms that may link cognitive factors, bilingualism, and racial bias.

Several honesty promotion techniques have been established for children living in Western cultures; however, limited research has examined the effectiveness of these techniques among non-Western children. Recently, inducing self-awareness (by looking at oneself in a mirror) was found to be effective in promoting young Western children's honesty. The present investigation compared the effectiveness of this self-awareness technique to a novel other-awareness technique (looking at a photograph of a peer) in promoting young Chinese children's honesty. Chinese children aged 3 and 4 years (N = 121) completed a modified temptation resistance paradigm where they were requested not to peek at a toy in the experimenter's absence. Children were randomly assigned to a Self-Awareness, Peer (other-awareness), or Control condition. When asked whether they peeked at the toy, children in the Self-Awareness condition were significantly more likely to tell the truth compared to those in the Control condition. No significant differences in truth-telling emerged between the Peer and Control conditions. The present results demonstrate the cross-cultural application of self-awareness as an honesty promoting technique with young children. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? High rates of dishonesty persist across cultures. Social and cultural values can shape lie-telling behaviours. Inducing self-awareness promotes honesty in Western children. What does this study add? A tool for promoting honesty in non-Western cultures. Inducing self-awareness promotes honesty in Chinese children. Inducing other-awareness was not effective in promoting honesty in Chinese children.

Theory of mind (ToM) has long been recognized to play a major role in children’s social functioning. However, no direct evidence confirms the causal linkage between the two. In the current study, we addressed this significant gap by examining whether ToM causes the emergence of lying, an important social skill. We showed that after participating in ToM training to learn about mental-state concepts, 3-year-olds who originally had been unable to lie began to deceive consistently. This training effect lasted for more than a month. In contrast, 3-year-olds who participated in control training to learn about physical concepts were significantly less inclined to lie than the ToM-trained children. These findings provide the first experimental evidence supporting the causal role of ToM in the development of social competence in early childhood.

The present study examined how different brain regions interact with each other during spontaneous honest vs. dishonest communication. More specifically, we took a complex network approach based on the graph-theory to analyze neural response data when children are spontaneously engaged in honest or dishonest acts. Fifty-nine right-handed children between 7 and 12 years of age participated in the study. They lied or told the truth out of their own volition. We found that lying decreased both the global and local efficiencies of children’s functional neural network. This finding, for the first time, suggests that lying disrupts the efficiency of children’s cortical network functioning. Further, it suggests that the graph theory based network analysis is a viable approach to study the neural development of deception.

We investigated how the ability to deceive emerges in early childhood among a sample of young preschoolers (Mean age = 34.7 months). We did this via a 10-session microgenetic method that took place over a 10-day period. In each session, children played a zero-sum game against an adult to win treats. In the game, children hid the treats and had opportunities (10 trials) to win them by providing deceptive information about their whereabouts to the adult. Although children initially showed little or no ability to deceive, most spontaneously discovered deception and systematically used it to win the game by the tenth day. Both theory of mind and executive function skills were predictive of relatively faster patterns of discovery. These results are the first to provide evidence for the importance of cognitive skills and social experience in the discovery of deception over time in early childhood.

Elementary school children’s cheating behavior and its cognitive correlates were investigated using a guessing game. Children ( n = 95) between 8 and 12 years of age were asked to guess which side of the screen a coin would appear on and received rewards based on their self-reported accuracy. Children’s cheating behavior was measured by examining whether children failed to adhere to the game rules by falsely reporting their accuracy. Children’s theory-of-mind understanding and executive functioning skills were also assessed. The majority of children cheated during the guessing game, and cheating behavior decreased with age. Children with better working memory and inhibitory control were less likely to cheat. However, among the cheaters, those with greater cognitive flexibility use more tactics while cheating. Results revealed the unique role that executive functioning plays in children’s cheating behavior: Like a double-edged sword, executive functioning can inhibit children’s cheating behavior, on the one hand, while it can promote the sophistication of children’s cheating tactics, on the other.

The present study focused on the potential application of fNIRS in the detection of concealed information. Participants either committed a mock crime or not and then were presented with a randomized series of probes (crime-related information) and irrelevants (crime-irrelevant information) in a standard concealed information test (CIT). Participants in the guilty group were instructed to conceal crime-related information they obtained from the mock crime, thus making deceptive response to the probes. Meanwhile, their brain activity to probes and irrelevants was recorded by functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). At the group level, we found that probe items were associated with longer reaction times and greater activity in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and supplementary motor cortex than irrelevant items in the guilty group, but not in the innocent group. These findings provided evidence on neural correlates of recognition during a CIT. Finally, on the basis of the activity in bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and supplementary motor cortex, the correct classification of guilty versus innocent participants was approximately 75 % and the combination of fNIRS and reaction time measures yielded a better classification rate of 83.3 %. These findings illustrate the feasibility and promise of using fNIRS to detect concealed information.

The present study used the functional Near-infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) methodology to investigate the neural correlates of elementary school children's own- and other-race face processing. An old-new paradigm was used to assess children's recognition ability of own- and other-race faces. FNIRS data revealed that other-race faces elicited significantly greater [oxy-Hb] changes than own-race faces in the right middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus regions (BA9) and the left cuneus (BA18). With increased age, the [oxy-Hb] activity differences between own- and other-race faces, or the neural other-race effect (NORE), underwent significant changes in these two cortical areas: at younger ages, the neural response to the other-race faces was modestly greater than that to the own-race faces, but with increased age, the neural response to the own-race faces became increasingly greater than that to the other-race faces. Moreover, these areas had strong regional functional connectivity with a swath of the cortical regions in terms of the neural other-race effect that also changed with increased age. We also found significant and positive correlations between the behavioral other-race effect (reaction time) and the neural other-race effect in the right middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus regions (BA9). These results taken together suggest that children, like adults, devote different amounts of neural resources to processing own- and other-race faces, but the size and direction of the neural other-race effect and associated functional regional connectivity change with increased age.

Deception is commonly seen in everyday social interactions. However, most of the knowledge about the underlying neural mechanism of deception comes from studies where participants were instructed when and how to lie. To study spontaneous deception, we designed a guessing game modeled after Greene and Paxton (2009) "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(30), 12506-12511", in which lying is the only way to achieve the performance level needed to end the game. We recorded neural responses during the game using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). We found that when compared to truth-telling, spontaneous deception, like instructed deception, engenders greater involvement of such prefrontal regions as the left superior frontal gyrus. We also found that the correct-truth trials produced greater neural activities in the left middle frontal gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus than the incorrect-truth trials, suggesting the involvement of the reward system. Furthermore, the present study confirmed the feasibility of using NIRS to study spontaneous deception.

Executive function (EF) plays vital roles in our everyday adaptation to the ever-changing environment. However, limited existing studies have linked EF to the resting-state brain activity. The functional connectivity in the resting state between the sub-regions of the brain can reveal the intrinsic neural mechanisms involved in cognitive processing of EF without disturbance from external stimuli. The present study investigated the relations between the behavioral executive function (EF) scores and the resting-state functional network topological properties in the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC). We constructed complex brain functional networks in the PFC from 90 healthy young adults using functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). We calculated the correlations between the typical network topological properties (regional topological properties and global topological properties) and the scores of both the Total EF and components of EF measured by computer-based Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB). We found that the Total EF scores were positively correlated with regional properties in the right dorsal superior frontal gyrus (SFG), whereas the opposite pattern was found in the right triangular inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Different EF components were related to different regional properties in various PFC areas, such as planning in the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), working memory mainly in the right MFG and triangular IFG, short-term memory in the left dorsal SFG, and task switch in the right MFG. In contrast, there were no significant findings for global topological properties. Our findings suggested that the PFC plays an important role in individuals' behavioral performance in the executive function tasks. Further, the resting-state functional network can reveal the intrinsic neural mechanisms involved in behavioral EF abilities.

We revisit intergroup prejudice by distinguishing two separable decisions in norm enforcement, first, punish or not, and second, how much to punish, with a third party punishment game. We find that ingroup favoritism only occurs when subjects decide to punish or not, but not when decide how much to punish, suggesting that these two decisions follow different behavioral rules.

The present study focused on neural correlates underlying second-order deception. In first-order deception, the recipient of deception is unaware of the deceiver's deceptive intention. However, during second-order deception, the recipient is fully aware of the deceiver's deceptive intention and thus the deceiver needs to use both lies and truths to deceive the recipient. Using the functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) methodology and a naturalistic interactive game, we found that second-order deception elicited significantly greater [oxy-Hb] changes in the prefrontal cortex (the right superior frontal gyrus (SFG), BA6) than the non-deceptive control condition. This finding suggests that second-order deception, like first-order deception, engages specifically the cortical regions associated with the planning of complex actions and goal processing. We also found that lying to deceive produced greater neural activities in the right middle frontal gyrus than truth-telling to deceive. This suggests that although both actions serve deceptive purposes, making a false statement contradicting the true state of affairs still requires more executive control and thus greater neural responses in the cortical regions associated with this function. In addition, we found that the successful deception produced greater neural activities in a broad area of the prefrontal frontal cortex than failure to deceive, indicating the involvement of the cortical reward system during second-order deception. Further, failure of truth-telling to deceive produced greater neural responses in the right SFG than failure of lying to deceive. The present findings taken together suggest that second-order deception engages both the cortical executive and reward systems.

The neural basis of self and identity has received extensive research. However, most of these existing studies have focused on situations where the internal representation of the self is consistent with the external one. The present study used fMRI methodology to examine the neural correlates of two different types of identity conflict: identity faking and concealment. Participants were presented with a sequence of names and asked to either conceal their own identity or fake another one. The results revealed that the right insular cortex and bilaterally inferior frontal gyrus were more active for identity concealment compared to the control condition, whereas identity faking elicited a significantly larger percentage signal increase than the control condition in the right superior frontal gyrus, left calcarine, and right caudate. These results suggest that different neural systems associated with both identity processing and deception were involved in identity concealment and faking.

The present study examined Chinese children’s moral evaluations of truths and lies about one’s own pro-social acts. Children ages 7, 9, and 11 were read vignettes in which a protagonist performs a good deed and is asked about it by a teacher, either in front of the class or in private. In response, the protagonist either tells a modest lie, which is highly valued by the Chinese culture, or tells an immodest truth, which violates the Chinese cultural norms about modesty. Children were asked to identify whether the protagonist’s statement was the truth or a lie, and to evaluate how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ the statement was. Chinese children rated modest lies more positively than immodest truths, with this effect becoming more pronounced with age. Rural Chinese children and those with at least one nonprofessional parent rated immodest truths less positively when they were told in public rather than in private. Furthermore, Chinese children of parents with high collectivism scores valued modest lies more than did children of parents with low collectivism scores. These findings suggest that both macro- and micro-cultural factors contribute significantly to children’s moral understanding of truth and lie telling.

Erratum to “Neural correlates of spontaneous deception: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study” [Neuropsychologia, 51(4), 704–712] Xiao Pan Ding , Xiaoqing Gao , Genyue Fu , Kang Lee d,e,nn a Hangzhou College of Preschool Teacher Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Hangzhou 310012, China b School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China c Centre for Vision Research, York University, Toronto, Canada ONM4N3M6 d Dr. Eric Jackman Institute of Child Study, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada ONM5R2X2 e Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, LaJolla, CA 92093-0109, US