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Alien addition lines are important for transferring useful genes from alien species into common wheat. Rye is an important and valuable gene resource for improving wheat disease resistance, yield, and environment adaptation. A new wheat-rye addition line, N9436B, was developed from the progeny of the cross of common wheat (Triticum aestivum L., 2n = 6x = 42, AABBDD) cultivar Shaanmai 611 and rye (Secale cereal L., 2n = 2x = 14, RR) accession Austrian rye. We characterized this new line by cytology, genomic in situ hybridization (GISH), fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH), molecular markers, and disease resistance screening. N9436B was stable in morphology and cytology, with a chromosome composition of 2n = 42 + 2t = 22II. GISH investigations showed that this line contained two rye chromosomes. GISH, FISH, and molecular maker identification suggested that the introduced R chromosome and the missing wheat chromosome arms were 1R chromosome and 2DL chromosome arm, respectively. N9436B exhibited 30-37 spikelets per spike and a high level of resistance to powdery mildew (Blumeriagraminis f. sp. tritici, Bgt) isolate E09 at the seedling stage. N9436B was cytologically stable, had the trait of multiple spikelets, and was resistant to powdery mildew; this line should thus be useful in wheat improvement. Key words: wheat-rye addition line, multiple spikelets, powdery mildew resistance, GISH and FISH, molecular makers. Les lignees d'addition exotiques constituent un moyen important pour transferer des genes utiles d'especes exotiques au ble. Le seigle constitue une ressource genetique importante et de grande valeur pour augmenter la resistance aux maladies, le rendement et l'adaptation environnementale chez le ble. Une nouvelle lignee d'addition ble-seigle, N9436B, a ete developpee ?1 partir de la descendance du croisement entre le cultivar Shaanmai 611 du ble tendre (Triticum aestivum L., 2n = 6x = 42, AABBDD) et l'accession Austrian du seigle (Secale cereale L., 2n = 2x = 14, RR). Les auteurs ont caracterise cette nouvelle lignee par le biais d'analyses de cytologie, d'hybridation genomique in situ (GISH), d'hybridation in situ en fluorescence (FISH), de marqueurs moleculaires et de la resistance a une maladie. La lignee N9436B s'est montree stable tant en matiere de morphologie que de cytologie, avec une formule chromosomique de 2n = 42 + 2t = 22II. Les analyses GISH ont montre que cette lignee possedait deux chromosomes du seigle. Les analyses GISH, FISH et les marqueurs moleculaires ont suggere que le chromosome R introduit et le bras chromosomique manquant etaient respectivement le 1R et le 2DL. N9436B presente 30 a 37 epillets par epi et un niveau eleve de resistance a l'isolat E09 du blanc (Blumeriagraminis f. sp. tritici, Bgt) au stade plantule. N9436B affichait une stabilite cytologique, de nombreux epillets et la resistance au blanc; cette lignee devrait ainsi s'averer utile en amelioration genetique du ble. [Traduit par la Redaction] Mots-cles : lignee d'addition ble-seigle, epillets multiples, resistance au blanc, GISH et FISH, marqueurs moleculaires., Introduction Rye (Secale cereale L., 2n = 2x = 14, RR), a species closely related to wheat (Triticum aestivum L., 2n = 6x = 42, AABBDD), has been used extensively [...]

Considering information security insurance, this paper investigates an information security investment game between two firms with complementary information assets. Each firm's information security investment and expected profit in Nash equilibrium (i.e., firms make decisions individually) and social optimum (i.e., firms make decisions jointly) are analyzed through rigorous theoretical analyses and numerical examples. We find that making decisions jointly will make the two firms as a whole obtain more profits than when they make decisions alone, whereas this does not mean that each firm will benefit from the joint decision‐making process. Our results show that a firm yields a smaller expected profit in the joint decision game than the individual decision game under some conditions. In addition, the impacts of a higher insurance price and a higher investment efficiency on a firm's information security investment and expected profit are explored. The results indicate that, for a single firm, a higher insurance price does not necessarily result in smaller profit, and a higher investment efficiency does not always lead to larger profit. Then we design a compensation‐based contract to coordinate the two firms' information security investments when they make decisions individually. The contract will make the two firms achieve social optimum and ensure that each firm yields more profits than firms without the contract. Finally, we extend our research by setting the insurance amount as a decision variable to verify the above analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]