Search

Permeated by traumatic memories and claims for recognition and compensation of the colonial past, the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan experienced intense strains during the administrations of Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) and Moon Jae-in (2017-2022). Park stipulated that recognition of the colonial past would be a prerequisite for improving relations with Tokyo, and the Comfort Women Agreement, unexpectedly signed, had its legitimacy challenged. During his term, Moon invalidated the Comfort Women Agreement and demanded a resolution centered on the demands of the victims, while also advocating for Japanese companies to compensate South Koreans forced to work in its facilities during the colonization. In a different panorama, the conservative government of Yoon Suk-yeol (2022-present) adopted a stance of restructuring the South Korea-Japan relations without criticizing the effects of colonization or seeking Japan's acknowledgment of responsibility. This research analyses how the administrations of Park, Moon, and Yoon have handled the colonial agenda in South Korea's foreign policy, resulting in either friction or rapprochement with Japan. It is argued that Park intensified historical grievances, even after the Comfort Women Agreement, due to its unsatisfactory approach. Moon, focused on healing the colonial wounds, faced diplomatic, economic and security friction amid Japan's unwillingness to revisit the past. Lastly, Yoon, in seeking reconciliation with Japan, achieved rapprochement in a tone of submission, undermining the victims' claims for justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea, caught amid the intensifying Sino-US peer competition, has begun to re-orientate its foreign policy under President Yoon Suk-yeol, significantly shifting it away from his predecessor President Moon Jae-in. At the crux of these policy changes is a shift away from the so-called "Three Noes", which have existed as a policy stopgap in order to stabilize Seoul's position between China and the US following the 2017 THAAD debacle. This policy shift indicates that the Yoon administration has begun removing policy stopgaps that facilitated hedging behavior and is trimming South Korea's hedge tacking harder on the US for security and aligning as a core Asian state with the Rules-based International Order. Nevertheless, careful strategic calculus is required to avoid backlash from Beijing, despite Yoon seeking closer alignment with Washington. The policy shift underway has the geostrategic potential to solidify the Northeast Asian flank of Washington's efforts to counter Beijing, with a phalanx of Asia-Pacific allies and partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the outcomes and examines the implications of South Korea's 2022 presidential election on the country's domestic politics and economics, specifically regarding the new government's exercise of executive power. While the 2022 election saw the return of the conservatives to power after five years of a progressive government, this article argues that the election won by Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party reflects the growing polarised politics along partisan lines between conservatives and progressives – rooted in the contingency of class formation through the long-standing neo-liberal policy of the South Korean developmental state. Such political divide, which has taken place amid the broader context of the increasing polarising populism across developed and developing countries in recent years, constrains the Yoon administration from addressing domestic issues, notably economic woes such as ongoing income inequality, sluggish job creation, fluctuating housing prices, as well as corruption that links high-profile politicians and chaebol. Although power compromise with opponents is essential to cope with limitations, this article contends that it is less likely under the circumstances of severe political tensions between the ruling and opposition parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of the term 'imperial presidency' in South Korea refers to the fact that the country's 1987 constitution grants the state's highest office holder de facto imperial powers with regard to domestic and foreign policy making. This version of the term therefore differs from Arthur M. Schlesinger's usage in the US context, which was critical of the discretionary powers exercised by US presidents in efforts to subvert the checks and balances of the US Constitution. Concentrating political power in the South Korean presidency severely curtails the work of the other political institutions, including its parliament (the National Assembly). Every time the presidency changes hands, the leadership structures of all other public institutions are subjected to major restructuring according to political loyalty, which interrupts their routine functioning. Overall, the presidency in its current form is dysfunctional and works as a barrier against democratic deepening. This article examines why lengthy debate over South Korea's imperial presidency has so far failed to result in comprehensive constitutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most consequential political event that took place on the peninsula in 2022 was the election of a new president in South Korea. The very narrow victory of the conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol marked a clear break with his predecessor Moon Jae-in and returned the image of a very divided country. The division continued throughout the year and contributed to a rapid and sharp decrease in the approval rating of the new president, together with a series of disasters and incidents that hit the country. The election of Yoon also influenced inter-Korean relations, with a return to a tougher position in Seoul. The resurgence of missile tests by North Korea, combined with this new attitude in the South, inevitably led to an exacerbation of tension that took the form of repeated military provocations and reactions, especially in the second half of the year. The spread of COVID-19 continued to be a relevant factor influencing social and political developments on the Korean peninsula. On one side, South Korea was able to adapt its strategy to the spread of the new and much more contagious «Omicron» variant; on the other side, North Korea experienced its first, officially recognized, wave of infections, that did not lead to the collapse of the country’s healthcare system and was managed with a relatively low number of deaths, according to government data. In terms of international relations, the attitude of both Koreas was a return towards traditional alliances and practices. North Korea openly supported Russia, and its invasion of Ukraine, and China, in order to weaken the position of the United States and to benefit from the split among the great powers within the UN Security Council. South Korea’s new president restored the pre-eminence of the alliance with the U.S. and of the country’s role within the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]