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The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to cont...

In this chapter, it is argued that the security bills are the product of Abe’s pragmatism. This means that Prime Minister Abe exerted great efforts to make the security bills acceptable to Japanese voters largely by abandoning his original ideological agenda. It can be said that Abe’s administration is not anxious to make a radical shift in national security policy, as that might endanger previous positive support for Abe’s security agendas. In this sense, Abe’s security shifts have so far been largely the result of incrementalism. Furthermore, it remains necessary to create a new consensus on Japan’s security strategy that can move Japan beyond the Yoshida Doctrine. Abe’s intention has been to replace that doctrine with his own. But the task remains undone.

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy.

In Japan, two political issues came to the forefront in the year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. While usually dealt with separately, the Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, issued on August 14, 2015, and the security legislation based on the concept of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” both relate to the question of how we view Japan's place in international society. This article examines how both these issues support Japan's commitment to maintaining its identity as a peace-loving nation and its responsibility to contribute to international peace and prosperity.

For much of its postwar history, Japan's diplomacy consisted of three pillars: “the United Nations centrism,” “cooperation with free countries,” and “being a member of Asia.” However, beginning in the twenty-first century, two new diplomatic strategies for East Asia have emerged. These two paths exhibit different philosophies which however share some elements. This article examines the “East Asian Community” vision and the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” initiative and identifies the key concepts that they share. Finally, it suggests that if Japan's two foreign policy visions were unified, the strategy would be strengthened.

The year 2011 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Hague Declaration of 1991 between Japan and the European Community. This declaration was originally intended to enhance the bilateral relationship between Japan and Europe, but the reality was little more than a reluctant promotion of several insignificant programs. Meanwhile, although the EU has significantly developed its partnership with China, it has become ambivalent about the future of EU-Asia relations. While endeavouring to expand its economic ties with China, the EU also attempts to be a ‘normative power’, but, because of the limited nature of the EU's influence in East Asia, it needs normative partners in this region. This article argues that the EU-Japan relationship is becoming more vital because of the increasing importance of norms due to the rise of China. In the last decade, the Japanese government has increasingly emphasized the importance of values and norms in its diplomacy. At the same time, both the EU and Japan have been ...

This article examines the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” which symbolizes a new direction of Japanese diplomacy and reinforced cooperation with countries where such ideals as democracy, freedom, and human rights are shared. Originally proposed by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, the concept has since moved into the background but nevertheless remains in the thoughts of current Japanese diplomatic strategy.

When Abe Shinzo entered a meeting room in the Prime Minister’s Office in the afternoon of May 15, 2014, a group of Japanese journalists awaited his arrival to take a picture of an historic moment. Members of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, including myself, were also there and due to submit our final report to him recommending that the government revise the previous constitutional interpretation on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The submission of this report, as expected, aroused a great political debate in Japan, which has not abated.

After the end of the Cold War Japan was forced to search for a new identity in international politics and security. Such a search was accompanied by fundamental changes in Japanese domestic and foreign policies and became even more imminent after Japan lost the status as the world’s second biggest economy to China a few years ago. As regards domestic politics, the decade-old rule of Japan’s Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) came to end, albeit temporarily as it turned out. Currently, Japan is experiencing the structural transformation of both its domestic and foreign policies.