Search

Why did Poland not join the Eurozone despite being integrated economically and dependent on investments and trade with existing Eurozone countries? The reluctance of its government seems puzzling taking into consideration Polish economic exposure to Eurozone countries as well as its commitment to switch to the euro stemming from EU treaties. The Polish governmental position on Eurozone accession demonstrates that monetary integration is not only an economic and legal issue, but it also results from political decisions of individual governments. This paper argues that a complementary understanding of the position of the Polish government on Eurozone accession is possible by looking at domestic ideas and interests. For this aim, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. It focuses on the influence of domestic ideas (value-based collective expectations of voters) and interests (cost-benefit calculations of lobby groups) on governmental positions. In applying the societal approach, this paper has two goals: first, to show that the Polish governments’ reluctance to join the Eurozone stems from domestic societal pressures (value-based ideas and material interests) and, second, to specify the conditions for either ideas’ or interests’ individual bearing on the government’s preference.

Der Beitrag untersucht das Verhältnis zwischen administrativer wohlfahrtsstaatlicher und identitär-partikularer Solidarität. Zunächst wird der Solidaritätsbegriff theoretisch in seiner Mehrdimensionalität entfaltet und dann die beiden Modi der administrativen und der identitär-partikularen Solidarität unterschieden. Diese theoriegeleitete Differenzierung wird im empirischen Teil mit den Daten aus der fünften Welle der European Values Study verknüpft. In einer Mehrebenenanalyse wird für die Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Union untersucht, wie sich Religiosität und nationenbezogene Zugehörigkeit auf Einstellungen zur administrativen Solidarität in unterschiedlichen staatlichen Kontexten auswirken. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine mehrdimensionale Untersuchung von Solidarität das komplexe Verhältnis von administrativer und identitär-partikularer Solidarität näher aufschlüsseln kann und Religiosität und nationenbezogene Zugehörigkeit die Dimensionen der administrativen Solidarität je unterschiedlich beeinflussen: Während Religion teils konkurrierende Einflüsse aufweist, scheint Nation eher unterstützend zu wirken. The paper analyzes the relationship between welfare state-related administrative and identity-based solidarity. The article starts by unfolding the multidimensionality of solidarity, to then differentiate between the two types of administrative and identity-based solidarity. These theory-driven considerations are operationalized and confronted with data from the fifth wave of the European Values Study. A multilevel analysis shows for the member states of the European Union how religious and national identities influence attitudes towards measures of administrative solidarity within differing country-related contexts. The study concludes that a multidimensional analysis of administrative and identity-based solidarities may indeed facilitate the understanding of their complex relationship. Religious and national identities influence administrative solidarity in its various dimensions in quite different ways: while religion has contradictory effects on administrative solidarity, the effects of national identity seem rather to support the latter’s strength. Cet article étudie le rapport entre la solidarité administrative relevant de l’État-providence et la solidarité identitaire particulariste. Le concept de solidarité est tout d’abord déployé théoriquement dans toute sa multidimensionnalité puis une distinction est établie entre deux de ses modes : la solidarité administrative et la solidarité identitaire particulariste. Dans la partie empirique, cette différenciation théorique est mise en corrélation avec des données issues de la cinquième vague de la European Values Study. Pour étudier l’influence de la religiosité et de l’appartenance nationale sur les attitudes vis-à-vis de la solidarité administrative dans différents contextes étatiques, une analyse multi-niveaux a été conduite pour les pays membres de l’Union européenne. Cette analyse montre qu’une étude multidimensionnelle de la solidarité permet de déterminer plus précisément le rapport complexe entre solidarité administrative et solidarité identitaire particulariste et que la religiosité et l’appartenance nationale peuvent exercer une influence différente sur les dimensions de la solidarité administrative : Tandis que la religion représente une influence en partie concurrente, la nation semble plutôt avoir un effet de soutien.

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of “right” and “left,” this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.

Environmental issues, sustainability, and climate change have become the targets of many policies from international and governmental organizations including the EU’s European Green Deal action plan. This plan provides tools to address them—which include support for the circular economy, implementation of energy and environmental taxes, and investment in environmental protection—with the aim of favoring the well-being of EU citizens. In this context, this study analyses the impact of several parameters (environmental matters, global warming, circular economy, energy and environmental taxes, and expenditure and investment on the environment) on life satisfaction, or subjective well-being, and their effects on 33 European countries. For this purpose, four econometric models were carried out using data collected from the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Values Study (EVS), and the World Bank and Eurostat, reflecting subjective citizen satisfaction data. The findings present a highly significant inverse relationship between life satisfaction variables and both environmental problems and energy taxes. Additionally, there is a highly significant positive relationship between circular economy, environmental tax, and environmental protection expenditure parameters and life satisfaction variables, as well as, to a lesser degree of significance, with noise pollution from neighbours.

While we know a lot about the typical type of radical right-wing (RRWP) voter, individual religiosity in explaining support for RRWPs has eluded consistent scholarly attention. The mixed results available from the scarce literature find both positive and negative associations between religiosity and RRWPs vote. The variation in these relationships is puzzling, especially if we consider how RRWPs often present themselves as guardians of native ethnic and religious identity. In this paper we argue that religiosity increases the chance of voting for RRWPs when ethnic relations are a salient issue in the political system. We test our theory using multilevel regression modeling on the European Social Survey, specifically Rounds 7, 8 and 9 and replicate our results based on the European Values Study from 2017. We find that religiosity is a significant predictor of the RRWP vote when there are salient ethnic relations in the political system, proxied by the presence of an ethnic minority party. On the other hand, in countries without minority parties, non-religious individuals are more likely to vote for RRWPs.

Italy is the cradle of Catholicism and, despite the secularization process, religion continues to be part of its national culture. Although Italian sociologists have investigated the religious paradigm in Italy, there are aspects of such phenomenon still little explored. This paper examines the potential influence religion has on individuals’ life satisfaction. Data from the European Value Study survey provides evidence of a two-way interaction between religion and life satisfaction, with a substantial effect only in the case of public religious forms. This association seems to be moved by the mechanism of social support, and it differs across Italian regions. Results confirm the hypothesis that in areas of Italy more exposed to social isolation religion is associated whit life satisfaction because, in those areas, religion supplies peoples’ need to belong. Further confirmation of this analysis came from the fact that in grey zones of “religious conformism” the influence of religion on life satisfaction is marginal., Italian Sociological Review, Vol 11, No 2 (2021)

Polazeći od dvodimenzionanog razumijevanja povjerenja u političke institucije, u radu provjeravamo prediktivnost povjerenja u vladu i predstavničke institucije i povjerenja u provedbene institucije za objašnjenje glasanja te prosvjednog sudjelovanja, kao i moguću posredujuću ulogu zadovoljstva funkcioniranjem političkog sustava. Rad se temelji na hrvatskim podatcima petog vala Europskog istraživanja vrednota – EIV (European Values Study – EVS, 2017). Pojedinačne povezanosti dvaju oblika povjerenja i dvaju tipova sudjelovanja pokazuju da je izraženije povjerenje u vladu i predstavničke institucije povezano s češćim glasanjem te manjom sklonošću prosvjednom sudjelovanju, dok je povjerenje u provedbene institucije povezano samo s manjom sklonošću prosvjednom sudjelovanju. Ujedno, oba su oblika političkog povjerenja snažno međusobno povezana te praćena većim zadovoljstvom funkcioniranjem političkog sustava, a koje je u slaboj pozitivnoj vezi s glasanjem te u negativnoj sa sklonošću prosvjedima. Multivarijatnom analizom potvrđen je samo samostalan pozitivni doprinos povjerenja u vladu i predstavničke institucije za pojašnjenje glasanja. Rezultate raspravljamo u kontekstu visoke povezanosti dvaju oblika političkog povjerenja u hrvatskim uvjetima te dosadašnjih nalaza o odrednicama glasanja i prosvjednog sudjelovanja kao dvaju oblika političkog sudjelovanja., Starting from a two-dimensional understanding of trust in political institutions, the paper examines trust in the government and representative institutions and trust in executive institutions as predictors of voting and protest participation, as well as the possible mediating role of satisfaction with the functioning of the political system. The paper is based on the Croatian data from the fifth wave of the European Values Study (EVS, 2017). Individual associations between the two forms of trust and the two types of participation indicate that greater trust in government and representative institutions is associated with more frequent voting and a lower propensity for protest participation. In contrast, trust in executive institutions is only associated with a lower propensity for protest participation. At the same time, both forms of political trust are strongly interconnected and accompanied with greater satisfaction with the functioning of the political system, which is weakly positively associated with voting and negatively associated with the propensity for protest participation. The multivariate analysis confirmed only the trust in government and representative institutions as a unique positive predictor of voting. The results are discussed in view of the high association between the two forms of political trust in the Croatian context, and the findings to date regarding the determinants of voting and protest participation as two forms of political participation.

Left-right partisan conflict has been a key driver of welfare state expansion and retrenchment over time and across countries. Yet, we know very little about how left-right differences in party appeals vary across social policy domains. Why are some issues contentious while there is broad consensus on others? This paper starts from the simple premise that partisan conflict is a function of how popular a certain policy is. Based on this assumption, it argues that the left-right gap should be (1) larger for revenue-side issues than for expenditure-side issues, (2) larger for policies targeted at groups that are viewed as less deserving and (3) larger for more redistributive programs than less redistributive ones (e.g. means-tested versus earnings-related benefits). These expectations are tested on fine-grained policy data coded from 65 Austrian party manifestos issued between 1970 and 2017 (N = 18,219). The analysis strongly supports the revenue–expenditure hypothesis and the deservingness hypothesis, but not the redistribution hypothesis.