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Consider a dual-oligopoly game model of two manufacturers and consumers, where the government collects taxes from manufacturers based on their carbon emissions and the manufacturers can recycle waste products from consumers to reduce production cost and carbon emission taxes. Since manufactures are taking various strategies to achieve carbon abatement, models are also built under different circumstances. After solving the single phase equilibrium solution, a multi-period dynamic game model is further built. The complex characteristics, such as bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity are analyzed through 3-D stable state diagrams, parameter basin diagrams, and bifurcation diagrams. The results show that the system stability range, which is kept by the manufacturer's recovery price and its adjustment speed, reduces with the increase of carbon tax. Compared with manufacturer 1 who sells new products and recycles waste ones at the same time, the manufacturer 2 who only sells but not recycles has slighter influence on carbon emissions, and the sensitivity of consumers to price on the stability of the system is quite lower. • It is proposed that manufacturers adopt recycling and remanufacturing strategies to reduce carbon tax. • Coordination and equilibrium strategies of game system in single-cycle and multi-cycle situations are given. • A chaotic control method is proposed and the complex characteristics of the system are compared and analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a dynamic research and development two-stage input competition game model in the Bertrand duopoly oligopoly market with spillover effects on cost reduction. We investigate the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and local stable conditions and stability region of the Nash equilibrium point by the bifurcation theory. The complex dynamic behaviors of the system are shown by numerical simulations. It is demonstrated that chaos occurs for a range of managerial policies, and the associated unpredictability is solely due to the dynamics of the interaction. We show that the straight line stabilization method is the appropriate management measure to control the chaos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation efficiency is an important index to measure the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises. Numerous researches have been conducted on innovation efficiency at national, regional, and sectoral levels, while there are comparatively few studies on the innovation efficiency of high-tech small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from a micro perspective. Therefore, innovation efficiency of 251 high-tech SMEs listed in China from 2012 to 2015 is measured with the super-SBM model in this paper. The results suggest that the overall innovation efficiency is low but shows an upward trend. In addition, the antecedents of innovation efficiency are explored using the panel regression model and the conclusions are as follows: (1) government subsidies, ownership concentration, and market competition deter enterprise innovation efficiency, and the impact of ownership concentration is found to be the most significant; (2) firm size and asset-liability ratio bear positively on enterprise innovation efficiency, with the effect of asset-liability ratio being greater; (3) firm age has significantly positive effects on scale efficiency but not on innovation efficiency and pure technical efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation efficiency is an important index to measure the innovation performance of high-tech enterprises. Numerous researches have been conducted on innovation efficiency at national, regional, and sectoral levels, while there are comparatively few studies on the innovation efficiency of high-tech small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from a micro perspective. Therefore, innovation efficiency of 251 high-tech SMEs listed in China from 2012 to 2015 is measured with the super-SBM model in this paper. The results suggest that the overall innovation efficiency is low but shows an upward trend. In addition, the antecedents of innovation efficiency are explored using the panel regression model and the conclusions are as follows: (1) government subsidies, ownership concentration, and market competition deter enterprise innovation efficiency, and the impact of ownership concentration is found to be the most significant; (2) firm size and asset-liability ratio bear positively on enterprise innovation efficiency, with the effect of asset-liability ratio being greater; (3) firm age has significantly positive effects on scale efficiency but not on innovation efficiency and pure technical efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers price as a strategy using two methods of market segmentation through game theory based on the collected data of several typical cities in Shandong province. Three oligarchs are discussed to analyze the complexity of the market in tobacco system. The effect of different factors on the equilibrium price of Nash equilibrium is discussed. What is more, the variation of parameters drives the system to change to uncertain status, even to bifurcation or chaos. We also discuss the model under normal circumstances, when the three parties jointly take chaos control measures, and its impact on the system. Finally, we clarify chaos control of economic significance. The results indicate that only reasonable pricing strategy is a critical point to achieve maximized profit and maintain orderly operation at the same time, which is a constructive suggestion for tobacco companies’ operational strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, with a great number of household electrical appliances being discarded in every corner of the world every day, household electrical appliances recycling is attracting more attention. In this paper, we build a closed-loop supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a third-party recycler based on the development of "Internet Plus" recovery platform. We thoroughly analyze the model and its evolution by chaos theory, complex dynamics theory, and numerical simulation and introduce the adaptive method to control the chaos of the system. We find that as the manufacturer increases the retail price, the stable area of the market becomes smaller. At the same time, when the manufacturers direct recycle price or the price adjustment range of the products recycled from the third party exceeds a certain threshold, all the recycle prices in the whole market will fluctuate, thus causing market chaos. Among them, as an adjustment decision method, delay strategy reduces the volatility of recycle price and makes it return to a stable state, which is an effective method to control system disorder. In addition, the third-party recycler will change the optimal subsidy model according to the government's price subsidy level, while the manufacturer always prefers the price subsidy model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, based on chaos theory and dynamic system simulation, a dynamic model of a relational leadership system with pressure factors is established and simulated. The study found that the excessive self-leadership and the relational leadership cannot effectively improve the leadership effectiveness of leaders. In addition, with the adjustment of the self-leadership adjustment coefficient, leadership effectiveness will change from a stable state to a chaotic state. Only by adopting limited rational decision-making strategies in multicycle decision-making can leaders maintain a high level of leadership effectiveness. Previous research mainly focuses on the theoretical analysis of the complexity of the leadership system or the issuance of questionnaires, but seldom on the dynamic complex process of the leadership system. This study reveals the complexity and chaos characteristics of the dynamic evolution of the multifactor relational leadership system, puts forward the relational leadership theory and the complex leadership theory under the influence of pressure, and makes some suggestions on how to improve the leadership effectiveness under the complex environment. The research results are of great significance to theoretical innovation and practical application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, fifteen indicators from four dimensions are selected to construct an evaluation system for the happiness of land-lost farmers. The factors affecting the happiness of land-lost farmers are analyzed using the rough DEMATEL method. The results show that land expropriation compensation (F6) and job stability (F7) are the driving factors for improving the happiness of land-lost farmers. The government can improve the social environment policies, such as land acquisition, social security, and employment to influence other factors and improve the level of happiness of land-losing farmers. This study has important guiding significance and reference value for the reform of China's land expropriation, the protection of land-lost farmers' rights and interests and the improvement of their happiness, and the maintenance of social harmony and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we establish a cold chain dynamic game model including a milk manufacturer and two downstream oligopoly supermarkets under the wholesale price contract in the real world. The manufacturer is responsible for the production and cold transportation, and the two retailers sell the product. The Nash equilibrium points and the complexity of the system are discussed. The influence of the decision parameters and the stability of the system are studied by using complexity theory. We reveal the stable regions for the dynamic system. In addition, revenue sharing contract and profit sharing contract are two valuable contracts. In order to see how the two contracts would impact on the system's equilibrium solution and the profits, we establish and analyze two new dynamic models for the cold chain. By the comparison of the analyses under three contracts, we find that the manufacturer's effort of cold transportation will change under different contracts, and the profit distribution of the whole cold chain will be affected. Chaos control is also studied by the method of delay feedback control, in order to provide some management advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly model with market share preference is established. Assume that there is a degree of product difference between the two firms, where one firm takes the price as a decision variable and the other takes the quantity. Both firms are bounded rational, with linear cost functions and demand functions. The stability of the equilibrium points is analyzed, and the effects of some parameters (α, β, d and v1) on the model stability are studied. Basins of attraction are investigated and the evolution process is shown with the increase in the output adjustment speed. The simulation results show that instability will lead to the increase in the average utility of the firm that determines the quantity and reduce the average utility of the firm that determines price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]