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The global shipping industry still frequently faces the problems of low profitability and excessive capacity despite the claimed benefits of capacity sharing between alliance members. This paper investigates capacity sharing within shipping alliance members and its impacts on social welfare under stochastic demand. The dynamic game models constructed in this study examine four scenarios based on whether the alliance members share their surplus capacities and whether their pricing is flexible (their prices are determined before or after the demand realization). The results suggest that flexible pricing always harms the social welfare while capacity sharing improves the social welfare. Without capacity sharing, the government's subsidy or tax is needed when the carriers' service substitute degree is low or high, respectively. If the carriers agree with capacity sharing, the tax is needed under flexible pricing while neither subsidy nor tax is needed under the inflexible pricing. This paper provides explanations on the low profits of the shipping lines with their pricing and alliance strategies. Moreover, the policy implications identified in this study can provide support for governments to make their regulation on carriers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, there has been an increasing demand for policy research focusing on market-based measures for decarbonizing shipping. It is increasingly recognized that more than just technological and operational measures will be needed to achieve the objectives of decarbonizing shipping. This paper presents a quantitative review of the existing research leveraging bibliometric analysis techniques, highlighting the concepts, general trends, research themes and applications within the maritime industry in this field. It sheds light on the evolution of policy and regulations, design details, impacts and methods of quantifying the effects of environmental policies and provides future research directions in this area. The findings and future research agenda may become valuable resources for academic research and industrial practice. • This paper presents a quantitative review on market-based measures towards shipping decarbonization. • A bibliometric analysis on research themes and applications of decarbonization within maritime industry is made. • It sheds light on the evolution of environmental policies and future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper develops an integrated economic model to examine two competing ports' adaptation to climate-change disasters, when they have asymmetric information. • Under publicity policy, the better-informed port initiates a "signaling game". • Under confidentiality policy, both ports make their decisions simultaneously. • The government needs to promote inter-port competition (when they have different information structure) if it decides to publicize port adaptation information. • A joint implementation of the publicity and subsidy policies may result in excessive adaptation investment, leading to social welfare loss. This paper develops an integrated economic model to examine two competing ports' investment in adaptation to climate-change disasters. The ports have asymmetric information on the actual disaster damage. In deciding on adaptation investment, the "leader" port is a better-informed first mover and the "follower" port is a less-informed follower. The government is able to acquire and verify port adaptation information and chooses whether to publicize it (publicity policy) or keep it confidential (confidentiality policy). If the information is publicized, the leader port initiates a signaling game in which it makes a decision first, and the follower acts after observing the leader's decision. Under the confidentiality policy, both ports make their decisions simultaneously. Our analysis shows the following. 1) Under the publicity policy, the leader port does not adopt a pooling strategy; rather, it determines its adaptation and output based on true information on disaster damage (i.e., it implements a separating equilibrium). 2) The publicity policy has two effects: it increases the leader's throughput while decreasing the follower's throughput (i.e., the throughput effect), and it helps rationalize the follower's adaptation investment by making more up-to-date disaster information available (i.e., the adaptation investment effect). 3) When the degree of inter-port competition is high, the publicity policy improves social welfare by increasing the total throughput of the two ports (i.e., an overall positive throughput effect) and rationalizes the follower's adaptation investment (i.e., a positive adaptation investment effect). Otherwise, it reduces the total throughput of the ports (i.e., an overall negative throughput effect). This negative throughput effect may outweigh the positive adaptation investment effect, thereby reducing social welfare. These analytical results suggest that the government needs to promote inter-port competition if it decides to publicize port adaptation information. Finally, we find that the joint implementation of publicity and subsidy policies could result in excessive adaptation investment, leading to social welfare loss. Our study illustrates the important effects of information asymmetry on adaptation investment and has policy implications in the presence of port competition and government subsidy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We examine the joint resilience investment on the cross-country transport infrastructure. • The first-best outcomes can be achieved if the resilience investment is verifiable. • The non-verifiability leads to a downward distortion on investment under higher disruption. • The first-best outcomes can still be achieved under non-verifiability if the disruption is low. Unlike the domestic transport infrastructure, the cross-country ones are subject to more diverse and unconventional disruption risks due to the unstable geopolitical conditions, terrorist attacks, and complex landscape and extreme weather events, thus calling for resilience-related investments from different countries. However, such resilience investment made by one country to deal with such unconventional disruption risk is very hard to be verified by other countries (i.e., non-verifiability). This paper establishes an integrated economic model to analytically examine countries' joint resilience investments on the cross-country transport infrastructure in presence of non-verifiability. Specifically, there is one "investing country" who constructed the infrastructure which is also used by a "host country". Our analytical results suggest that the first-best investment and market outcomes for the global welfare maximization can be achieved if the resilience investment is verifiable. The non-verifiability is, however, found to cause a downward distortion in the resilience investment and an upward distortion in transport price when the probability of the disruption is higher such that the resilience investment only partially covers the potential loss. On the contrary, when the probability of disruption is low so that the resilience investment can lead to the full loss coverage, the first-best outcomes can still be achieved without any distortion. Our analytical model is also extended to account for the intermodal competition. Although our main conclusions still qualitatively hold, the intermodal competition is found to have uncertain effects on the market outcomes, depending on the interaction between the resilience investment cost and the degree of the intermodal competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We model subsidy policies on transport facility adaptation under incomplete information and ambiguity. • Incomplete information and ambiguity make the facility output, adaptation investment and social welfare downwardly distorted. • Two countervailing effects, the "pooling effect" and the "agency cost effect," jointly determine the downward distortions. • When the ambiguity is sufficiently high (or low, respectively), a complete pooling (or partial pooling, respectively) strategy is adopted. • Under ambiguity, a more optimistic government leads to a larger distortion on the regulation outcomes. This paper models subsidy policies on transport facility's adaptation to climate change-related disasters under the government's incompleteness and ambiguity of disaster information. We consider a transport facility (an airport or a seaport) that is in a vertical structure with an upstream facility operator and a few downstream carriers. The exact probability of disaster damage level is privately known by the facility operator, while the government has incomplete information and has to form a probability distribution. If the government cannot accurately perceive such probability (misjudgment), ambiguity emerges. This is the first modeling work to integrate the incomplete information and ambiguity in one framework to analyze the transport investment under uncertainty. Modeling results suggest that such incomplete information and ambiguity in many cases allow the facility operator to secure information rent, and make the facility output, adaptation investment and social welfare downwardly distorted (i.e., less than the levels under complete information). The ambiguity can bring two countervailing effects under incomplete information, namely the "pooling effect" and the "agency cost effect," which jointly determine the downward distortions on market outcomes and the welfare-maximizing subsidy policy. When its degree is low, the ambiguity causes a more dominant "pooling effect" that can help alleviate the distortion, improving social welfare. In presence of ambiguity, the increasing optimism of the government would deteriorate the distortion, likely to damage social welfare. Our analytical results provide support to subsidy on adaptation and policies to promote adaptation effectiveness and carrier competition in downstream market. To alleviate possible distortion, the government also needs to be cautious to reduce ambiguity through more information acquisition, and not be too optimistic on the disaster damage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transport facilities are increasingly threatened by the climate-change related natural disasters in recent years. In order to incentivize the transport facility operators to engage in climate change adaptation, governments may provide subsidies to the adaptation investment. Due to the substantial uncertainties in the outcomes of the adaptation projects, the government can set up an “experiment” project, which can be used as a demonstrator. In this paper, we develop real-option game models to investigate the transport facility operators’ adaptation investment under static stochastic demand and time-varying stochastic demand. Meanwhile, the government’s optimal decisions on whether to set up a demonstrator and the related subsidy policies are also examined. We find that under static stochastic demand, the government prefers to set up a demonstrator if the marginal benefit of the adaptation capacity is larger than its marginal cost, or the demonstration effect is high enough. Under time-varying stochastic demand, the government prefers to set up a demonstrator when the demand volatility is low. Moreover, increasing demand volatility requires less (or more) subsidy, when the demonstrator is (or is not) set up. Increasing demand volatility leads to postponement of the adaptation timing and more adaptation investment, irrespective of whether there is a demonstrator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects of consortium blockchain on the shipping industry. We model a market with two competing shipping lines and a port. We compare three scenarios: no blockchain (NB), partial blockchain consisting of only the two shipping lines (PB), and full blockchain consisting of both the shipping lines and the port (FB). Using game theory, we analyze how the consortium blockchain affects the shipping market and social welfare. We find that adding more players (especially the port) to the consortium blockchain does not always benefit everyone. The port gains from joining the consortium blockchain if its adoption cost is low. But compared with PB, FB generally decreases the profit of the shipping line with information advantage. PB enhances social welfare regardless of the blockchain adoption cost, while FB does so only under fierce competition between the shipping lines. Moreover, both PB and FB increase the volatility of the shipping freight rates, although they do not affect the volatility of shipping outputs or the port charges. Our analysis reveals that policy interventions are essential to ensure that the benefits of consortium blockchain adoption are equitably distributed among all shipping industry participants. Additionally, regulatory measures may be necessary to mitigate the heightened volatility in freight rates introduced by blockchain, ensuring a stable and predictable shipping industry landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected airlines' passenger businesses, while the air cargo sector has been more resilient. To reduce the financial pressure and tap into the profitable cargo business, airlines around the world are actively converting passenger aircraft into cargo planes (i.e., preighters). This paper develops an integrated economic model to examine airlines' aircraft conversion strategies when facing dynamic market demand due to the pandemic. We consider the possibility of temporary conversion, i.e., passenger aircraft that have been converted into preighters during the pandemic can be converted back into passenger aircraft after the pandemic. We find that when the air cargo transport price is exogenous, the socially optimal conversion rates are lower than the profit-maximizing level for airlines in both the pandemic and the post-pandemic periods, and a government subsidy reduces social welfare. Competition in the passenger market or the cargo market increases conversion rates under both the airline optimum and social optimum, and widens the gap between them. However, if the airlines can influence the air cargo transport price, conversion rates may be higher under the social optimum than under the airline optimum. Competition in the passenger market and the cargo market has opposite effects on the two optimal conversion rates. When the expected cargo market size is small (large), the conversion rates in the social optimum are lower (higher) than the airline optimums, and a government subsidy worsens (enhances) social welfare. Finally, we extend our model by incorporating more real-world factors, such as the lower efficiency of preighters than that of freighters, the freighter leasing market and airlines' lay-up of idle passenger aircraft. Most of our analytical results remain valid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We model the government's minimum requirement regulation and subsidy policy of port adaptation investment to mitigate damage caused by climate change-related disasters • The ambiguity of disaster occurrence probability, decision maker's attitudes towards risk and adaptation's spill-over externality are explicitly modelled. • Subsidy policy dominates the minimum requirement regulation in terms of the equilibrium social welfare in most cases. • Degree of ambiguity changes the optimal designs of minimum requirement regulation and subsidy policy, but does not change their relative ranking qualitatively. • Higher degrees of pessimism make the government more reluctant to intervene in the ports' adaptation, and less likely to impose the two regulatory policies. This paper models two commonly adopted regulatory polices (the minimum requirement regulation vs. subsidy) on port adaptation investment to mitigate the damage caused by climate change-related disasters. The ambiguity of the disaster occurrence probability and the decision makers' attitudes towards risk are explicitly modelled. It is found, under the minimum requirement regulation, ports balance the option of increasing their adaptation vs. reducing their economic activities. In comparison, subsidies promote adaptation without introducing any incentive for ports to reduce outputs, but they can be less efficient than minimum requirement regulations in addressing market failures, such as that caused by a spill-over externality. The ambiguity of disasters changes the optimal designs of minimum requirement regulation and subsidy policy but does not change their relative ranking qualitatively. Decision makers' risk attitudes also play important roles. Higher degrees of pessimism (more risk aversion) lead to lower port outputs but can also increase the level of port adaptation to achieve full insurance against disaster loss. Higher degrees of pessimism also make the government more conservative to intervene in the ports' adaptation and thus less likely to impose the two regulatory policies. Our analysis also explains why it is justified for the government to withhold intervention under ambiguity, and also shows that the ambiguity does not necessarily bring worse expected social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the development modes of inland ports based on the economic models and the Chinese empirical cases. After reviewing the recent policies in China, four modes, i.e., the government-driven mode, the seaport-driven, the market-driven mode and the corridor-effect mode, are established to describe the development of Chinese inland ports from the perspective of the driving forces. Moreover, we setup an economic model to compare them and conclude that (1) the seaport-driven mode promotes the larger inland port than the corridor-effect mode and the market-driven mode; (2) if the marginal capacity investment cost is low or the efficiency of the inland port is high enough, the corridor-effect mode leads to higher social welfare than the market-driven mode and the seaport-driven mode; (3) whether the government-driven mode promotes the larger inland port and higher social welfare than the other modes depends on the positive externality from the inland port to the social welfare; (4) The 'Go west' policy and the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R) promote the inland port capacity under all modes. Whether the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and the port integration promote the inland port capacity depends on the port efficiency improvement after the implementation of these policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies an information provision game between a better-informed government (on the climate change-related disaster) and a transport facility operator. The government can acquire better disaster information and adopt a persuasion strategy to affect the facility operator's adaptation investment. The Bayesian persuasion framework is used to model the government's design on its information signaling mechanism. We also solve the equilibrium outcomes of government subsidy policy and benchmark them with those under the persuasion strategy. Our analytical results suggest that the government's optimal persuasion strategy depends on the common prior belief on the disaster and the expected level of unavoidable loss (NL). When the NL is low (or intermediate, respectively), the persuasion strategy should be full (or partial, respectively) disclosure of the government's information to the facility operator. When the NL is high, the persuasion strategy has no impacts. In terms of social welfare improvement, the persuasion strategy dominates (or is dominated by, respectively) the subsidy policy if the effectiveness of the adaptation investment is low (or high, respectively). When the effectiveness of the adaptation investment is intermediate, the comparison is uncertain. Furthermore, we extend our model to the oligopoly case with multiple competing transport facilities and also allow their adaptation investments to have positive externality. We find that more intense competition among the facility operators leads to more conservative persuasion strategy, and larger spillover effect of the adaptation investment among facilities leads to more radical persuasion strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We analytically investigate an airlines' investment timing on its exclusive terminal under demand ambiguity. • The multiple prior expected utility form and the real option approach are used to describe the airline's decision. • The airline's optimal investment timing requires its expected present value of the future profit increment to exceed its investment cost by the option value multipliers. • The airline's investment is later than the social optimum when the competition in the aviation market is low. • The government's regulation rules on the airline's exclusive terminal investment timing indicate a stepwise structure. In this paper, we study the timing decision of airlines' investments in exclusive airport facilities in the presence of demand ambiguity and competition. We model the investment decision as a real options problem under ambiguity. An airline's ambiguity-averse preferences are modeled using the multiple prior expected utility form. We obtain the optimal investment timing rule for the airline and find that it requires the airline's expected present value of its future incremental profit from investing to exceed the investment cost by the option value multiplier. We then compare the airline's optimal investment timing rule to the social optimum and discuss two possible subsidy policies, a lump-sum subsidy and a per-unit subsidy, with which the government can align the airline's investment timing rule with the social optimum. We characterize the stepwise structure of both subsidy policies, in which the optimal time to invest in an exclusive terminal depends on three thresholds: the social optimum, the airline's break-even point, and a combination of the social optimum and the airline optimum. We conclude that the two subsidy policies have equivalent effects when the government and the airline have the same ambiguity levels, as they lead to the same investment timing and require the same amount of government funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigate the effects of demand information sharing between PAs and POs on concession arrangements and market equilibria. • We find that information sharing can improve welfare if its externality is sufficiently high. • Absent compensation POs have no incentive to share their private information to PAs. • With information sharing/payment arrangement and when ports cost and services are symmetric, one PO prefers to share information when the externality on welfare exceeds a threshold. This paper investigates the effects of demand information sharing on concession arrangements and market equilibria, when two ports, each managed by a welfare-maximizing port authority and a profit-maximizing port operator, compete for demands. The problem is formulated as a multi-stage game, in which the authority and the operator at each port first decide whether to share demand information and make concession arrangements; then, the port operators compete à la Cournot. Alternative scenarios are compared to identify the effects of information sharing and market structure. Our analytical results identify the conditions under which demand information sharing is beneficial in port concession arrangements and highlight the importance of the underlying market structure and congestion levels in achieving these benefits. Specifically, we show that information sharing is a source of welfare improvement, and the effects are more significant when the positive externality of information sharing on welfare is large, inter-port competition is strong, and port congestion is costly. However, with no compensation, the port operators have no incentive to share their private information because otherwise, this is likely to increase concession unit-fees, limit their ability to compete effectively with each other, and ultimately reduce their expected profits. Therefore, transfer payments are necessary to encourage information sharing. With this arrangement and the assumed symmetric cost and service structure, we show that a port operator prefers sharing information if the externality of information sharing on welfare exceeds a threshold. Furthermore, when this externality is sufficiently large, the operators at both ports benefit from sharing information. Finally, when the two ports compete in price, we show that a port operator's single-side information sharing may not always benefit its port authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the years many shipping lines have established terminal operation companies, with some set up as independent firms. However, port authorities and local governments have not always welcomed external investment and control with open arms. The economic implications and each stakeholder's best strategies remain unclear. This study develops an analytical model in order to study the effects of vertical integration, with a focus on shipping lines' investment in ports' capacity. Modelling results suggest that vertical integration between terminal operator and a shipping line leads to higher port capacity, port charge, market output and consumer surplus. It also reduces delay costs. All these results suggest that vertical integration can be an important source of synergy for the maritime industry. Although vertical integration increases the participating carrier's output at the expenses of non-integrating rival shipping firms, our numerical analysis suggests that the overall social welfare is likely to increase. Preliminary empirical tests confirm that vertically integrated ports handle more traffic volumes and are associated with better infrastructure and equipment. Therefore, port authorities and government regulators should carefully review the market competition status as well as port expansion plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the disruption risk and congestion deterioration caused by recurrent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several ports, this study developed a port capacity decision three-stage game model by adopting a sharing approach, which comprised a combined port management committee and a two-port system. The former determines the capacity-sharing rate, and the latter sequentially chooses its terminal handling charge (THC). Through backward induction, the capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extrema are derived, and then the "siphon effect" and "spillover effect" of capacity-sharing are analyzed. A case study of Shanghai and Ningbo Zhoushan Ports is presented to further illustrate the findings. • Three-stage game model is developed by first adopting a capacity sharing approach in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era. • The three-stage game model focuses on the imbalanced capacity and congestion deterioration. • A combined port management committee and a two-port system are considered. • The optimal capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extremums are derived. • "Siphon effect" and "spillover effect" of capacity-sharing are comparatively analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This review paper investigates and presents generalized answers to the two basic questions of port governance, namely how to govern and for what purpose. The study is based on a total sample of 118 studies on port governance. The results from the analysis of these studies show that port devolution and port re-centralization are the main governance tools at the institutional level. At the strategical level, the main governance tools are port co-opetition, port regionalization, port integration, stakeholder management strategy, and corporate governance. While at the managerial level, the main governance tools are port pricing, port concession, port user/customer relationship management, monitoring and measuring, regulatory control, port security management, and information and communication technologies. The institutional governance tools are generally used by governmental organizations to set the fundamental regulative rules for the port governance system, while strategical tools are applied by port organizations in gaining competitive advantages and increasing market share in the long term. Managerial tools are related to the port business operations and management. Furthermore, The study clearly shows that the main objective of port governance is the improvement of port efficiency and port effectiveness. However, the choice of efficiency-oriented or effectiveness-oriented configuration is largely determined by the port organization's external operating environment, strategies and structures. Highlights • The answer to the question of "how to govern" is related to the governance tools. • Port efficiency and port effectiveness provide the answers to the question of "govern for what purpose". • The question of "how to govern" is about actions, while "govern for what purpose" is about objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • This study develops a theoretical model to investigate airlines' incentives to collude on offset purchases and the potential mechanisms and corresponding market/welfare implications of such collusions. • The model compares two types of voluntary carbon offset schemes, namely a Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)-style market and an over-the-counter (OTC) market. • The results suggest that airlines do not have incentive to cooperate in offset purchases in CCX market but might be willing to willing to form alliances in OTC market. • The model also analyzes the profit and social welfare implications of an internal bargaining mechanism for alliances without output coordination. Abstract This study develops a theoretical model to analyze the effects of two types of voluntary carbon offset schemes, particularly airlines' incentives to collude on offset purchases as well as the potential mechanisms and corresponding market/welfare implications of such alliance. The modeling results suggest that in a Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)-style market, airlines do not have the incentive to cooperate in offset purchases. However, in an over-the-counter (OTC) market, airlines are willing to form alliance provided that the alliance's bargaining power is sufficiently stronger than the airlines' independent bargaining power. With coordinated output decision, the alliance increases social welfare when the marginal environmental cost of aviation is high. If the alliance partners do not coordinate their output decision, we show that an internal bargaining mechanism within the alliance can reduce the offset price and increase the alliance's profit compared with the case of output-coordinated alliance. Without such internal mechanism, the alliances' total profits and the social welfare may decrease. In addition, we extend our models to consider the alliance synergy effect in reducing the alliance members' marginal operating costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • This paper is a first trial to quantitatively measure the effects of regional port integration. • The three-stage non-cooperative game is used to play the quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. • A higher degree of regional port integration can cause lower handling charge and more container throughput. • A threshold effect is derived in the process of regional port integration in the multi-port region (MPR). Abstract This paper quantitatively examines the effects of regional port integration in the multiport region (MPR) by applying a game theoretical approach. We construct a three-stage non-cooperative game theoretical model where each port sets container throughput in the timing of port integration effort, in light of choosing the different degree of regional port integration. Our main findings are that a higher degree of regional port integration can cause lower handling charge and more container throughput, as well as the threshold effect is derived in the process of regional port integration. Numerical simulation is applied to the case of Ningbo-Zhoushan Port. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study models the emission regulation of a port's cargo-handling activities when the regulatory government agency lacks complete information on the cost of reducing emissions for the port. The goal is to identify rules for determining the optimal port charge and capacity to allow port emissions to be regulated in an environment with incomplete information. We evaluate the effect of introducing a risk-averse environmental monitor as a supervisor to provide the government with additional information (a signal) on the port operator's emission reduction cost. To prevent the environmental monitor from colluding with the port operator, we develop a collusion-proof regulation scheme based on the principal–agent theory. The scheme is modeled as a bi-level problem faced by the government and the monitor. We find that, compared to the case with complete information, collusion-proof regulation do not distort optimal port charges only when the port operator is efficient and has low emission reduction costs. When distortion does occur, it depends on the monitor's degree of risk aversion and the accuracy of the signal about emission reduction cost. Besides, information asymmetry leads to less cargo throughput, a lower emission level, and reduced port capacity. Such regulation-induced downward distortion can be either alleviated or aggravated by the collusion-proof regulation, depending on the quality of the information received by the environmental monitor. Our theoretical models are tested using a case study based on container terminals in the Port of Shanghai. The numerical results suggest that a risk-averse environmental monitor can improve port user's social welfare in the presence of imperfect information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a real option approach to analyze terminal investment timing decisions for situations in which a port faces competition from its rivals in an uncertain market. We propose a network model to describe carriers’ cargo routing decisions and competition among rival ports. We then transform this model into a multicommodity flow problem and use the column generation algorithm to solve it. After obtaining a port’s possible future annual revenues and the potential net present value (NPV) for its terminal construction project through the network model, we adopt the expanded NPV rule and transform the investment timing decision into an optimal stopping problem. A least squares Monte Carlo simulation algorithm is proposed to find the investing probabilities for future years. The proposed models are applied to a steel cargo terminal investment case in the Port of Bengbu in Anhui province of China. The impacts on the investing probability and the expanded NPV of changes in the demand volatility, the initial investment and the port discharging rate are analyzed to provide managerial insights for port managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the dynamic features of the spot rates for VLCC/ULCC, Suezmax, Aframax, Panamax and Handysize tanker markets by means of multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MF-DFA). The Hurst exponents, especially the time-dependent Hurst exponents, of the daily rate returns are calculated to capture the fractal properties of these different tanker markets. The origins of multifractility in these markets are identified by comparing their multifractal scaling exponents based on the original data, the shuffled data and the surrogate data. Furthermore, the non-periodic cycles for these markets are detected by the V-statistic. Finally, the comparisons of the fractal properties between the tanker markets and the crude oil commodity markets suggest that the tanker markets are more fractal than their upstream counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on empirical studies of the technical, allocative, and cost efficiencies (CEs) of Chinese ports based on the panel data of 16 listed port corporations from 1998 to 2011 by means of Bayesian Inference and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. An error terms approach is used to resolve the Greene Problem in the estimation of allocative efficiency. The results show that the technical efficiencies have tended to decline in most ports. Inputs to R&D and improving management level are insufficient to offset this decline. Seaports have higher CEs than river ports. Ports with higher container cargo proportion have higher CEs. Ports with more than 50% of shares owned by the State have higher CEs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper studies the comparison of two kinds of port regulation modes - the centralization mode and the decentralization mode - using principal-agent theory and dynamic game theory. The optimal tariffs, port capacities and port efficiency levels under these two regulation modes are determined. The theoretical results are applied to the container terminals in Port of Shanghai in China. Sensitivity analysis and comparative studies show that the tariff, port efficiency level, port service demand and social welfare are higher under the decentralization mode, while the impact to port capacity and port operator's profit with different port regulation modes is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We model the inter-port competition in adaptation investments when ports face asymmetric disaster losses. • Trading mechanism of the adaptation resources are benchmarked with the adaptation subsidy policies. • Subsidy policy is pro-competitive while adaptation trading facilitates inter-port coordination. • When disaster damages are low, adaptation trading brings higher social welfare despite possible port collusion. • When disaster damages are high, the subsidy policy is preferred in terms of social welfare and port adaptation. Many seaports around the world face serious threat of natural disasters related to climate change. They have been investing in adaptation measures to mitigate potential disaster damages. This paper proposes an economic model to examine the inter-port competition in adaptation investments when ports face asymmetric disaster losses. Specifically, we model the trading mechanism of the adaptation resources among different ports, and benchmark the outcomes with the widely used adaptation subsidy policies. Our analytical results suggest that with adaptation trading under the minimum requirement policy, the port facing the low disaster loss sells adaptation resources to the port facing the high disaster loss, allowing the latter to cover all its disaster loss. Subsidy policy is pro-competitive and intensifies inter-port competition in adaptation investment and output. In comparison, adaptation trading facilitates inter-port coordination, possibly leading to port collusion. When the magnitudes of disaster damages are low, adaptation trading brings higher social welfare than the subsidy policy despite possible port collusion, leading to a Pareto improvement. When the magnitudes of disaster damages are high, the subsidy policy is preferred in terms of social welfare and port adaptation. Our model results reveal the strengths of alternative adaptation policies, and call for evaluation beyond competition effects when examining port coordination in adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resistivity, magnetization and longitudinal ultrasonic velocity ( V) have been measured in single-phase polycrystalline NdSrMnCrO ( x=0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1) to clarify the Cr doping effect on the metal-insulator and charge ordering transitions. For x=0 sample, the V shows two large stiffening just below the metal-insulator transition temperature T and the charge ordering temperature T, respectively. It is suggested that the former ultrasonic anomaly may originate from the spin-lattice effect and the dynamic Jahn-Teller effect, and the latter is due to the electron-lattice effect arising from the static Jahn-Teller effect of Mn. With the Cr doping, the T shifts to lower temperature, the maximum of magnetization becomes smaller and the resistivity remains metallic type. Furthermore, only one stiffening of ultrasonic velocity is observed below T in these doping samples. The analysis suggests that the Cr doping enhances the double exchange between Mn and Mn, and thoroughly destroys the charge ordering state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reactions of lithium halide (LiX, X = F, Cl, Br and I) and methyl halide (CHX, X = F, Cl, Br and I) have been investigated at the B3LYP/6-31G(d) level of theory using the microhydration model. Beginning with hydrated lithium ion, four or two water molecules have been conveniently introduced to these aqueous-phase halogen-exchange S2 reactions. These water molecules coordinated with the center metal lithium ion, and also interacted with entering and leaving halogen anion via hydrogen bond in complexes and transition state, which to some extent compensated hydration of halogen anion. At 298 K the reaction profiles all involve central barriers Δ E which are found to decrease in the order F > Cl > Br > I. The same trend is also found for the overall barriers (Δ E) of the title reaction. In the S2 reaction of sodium iodide and methyl iodide, the activation energy agrees well with the aqueous conductometric investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The chemical fixation of diethylaluminum cyanide (Et2AlCN) reacting with N-benzylideneaniline to produce 2-phenyl-2-(phenylamino)acetonitrile has been investigated by using DFT/B3LYP methods. The solvent effect is assessed using the continuum solvent model based on the SCRF/PCM method at the PCM/B3LYP/6-31G∗ level. Our results reveal that based on isomerization of Et2AlCN to Et2AlNC and their ambidextrous CN groups which will result in C-attack or N-attack to imine center carbon, there are four possible reaction paths to be found. The analysis of activation barriers shows the carbon atom in Et2AlNC firstly attacking the imine C atom in N-benzylideneaniline to afford the five-membered-ring transition state 4′a is favorable in the gas phase and in solvent toluene. The changing geometries and Wiberg bond indices with NBO analysis indicate the reaction process and the overall reaction is exothermic. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• We analyze the competition and alliance strategies of liners and ports in a route. • Forming alliance is the dominant strategy for liners. • Ports better to form vertical cooperation when liners' substitutability is weak. • Port vertical cooperation provides higher social welfare than horizontal cooperation. • The scale factor is critical for the equilibrium between the liners and ports. This paper investigates the strategic reaction of ports when they face the increasing bargaining power of shipping alliances. A dynamic game model is established to analyze the strategies of the shipping lines (competing à la Cournot or forming an alliance) and the ports (operating independently or forming horizontal cooperation or vertical cooperation). The shipping lines' economies of scale is considered. The results in the equilibrium indicate that (1) forming the alliance is the dominant strategy for the shipping lines; (2) under the shipping alliance, the ports' vertical cooperation reduces their charges and increases their capacities and the market outputs; (3) under the shipping alliance, when the substitutability (between the shipping lines) is strong, the ports choose horizontal cooperation; when the substitutability is weak, the ports choose vertical cooperation; and when the substitutability is intermediate, the ports choose independent operation. We also compare the social welfare and the local social welfare under the shipping alliance. The results indicate that mostly the ports' vertical cooperation is the best for both the local social welfare and the social welfare. Moreover, our analysis is extended to the cases where the shipping lines engage in Bertrand competition, the ports can change their capacities, the ports also have the economies of scale on their operation, and the ports take asymmetric cooperation strategies, respectively. The results demonstrate the robustness of our conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigate two shipping lines' DT investment timing decisions under demand ambiguity. • If the shipping lines are symmetric, their DT investment game reaches a sequential equilibrium. • We discuss the government's subsidy policies to regulate the DT investment timing. • If the government has complete information, the regulation rule exhibits a stepwise structure. • If the government has incomplete information, the shipping lines can obtain extra subsidies. This paper establishes real option game models to investigate two competing shipping lines' timing decisions on their respective dedicated terminal (DT) investments in the presence of demand ambiguity. In addition, we compare the shipping lines' DT investment timing with the choice under the social optimum, and discuss the subsidy policies with which a government can regulate the shipping lines' investment timing. The results indicate that (1) if the shipping lines are symmetric (i.e., have the same DT capacities, investment costs, and operation costs while having symmetric demands), their DT investment game could reach sequential investment equilibrium, where the leader makes a preemptive investment while the follower's investment is delayed compared to the case without ambiguity; (2) when the government has complete information on the shipping lines' ambiguity level, the regulation rule exhibits a stepwise structure where the social optimum (or the mixed timing between the social optimum and the shipping lines' optimum, respectively) is implemented, if the social optimal timing is later (or earlier, respectively) than the shipping lines' break-even timing; (3) when the government has incomplete information on the shipping lines' ambiguity level, the stepwise structure still holds but the shipping lines can obtain extra subsidies due to their information advantages compared to the complete information case; and (4) compared to the complete information case, the incomplete information may promote (or delay, respectively) the regulated DT investment timing, if the increasing ambiguity has positive (or negative, respectively) effects on the shipping lines' marginal option values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• First study to quantitatively compare climate change mitigation and adaptation for two ports. • Three market relationships are considered, i.e., independent, strategic substitute, strategic complement. • Both mitigation and adaptation increase the executing port's output. • Adaption decreases the other port's output if the two ports are independent or strategic substitutes. • A numerical case study on four Chinese ports based on the model is implemented. The two major approaches that seaport operators adopt to address climate change impacts are mitigation (CCM), i.e., reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and adaptation (CCA), i.e., adjusting the facility to moderate the negative outcomes of climate change. This paper is among the first to construct an economic model to compare the impacts of CCM and CCA in affecting the outputs of the executing port and the other ports in its network, considering the effects of market interactions. We find that both strategies can increase the executing port's cargo traffic, and can either increase or decrease the other port's cargo traffic depending on the market relationships between the ports. We also implement a numerical case study on four Chinese ports (Ports of Shenzhen, Xiamen, Tianjin and Hong Kong) based on our model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We investigate airline baggage fees' impacts on airport congestion. • Both checked bags and carry-ons could cause airport congestion. • Airline competition may not be able to induce social optimum. • Shifting from bundle pricing to checked bag pricing may lower social welfare. This paper builds an economic model to investigate the interactions between baggage fee and airport congestion. With checked bag fees, we find that the socially optimal numbers of passengers and checked bags will not be achieved if the marginal congestion cost from carry-ons is larger than that from checked bags. However, it is possible with bundle pricing. Furthermore, we use numerical experiments to illustrate that checked bag pricing may underperform bundle pricing in terms of social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an environmentally friendly and convenient transport mode, bike-sharing has been fast developed in major cities around the world. More bike-sharing firms have been formed and intensified market competition. The government has stipulated regulations to intervene in bike-sharing firm operations and to maintain orderly competition. This paper establishes an integrated economic model to examine duopoly bike-sharing firm competition in both prices and the number of deployed bikes. Specifically, more deployed bikes in the urban area reduce the time cost for the users to find an available bike (i.e., the search cost), but they can also impose a negative social externality on the urban management. Two government policies to control the number of deployed bikes have been examined and benchmarked. One is the limit on the total number of the deployed bikes (i.e., the supply-side regulation), and the other is the restriction to allow the users to only register or use certain firms' services (i.e., the demand-side regulation of single-homing). Our model is also further calibrated by using the bike-sharing market data of Beijing for policy implications. It is found that, when the negative social externality of bike deployment is sufficiently small, the government should allow users' multi-homing (i.e., registration on both firms' platforms). However, when the negative social externality is high, the government should strictly control the number of bikes through both the supply-side and demand-side restrictions. Our analyses also suggest that it is never socially optimal to only adopt the demand-side restriction (i.e., forcing the single-homing). That is, the supply-side policy is more socially preferred to correct the negative social externality in most cases. When two bike-sharing firms offer quite heterogeneous services (i.e., low service substitutability), it is more socially optimal to only implement the supply-side policy. • Dockless bike-sharing firms compete in both price and number of deployed bikes. • The government adopts two alternative policies to control the number of deployed bikes. • With small negative externality, the supply-side regulation to limit deployed bikes is preferred. • It is never socially optimal to only adopt demand-side regulation by imposing single-homing. • The analytical model is also calibrated with real-world market data of Beijing for more insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A low‐noise fully‐integrated charge‐pump phase‐locked loop (CPPLL) for 5G applications is presented in this letter. The PLL architecture includes a phase and frequency detector (PFD), a charge pump (CP), a low‐pass filter (LPF), a voltage‐controlled oscillator (VCO), and a programmable divider. To achieve low phase noise, class‐C VCO, TSPC logic, and other methods are employed in the PLL circuit design. Fabricated in 65 nm technology, the PLL measures a tuning range of 5.91–8.94 GHz. The minimum and maximum measured phase noise are −125 dBc/Hz and −116.6 dBc/Hz @1 MHz. The size of CPPLL core area is 0.8 mm by 0.95 mm without the pads while having a 50‐mW power consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fluctuation of freight rates revenue and the fierce volatility of oil cost are two of the most key risk exposures in the shipping industry. However, neglecting the dynamic interrelationship between the cost and the revenue markets leads to the overestimation or underestimation of hedging ratios, which makes the present single hedge strategy less efficient. This paper proposes an optimal combination hedging model for a shipowner trading the derivatives of crude oil and dry bulk freight rates simultaneously with the cross-market economic linkages. We investigate the impacts of spillover transmission, structural breaks, and dynamic conditional correlations (DCCs) on the optimal combination hedging trading. It is found that the significant volatility transmission between oil future and dry bulk forward freight agreements suggests a high dependence of the Capesize sector on the oil fluctuations, which means that the dynamic cross-market interactions have significant impacts on the aggregate risk exposures. Furthermore, the DCCs incorporating structural breaks significantly improve the performance of the combination hedge, which is superior to the two separate hedging strategies. Our study offers new insights into how the freight rates and oil markets relate to a combination hedging, which can be used to promote the risk management in the market. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although operational activities in the aviation sector inevitably bring more emissions, they also reshape the structure of the regional economy, and often upgrade emission-heavy industries to cleaner service sectors. Thus, the overall impact of aviation network development on the region's environmental trajectory is unclear, and calls for rigorous empirical study. Using the data of 283 Chinese prefecture-level cities for the period 2003–2017, this paper proposes and calculates a comprehensive "carbon lock-in" index to measure cities' reliance on emission-heavy sectors and resistance to emission reduction. Then, we calculate cities' air connectivity and network centrality to measure the aviation development, and also examine their direct, indirect, as well as heterogeneous impacts on cities' carbon lock-in. Our empirical results suggest that an improved aviation network development helps alleviate carbon lock-in. Mechanism analysis further reveals that fixed input, industrial structure upgrading, and technological innovation are the three underlying channels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of dry ports has reshaped the international freight shipping market, introducing both competition pressure (i.e., the common hinterland) and cooperation opportunities (sea-rail intermodal) for seaports. This is more evident in China with the development of the China Railway Express. Unlike dry ports, seaports are more vulnerable to climate change-related disasters, calling for investment in adaptation measures. This paper examines how co-opetition with the dry port affects seaport adaptation investment using a two-stage game-theoretical economic model. Results indicate that cooperation leads to more seaport adaptation investment, while competition results in reduced investment. When compared to the social optimal level of adaptation investment, the seaport tends to under-invest (over-invest) when the cooperation (competition) market size is larger. We also analyze how government subsidies in the seaport's adaptation help achieve optimal social adaptation and how the Knightian uncertainty of the disaster occurrence affects seaport adaptation investments. The relevant policy implications are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The restructuring of railway systems has been widely analyzed around the world, while the empirical evidence from the Chinese railway industry is few, despite its significant market scale and unique organizational structure. This study aims to construct and estimate a hedonic cost function for Chinese railway system using the panel data on 18 Regional Railway Administrations (RRAs) of 2006–2017 period. The returns to density (RTD), the returns to scale (RTS), the cost complementarities and the economies of scope (SC) are estimated. The key findings and policy implications are as follows: (1). RTD and RTS of RRAs are 3.56 and 1.19, respectively, suggesting very significant returns to density and slight returns to scale at RRA level. (2). 1% increase in passenger output would increase the marginal costs of freight operations and network infrastructure by 0.233% and 0.808%, respectively. 1% increase in freight output would increase the marginal costs of passenger operations and network infrastructure by 0.486% and 0.735%, respectively. 1% increase in network infrastructure would increase the marginal costs of passenger operations and freight operations by 0.809% and 0.736%, respectively. (3). The economy of scope (SC) between passenger operation and freight operation is −0.189, implying no existence of economy of scope. (4) Based on these estimated results, 18 RRAs are suggested to be consolidated into several larger scale ones, and a separation between passenger and freight operations could be suitable for Chinese railway sector in terms of short-run cost efficiency improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Environmental and welfare implications of intermodal competition between the CR Express and maritime shipping are examined. • While increasing the welfare, CR Express increases emissions unless it is sufficiently emission efficient. • Such impacts are enhanced with more CR Express operators, or fewer shipping carriers. • The competition among Chinese local governments in supporting their own CR Express services also strengthens the impacts. • The analytical model is further calibrated with real market and operational data. China Railway Express (CR Express) has been fast developed, offering an alternative to transportation of the containerized cargo between China and Europe. This paper examines CO 2 emissions and social welfare implications of the intermodal competition between the emerging CR Express and incumbent maritime shipping. An analytical model is developed, which shows that the implications depend in general on the relative emission intensities of the two transport modes on a per-trip basis. The entry of CR Express and the resultant intermodal competition, while likely improving welfare, will increase emissions unless CR Express is sufficiently emission efficient. Such impacts on emissions and welfare are enhanced when there are more CR Express operators, or when there are fewer shipping carriers. The competition among Chinese local governments in supporting their own CR Express services also strengthens the impacts. The analytical model is further calibrated with real market and operational data on the route between China's Yangtze River Delta and Central Europe. Our numerical simulations show that intermodal competition leads to more emissions unless CR Express can achieve an approximately 90% reduction in emission intensity and that overall welfare is nonetheless improved. Policy and managerial implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Herein, we reported a facile one-step hydrothermal strategy to synthesize stable, strong blue fluorescence and water-soluble sulfur doped graphene quantum dots (S-GQDs) with the citric acid (CA) and powdered sulfur (S) as the precursors. The results indicated that S atoms were successfully introduced into the structure of graphene, and sulfur doping indeed improved the intensity of blue emission of GQDs. The as-prepared S-GQDs, as the effective cell-imaging material, would easily penetrated into the cell membranes of Hela cell and exhibited relatively low cytotoxicity. When treated with the typical bacteria medium ( Staphylococcus aureus LZ-01 and Escherichia coli DH5α ), it also did not show the conspicuous antiseptic qualities. Therefore, the S-GQDs would have potential applications in the bio-imaging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• First study of port's resource allocation between capacity expansion and disaster prevention. • Uncertainties on both demand and disaster occurrence. • Ports always prioritize capacity investment over disaster prevention investment. • Welfare maximizing ports invest more in both capacity and disaster prevention than profit maximizing ports. • Welfare maximizing ports require larger budget to justify the investment in disaster prevention. Most seaports face constraints in financial resources to some degree, and thus need to balance the investments in capacity and natural disaster prevention. On the one hand, due to budget constraint, limited resources need to be allocated between the two tasks. On the other hand, the benefit of natural disaster prevention investment is likely to be higher for ports with larger capacity. This study builds a stylized analytical model to examine the managerial and policy implications of such interactions between the two counteracting mechanisms. We find that the port managers would always prioritize capacity investment over natural disaster prevention investment. Social welfare maximizing ports invest more in both capacity and disaster prevention than those chosen by profit maximizing operators. However, compared with profit maximizing ports, welfare maximizing ports also require a larger budget to justify the investment in disaster prevention. Moreover, with increasing intensity of natural disaster, a port's capacity investment decreases and its disaster prevention investment increases, irrespective of its objective. The magnitudes of both changes are larger for welfare maximizing ports than for profit maximizing ports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• An ECA policy's effect is investigated by the regression discontinuity method. • The ECA policy plays a positive role in reducing the SO 2 concentration. • The SO 2 concentration in Shanghai decreased by 0.229 μg/m3 daily on average. As an important measure to abate ship-source air emissions, the establishment of Emission Control Area (ECA) has been adopted not only at international level, but also at national and regional level. However, there exists a research gap of employing econometric models to enrich the ECA policy evaluation research by testing the effectiveness of an ECA policy based on the empirical data. This paper focuses on the effectiveness of the ECA policy in shanghai port by adopting regression discontinuity (RD) approach. The RD design is considered as a wonderful substitution for the randomized control trial, which usually serves as a conventional and effective tool to address endogeneity. The causal effect of the ECA policy on the SO 2 concentration reduction can be detected by the RD approach. According to the estimated results, there is a discontinuity around the ECA policy cutoff point, and it is indicated that the SO 2 concentration in Shanghai decreased by at least 0.229 μg/m3 daily on average due to the implementation of the ECA policy. The positive role that the ECA policy plays in reducing SO 2 concentration in Shanghai is well demonstrated. This paper also puts forward an agenda for the future studies in the domain of the ECA policy evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]