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Management incentives for engaging and excelling in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is an important theme as business sustainability gains momentum. We examine the role of tournament incentives, which are created by competition among non-CEO (chief executive officer) senior executives (vice presidents [VPs]) for promotion to the CEO position, in firms' CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 firms from 1993 to 2014, we find that tournament incentives proxied by pay gaps between CEOs and VPs are negatively associated with CSR performance, suggesting that competition for promotion could be detrimental for CSR performance. We further show that such association is more pronounced when the perceived probability of promotion increases prior to CEO turnover. This article provides policy, practical, and education implications and contribute to the literature on the integration of CSR into the business culture and strategic management processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal governance is the process by which vice presidents (VPs) use their influence with the chief executive officer (CEO) to impact the firm's direction and policy. This study examines the effect of internal governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Based on a large sample of US firms and after controlling for various CEO incentives, corporate governance and other determinants of CSR performance, we find that more effective internal governance is associated with a better CSR performance. These results are robust to alternative internal governance and CSR measures, alternative samples and various approaches that mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Further analysis shows that the effect of internal governance on CSR performance is more pronounced when (a) the CEO is subject to more intensive monitoring, (b) VPs are more powerful, (c) firms experience less short‐term financial performance pressure and (d) they face stronger product market competition. This study advances our understanding of corporate governance's effect on CSR by showing the importance of internal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how labor-friendly institutional features (i.e., laborism) relate to corporate investment efficiency in labor in a sample of firms from 33 countries over 1996–2012. We consider three dimensions of laborism—the presence of a left-leaning government, rigidity of employee protection laws, and collectivist culture. Our evidence shows that firms operating in stronger laborism countries make less efficient labor investment decisions, which is consistent with higher labor adjustment costs associated with laborism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: This study examines the relation between country-level audit profession development (APD) and bank loan contracting around the world. Using a sample of bank loan data from 35 countries, we find that stronger APD is associated with more favorable loan terms, such as lower loan spreads, fewer covenants, and larger loan amounts. These effects are stronger in countries with a weaker rule of law. We also find that stronger APD attracts significantly more lenders participating in loans and more foreign lenders leading loans. A breakdown of APD into three subcategories, namely, auditor education, auditor independence and liability, and auditor oversight, reveals that all three influence various contracting terms. We also provide evidence that stronger APD is associated with a higher degree of timely loss recognition. Collectively, our findings show that APD improves bank loan contracting terms. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources mentioned in the manuscript. JEL Classification: F34; K20; M41; M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether and how auditors respond to audit risks arising from secrecy culture when making audit opinion decisions. Using a sample of international Big N auditors from 33 countries, we find strong and robust evidence that auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients domiciled in countries with a strong secrecy culture. In addition, we find that the association between secrecy culture and auditors' propensity to issue modified audit opinions is less pronounced in countries with strong investor protection than that in countries with weak investor protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]