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We use an updated form of an old database to examine aid predictability, i.e. the relationship between commitments and disbursements. In contrast to the existing literature, the regression results suggest that on average almost all commitments tend to be met within two years, with the overwhelming majority met immediately. But the situation is different with respect to individual sectors. Some such as infrastructure have very long lags. For some sectors too it seems likely that commitments will never be fully met. Debt aid, however, tends to be disbursed in full almost immediately. There are also substantial differences between countries.

Aid flows continue to be volatile and unpredictable, even though it is widely accepted that this erodes the effectiveness of foreign aid. We argue that fragmented donor-recipient relationships, notably the large number of minor aid relations that tend to be associated with donors' desire to have 'fly their flag' around the world, increase aid unpredictability. Our empirical analysis of the determinants of aid unpredictability suggests that aid becomes less predictable with more fragmented donor-recipient relationships. Specifically, the effect of fragmentation on overshooting previous spending plans is statistically highly significant and substantively important. In contrast, fragmented donor-recipient relationships have no effect on the shortfall of actual aid compared to donors' spending plans.

As regards development aid the law is as creative as fertile : economic and social rights, human rights, sustainable development, etc. ; so many matters put in balance with the market law, the competition on behalf of a general economic interest. The first option of this study is to consider the legal mechanisms peculiar to the development aid through these two ends, at first sight paradoxical/antinomical : the economic efficiency and the human development. The second is to bound the field of research to the conventional material in order to appreciate the only process partnership which, from the international cooperation point of view, has not delivered yet all his potential. The interest of this international cooperation pattern based on the ”Partnership” remains still secondary, compared with the nature of the parties (public and private) which bind themselves, the nature of the rights (political, economical and social) that it sets out to conciliate, and finally, the bonds of profitability as well as humanism (the market of human development) it imposes upon its partners. Thus, the purpose of this research is indeed, to question the legal effects of such partnerships, but also, to regard the contract of public procurements of Development Aid, as potentially a growth market of an new model cooperation to be used for resorb inequalities of development between states., En matière d’aide au développement le droit est aussi inventif que fertile : droits économiques et sociaux, droits de l’homme, développement humain durable, etc. ; autant de matières mises en balance avec le droit du marché, de la concurrence sous couvert d’un intérêt économique général. La première option de cette étude est d’envisager les mécanismes juridiques propres à l’aide au développement à travers ces deux finalités à première vue antinomiques : l’efficience économique et le développement humain. La seconde est de délimiter le champ de recherche à la matière conventionnelle afin d’apprécier le seul processus partenarial qui, du point de vue de la coopération internationale, n’a pas livré tout son potentiel. L’intérêt de ce modèle de coopération internationale fondé sur le « Partenariat » n’est encore que secondaire comparé à la nature des parties (publique et privée) qui s’obligent, la nature des droits (politiques, économiques et sociaux) qu’il se propose de concilier, et enfin, les obligations à la fois de rentabilité et d’humanisme (le marché du développement humain) qu’il impose aux partenaires. Ainsi, la finalité de cette recherche est, certes, d’interroger les effets juridiques de tels partenariats, mais également de considérer le contrat de marchés publics d’aide au développement comme, potentiellement, porteur d’une nouvelle formule de coopération visant à résorber les inégalités de développement entre États.