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This paper develops a novel interpretation of Dasein, as we find it in Heidegger's Being and Time. On this interpretation, Heidegger models this most famous of all his concepts after Aristotle's account of the soul from De Anima as isomorphic with whatever it currently cognises. Indeed, Dasein proves central to the inquiry into Being he attempts in that book precisely because, like soul, it is capable of becoming like all beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strabo, in 10.3.7-23, presents an account of the music performed in initiation rites, according to which such music is used, naturally, to facilitate knowledge of divinity. I argue that, despite appearances, religious music, for Strabo, does not fulfill that function by reflecting the harmonious constitution of the cosmos—a Pythagorean-Platonic (and later, Stoic) idea that Strabo mentions but ultimately rejects. Instead, Strabo's account is clearly influenced by Aristotelian theory, and it stresses the significance of the emotional effect (i.e., awe or astonishment) generated by religious music, which in turn is useful toward gaining knowledge of the gods, most probably because it motivates audiences to learn about them. Indeed, the affinity between Strabo's text and Aristotle seems sufficient for Strabo's 10.3.23, perhaps in addition to parts of 10.3.7 and 10.3.9, to count as Aristotelian 'fragments.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the following close examination of chapter 26 of Aristotle's Poetics it is argued (a) that unlike the main part of the treatise, tragedy and epic are no longer compared in the frame of 'poetic art', i.e. as literary genres, but rather as Gesamtkunstwerke judged by elitist criteria; (b) that the chapter adopts a logical method of argumentation founded on the dialectical method of the Topics ; (c) that, as at the end of Book 8 of the Politics , it mainly reflects disputes in the Academy instigated by the so-called 'New Music'; (d) that for a variety of reasons this chapter of the Poetics and hence the earlier layer of the treatise dates back to Aristotle's first Athenian period (367-347 BCE). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The educational approach known as positive education emerged from positive psychology and frequently attributes its conception of flourishing to Aristotelian eudaimonia. This is a point of contention between scholars who see positive psychology's flourishing as an epithet of Aristotelian virtues and others who have identified critical divergences between the philosophical foundations of positive psychology and Aristotle's normative ethics. Few scholars have examined whether adolescent understandings of flourishing reflect Aristotelian eudaimonia, and whether this is different in positive education students. This paper explores notion of the good life through the writings of 226 adolescents, 93 of whom attend a school that has implemented positive education. These are analysed through an Aristotelian lens, finding more similarities than differences between the groups. Both groups discussed relationships, emotions, and accomplishments, but moral goodness and virtue were not prominent. Conclusions are drawn about the implications of this for 'positive' education and the role it plays in nurturing flourishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that despite certain appearances, Aristotle does not think of ownership as the exclusive right of a person to decide upon the use and alienation of a thing. Rather, in Aristotle, ownership is a relation between a person and a thing such that (1) the thing is instrumental for this person’s life, (2) it is external to the organic body of the person, and (3) the person is protected against being excluded from the relevant kinds of access to the thing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its position in an introductory work to logic, the account of continuity presented by Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories is apparently even less accessible to the beginner than Aristotle’s original. This is in part because Al-Fārābī integrated elements of the accounts of continuity in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics into an account mainly derived from Aristotle’s Categories. While Al-Fārābī’s account chiefly follows Aristotle’s Categories 6 in describing a continuous object that can be divided into parts with a shared boundary, it borrows the terminology of limits from Physics 5 and the notion of quantity as divisible into its parts from Metaphysics 5.13. In doing so, Al-Fārābī defines continuity using a notion of a limit without determining whether or not it was part of the continuous quantity. This definition could also accommodate atomists, since it would work even if the limit were an atom or several atoms that were part of the continuous object. The broadness of this definition is probably intended to allow students of logic who may have atomist tendencies to accept the account of quantity in the categories tradition, even though they may not be ready to reject atomism until after studying physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the ‘same’ action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these ‘agential conditions’ are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I propose that they are instead ‘perfections,’ i.e., constitutive features of virtuous action as such, admitting of degrees. Unlike the alternative interpretation, my proposal fully harmonizes with three important Aristotelian doctrines: that action from virtue is prior to action merely in conformity with virtue; that character virtue is a perfection of human beings; and that practical life is not properly characterized in transitive, productive terms. My proposal still allows for a generic sense of ‘sameness’ in which the ‘same’ action may be virtuously or non-virtuously performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers often rely on sciences of their own time. This is especially true for scientists writing philosophical works. In the case of Ernst Mach, the scientific references are mainly to physics, physiology, evolutionary biology and—in a somewhat different manner—the new discipline of psychology. Like so many authors in the late 19th century, Mach had extreme confidence in the methods of the natural sciences. However, this trait, often called scientism or positivism, can easily be used in polemical accounts that obscure other aspects of Mach's thought. Mach is well-known for both his analysis of sensations and his evolutionary conception of perception and knowledge. The tension between the ambition to clarify the empirical basis of perception on the one hand and the focus on the natural origins of human perception on the other hand is, however, considerable. A comparison of these two perspectives can contribute to an ontological understanding of experience that sheds new light on the much-discussed topic of sense data and at the same time clarifies the difference between experience and observation and the role of experimental science in this context. In some respects, Mach seems closer to William James than to his followers in the Vienna circle. The accusation of idealism made by Lenin in his influential critique of positivism overlooks the implications of this naturalist approach but offers the occasion to dwell on the ontological implications of something that can be called natural historicity. Comparisons with Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Kant situate the empiricist theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘Unity of virtues’ (UV) in Aristotle is the claim that the ethical virtues are mutually entailing. But commentators typically focus on the fact that wisdom implies all the ethical virtues, without explaining how the ethical virtues themselves are mutually entailing. I argue that the so-called ‘Grand End’ view, understood as applying to both wisdom (φρόνησις) and political expertise (πολιτική), allows us to give an account of UV at the level of the ethical virtues. By discussing the ethical virtues individually, I show how all the ethical virtues can be seen as different aspects of the philosopher-statesman’s multifaceted character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a novel analysis of the relations between Aristotle's three species of desire – appetite, temper, and wish – and the three things he says in EN 2.3 lead to pursuit – the pleasant, the beneficial, and the noble. It has long been tempting to think that these trios line up with one another in some way, ideally relating their members in one-to-one fashion. One account, by John Cooper, has gathered prominent adherents, but other authors, notably Giles Pearson, have argued we should give up on even trying to correlate the two trios. I attempt to show that the two trios do relate in interesting ways, but not in a way that correlates their members in a one-to-one fashion. Instead, I argue that both appetite and temper are ultimately for the pleasant, while all things that an agent takes as objects of wish are conceived of as either pleasant, beneficial, or noble. This account conflicts with a dominant understanding of the species of desire as differentiated by their objects. I defend the view by showing that there is a second criterion for differentiating the species of desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is prima facie evidence that Theophrastus naturalized nous to the extent that he spoke of it in naturalizing terms. But our evidence also suggests that Theophrastus accepted the reasons Aristotle had for excluding nous from the reach of natural philosophy. We show that, far from revealing an inconsistency on Theophrastus' part, this apparent tension results from a consciously adopted strategy. Theophrastus is developing one aspect of Aristotle's account of nous he found underdeveloped and feared might be misunderstood, namely the infrangible organic unity of the whole human being, including its nous. That is why he insists that nous , although 'from outside,' is 'grown together' with us, why he speaks of it as a nature (phusis), and why he insists that thought is a motion (kinêsis). We show how these striking claims can be understood against the broader background of Theophrastus' natural philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's divine nous of Metaphysics Λ.9 is generally understood to exclusively characterise the Prime Mover-God. This paper challenges this view by (1) drawing out the strong congruity between our 'best state' and that of the Prime Mover in Λ.7 and (2) removing certain key obstacles to a more inclusive reading of Λ.9: our thought is not limited to the 'human' kind (ho anthrōpinos nous , 1075a7), nor is our self-knowledge always a 'by-product' (en parergōi , 1074b36). Noēsis noēseōs , I contend, equally applies to some forms of our thought. Hence, divine thought is accessible—indeed, even commendable—to us, just as the 'divine life' of Nicomachean Ethics X.7 is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevailing narrative in the history of science maintains that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of a 'law of nature'. This paper overturns that narrative and shows that some ancient Greek philosophers did have an idea of laws of nature and, moreover, they referred to them as 'laws of nature'. This paper analyzes specific examples of laws of nature in texts by Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Galen. These examples emerged out of the closely intertwined Platonic and Pythagorean traditions, and these philosophers' texts make reference to laws of nature when describing arithmetical methods, arithmological doctrines, or medical theories. Nicomachus' laws of nature are especially noteworthy, because they have features that historians look for in the search for the origin of the modern concept of laws of nature. Nicomachus' laws of nature are mathematical, universal, and necessary. This paper raises the possibility that the ancient Platonic and Pythagorean traditions influenced the subsequent development of the idea of laws of nature in medieval and early modern Europe, including the conception of laws of nature deployed by Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Willowbrook Hepatitis Study is one of the best-known examples of unethical medical research, but the research has always had defenders. One of the more intriguing defenses continually used was that critics did not know the researchers on the study and, therefore, could not assess their ethics. This essay traces the appeal to the researchers' characters across published research and archival sources from the 1960s through today. These appeals reflect the observation as old as Aristotle that one of the most potent modes of persuasion is ethos or character. The specific types of character in these appeals develop out of the paternalistic nature of clinical and research practice in the mid-twentieth century. If the individual physician is the locus of medical judgment, then the physician's character becomes a key concern for bioethics. These appeals still appear and have implications for bioethics in the present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicomachean Ethics 6.8 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. One dispute involves Aristotle's remarks about the relationship of phronēsis to politics: does Aristotle claim that phronēsis is foremost applicable to an individual's private life, to the political realm, or to some combination of the two? Two features of this dispute make it worthy of closer attention. First, the conflict of interpretations has not been documented as such. Second, I argue this contemporary conflict is a repetition of an ancient conflict about phronēsis that was being waged in 5th/4th century Athens. Phronēsis was a contested term alongside two related terms, apragmosynē (quietism) and polypragmosynē (meddlesomeness), and the construction of lines 1141b23–1142a12 enters into this historical debate to create a productive tension between two rival views. Aristotle heightens the tension between views represented by quietists and busybodies for his own purposes. In section 1, I surface the neglected historical frame of Nicomachean Ethics 6.8. In section 2, I turn to the contemporary conflict of interpretations, showing how it repeats the historical frame in many ways, and I provide a basic taxonomy of the views typically offered. In section 3, I bring the two debates – historical and contemporary – together and offer my own view of what Aristotle is up to in the passage. I argue that centering the historical frame in this passage highlights Aristotle's use of Isocratean-style phronēsis , while also transforming the concept by connecting it to a series of questions that go beyond Isocrates' view, thus preparing for a later exploration of the best forms of human living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that despite Aristotle's criticism of him, Isocrates does not actually hold the belief that political science, or universal knowledge of practical affairs, is impossible. When he appears to express this view, he is using hyperbole to distinguish himself from his adversaries. In reality, while he certainly underscores the significance of particular cases and doxa , he also claims to possess insights into universal principles concerning politics. He does so on the ground of philosophical arguments characterized by their consistency, sophistication, and substantive nature. These arguments are robust enough to be structured into a coherent system of principles akin to a political science in the Aristotelian sense of the term – although Isocrates himself never elaborated this science in a clear and systematic manner. The objective of this article is twofold: first, to defend this unconventional interpretation of Isocrates' political speeches, and second, to offer a systematic analysis of the implicit political science within them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that despite prima facie impressions, the first Stoics (the 3rd c. bc) put forward a conception of rhetoric of similar if not of equal importance as that of Plato and Aristotle, who represent two landmarks in the earliest development of what we may call 'philosophical rhetoric'. The paper shows that the Stoics built upon their predecessors' ideas, and that once we see this continuity, common features in Plato's, Aristotle's and the Stoics' conception of rhetoric come to the fore. For all of them argumentation, logical or dialectical, is at the core of philosophical rhetoric. The paper also addresses passages in Plutarch which accuse the Stoics of contradiction in their approach to rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle follows the Socrates of Plato's Gorgias in contrasting rhetoric with teaching. For him, premises of arguments must in rhetoric be reputable (endoxa), but in teaching be archai of the relevant science. And teaching requires recognition of the speaker's authority, rhetoric does not. Like Socrates, he thinks teaching but not rhetoric requires knowledge of your subject. Unlike Socrates, Aristotle does not for this reason reject rhetoric as dangerous, but accepts it as useful for public and interpersonal deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Academic Social Resources is the property of Journal of Academic Social Resources and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Flourishing is an increasingly common construct employed in the study of human wellbeing. But its appropriateness as a framework of wellbeing at certain stages of life is contested. In this paper, we consider to what extent it is possible for someone to flourish at the end of life. People with terminal illness often experience significant and protracted pain and suffering especially when they opt for treatments that prolong life. Certain aspects of human goods, however, that are plausibly constitutive of flourishing—such as meaning and purpose, deep personal relationships, and character and virtue—can be uniquely realised when life is ending. We argue that there is a qualified sense in which one can flourish at the end of life but that one must make important modifications to the criteria implicit in conventional conceptions of flourishing. We close with a discussion of the empirical assessment of wellbeing at the end of life and explore the possibility of introducing a flourishing measure in palliative care practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle’s Meteorology 4.12 is puzzling, in part because the chapter appears to extend teleological explanation to include certain inorganic materials without natural biological functions, such as metals and stone. This paper examines two attempts to explain why such materials can have functions, and shows that they are problematic. As an alternative, I argue that raw inorganic materials—as well as separated parts of organisms—can have extrinsic functions. Extrinsic functions can explain why natural inorganic materials can be sorted into natural kinds, even if their functions are ultimately related to their uses in the productive arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle devotes Nicomachean Ethics IX.6 to the notion of homonoia. Commonly translated as ‘concord’ or ‘like-mindedness’, homonoia is a central concept in Aristotle’s account of political friendship. I argue in this paper that Aristotle’s concept of homonoia cannot be perspicuously rendered as ‘like-mindedness’ or its cognates. For homonoia does not just involve the sameness of belief or opinion: it involves both shared commitments to the same goals and collective action aimed at realizing those goals, and cognates of ‘like-mindedness’ do not bring this activity-involving component of homonoia clearly into relief. I attempt to capture this activity-involving component by presenting a novel interpretation of Aristotelian homonoia as joint commitment. My interpretation of homonoia as joint commitment offers solutions to two puzzles associated with NE IX.6. First, it establishes the function of NE IX.6 within Aristotle’s broader theory of friendship. Second, it clarifies the proper relationship between homonoia and political friendship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The copula is a linguistic unit that means bond, conjunction, relation, connector of the predicate to the subject in a proposition, and in logic expresssing judgement. In most Indo-European languages the main copula is a verb meaning to be such as to be in English or être in French. In ancient Greek, the language of Aristotle, the word είναι (einai), is the infinitive of the verb εἰμί (eimi), which has the third person singular ἐστί (esti) and is -dir in Turkish. Originally from what is now Kazakhstan, al-Fārābī drew on the work of Aristotle in his own work on logic, which he wrote in Arabic in accordance with the scientific understanding of the period. Although the Arabic, which belongs to the Semitic family of languages, is perfectly capable of combining words, it lacks an explicit copula. However, it was necessary to create one in order to translate Aristotle accurately, so earlier Arabic translators of his work had already proposed the terms ھو (huwa) or الموجو د (mawjūd) which were used in the form of یوجد (yūjad), both derived from الوجو د (wujūd), meaning "being, existing", for an explicit copula. Similarly influenced by Aristotle to feel that to use of copula is necessary for the exposition of logic, there is a need for a use of a copula, al-Fārābī is clearly drawn to yūjad. What brings him to this position is his mutliligualism and his ethnicity. For in addition to his native Turkish language and the Arabic, his knowledge of the Indo-European languages of Sogdian and Fārsī gives him with an understanding of a verb meaning to be that is بودن (būdan) in Fārsī and which is cognate with Aristotle's είναι (einai). The same sense is carried in Turkic languages, not through a verb as such, but rather through a predicate adjective, which in modern Turkish is var, but which also carries a meaning of to be present. With al-Fārābī's ethnic Turkic background, as it is the similarities between "yujad" and the Turkic term "var" that make it so attractive to him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the influential topics in Islamic philosophy is the issue of "active intellect". This term has entered Islamic philosophy from Aristotle's philosophy and some interpreters of Aristotle's works. Islamic philosophers interpreted this issue in the context of their philosophical system and by expanding its concept from the field of natural and industrial (artistic) phenomena to the field of epistemology; they gave it a significant role. These philosophers have presented two types of arguments to prove the active intellect. Some of these arguments are formulated based on the theory of the nine spheres and according to the principle of causality. These arguments attemt to prove efficient causes for the existence of spheres and introduce ultimate causes for their rotational movements. Arguments of the second category also attempt to prove active intellect by relying on principles such as "every event and contingent needs an efficient cause" and "lacking a thing, it is not given to it". In this article, these arguments have been examined and finally, it has been concluded that the arguments of the first category are vulnerable and invalid due to the invalidity of their basis (planetary theory); and the arguments of the second category can only prove non-material and efficient cause or causes, provided that their premises are true, not the active intellect, i.e., the tenth intellect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I discuss the conditions for the possibility of the existence of time according to Aristotle’s Physics IV, 10-14. For this purpose, I present three thought experiments that help to clarify the nature of time. According to my reading, motion is not a sufficient condition for the existence of time; such condition is, instead, that motion could be measured—even if it is not actually measured. There is time when a movement can be put in a relation of proportion with another movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Eros has a central philosophical function in the dialogues of Plato, it all but disappears as a philosophical term in the thought of Aristotle, and is replaced by the more rational and reciprocal relation of friendship, φιλία. This essay asks what becomes of Eros in Aristotle's thinking, whether as deity, natural or cosmic force, or mode of human relation. Drawing on the ancient epithet of Eros, Ἔρως λυσιµελής , unbinder of limbs, Aristotle's usages of both ἔρως and λύσις (loosening, unbinding), respectively are traced in their ambivalence for his fundamentally organismic philosophy, insofar as they disturb the organism's ontological integrity. With the assistance of Kristeva's notion of the abject, it is argued that while Aristotle's overt stance is a polemic against eros, his principal metaphysical innovations – the recasting of ἀρχή as divine τέλος , and the separation of material and moving causes – are solutions (λύσεις) to aporias that may involve a traversal of the sublime that is also irreducibly corporeal and erotic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Aristotle in Poetics, dramatic characterization should show the character's moral choice in the form of action, and good moral choice is the criterion of the tragic character's moral goodness. A good or virtuous action, based on Nicomachean Ethics, is an action free from extremes, that is, an action in which the rule of the middle is observed. The tragic character is morally similar to us because he commits a moral error like us, but he is also superior to us because despite his moral error, he can return to the path of virtuous life. According to Aristotle, action and character in tragedy should be intertwined in such a way that they represent the all-moral nature of human life. Therefore, the ideal character of tragedy is morally, and potentially, good; who tries to realize and actualize his moral goodness during the rational, causal, unified and goal-oriented process of tragic design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A novel method of portfolio selection is provided with further higher moments, filtering with fundamentals in intelligent computing resources. The Evolutional Portfolio Optimization System (EPOS) evaluates unobtrusive relations from a vast amount of accounting and financial data, excluding hoax and noise, to select the optimal portfolio. The fundamental question of Free Will, limited in investment selection, is answered through a new philosophical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Music is an element that appears systematically as part of the rhetorical strategy of audiovisual narratives and is, to that extent, a constitutive part of them. Since audiovisual narratives, especially fictional ones, can be considered as poetic works in the Aristotelian sense, it is worth asking about the role that music plays in this poetic condition. In this research article, a theoretical proposal along these lines is put forward that will serve both to explain the role of music in the work of fiction and to analyze it. For the development of this proposal, the basis of the theory is based on the Aristotelian corpus (in particular, Poetics, Politics and Rhetoric), from which music can be understood as an expressive resource linked to the representation and creation of emotion. For this point, it is proposed to develop a theory of emotions, elaborated fundamentally from the studies of M. Nussbaum and M. Scheler, whose contributions connect the emotional processes with the recognition of ethical values. These ethical values, linked to emotions and their corresponding musical expressions, are to serve the purpose of discerning the function that music fulfills in the “letting oneself be followed” of history as a whole, by pointing out the prevailing emotional state or adjusted to the action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent's sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent's sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent's sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent's sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to understand the distinctively human behavior from Aristotelian ethics and evolutionary science to offer a perspective of what it means to act rationally. We argue that this way of acting is characterized by a decision informed by the analysis of whether or not it is worth pursuing an end, and by certain means, which takes place through a weighting of consequences from the body of knowledge that the person has so far We also argue that such a process can occur quickly (and requiring a less cognitive effort) or slowly (and demanding more cognitive effort), depending on whether or not the person has previous experiences of choices that have generated good consequences in the type of context presented; What does it mean for a person to have or not rational heuristics established in their minds, which are those that are connected to the most current network of "whys" and that has been consolidated precisely because they have proven effective in pointing out what is best to do in that kind of context. Finally, we apply the perspective we are offering to evidence three imprecise notions about "acting rationally". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the depiction of time in the works of C. S. Lewis, offering an analysis rooted in a reading of select passages that highlight issues of temporality in Lewis' works. The select passages are from the following books: Mere Christianity; The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe; The Magician's Nephew; and The Last Battle. The theoretical framework for this article is derived mainly from Aristotle's perennial contribution to rhetoric, adopting his definition of rhetoric as: "The faculty of discovering, in the particular case, the available means of persuasion." Moreover, this paper engages with published readership on Lewis' relationship with rhetoric, as explored by Gary Tandy in The Rhetoric of Certitude, and Don W. King's "The Rhetorical Similarities of C.S. Lewis and Bertrand Russel" among others. This study mainly aims to explore Lewis' employment of Pathos, Ethos, and Logos in his writings, demonstrating how these three modes manifest differently in his nonfiction and fantasy works yet remain equally compelling. Finally, this article aims to show how Lewis utilizes literary techniques that enhance the sense of identification between his voice and that of the reader, in order to increase the receptiveness of his audience toward the following three points which he postulates: Firstly, time has clear boundaries; specifically. This implies that created time, or time on earth is finite. Secondly, time is linear. Namely, it has a continuous and sequential nature, where events follow each other in a straight line, regardless of how it is experienced on a subjective level. And thirdly, time is but a line encompassed by an infinite eternal being, the Creator of time. Meaning that as a finite being, God exists outside of time, and as thus is capable of creating time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this essay, I evaluate the theory that leadership ought to be "paradoxical", meaning that leaders should embrace contradictions and incoherent norms. The idea of a paradoxical practice is trending in both education leadership and policy studies (as well as in business leadership studies), but in fact the literature on education (in Singapore and elsewhere) suggests that this is not helpful for arresting the terrors of performativity, and that there are examples of high performing education systems flourishing better through being consistent with core values. I detail how paradoxical leadership makes it difficult for defending ethical practice and how their rejection and shaming of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction risks effecting a woke culture that represses criticality. I argue that all this is part of an ongoing nominalist trend (the bifurcation between nature and thinking) in the history of ideas, only that we are at a philosophical tipping point. I explore the alternative, which takes contradictions seriously and irons out inconsistencies, and pre-empt objections internal to the Aristotelian tradition, and also offer an interpretation of James March's influential theory of leadership to show that if read carefully, the theory does not fit well with the paradoxes approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many literary works, the characters transform into a "new man". For example, Tom Joads in Grapes of Wrath is transformed from a selfish character who prioritizes his own survival under the social background of the Great Depression. After traveling with his family to California. Young Joads gradually become sober towards the suffering of lower class Americans, turning into a righteous man who fights for social justice. Nevertheless, I disagree with the concept "new man", because despite the ceaseless stream of time and transformative experiences we undergo, our personal essence is constant through time. Meaning that we do not form a complete new self through the transformation of time and experience. To understand this we will be examining the concepts of personal identity defined by memory and consciousness throughout the period of human life. Locke believes that experiences form a human being, and that the concept of individual consciousness will demonstrate the inherent continuity and persistence of the self that are presented through a comprehensive understanding of nature's capacity for transformation over the span of time. Therefore factors such as individual perceptions and impressions in shaping one's sense of self, along with the influence of moral development and virtue on individual identity do not alter the core of identity. Indeed, Descartes, who views the human consciousness as the only object that holds true in the universe, agrees that we are not able to perceive the objective truth. The view point we will argue is in contrast to that of Hume and his bundle theory of identity; we will, therefore, first give an exposition on Hume's critique of a stable personal identity, which it separated into qualitatively identify, and numerical identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adab Al-Kufa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the influential topics in Islamic philosophy is the issue of "active intellect". This term has entered Islamic philosophy from Aristotle's philosophy and some interpreters of Aristotle's works. Islamic philosophers interpreted this issue in the context of their philosophical system and by expanding its concept from the field of natural and industrial (artistic) phenomena to the field of epistemology; they gave it a significant role. These philosophers have presented two types of arguments to prove the active intellect. Some of these arguments are formulated based on the theory of the nine spheres and according to the principle of causality. These arguments attemt to prove efficient causes for the existence of spheres and introduce ultimate causes for their rotational movements. Arguments of the second category also attempt to prove active intellect by relying on principles such as "every event and contingent needs an efficient cause" and "lacking a thing, it is not given to it". In this article, these arguments have been examined and finally, it has been concluded that the arguments of the first category are vulnerable and invalid due to the invalidity of their basis (planetary theory); and the arguments of the second category can only prove non-material and efficient cause or causes, provided that their premises are true, not the active intellect, i.e., the tenth intellect.

It is a common mistake of contemporary natural law scholarship to overestimate the ancient Greeks' contribution to a meaningful theory of natural law and to mistake an appeal to unwritten law with natural law's criteria for normative validity. This paper was designed to elaborate on two interrelated queries. On the one hand, it labours to reconstruct the ancient Greeks' understanding of a hierarchy of law, which is answered in the affirmative. On the other hand, the paper inquires whether there existed any meaningful sense of natural law in the Classical period, to which question the Archytean nexus of law and natural justice is offered as a palpable compromise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like other key terms in the medical and health humanities—empathy, creativity, and reflection, to name just a few—wellness has become a weasel word, rife the language of optimization, duty, and self-perception. While alternative vocabularies exist—well-being and quality of life among them—these options usually privilege the objectives of academic (often psychological) research, health institutions, and the economic state apparatus, rather than people themselves. In mind of these concerns, why attempt to make a case for wellness at all? We present a historically informed, theoretically driven, praxis-guided framework for a renewed vision of social wellness (a concept first defined in the late 1950s). While definitions since Bill Hettler's "hexagonal" model (1980) have included mutual respect for others and the assumption of cooperative behaviors, conspicuously absent from contemporary definitions and usage is any mention of the aesthetic realm, which we—alongside philosophers like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum—take as a central human capability. How can the relational possibilities of arts engagement be understood as not just a means of promoting individual wellness, but also as a method and outcome of social wellness? We propose that social wellness is ultimately premised on the interplay between wellness of the collective and the strength of the relational encounters it engenders. We turn to a key practice paradigm—community arts engagement—as both a vehicle for and site of social wellness. With brief reference to a Canadian exemplar, we conclude with concrete recommendations for addressing critical opportunities for advancing arts-led social wellness initiatives involving academic and community partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tension at the heart of Aristotle's understanding of organic activities, created by his appeals to the productive activities of craftsmen and his use of normative language to characterize the goals of such activities. In this paper I discuss two ways of interpreting Aristotle's teleology aimed at resolving this tension, and discuss a closely analogous tension at the heart of a number of contemporary defenses of teleological reasoning in biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regularly invoked but rarely defined, 'the rule of law' has over the last few decades been converted from a legal term of art into one of the most ambiguous slogans of contemporary public policy. Political scientists claim it as a crucial test of a regime's legitimacy. Economists maintain that it provides an essential foundation of a flourishing market economy. Philosophers suggest it captures the essence of the state as a moral association. Historians acknowledge that, even if they might distrust such an abstract notion, the imposition of effective inhibitions on power is an 'unqualified human good'. And lawyers, of course, have treated it as the foundation of their discipline ever since the mid-thirteenth century when Bracton asserted that 'there is no rex where will rules rather than lex'. Those who extend its usage beyond the confines of professional legal discourse commonly give it a positive valence. But the rule of law also has its detractors. These critics assert that it promotes purely formal, individualistic values at the expense of substantive justice, or that it is a smokescreen preventing us from seeing the impact of recent global developments that signal the rule of lawyers. Some anthropologists even denounce it as an imperial ideology that legitimates European conquest and the plunder of the rest of the world. But given the fact that almost every state in the world now claims to act in compliance with the rule of law, these critics seem to have done little to dent its appeal. Yet, the sheer range of views and perspectives that now exist about the meaning, purpose, and value of the rule of law considerably complicates any inquiry into its current standing. In this paper, I will try to bring some clarity to the issue by providing a sketch of the main varieties of ways in which the term is being invoked. The paper comprises five sections, which each address a specific aspect of the term's usage: (1) its coinage in English law, (2) the adoption of a superficially similar terminology in the German concept of the Rechtsstaat, (3) the jurisprudential innovations that complicate its meaning, and finally its most recent invocation (4) first in development work and (5) secondly in constitutional rejuvenation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates Machiavelli’s relationship with the treatment of tyranny in scholastic Aristotelianism. More specifically, it analyzes Machiavelli’s omissive analysis of tyranny against the backdrop of the Vernacular translated texts of two Aristotelian thinkers who were present in Machiavelli’s context: Giles of Rome and Marsilius of Padua. It is argued that some pragmatic political themes of Machiavelli’s political thought have interesting antecedents already in previous medieval Aristotelian thinkers.

The paper discusses the conception of philosophy and ethics in Seneca’s Letters, as well as in his other writings, which it sets in the broader context of ancient and modern thought. The introduction outlines the Socratic and Stoic foundations of Seneca’s ethics. The next section focuses on the interpretation of passages from the Letters that remind us that the task of philosophy is to teach human to live an active life. The paper points out that, according to Seneca, philosophy resembles art more than knowledge, and Seneca adapts his language and the examples he uses to this effect. In the next section, the paper returns to delineating the relationship between theoretical and practical thought. The specificity of Seneca’s position becomes visible in the background of Aristotle’s problematization of this relationship. The last section asks how we should approach Seneca’s conception of ethics and philosophy. The analyses outlined above show that Seneca’s Letters fully express an approach to philosophy as an art of living, an approach that modern authors such as Nietzsche and Foucault consider determinative for the whole of ancient philosophy.

Acidic substances were known for thousands of years, and their macroscopic-sensory characteristics were reflected by words in most ancient languages. In the Western canon, the history of the concept of acidity goes back to Ancient Greece. In Greek, the word associated with acidity from its early literary references was ὀξύς ("sharp"), and still in contemporary Greek the words "sour" and "acidic" have the same root. This paper makes a short presentation of the appearance of the abstract concept in the works of Plato and Aristotle and relates it, on one side to the already existing theological-philosophical tradition, starting with Hesiod´s Theogony and on the other, to the then available to the Greeks organoleptic experiences of sourness-vinegar and sour milk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines possible reasons as to why Plato wrote dialogues. Hypotheses raised include the notion that dialogues were designed for public consumption, Plato's Idea of the Good and his protection of himself from the power elite. It describes the features of each variety of Platonic dialogues and discusses the essence of human wisdom, knowledge acquisition and the theoretical pessimism embedded in Plato's book "The Apology of Socrates."

What are the contents, limits, and possibilities of Aristotle's works for critical thinking about money? Recent scholarship has (re)turned to Aristotle as an authority for two key political approaches to money. The first aims to democratize the governance of monetary institutions in order to realize more just economic outcomes. The second seeks to prevent money, or its inherently deleterious excesses, from corrupting political actors and political life. Arguing that these two approaches are insightful, important, and incomplete, I reengage Aristotle's account of money across the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics to theorize money as a vital but underexplored means of political subject formation. I illuminate how the use of money produces collective and constitutive relations that emerge by way of people's engagements and entanglements with the things they produce, acquire, desire, and exchange. Bringing this to light also makes visible, I argue, how Aristotle understands money as something capable of being used to both bring about social justice and to pervasively corrupt the foundations of shared democratic life. Taking stock of this dual capacity of money, I show how money's relationship to subjectivity simultaneously makes money the site of a seemingly intractable problem for politics under capitalism and the means to revive it and reconnect it to democratic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As William Cavanaugh has remarked, the scholarly notion of religion "should often be surrounded by scare quotes. Its flexibility and occasional nebulousness make evaluating its role in conceiving of, effecting, and justifying violence even more difficult. At the same time, it sticks around and remains a vital category of contemporary analysis. What if getting behind the Wars of Religion—the period to which Cavanaugh traces the emergence of his "myth of religious violence"—could plant the seeds for a new paradigm in understanding the relationship between religion and violence? In this article, I analyze the Chronicon of Jean Hocsem, a fourteenth-century canon from Liège. Untranslated into English and rarely written about, Hocsem's text offers an unexpectedly political perspective on this question. Combining insights from Augustine's City of God as well as Aristotle's Politics and basing his ideas on his own experience of nearly constant conflict, Hocsem develops the idea that class antagonisms and human frailty make violence—especially political violence—inevitable. He takes this approach within a polity ruled by a prince-bishop, though one he would not have thought of as "religious". Hocsem's solutions are thus avowedly political. His pessimism about such questions leads to an emphasis on mitigating violence through the institution of proper socio-political structures. This reading of Hocsem and his politicizing of the question of violence opens new possibilities for scholars, further calling into question any easy relationship between the modern categories of "religion" and violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]