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Paula DeSutter Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation reiterates the strategy of persuading the People's Republic of China to better implement and consistently enforce its nonproliferation commitments before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission in July 2003.

Articles are presented that provide different viewpoints on the meeting between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss economic and strategic issues, at the Genoa Summit on 22 July, 2001. In talks on strategic stability, the two presidents agreed to meet in the Fall to start discussions on offensive and defensive systems.

There is much hand-wringing in the arms control trenches these days over the role and future of arms control in U.S. policy. Liberal supporters of arms control lament what they [...]

The nuclear rests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 were a reminder to the world that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are still very much with us. Most [...]

The success of Russia's arms control and ballistic missile defense program correlates with the maintenance of its status as a strategic peer vis-a-vis the US through the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The significant decline of Russia's military power has promoted a fluctuation approach to the country's ballistic-missile defense and arms control strategy. Future Russian-American accommodation on ballistic-missile defense-associated issues need to be focused on a 'top-down' scheme supporting both sides' efforts to address concerns related to ballistic missile defense.

UN's inspection of Iraqi facilities that produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will not necessarily destroy Saddam Hussein's WMD capacity, in the same way that it will not oust him from power. This conclusion is based on the fact that Iraq's WMD programs are deeply entrenched in civilian, dual-use industries, strengthened no less by Western technology. Only political change in Iraq, coupled with the containment of Saddam, could eliminate the country's WMD capacity and the security threat that it brings on a global scale., While the Kofi Annan-brokered agreement of February removed, at least temporarily, Iraq from the headlines and talk shows, there is no reason to believe that defusing the crisis over the [...]

Efforts to formulate ballistic missile defense policies may not be on the front burner but should definitely be addressed. The technology of missile defense has changed dramatically since the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense treaty, to where the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons is no longer clear. The subject is divisive among Allied countries and even within the U.S. Allies should work together to prevent the use of space to store and launch weapons.

The West is imposing restrictions on acquisition of defense technology by India mainly because it wants to avoid the threat posed by Indian defense technology to Western defense market. India is denied access to technology though it has not misused its defense power while many other violators of international arms control treaties have access to high technology. The US should support third world democracies such as India and not totalitarian regimes to create a world devoid of tensions.

The non-proliferation theory needs to be reviewed due to the rapid growth of missiles and warheads. Ballistic missiles of various ranges are held by more than 30 nations and there is a danger of terrorists acquiring these missiles. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and the former Soviet Union is no longer relevant as it contains too many restrictions. To counter the threat of proliferation, a Global Protection System against ballistic missile attack has to be formed.

The end of the Cold War revealed the nexus between arms control and politics, proving that the policy of arms control advocated and practiced by the US has been a total failure. The threat to international security is not from armaments but from nations' motives in acquiring them. It is politics which influences the use of armaments, and the outbreak of peace does not necessarily result in arms control.

The possibility of limiting the arms trade increases amidst the political and economic changes occurring throughout the world. The decline in arms production, the decreasing tension between the US and the former USSR and the lessons learned from the Gulf War have all contributed to this trend. However, there are certain political, economic and technical factors that could hinder in the effective control of destructive weapons.

This article examines the intersection between war termination and arms control leading to postwar arms control. The following two questions are explored: To what extent do war outcomes condition postwar arms control? Do arms arrangements that emerge from armed conflicts improve the postwar order in the long term? The article establishes a typology of war outcomes in function of their effects on arms control. Most armed conflicts do not create conditions favourable to lasting arms control. The examined cases that include, inter alia, Germany's disarmament after Versailles, arms restriction agreements after the Yom Kippur War, and Iraq's partial disarmament after the Gulf War, show that arms control efforts after wars tend to be linked more to the process of ending a hot conflict than to the construction of a stable postwar regime. In asymmetrical outcomes of war (i.e. with a clear winner and loser), the chances for a lasting agreement on armament are very small. The coercive nature of such agreements leaves little ground for extension to a broader, multilateral arms control agreement. In symmetrical outcomes of war (i.e. conflicts that end in stalemate), there is no fertile ground for armament control either. The temporary character of symmetrical war endings prevents cooperation between the former belligerents in areas that would affect their military capabilities. But, symmetrical war termination can produce confidence and stability through disengagement arrangements, provided that the parties are prepared to accept and comply with cooperative verification measures. The article concludes that the chances for postwar arms control may improve in the future due to the enlargement of the normative consensus resulting from the growing number of peacetime arms control regimes.

Changes in the geopolitical environment and fears about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading policymakers to consider ZBM as a national security policy. This policy would increase international stability and improve relations within the American strategic community. ZBM as an arms-control policy is more feasible than controlling the proliferation of clandestine nuclear capabilities.