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Countertransferential and other types of personal responses to candidates are inevitable among psychoanalytic educators, whether they be supervisors, progression advisors, the progression committee as a whole, or course instructors. Nonetheless many educators remain unaware of these phenomena – despite the robust literature on this subject in supervisors – perhaps because we do not like to think of ourselves as having potentially deleterious personal reactions to younger colleagues with whom we have significant and highly valued relationships. This paper emphasizes the role of such phenomena in progression advisors' deliberations about candidates' development, as well as in the committee as a whole – a subject not addressed in the literature. Especially when unrecognized such responses can compromise the checks and balances function of the progression committee and significantly diminish rich and effective dialogue with candidates about their development. Examples of the potential impact and more or less effective mitigation of such responses are presented. Ensuring that faculty members and candidates alike are familiar with the inevitability of these reactions, their multiple sources and manifestations in those involved in the work of progression enhances the possibility of developing strategies to address these reactions and reduce their effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Independent commissions and other bodies take ever-growing importance in the process of the selection and appointment of judges, but they are not a cure against all threats to judicial independence. Starting from the Guðmundur case in a comparative perspective yet focused on the Hungarian model the paper will investigate other elements of the selection process that also play a role in guaranteeing judicial independence, as the question of judicial appointments is of great importance for an independent tribunal being established by law. The paper argues based on recent case-law that the requirement of judicial review against breaches of the appointment process will lead to a judicialization of this now rather political question and can enhance the system of checks and balances in this field. This will again probably entail the need for more defined selection criteria. The Hungarian model shows weaknesses, the analysis of which may help to avoid some "faux-pas" and trigger a more systematic European response. The paper uses the comparative legal method and relies on the analysis of legal texts, mostly from European and national courts and other European fora within the Council of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politische Vierteljahresschrift is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses authority granted to Congress over imposing federal taxes in general, and income tax in specific. The author used the critical analytical method to analyze the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Income Tax Law, and the U.S. Constitution, to reach the policy followed by the court in ruling on the constitutionality of legal provisions related to the constitutionality of such tax legislations. The importance of this article comes in that it is one of the few studies that analyzed and criticized the policy of the U.S. Supreme Court in its ruling on the constitutionality of tax federal legislations. The author explains the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in identifying what is considered as income in some gray areas that the U.S. tax code (26 U.S. Code of 1986) did not provide an answer for, or petitioners claimed that such income does not fall in gross income inclusions. In addition, the author explains the philosophy behind granting Congress such power, and the effects of such authority. Although the author believes that many amendments to the tax code has political backgrounds rather than economic, granting this power to Congress would be less arbitrary compared to the political scenarios that could appear if it granted to the Executive Branch. At last, the author discusses the constitutional limits on congressional power of taxing and how these limits would affect tax legislations that Congress was trying to pass, considering people’s right of equity in tax treatment under Uniformity Clause.

This article analyzes the implications of the proposals of the Minister of Justice and the Chair of the Knesset’s Constitution Committee to overhaul the judiciary of Israel. These proposals, if legislated, will undermine basic principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. In the absence of a complete formal constitution and its relatively weak system of checks and balances, Israel has developed several institutions that protect the rule of law and human rights, including a Supreme Court with the power of judicial review of legislation; a balanced and professional system for selecting judges; a strong legal civil service, with a relatively independent attorney general. The so-called legal reforms deal specifically with these institutions, and seek to weaken or annul them. As such, this judicial overhaul is tantamount to a revolutionary attempt to change the regime and would undermine the democratic character of Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has lacked a system of separation of powers with checks and balances. Even the 2004 constitution, which was drafted in a relatively open political environment, fell short of establishing such a system. It granted the president excessive executive, legislative, and judicial powers, effectively concentrating power in the executive branch. This centralism fostered autocratic tendencies. The President intervened in legislative matters, bypassing constitutional requirements and weakening legislative oversight. Similarly, the president’s excessive power undermined the independence of the judiciary system, turning it into a tool to pursue his interests. The combined executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the president, coupled with weak oversight institutions, led to unchecked centralism. This concentration of power weakened the rule of law, fueled corruption, exacerbated wealth and power imbalances, and eroded public trust in the government. More importantly, this centralism exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country. The present contribution, informed by the author’s experience with the Constitutional Oversight Commission in Afghanistan, follows a descriptive and analytical approach. It argues that there is a need for decentralizing power in any future constitution in order to establish a modern and stable governance system in Afghanistan.

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments—for example, anti-dumping—and by adding new instruments to the European Commission’s toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission’s growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia outlines the impeachment mechanism. This Constitution outlines that the procedure for impeaching the president and vice president must be mandated by the People's Representative Council (DPR) to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It is important to acknowledge that the current impeachment process upholds the principle of checks and balances of direct presidential elections. The impeachment decision of the current president and vice president cannot strengthen the rule of law when the Constitutional Court (MK) determines that the president or vice president has violated the Constitution. This research aimed to find out the impeachment mechanism outlined in the 1945 Constitution with the principle of the supremacy of constitutional law. This research included a qualitative method by focusing on the problematic effectiveness of the 1945 Constitution on the check and balance mechanism and the impeachment of the president and vice president from the constitutional law perspective. The check and balance mechanism aims to create a democratic government. Check and balance is a principle controlling and maintaining state institutions' balance. The results revealed that the 1945 Constitution's mechanism for impeaching the president or vice president was relatively ineffective because the rule of law and the constitutional judicial mechanism were still handled by the political mechanism. Consequently, the check and balance mechanism did not occur in this process. The characteristic of impeachment as a control causes impeachment cannot to be implemented following the rule of law, which was an indicator that the check and balance mechanism had been unbalanced by the Constitutional Court's decision, which was used to create a legal mechanism that was not explicit and binding on the MPR and the 1945 Constitution.

Copyright of Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política is the property of Instituto de Ciencia Politica (Universidad de la Republica de Uruguay) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's political constitution rests on the checking and balancing operations of a representative system in which parliament is sovereign. By contrast, referendums are often considered instances of popular sovereignty. Critics condemn them as populist appeals to a singular will of the people that risk majority tyranny, supporters believe they allow citizens to check and balance the elitism of politicians. Such arguments lay behind the criticism and praise of the Brexit referendum. This article argues that while the criticism is justified when referendums form an alternative to representative democracy, they can usefully supplement such a system provided they are embedded within and constrained by it. So conceived, the Brexit referendum can be regarded as consistent with political constitutionalism. Yet, this conception challenges claims that it represented the sovereign will of the people. The result remained subject to ratification by a sovereign parliament and could be legitimately overturned by that body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence of norms in the law that have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, but re-included in the process of forming laws, can cause harm to the rights of citizens that have been guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution, especially if they are placed in the concept of checks and balances. This study has two objectives, namely, first, to analyze the concept of checks and balances and examples of norms that were canceled by the Constitutional Court but revived. Second, the implications of bringing unconstitutional norms to life. This research was conducted using normative juridical research. The results showed that the principle of checks and balances requires that legislative, executive, and judicial powers control each other. Some unconstitutional norms, but re-enacted, are spread through some statutes. The consequences if an unconstitutional article is reinserted into the law, it will threaten the system of checks and balances that have been agreed upon and affirmed in the 1945 NRI Constitution. In order to apply the principle of checks and balances, reviving an unconstitutional clause that has been overturned by the Constitutional Court must be rejected.

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments—for example, anti-dumping—and by adding new instruments to the European Commission's toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission's growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Critique of Law: Independent Legal Studies / Krytyka Prawa: Niezalezne Studia nad Prawem is the property of Akademia Leona Kozminskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes the challenges for parliamentary democracies due to the strengthening of the Executive Power and judicial activism. It also examines the challenges of Global Administrative Law, which is defined as the mechanisms, principles, practices, and social agreements that support and promote accountability of global administrative bodies. The article highlights the lack of accountability and participation mechanisms in global administrative law, as well as the change in the system of formal sources and the strengthening of executive and judicial power at the expense of parliaments. It also mentions the impact of transnational phenomena on the system of checks and balances and human rights, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article poses the challenge of preserving and guaranteeing the principles of parliamentary democracy and the values of the social and democratic rule of law in the global legal sphere. [Extracted from the article]

The paper analyzes the institution of judges – the Lithuanian Judicial Council referred to in Article 112(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. The paper attempts to define this institution by considering various alternatives of interpretation of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and at the same time assessing the interpretation of this document made by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania.

Science is the search for truth about the observable world. But it rests on values. The only thing that can be discovered by observation is the immediate here and now. Otherwise, knowledge about the observable world is based on hearsay, spoken or recorded, about others' observations. Apart from small and fleeting observations, science rests on trust. Our scientific lives and scientific knowledge depend on choosing who and what to trust. Since we can meet only a few scientists at best, we have to decide whether to trust science as an institution. Science is a good bet because its aim is to create truth, perhaps posthumously; truth is its end as well as its means. In today's world, science is vitally important as a check and balance on democratic power and an object lesson for decision-makers. To do good, honest, science is to support democracy in the face of populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Law / Teise is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes the problems caused by the state of emergency in Indonesia. It focuses on explaining the meaning of a state of emergency, based on Article 12 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. It addresses how Indonesia determines the emergency status and how checks and balances regarding the emergency status were implemented. This paper highlights three points. First, the existing law on the state of emergency is no longer in line with Indonesia's constitutional concept, following the amendment; second, there are findings indicating that several emergency statuses were not appropriately declared; third, the lack of the Parliamentary and court role in conducting checks and balances on the President in the state of emergency. This paper offers a recommendation concerning the importance of strengthening checks and balances to ensure there will be no abuse of power in implementing a state of emergency in the future.

Copyright of Historia Constitucional is the property of Revista Historia Constitucional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to shed light on the decisionmaking process in early modern Kotor, based on an analysis of the Statute of Kotor (1616) and surviving notarial documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of IUSTA is the property of Universidad Santo Tomas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With technocratic populist Andrej Babiš leading the Czech government coalition, the country has experienced some democratic backsliding. In contrast to its Hungarian and Polish counterparts, however, the Czech Constitutional Court has been spared from executive capture. This article argues that resilient constitutional courts may act as one of the key safeguards against illiberal populism. We demonstrate that resilient constitutional courts are products of an institutional framework, which prevents court-packing by loyal allies of populist leaders, and of courts' activities that increase their reputation with the public, thus making political attacks against them overly costly. We argue that the Czech Constitutional Court has exercised an approach of selective judicial activism that focuses on keeping political competition fair while avoiding involvement in controversial socially transformative judicial decision-making which would outrage large parts of the population. Moreover, by acting as a guardian of fair political competition, the Court contributed to the further fragmentation of the political landscape, which in turn prevented the accumulation of political power, and hence the Court shielded itself from political attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Selcuk Law Review / Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Selcuk Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The doctrine of separation of powers is recognized by most civilized democratic countries. It was first presented in the Magna Carta. The doctrine dictates that power is divided into three branches of the government namely the executive, legislature, and the judiciary. For the doctrine to be implemented effectively and efficiently, there is a principle of checks and balances wherein each branch has power to exercise oversight on the others to check arbitrariness. The essence of checks and balances is to curtain and curtail any abuse of power by any of the branches. The courts have the power to interpret and apply the law and can even declare any provision of the Constitution or legislation invalid and unconstitutional. The courts wield enormous power to the extent that they have the power to review conduct of the other branches and spheres of the state and declare any of their action or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution. However, while exercising their judicial review powers, the courts too have limits or boundaries. The court cannot usurp the power of any of the other two organs of government. The only time a court might intervene in other branch is when the organ of the state has acted contrary to the Constitution. This paper accentuates that the majority judgement in the case of “Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National assembly 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC) (EFF2)” seemed to have encroached into the domain of the legislative arm of the government by not observing the limits of the judiciary in the exercise of judicial powers and therefore violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Against this backdrop, this paper concurs with the minority judgement in the case of EFF2 which held that the judiciary overarched by usurping the power and performing the functions constitutionally reserved for the parliament-the legislature. It concludes that the judiciary overreached and went beyond exercising checks and balances permitted by the Constitution in that the judiciary used its judicial power to dictate to the parliament to exercise its powers in a certain way. Whereas the Constitution reserved this power to the parliament to make its own rules in order to govern its processes.

The Study is a tribute to Zoltán Magyary, the founder and outstanding scholar of public administration in Hungary. It briefly describes and praises the career and work of the Professor, who committed suicide in 1945, and emphasises that his personal ambitions, his thirst for knowledge, his discipline, his dedication, his talent, his excellent memory, the personality traits that made him a star of Hungarian public administration, would have brought him to the top even in less tragic times. The pressures of reform on the Hungarian administration would have been very different in a country that had not been torn apart, or not completely torn apart, by Trianon, and whose resources, population and culture might have been very different. By analysing some elements of Magyary's "American State Life", a comparative state-scientific analysis of the constitutional system and public administration of the United States of America, the article demonstrates that Professor Magyary brought Hungarian public administration to the forefront of European and even world scholarship at the time.

The judgement issued by the Dutch Supreme Court in the Urgenda Climate Case (2019) attracted considerable attention, both in the Netherlands and abroad. For the first time, a supreme court in one of EU member states forced the government to take measures to combat climate change. The verdict by the Supreme Court is particularly relevant from the viewpoint of separation of powers and the rule of law. In the Urgenda ruling, the Supreme Court especially considers its own role in the rule of law, while ignoring the interests that are at stake regarding other state authorities, Government and Parliament. The judicial order to create legislation is not compatible with constitutional arrangements regarding the independence of Parliament and its members in the context of the separation of powers. The ruling furthermore clashes with the legality principle in the rule of law. The Supreme Court departs from the principle that a court dispenses justice in accordance with the wording and intention of the law. The Supreme Court does not apply the law but instead bases itself on political and scientific insights. In that way, the Supreme Court assigns itself a role in the political domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1991, a new constitution was created to include all political stakeholders in addition to those traditionally excluded in the 1886 constitution, in the hope of putting an end to armed conflicts, strikes and citizen discontent. These citizen demonstrations were capitalized by the students in the seventh ballot, which prompted the convocation of the constituent assembly. After the promulgation of the new constitution of 1991, a cascade of reforms began, which evidenced a constant dispute for power between the elites, emerging legal and illegal groups, and the population that began to feel part of the power. But, what was the purpose of these constitutional changes? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Winners and losers of elections have different stakes in protecting democratic institutions. We provide new evidence for the effects of partisanship and economic performance on support for checks and balances and acceptance of their infringement. Using survey data from 26 European countries, we show that voters who feel close to a political party that lost the elections support checks and balances significantly more than other citizens. We also find that higher satisfaction with the economy is associated with lower support for checks and balances. Our experiment in Ukraine shows that supporters and opponents of the governing party have divergent evaluations of a reform potentially infringing on the independence of the judiciary. Those in opposition find such reforms less acceptable and justified. Again, we find that improved economic performance leads to higher acceptance of judicial reform. Our results confirm that citizens' support for checks and balances is contingent and volatile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I will analyse the impact that from my point of view the legislation dictated during the pandemic has had on the normal functioning of the judiciary, I will refer to how the necessary separation and division between the separate branches of the State has been altered, and I will recount how the system of checks and balance inherent in a social and democratic state of law has been disturbed. I will also describe the impact on our social and democratic State of Law, which carries the principle of separation and division of powers and the existence of a regime of checks and balances between the different branches of the State has had Royal Decree 463/2020, of March 14, which declared the state of alarm for the management of the health crisis caused by COVID-19 that meant the interruption of the normal functioning of the judiciary during the state of alarm, and, of Law 3/2020, of September 18, on procedural and organizational measures to deal with Covid-19 in the field of the administration of justice that established an unconstitutional conmixture between the Executive Power and the Judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the vast body of scholarship on the Enlightenment, only a small portion addresses the role of China in the debates of that period. Among those, scarcely any concerns the relationship between China and Rousseau's thought. Yet the connections are many, and deep. This essay surveys a body of Chinese political theory available to Rousseau, then compares Rousseau's understanding of sovereignty, the "people," popular will, public opinion, and the authority of office, with comparable terms present in the Chinese theory available to him. The aim of this exercise is not so much to establish influence, though that can be difficult to deny. Primarily, the essay attempts to show that Rousseau's system generates contradictions in part because he attempts to combine parliamentary procedure with the conception of sovereignty and the popular will found in his Chinese sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]