Search

With a shift in the strategic direction of the Marine Corps due to the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, should the Marine Corps shift the way it procures the systems necessary to execute Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, namely in the procurement of a novel autonomous logistics system (ALS) that provides middle-mile logistics in a military environment? This thesis attempts to answer the following questions: Should the Marine Corps seek to procure commercial ALS via outright purchase, lease, or a hybrid of the two models? What is unique about commercial ALS that would bias a lease-versus-purchase decision one way or the other, and which aspects of such systems in the analysis could translate to similar analyses of other potential Department of Defense (DOD) systems? What are the likely challenges to a lease-based business model, and what drawbacks will need to be addressed or alleviated by the DOD and by private industry? The research includes literature and legal review, case study analysis, and comparative analysis of procurement methods. A fictional operational vignette is used to ground and explain the comparison. The recommended procurement course of action is a hybrid model, starting with a trial lease period in partnership with a manufacturer, that allows the Marine Corps to test, utilize, and analyze all aspects of a commercial ALS before deciding on a long-term business model to implement across the force., Captain, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Currently, U.S. air carriers do not provide equipment or training necessary to mitigate the risk posed by surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) threats. These threats consist of self-guided weapons (infrared shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles), manually-aimed threats (small arms, recoilless grenade launchers, rockets, and light anti-aircraft artillery), and hand-held lasers. Technological solutions to counter infrared shoulder-fired missiles have been explored, but were rejected due to prohibitive equipment and maintenance costs. A lower cost option, providing air-carrier pilots with SAFIRE risk-reduction training, has not been formally addressed by the air-carrier industry or the U.S. federal government. This effort will use a business concept, the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), to illustrate a method that could be used to help policy makers and stakeholders determine if the SAFIRE threat warrants the individual air-carrier expense associated with a mandatory SAFIRE risk-reduction training program. This project advocates the creation of a panel with (a) the expertise necessary to conduct a detailed CBA of air-carrier expense to determine the necessity for a federally mandated SAFIRE risk-reduction training program; and (b) the authority to implement the policy as determined by the lead agency. To understand the issues surrounding the CBA, it is necessary to examine the nature of the three primary categories of SAFIRE threats, identify potential stakeholders, review notional training options, examine statistical tools, and quantify potential expenses. Two notional CBAs were used to show the difference in results between potential statistical methodologies, with the Direct Comparison model validating the concept and the Expectant Value model showing that the training expense far outweighed the financial risk. Although this project describes how a training program could be developed and implemented, it is not intended to support either the implementation or the absence of SA

To move passengers and cargo, DoD supplements its military aircraft with cargo and passenger aircraft from volunteer commercial carriers participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Participating carriers commit their aircraft to support a range of military operations in exchange for peacetime business. A House Armed Services Committee mandated GAO to report on matters related to the CRAF program. GAO assessed whether DoD did the following: (1) met its military airlift training requirements while also using CRAF participants to the maximum extent practicable, (2) provided justification for restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain routes, and (3) has established future requirements for CRAF and how the planned size of CRAF compares to those requirements. GAO reviewed guidance and policies pertaining to the program, flying hour data, and DoD-sponsored CRAF study reports. GAO also interviewed DoD and industry officials. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command -- in conjunction with the Commander, Air Mobility Command -- to use its existing processes for monitoring training to determine when it can shift its distribution of peacetime airlift workload from military to commercial sources. In comments on a draft of this report, DoD concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated that it believes implementing the recommendation will further improve the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program., Report to Congressional Committees.

Is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) still a viable airlift method for the DoD during times of war and national emergencies? Through examination of historical documents, this paper will provide background information as to how and why the CRAF was formed. Next, by exploring current national and DoD strategy and policies, and USAF doctrine, the paper will offer insight into how the CRAF is integrated into our national military strategy, and then it will attempt to determine how valuable the CRAF is in today's environment. In conclusion, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet provides a mission-ready capability that the DoD can rapidly call upon to provide airlift for any contingency in the world. In both instances of its activation, the CRAF successfully airlifted the majority of military troops and a significant amount of cargo, allowing the DoD to maximize strategic airlift to meet mission needs. The CRAF continues to be a viable airlift method for the DoD.

Organizational slack is the cushion of actual or potential resources that allows an organization to adapt to internal or external pressures. Slack resources can come in many forms, such as excess capacity and unused capital. Commercial airlines possess slack in the form of excess capacity, also known as load factor. Due to the increasing pressures to reduce costs and eliminate excess capacity, the commercial carriers constantly try to increase their load factors to a break even point. One method air carriers use to reach this break even point is by participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. By participating, commercial carriers are eligible for a portion of the $2 billion dollars in annual Department of Defense business and have access to a revenue stream to augment their commercial business and manage slack resources. The purpose of this study is to examine which factors have the greatest influence on CRAF participation. Due to the volatile nature of the airline industry, the author examined the roles of organizational slack, financial health, and U.S. economic conditions in CRAF participation. After conducting linear regression of the data, at least two conclusions can be derived from the results. First, the economic conditions that the commercial carriers are experiencing have little bearing on CRAF participation. Second, the large passenger carriers and integrated cargo carriers are the least likely carriers to want to participate in CRAF. The empirical evidence shows that CRAF participation is driven more by carrier size, carrier financial health, and carrier type. These results have significant implications for policy changes in the CRAF program. Maintaining viable incentives is vital to the long-term success of the CRAF program.