Search

Introduction: Hypoxia due to reduced partial pressure of oxygen from highaltitude exposure affects the cognitive function of high-altitude migrants. Executive function is an important component of human cognitive function, characterized by high oxygen consumption during activity, and its level can be measured using cognitive control capacity (CCC). In addition, there is evidence for the potential value of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO) interventions in improving cognitive decline on the plateau. Therefore, the objective of this study was to investigate the effect of long-term high-altitude exposure on CCC in highaltitude newcomers and whether hyperbaric oxygen intervention has an ameliorative effect. Methods: This study measured the magnitude of participants' CCC using a Backward Masking Majority Function Task (MFT-M). Study 1 was a controlled study of different altitude conditions, with 64 participants in the high-altitude newcomer group and 64 participants in the low-altitude resident group, each completing the MFT-M task once. Study 2 was a controlled HBO intervention study in which newcomers who had lived at a high altitude for 2 years were randomly divided into the HBO group (n = 28) and control group (n = 28). 15 times hyperbaric oxygen interventions were performed in the HBO group. Subjects in both groups completed the MFT-M task once before and once after the intervention. Results: Study 1 showed that CCC was significantly higher in the low-altitude resident group than in the high-altitude newcomer group (p = 0.031). Study 2 showed that the CCC in the HBO group was significantly higher after 15 hyperbaric interventions than before (p = 0.005), while there was no significant difference in the control group (p = 0.972). The HBO group had significantly higher correct task rates than the control group after the intervention (p = 0.001). Conclusion: This study confirms that long-term high-altitude exposure leads to impairment of CCC in high-altitude newcomers and that hyperbaric oxygen intervention is effective in improving CCC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paradoxically, some individuals who experience pathological worry also have good capacity for top-down control over their thoughts. Why such individuals would nevertheless worry excessively remains unclear. One explanation is suggested by research showing that those experiencing pathological worry are set apart from healthy controls by their beliefs that worry has utility and that effective worrying requires them to consider all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. This suggests that worriers with good capacity for cognitive control may engage in prolonged worry because they believe it is adaptive to do so. In a sample of 109 college students, among whom individuals reporting pathological worry were overrepresented, we tested this hypothesis using an objective index of top-down control capacity (i.e., resting vagally mediated heart rate variability [vmHRV]) and self-report measures of beliefs about worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptom severity/status. As predicted, GAD symptom severity and vmHRV interacted to predict beliefs about worry. Specifically, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with beliefs that worry has utility at higher levels of vmHRV. Furthermore, this pattern was mostly a function of the belief that worry serves to distract the worrier from more emotional things. Similarly, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with endorsement of an as many as can (AMAC) problem-solving rule when vmHRV was high. From the opposite perspective, both worry utility beliefs and AMAC rule endorsement were associated with the highest GAD symptom severity at higher levels of vmHRV. This was also true for the belief that worry distracts from more emotional things predicting analog GAD status. These results suggest that worriers who have higher levels of top-down control capacity may initiate and persist in worry, at least initially, because they value it. However, why they nevertheless rate their worry as excessive and uncontrollable is an important question for future research.

Subthreshold Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is defined as a neurobiological condition with some core inattentive or hyperactive/impulsive symptoms of ADHD which do not meet the full diagnosis clinically. Although it has been well documented that deficits in cognitive control, a high-level cognitive construct closely related to attention, are frequently found among children with ADHD, whether subthreshold ADHD is also associated with similar deficits remains unclear. In this study, we examined the attention functions and the cognitive control capacity (CCC) in children with ADHD (n = 39), those with subthreshold ADHD (n = 34), and typically developing peers (TD, n = 36). The results showed that the ADHD and subthreshold ADHD groups exhibited similar patterns of the impaired executive function of attention (revealed as an augment in flanker conflict effect) and reduced cognitive control capacity, and no significant difference was found between the two groups. These findings suggest that although children with subthreshold ADHD have not met the full criteria of ADHD, they showed reduced efficiency in cognitive control and attention function, similar to children with ADHD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subthreshold Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is defined as a neurobiological condition with some core inattentive or hyperactive/impulsive symptoms of ADHD which do not meet the full diagnosis clinically. Although it has been well documented that deficits in cognitive control, a high-level cognitive construct closely related to attention, are frequently found among children with ADHD, whether subthreshold ADHD is also associated with similar deficits remains unclear. In this study, we examined the attention functions and the cognitive control capacity (CCC) in children with ADHD (n = 39), those with subthreshold ADHD (n = 34), and typically developing peers (TD, n = 36). The results showed that the ADHD and subthreshold ADHD groups exhibited similar patterns of the impaired executive function of attention (revealed as an augment in flanker conflict effect) and reduced cognitive control capacity, and no significant difference was found between the two groups. These findings suggest that although children with subthreshold ADHD have not met the full criteria of ADHD, they showed reduced efficiency in cognitive control and attention function, similar to children with ADHD.

Paradoxically, some individuals who experience pathological worry also have good capacity for top-down control over their thoughts. Why such individuals would nevertheless worry excessively remains unclear. One explanation is suggested by research showing that those experiencing pathological worry are set apart from healthy controls by their beliefs that worry has utility and that effective worrying requires them to consider all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. This suggests that worriers with good capacity for cognitive control may engage in prolonged worry because they believe it is adaptive to do so. In a sample of 109 college students, among whom individuals reporting pathological worry were overrepresented, we tested this hypothesis using an objective index of top-down control capacity (i.e., resting vagally mediated heart rate variability [vmHRV]) and self-report measures of beliefs about worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptom severity/status. As predicted, GAD symptom severity and vmHRV interacted to predict beliefs about worry. Specifically, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with beliefs that worry has utility at higher levels of vmHRV. Furthermore, this pattern was mostly a function of the belief that worry serves to distract the worrier from more emotional things. Similarly, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with endorsement of an ‘as many as can’ (AMAC) problem-solving rule when vmHRV was high. From the opposite perspective, both worry utility beliefs and AMAC rule endorsement were associated with the highest GAD symptom severity at higher levels of vmHRV. This was also true for the belief that worry distracts from more emotional things predicting analog GAD status. These results suggest that worriers who have higher levels of top-down control capacity may initiate and persist in worry, at least initially, because they value it. However, why they nevertheless rate their worry as excessive and uncontrollable is an important question for future research.

Paradoxically, some individuals who experience pathological worry also have good capacity for top-down control over their thoughts. Why such individuals would nevertheless worry excessively remains unclear. One explanation is suggested by research showing that those experiencing pathological worry are set apart from healthy controls by their beliefs that worry has utility and that effective worrying requires them to consider all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. This suggests that worriers with good capacity for cognitive control may engage in prolonged worry because they believe it is adaptive to do so. In a sample of 109 college students, among whom individuals reporting pathological worry were overrepresented, we tested this hypothesis using an objective index of top-down control capacity (i.e., resting vagally mediated heart rate variability [vmHRV]) and self-report measures of beliefs about worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptom severity/status. As predicted, GAD symptom severity and vmHRV interacted to predict beliefs about worry. Specifically, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with beliefs that worry has utility at higher levels of vmHRV. Furthermore, this pattern was mostly a function of the belief that worry serves to distract the worrier from more emotional things. Similarly, high GAD symptoms were most strongly associated with endorsement of an 'as many as can' (AMAC) problem-solving rule when vmHRV was high. From the opposite perspective, both worry utility beliefs and AMAC rule endorsement were associated with the highest GAD symptom severity at higher levels of vmHRV. This was also true for the belief that worry distracts from more emotional things predicting analog GAD status. These results suggest that worriers who have higher levels of top-down control capacity may initiate and persist in worry, at least initially, because they value it. However, why they nevertheless rate their worry as excessive and uncontrollable is an important question for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive control, with a limited capacity, is a core process in human cognition for the coordination of thoughts and actions. Although the regions involved in cognitive control have been identified as the cognitive control network (CCN), it is still unclear whether a specific region of the CCN serves as a bottleneck limiting the capacity of cognitive control (CCC). Here, we used a perceptual decision-making task with conditions of high cognitive load to challenge the CCN and to assess the CCC in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. We found that the activation of the right anterior insular cortex (AIC) of the CCN increased monotonically as a function of cognitive load, reached its plateau early, and showed a significant correlation to the CCC. In a subsequent study of patients with unilateral lesions of the AIC, we found that lesions of the AIC were associated with a significant impairment of the CCC. Simulated lesions of the AIC resulted in a reduction of the global efficiency of the CCN in a network analysis. These findings suggest that the AIC, as a critical hub in the CCN, is a bottleneck of cognitive control. • Activation of the right anterior insular cortex (AIC) is associated with information rate. • This activation is positively correlated with the capacity of cognitive control. • Lesions of the AIC impair the capacity of cognitive control. • Simulated lesions of the AIC lead to a reduction in the network global efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One puzzle in high worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is the heterogeneity in the level of autonomic arousal symptoms seen among affected individuals. While current models agree that worry persists, in part, because it fosters avoidance of unpleasant internal experiences, they disagree as to whether worry does so by suppressing activation of autonomic arousal or by fostering persistent autonomic hyperarousal. Our Cognitive Control Model predicts that which pattern of autonomic arousal occurs depends on whether or not a worrier has sufficient cognitive control capacity to worry primarily in a verbal versus imagery-based manner. Because this model has been supported by only one study to date, the present study sought to replicate and extend that study's findings. Results from an online survey in an unselected sample of over 900 college students provide further support for our model's central tenet and initial support for its prediction that higher effortful control is associated with a higher percentage of verbal thought during worry. Finally, we report tentative evidence that autonomic arousal symptoms in worry and GAD vary as a function of individual differences in cognitive control capacity because higher capacity is linked to a greater predominance of verbal thought during worry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to control unwanted memories is essential for emotional regulation and maintaining mental health. Previous evidence indicates that suppressing retrieval, which recruits executive control mechanisms to prevent unwanted memories entering consciousness, can cause forgetting, termed suppression-induced forgetting (SIF). Since these executive mechanisms involve multiple mental operations, we hypothesize that the efficacy of SIF may be limited by individuals' capacity limitation of cognitive control. Here, we tested this hypothesis. Participants were assigned to two groups based on the median of their cognitive control capacity (CCC, estimated by the backward masking majority function task) and performed the think/no-think task with electrophysiological signals recorded. The results showed that the SIF effect was observed only in the high CCC group but not in the low CCC group. In accordance, repeated suppression attempts also resulted in a steeper reduction in intrusive thoughts in the high CCC group. Furthermore, ERP analysis revealed a decrease in recollection-related late parietal positivity (LPP) under the no-think condition in the high CCC group. A mediation analysis revealed that the reduced intrusive memories mediated the effect of CCC on SIF. These findings suggest that suppressing retrieval could reduce traces of the unwanted memories, making them less intrusive and harder to recall. More importantly, successful SIF is constrained by the capacity of cognitive control which may be used to ensure the coordination of multiple cognitive processes during suppression. • Cognitive control capacity (CCC) predicts suppression-induced forgetting effect (SIF). • The reduction in intrusive thoughts mediates the effect of CCC on SIF. • The decreased late parietal positivity (LPP) in the high CCC group indicates successful avoidance of recall. • Relevant training in cognitive control capacity might be a way to help people suppress intrusive memory and stop thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]