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In the preface to the recent Festschrift in honor of Armin W. Geertz, the editors state that "in recent years consilience has become a catchword for designating the attempt to increasingly bring the natural and behavioural sciences into closer dialogue with the humanities," adding that historians of religions and cognitivists need to "engage in conversation with each other, as well as dialogue with colleagues in all neighbouring disciplines." Should consilience dictate the agenda for future scholarship in the science of religion(s), or should hermeneutics and history still provide resilience against the "scientification of religion?" This review essay aims to contribute to this current debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working within the framework of a conception that makes social practices central to religion, I present an account of religious beliefs as beliefs that are targets of group-specific social practices organized around the norm that these beliefs are to be held. In addition to opening up new avenues of investigation regarding the ways religious adherents negotiate the expectations of their communities around issues of believing, the account generates reasons to resist the idea that religion is characterized by a distinctive kind of doxastic or quasi-doxastic propositional attitude. On my understanding, belief-targeted social practices can generate cognitive dissonance when they make religious adherents responsible for holding beliefs that they do not have good reasons to hold. And the variety of results produced by this dissonance suggests that there is no uniform resolution to this situation, but rather that belief-targeted social practices generate considerable instability within religious communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we introduce a neurocognitive model as a useful analytical approach to a wide range of representations (written, oral, and/or visual) of a comprehensive and dramatic collapse of the world order (cosmic, social, and/or moral). We gather these variegated representations under the term End Time Narratives (ETN). The widespread reception of ETNs, and their popularity and variability across different periods and cultures, is evidence that these representations continually affect us and hold power over us. Prominent and well-known examples of ETNs are the Jewish and Christian apocalypses from antiquity, which have been widely influential through the centuries. This prevalence raises the question of why ETNs exercise such an influence. The reasons, we suggest, are based on the following hypotheses: (1) that the efficacy and attraction of ETNs can be traced to identifiable cognitive mechanisms, (2) that these underlying mechanisms are linked to certain emotional reactions activated by the particular structure and design of these narratives, and (3) ETNs – as cultural products – seem to be designed and structured to elicit cognitive and emotional responses through effects on the brain. To investigate the possible neurocognitive and psychological mechanisms that are simulated and enacted in recipients by ETNs, we apply the model through an "enactive reading" of a classical ETN, the Book of Revelation 14–16. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a relatively young field that explores the intersection between science and religion. Some argue that CSR, by employing purely explanatory methods and presupposing methodological naturalism, has materialized religion. Others believe that explanatory methods are not the sole approach in CSR, and the use of other methods is permissible. I aim to show how CSR has influenced the entire philosophy of religion. The paper examines various perspectives on the extent of CSR's influence on the philosophy of religion, particularly analyzing its effect on the proofs of natural theology. Contrary to the dominant literature, the impact of CSR can extend beyond merely strengthening or weakening theological arguments and can be used to argue for the reform of religious beliefs. This view is pursued from four different perspectives: first, the concept of God, arguing that weakening classic proofs does not imply weakening belief in God; second, the methodology of studying religion, advocating for methodological pluralism; third, the revelation and the role of humans in religion, suggesting that a behavioral shift desirable in economics is also preferable in religious studies; and fourth, religious pluralism and interfaith relations, arguing against the exclusivity produced by textualism and foundationalism.

In a 2008 paper, Justin Barrett outlined five conditions meant to be jointly sufficient for an agent-concept to elicit faith and religious commitment. In other words, he outlined five requirements for an entity to be a god. His table of criteria was intended as a solution to the so-called Mickey Mouse problem, the problem of explaining why people believe in god(s), but not in other entities, such as Mickey Mouse. Barrett was criticized in a 2010 paper by Gervais & Henrich, who claimed the table yields false positives: some god-concepts meet all five criteria but are not the object of faith and religious commitment, such as Zeus, as well as any god-concepts of every extinct religion. In this paper, I argue along similar lines, but beyond. I show that some of the false positives Barrett's table allows for don't even stand for gods of any genuine religion, extinct or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) seeks to find causal explanations for the origin, dissemination and transmission of theistic beliefs. One of the beliefs related to the field of religion is counterintuitive concepts: ideas and concepts that violate the automatic and non-reflective expectations of our mental tools. According to the researchers of CSR, counterintuitive concepts, if they are used in their minimal sense and do not weaken the conceptual coherence, cause the permanence and transmission of religious beliefs in comparison with other beliefs. Therefore, counter intuitiveness plays an important role in understanding religion. Despite the positive points of counterintuitive concepts, we believe that these concepts have ambiguities and problems that, if not properly explained and corrected, will cause problems in the acceptance and fixation of theistic beliefs: First, metare presentation's inability to solve the problem of distinguishing between counterintuitive religious beliefs and other counterintuitive concepts. Second, ambiguity in the explanatory role of counterintuitive concepts. Third, emphasis on cognitive architecture and not paying attention to the role of upbringing and culture in identifying counterintuitive concepts. Fourth, the inconsistency in the analysis of some counterintuitive concepts such as God with the official doctrine of religions. Fifth, not paying attention to conscious intuitions. Sixth, it seems that with the naturalization of beliefs in the cognitive system, human agents will take the place of supernatural agents, but the statistics show something else. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In a 2008 paper, Justin Barrett designed a conceptual scale to measure the level of counterintuitiveness of concepts, "Barrett's counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme". According to Barrett, the higher a concept scores in this scale, the more counterintuitive it is. The scale is meant as an auxiliary tool for one of the mainstream theories in the cognitive science of religion, namely, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis. For a concept to be adherent, i.e., to survive across cultures and across time, it has to score points in the counterintuitiveness scale, but it has to score low. Concepts that score too high or that don't score at all are non-adherent. In this paper the case is made that at least some varieties of religious belief involve concepts that resist accurate measuring. The case study presented here features Spiritual Oneness, the belief that "all things are one", frequently prompted by mystical experiences and frequently described as being very adherent. We purport that the failure of Barrett's scale to allow for an examination of the concepts at stake in Spiritual Oneness is to be explained by the fact that the background assumptions about counterintuitiveness underpinning the scale are too narrow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are sometimes seen as debunking religious or supernatural beliefs (SBs). To date, arguments have been produced by proponents on both sides, with some claiming that debunking would result and others claiming that it would not. In this paper, I depart from the approach taken by others and offer an approach based in broadly Bayesian methods of updating subjective probability assignments, including classical Bayesian formulas as well as comparative ratios and Jeffrey conditionalization. I argue that debunking may take place, but only if specified conditions are met. One way to show that debunking takes place would be to show that the probability of some CSR theory naturalistically explaining SBs diminishes when it is postulated that SBs have epistemic warrant. Another alternative would be to show that CSR theories are less likely to succeed in explaining the origin of SBs if SBs have warrant than if they lack warrant. It can also be helpful to consider the role played by uncertain and even ineffable judgments. Either way, debunking SBs does not follow simply from CSR but must be considered in light of prior epistemic commitments and the role they play in evaluating probabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central claim often made to debunk religious beliefs is that they would be formed regardless of whether they are true or false. One way to support this claim is to apply findings from the cognitive science of religion. However, this use of science in an argument against religious beliefs has been strongly criticized. This article is about weaknesses in that criticism. I consider two arguments. Firstly, the critic of debunking can argue that the debunker makes empirically dubious claims about the origin of religious beliefs. I argue that the debunker can avoid this problem because the controversial empirical claims are not necessary. General naturalistic assumptions about the origin of religion also create worries that support the central debunking claim. The second criticism focuses on the highly general nature of the claims or assumptions debunkers make about the origin of religious beliefs. Critics maintain that such claims or assumptions, even if true, fail to affect the specific religious beliefs you or I form. I respond, arguing that this criticism fails to engage with the most prominent version of debunking, which aims at classes of beliefs. Furthermore, by making a detour through a related discussion in metaethics, I show how this version of the debunking argument can be extended in such a fashion that it applies to a given individual who forms a religious belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Matthew Braddock's argument from false god beliefs (AFG) is one of the most significant debunking arguments to emerge from the growing literature on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This argument aims to produce a defeater for any basic theistic belief. In this essay, I reply to AFG by defending a counter-example to AFG's crucial premise. In particular, I argue that the cognitive mechanisms posited by CSR do not "significantly contribute" to perceptually based theistic belief formation in the way that AFG claims. As a result, a large class of basic theistic beliefs remains undefeated in the face of AFG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks what, if anything, Christian theology should learn from the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Two possible answers are explored. The first is that Christian theology has nothing to learn from CSR. This is rejected in favour of the second: theology can learn from CSR by appropriating CSR insights carefully and critically to a theological understanding formed first and foremost by Scripture. Karl Barth's theological critique of religion and his engagement with Ludwig Feuerbach are used as a model for this approach. The article concludes with specific proposals about how, and how not, to engage theologically with CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions about the origins of life and the universe seem to callout for explanation, with science and religion offeringcandidate answers. These answers clearly differ in content, butdo they also differ in psychological function? In Study 1(N=501) participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk ratedscientific and religious answers to existential questions ondimensions related to epistemic functions (e.g., “Thisexplanation is based on evidence”) as well asmoral/social/emotional functions (e.g., “If everyone believedthis, the world would be a more moral place”; “Thisexplanation is comforting”). For non-religious participants,only scientific explanations were assigned high values alongepistemic dimensions; For religious participants, only religiousexplanations were assigned high values along non-epistemicdimensions. In Study 2 (N=130), priming a non-epistemic needboosted religious participants’ evaluation of the quality ofreligious (vs. scientific) explanations. These findings shed lighton the functions of scientific and religious cognition and raisenew questions about explanatory co-existence and the originsof religious belief.

The common consent argument claims that widespread belief in God is good evidence for God's existence. Though taken seriously throughout the history of philosophy, the argument died in the 1800s. Our philosophy of religion textbooks ignore it. In this paper, we hope to resuscitate it drawing upon the demographics of religious belief, the cognitive science of religion, and contemporary epistemology. We develop and defend two common consent arguments, which maintain that widespread belief in a High God is good evidence for theism over metaphysical naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The minimally counterintuitive (MCI) thesis in the cognitive science of religion proposes that supernatural concepts are prevalent across cultures because they possess a common structure—namely, violations of intuitive ontological assumptions that facilitate concept representation. These violations are hypothesized to give supernatural concepts a memorability advantage over both intuitive concepts and "maximally counterintuitive" (MXCI) concepts, which contain numerous ontological violations. However, the connection between MCI concepts and bizarre (BIZ) but not supernatural concepts, for which memorability advantages are predicted by the von Restorff (VR) effect, has been insufficiently clarified by earlier research. Additionally, the role of inferential potential (IP) in determining MCI concepts' memorability has remained vague and only rarely controlled for. In a pre‐registered experiment, we directly compare memorability for MCI and MXCI concepts, compared to BIZ concepts, while controlling for IP as well as degree of bizarreness. Results indicate that when IP and bizarreness are controlled for, memorability of counterintuitive and BIZ concepts—relative to intuitive control concepts—is similar across concepts with one, two, and three characteristics. Findings suggest that the MCI and VR effects may be manifestations of the same underlying mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article begins with an introduction briefly sketching the concepts of Western Christian theology and science in a systematic perspective informed by the historical shaping of the terms. It then offers an inquiry into the biblical traditions and their relations to the development of science in the modern age. This is followed by a general account of the development of the interactions between theology and science from late modernity until today, and relates this to methodological questions and positions. Finally, the article presents selected issues and themes discussed in such discourses which today are labelled ‘theology and science’.

Religious hate propaganda, which is sustained communication by an authority that attempts to guide an audience towards persecuting others based on religion, is a speech crime. Yet, it is one of the least understood and most difficult speech crimes to prosecute. This is due to misunderstandings and epistemic gaps regarding how persecutory language, which would otherwise have little significance for prosocial religious adherents, becomes meaningful for a religious community. Drawing from the cognitive science of religion (CSR), this article develops and explores the hypothesis that for some religious communities, discursive attacks on others become meaningful when they center on dangerous accusations. Dangerous accusations portray the other as capable of mystical harm and, when made by cultural authorities, become socially accepted truths if repeated during rituals of veridiction. This article shows that dangerous accusations are at the heart of religious hate propaganda and exploit cognitive biases for threat perception, coalitional psychology, and costly signaling. Moreover, dangerous accusations can reinforce the social order and maintain social cohesion. Together, an analysis of speech crimes and dangerous accusations shed light on how religious hate propaganda works, how it can offer meaning to religious communities, and how it can justify persecution in certain environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes as a starting point the fruitful scientific debate about the best ways to explain the phenomenon of religious experiences, conducting a literature review on the subject. Considering mostly English-speaking authors, it is possible to verify the existence of two poles in contemporary scientific production, which we can call "reductionist" and "non-reductionist". Both one and the other originated under the influence of the literature of the 20th century, renewing the debate in the 21st century in the light of new empirical evidence that allows not only to launch multiple perspectives on the phenomenon to open new perspectives of analysis on religious experiences, as well as how to seek alternatives to reconcile the two poles. It is concluded that, since the seminal work of William James, a multiplicity of alternatives brought by empirically based sciences has allowed us to advance in understanding the complex phenomenon of religious experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce the first set of stimuli designed to resolve methodological and theoretical issues that have muddled the interpretation of results on the memorability of supernatural concepts (e.g., ghosts, souls, spirits), an important line of research in the cognitive science of religion (Barrett, 2007). We focus here on Boyer's (1994), Boyer, 2001) pioneering minimally counterintuitive (MCI) hypothesis according to which supernatural concepts tap a special memory-enhancing mechanism linked to violations of default intuitive inferences. Empirical tests of the MCI account have given rise to a vexed picture that renders meaningful interpretation difficult. The lack of a common standard of comparison among different studies, coupled with the presence of uncontrolled variables independently known to affect memorability, lie at the heart of these problems. We show that our new stimuli offer the hope of resolving these issues, thereby establishing a more secure foundation for the study of the memorability of supernatural concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern.

Reformed epistemology, based on the reliability of the functions of cognitive faculties, holds that one can believe in God directly without argument or evidence. Alvin Plantinga, one of the proponents of this view, replaces justification with warrant in the classical definition of knowledge and considers true belief, which has a warrant as knowledge. On this basis, he considers it reasonable to believe in the existence of God because it has a warrant and arises from our healthy cognitive faculties without the need for an independent argument. Some defenders of the cognitive science of religion also seek to provide evidence from cognitive science to explain religious beliefs in such a way as to show that there is a natural mechanism in man to know God. They argue based on this mechanism in favor of the existence of God. Justin Barrett, one of the leading proponents of this view, uses a mental bias called the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which is evolutionarily developed in humans, to explain the process of generating belief in supernatural intentional beings, including God. In recent years, efforts have been made to integrate these two approaches and use the experimental results of cognitive science to validate reformed epistemology. The 2010 joint paper by Barrett and Clark, the former a cognitive scientist and the latter a reformed epistemologist, is a prime example of this effort. Although this paper lists some of the differences between the various perspectives in cognitive sciences of religion and reformed epistemology, its ultimate goal is to show the correlation and convergence of the two approaches. One of the similarities emphasized in this article is related to a particular type of cognitive faculty, called the sense of divinity or Sensues Divintatus, and in both approaches is mentioned by various terms.While acknowledging some similarities between the two theories, the present paper seeks to undermine the view that tries to use the cognitive science of religion as a scientific basis for validating reformed epistemology. This task has been done in this article by pointing out and providing evidence in favor of the fundamental differences between the two theories. In this article, two arguments are presented to show their fundamental differences.The first argument is based on differences in the origins and roots of the two theories. According to this argument, HADD as a cognitive tool in Barrett’s theory can be counted as a mediator, proof, or scientific evidence to prove God; while the foundation of reformed epistemology is to put aside these intermediaries and explain the rationality of belief in God, without resorting to an argument. As the scholars of the cognitive science of religion agree, what creates human bias towards intelligent factors is a spandrel or byproduct property that is not adoptive in the human evolutionary process. Some of them consider the generation of this property as the reason for the existence of God, but regardless of whether this argument is true or false, human cognitive biases in this argument are mediations to prove the existence of God. Accordingly, the two theories, despite their apparent similarities, are fundamentally different.The second argument emphasizes the difference in the goals or visions of the two theories. The main concern of the cognitive science of religion, according to Barrett, is how to produce belief; while the main concern of reformed epistemology is the rationality of belief. In fact, by relying on HADD, one can only remark on how a belief is made, regardless of its rationality. However, this does not meet the purpose of reformed epistemology. In reformed epistemology, Plantinga considers belief in God to be a kind of basic belief that we are reasonable to accept. Here, some have said, the belief produced in the evolutionary process can also be reasonable. This claim can be examined in its place, but so far as the ultimate goal of the cognitive science of religion is the explanation of belief production, and it is different from the ultimate goal of the reformed epistemology, that is, the explanation of the rationality of belief, it is sufficient for this article to show their differences.

Many cognitive and evolutionary theories of religion argue that supernatural explanations are byproducts of our cognitive adaptations. An influential argument states that our supernatural explanations result from a tendency to generate anthropomorphic explanations, and that this tendency is a byproduct of an error management strategy because agents tend to be associated with especially high fitness costs. We propose instead that anthropomorphic and other supernatural explanations result as features of a broader toolkit of well-designed cognitive adaptations, which are designed for explaining the abstract and causal structure of complex, unobservable, and uncertain phenomena that have substantial impacts on fitness. Specifically, we argue that (1) mental representations about the abstract vs. the supernatural are largely overlapping, if not identical, and (2) when the data-generating processes for scarce and ambiguous observations are complex and opaque, a naive observer can improve a bias-variance trade-off by starting with a simple, underspecified explanation that Western observers readily interpret as "supernatural." We then argue that (3) in many cases, knowledge specialists across cultures offer pragmatic services that involve apparently supernatural explanations, and their clients are frequently willing to pay them in a market for useful and effective services. We propose that at least some ethnographic descriptions of religion might actually reflect ordinary and adaptive responses to novel problems such as illnesses and natural disasters, where knowledge specialists possess and apply the best available explanations about phenomena that would otherwise be completely mysterious and unpredictable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Nola has recently defended an argument against the existence of God on the basis of naturalistic explanations of religious belief. I will critically evaluate his argument in this paper. Nola's argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation: since the naturalistic stance offers a better explanation of religious belief relative to the theistic explanation, the ontology of God(s) is eliminated. I rebut Nola's major assumption that naturalistic explanations and theistic explanations of religion are incompatible. I go on to criticize Nola's proposed naturalistic explanations: Freudianism, a Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device, and a Moralising Mind-Policing God. I find these inadequate as actual explanations of religious belief. Even if they are correct, they will not show that theism is false. So Nola's argument fails to convince. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary analytic theological discussions of atonement do not attend extensively to questions of how narrative might relate to the atoning work of Christ. Liberation theologians, on the other hand, utilize narrative in their scholarly method regularly and often employ it when discussing atonement or reconciliation. This essay argues that analytic theologians should consider the notion of narrative (and narrative identity) as a mechanism of atonement in the broad sense of the term introduced when William Tyndale coined 'atonement' to translate 2 Corinthians 5. I then offer some psychological grounds for thinking that reframing one's self-narrative in terms of a transcendent narrative is often conducive to human flourishing, and I consider the work of James H. Cone as an instance of such transcendent narrative reframing at work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ibn Taymiyya proposes his unique epistemology by employing the concept of the fiṭra. When his statements describing the fiṭra are collected, we see that Ibn Taymiyya has presented a detailed view of human nature and how that nature relates to God and the universe as a whole. His fiṭra-centric theory of human nature can be usefully compared to other theories, not only within the Islamic tradition but also in theories of the self found in other religions or even contemporary scientific theories. As of yet, Ibn Taymiyya's work has not been studied through the lens of Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). Ibn Taymiyya is an ideal candidate for applying CSR research to Islamic thought in order to reach broader insights about theories of human nature within the Islamic scholarly tradition. CSR findings are relevant to Ibn Taymiyya's work specifically because Ibn Taymiyya claims that certain human emotions, intuitions, and behaviors are inborn and universal. By applying CSR, we can conclude that some aspects of Ibn Taymiyya's theological perspective are grounded in deeper and more universal features of human cognition that are not specific to the particularities of his biases, his milieu, political pressures of his time, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since their emergence in nineteenth-century natural philosophy, theories of biological evolution have prompted religious believers to revisit traditional theological views of the world, humanity, and even God. This entry will first clarify the various strands of meaning to be discerned in ‘evolution’ and briefly delineate today’s most dominant evolutionary theory, the neo-Darwinian synthesis (section 1). Next, it will summarize the varied responses to Darwinian evolution in each of the main Christian denominations (section 2). Since many Christians have been (and still are) unwilling to accept biological evolution, they have elaborated a couple of alternatives: young earth creationism, old earth creationism, intelligent design, and (very popular but underexplored in the literature) origins agnosticism. After having introduced these alternatives (section 3), the most important theological challenges raised by evolutionary theory will be discussed (section 4). How does evolutionary theory impinge on biblical interpretation (especially with regard to the first chapters of Genesis, but also beyond)? How does evolution affect our view of classical divine attributes like goodness and wisdom, given the enormous amounts of animal suffering it assumes? What implications does evolution have for the traditional view of humankind as uniquely created in the image of God, for the doctrines of the Fall and original sin, for divine providence, and even for the nature of morality and religion? Finally, theologians have not only engaged in apologetical and revisionary approaches with regard to evolution, but also proposed constructive interpretations from the perspective of faith that try to make sense of the evolutionary narrative. This ‘evolutionary theology’ project is briefly discussed and assessed in the last section (section 5).

Reformed epistemology, based on the reliability of the functions of cognitive faculties, holds that one can believe in God directly without argument or evidence. Alvin Plantinga, one of the proponents of this view, replaces justification with warrant in the classical definition of knowledge and considers true belief, which has a warrant as knowledge. On this basis, he considers it reasonable to believe in the existence of God because it has a warrant and arises from our healthy cognitive faculties without the need for an independent argument. Some defenders of the cognitive science of religion also seek to provide evidence from cognitive science to explain religious beliefs in such a way as to show that there is a natural mechanism in man to know God. They argue based on this mechanism in favor of the existence of God. Justin Barrett, one of the leading proponents of this view, uses a mental bias called the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which is evolutionarily developed in humans, to explain the process of generating belief in supernatural intentional beings, including God. In recent years, efforts have been made to integrate these two approaches and use the experimental results of cognitive science to validate reformed epistemology. The 2010 joint paper by Barrett and Clark, the former a cognitive scientist and the latter a reformed epistemologist, is a prime example of this effort. Although this paper lists some of the differences between the various perspectives in cognitive sciences of religion and reformed epistemology, its ultimate goal is to show the correlation and convergence of the two approaches. One of the similarities emphasized in this article is related to a particular type of cognitive faculty, called the sense of divinity or Sensues Divintatus, and in both approaches is mentioned by various terms. While acknowledging some similarities between the two theories, the present paper seeks to undermine the view that tries to use the cognitive science of religion as a scientific basis for validating reformed epistemology. This task has been done in this article by pointing out and providing evidence in favor of the fundamental differences between the two theories. In this article, two arguments are presented to show their fundamental differences. The first argument is based on differences in the origins and roots of the two theories. According to this argument, HADD as a cognitive tool in Barrett's theory can be counted as a mediator, proof, or scientific evidence to prove God; while the foundation of reformed epistemology is to put aside these intermediaries and explain the rationality of belief in God, without resorting to an argument. As the scholars of the cognitive science of religion agree, what creates human bias towards intelligent factors is a spandrel or byproduct property that is not adoptive in the human evolutionary process. Some of them consider the generation of this property as the reason for the existence of God, but regardless of whether this argument is true or false, human cognitive biases in this argument are mediations to prove the existence of God. Accordingly, the two theories, despite their apparent similarities, are fundamentally different. The second argument emphasizes the difference in the goals or visions of the two theories. The main concern of the cognitive science of religion, according to Barrett, is how to produce belief; while the main concern of reformed epistemology is the rationality of belief. In fact, by relying on HADD, one can only remark on how a belief is made, regardless of its rationality. However, this does not meet the purpose of reformed epistemology. In reformed epistemology, Plantinga considers belief in God to be a kind of basic belief that we are reasonable to accept. Here, some have said, the belief produced in the evolutionary process can also be reasonable. This claim can be examined in its place, but so far as the ultimate goal of the cognitive science of religion is the explanation of belief production, and it is different from the ultimate goal of the reformed epistemology, that is, the explanation of the rationality of belief, it is sufficient for this article to show their differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-engages with the science versus religion debate in the light of the last three decades of scholarly progress in the study of religion coming from the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion. I begin by asking (1) 'if it is indeed possible to account for the origins of religious belief, its cultural transmission and evolution, and its maintenance— without any appeal to the real existence of any supernatural deity—then are we in a position to say we have explained it all away?' If we are, how does this affect central themes in the philosophy of religion about God's existence? In (2) I provide an outline of the cognitive and evolutionary approach to explaining religion. In section (3) I discuss abductive reasoning (3.1), problems with the accusation of having committed the genetic fallacy when answering (1) in favour of positive atheism (3.2), the need for first-order justifications of religious belief (3.3), and in (3.4) a peculiar divine attribute (i.e. omnipotent potential in a causal chain of events) that appears to immunise religious belief in a particular kind of supernatural deity from having been explained away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion represents a significant stream in the current academic study of religion. It can also be considered a critical reaction to the phenomenology of religion, which converged religious studies on confessional approaches. For a long time, the protectionist paradigm, represented above all by the aforementioned phenomenology of religion, prevailed in the study of religion. Therefore, there was a strong need to revive the naturalistic approach to the study of religion and to base research on scientific foundations. Cognitive science of religion has committed itself to the so-called second wave of consilience and seeks to integrate the methodology of natural sciences into the research of religion (naturalism, reductionism, explanation, experiment, hypothesis-driven research). The comparison of the perspective of the phenomenology of religion with the findings of the cognitive science of religion will be illustrated by the case of dance. It will directly show how the choice of one or the other theoretical framework significantly affects the whole research. The difference is not only in the way the problem is considered but especially the explanatory potential and verifiability of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the ritual practices denigrated through explicit or implicit criticism levied by the biblical writers is the worship of a deity or deities on the rooftops – sometimes of royal architecture, and at other times on private houses. In the present study I interpret this practice using concepts derived from the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and cognitive linguistics. I summarize previous typologies of objects employed in the sacrificial cult of the ancient Southern Levant, confirming prior arguments for understanding shaft-type limestone altars as stylized models of architectural precursors. From a cognitive perspective, these stylized architectural models prompted offrants to run a conceptual blend that replaced the modest small-scale vegetable or incense offering of the offrant's small-scale input space with the more sumptuous small-scale offering – or even large-scale animal sacrifice – of the monumental-scale input. This cognitive explanation provides explanation for Deuteronomistic and Priestly attempts to limit the practice, and occasions insight into the temporal aspects of "sacred space." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this response article, I argue that Launonen's criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen's claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science of religion has inspired several debunking arguments against theistic belief. Hans Van Eyghen's book Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion is the first monograph devoted to answering such arguments. This article focuses on Van Eyghen's responses to two widely discussed debunking arguments, one by Matthew Braddock and another by John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths. Both responses have potential but also face problems. Even if Van Eyghen manages to show that these authors have not fully excluded the possibility of noninferential theistic belief being underpinned by reliable belief-forming processes, he fails to offer convincing reasons to think the processes are in fact reliable. A positive argument for their reliability might ultimately have to be based on evidence for God's existence, namely, theistic arguments. The question of the rationality of religious belief (de jure) thus cannot be isolated from the question of God's existence (de facto). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]