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The view that human memory is constructive implies that recollections are not necessarily an accurate reproduction of past events. An approach to study this constructive nature of memory is by examining memory errors. In this regard, conjunction errors—i.e. incorrect recollection of new stimuli integrated by components from two previously studied stimuli—have attracted important attention in human memory research. Do animals other than humans make conjunction errors? To investigate this issue, a choice task in which training was not involved was used. Bees experienced two to-be-remembered stimuli. At the test, they were presented with four stimuli: one of the original items (i.e. old), an item made by combining two features of the original items (i.e. conjunction), an item containing a previously presented feature and a new one (i.e. feature), and an item integrated solely by new features (i.e. new). Bumblebees remembered the old items. Importantly, when making memory errors, bumblebees selected conjunction and feature lures more often than new items. These results indicate that bumblebees, like humans, spontaneously make memory conjunction errors and suggest that invertebrates' memories might also be constructive in nature. I suggest that focusing on memory errors is a solid avenue to investigate episodic (like) memory in animals. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

> Context • Reliably differentiating between memories of events that happened and those that did not (commonly referred to as "false memories" in the literature) is essential for both personal and societal well-being, yet studies increasingly show that this is nearly impossible to achieve. > Problem • Significant support for this conclusion comes from the research using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, which has been limited in terms of behavioral and phenomenological measures employed, particularly concerning recall memory (as opposed to recognition memory). > Method • We used a combination of disciplined first-person methodology and behavioral measures to explore the process of recall in the DRM paradigm. Participants were interrupted during word recall and underwent phenomenological interviews about their recall processes. Reaction times and performance accuracy were measured for each recalled word. > Results • We identified a diverse selection of categories pertaining to the phenomenology of recall, describing the mechanisms of attention, structural and processual characteristics, mood and motivation, and other experiences indirectly related to recall. These categories were used to construct the phenomenological indicators of accurate and inaccurate recall. The most coherent accurate recall indicators were related to the experience of strong certainty or the emergence of a word matching the critical lure during encoding as a word that should be avoided during recall. The most coherent inaccurate recall indicators were linked to a deliberate, inferential type of recall or an automatic and fluid recall. Preliminary joint analysis of phenomenological and behavioral data indicated support for the most coherent inaccurate recall indicators, showing varying reaction times associated with different indicators and noticeable differences in the serial position of recalled words corresponding to the indicators. > Implications • This study sheds light on the complexity of recall in the DRM paradigm, highlighting the need for a phenomenologically driven mixed-methods approach in a quest to better understand the nature of both accurate and inaccurate memories. > Constructivist content • The research design for this study draws heavily on Varela's neurophenomenological framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is widespread evidence that human memory is constructive, so that recollective processes may alter the information retrieved or impact on subsequent recollections. We examine a framework for narrowing down the nature of such processes, from physics. In Physics, the Temporal Bell (TB) inequality offers a general test of the sensitivity of the context of previous measurements in sequential measurement scenarios, as predicted by quantum theory. We present an empirical memory paradigm that allows a test of the TB inequality, using a novel kind of "change judgment," whereby participants are asked to decide whether there has been a change in a question across different time points of a scenario. Across two experiments, we were able to observe evidence for the violation of a TB inequality in one case, offering evidence for quantum-like processes in memory. The present results complement other recent work purporting the relevance of quantum-like representations in memory and raise questions regarding the adaptive value of such representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In hindsight, when the outcome of an uncertain scenario is already known, we typically feel that this outcome was always likely; hindsight judgments of outcome probabilities exceed foresight judgments of the same probabilities without outcome knowledge. We extend prior accounts of hindsight bias with the influence of pragmatic communication inherent in the task and the consolidation of self-generated responses across time. In a novel 3 × 2 within-participants design, with three sequential judgments of outcome probabilities in two scenarios, we replicated the within-participants hindsight bias observed in the classic memory design and the between-participants hindsight bias in a hypothetical design simultaneously. Moreover, we reversed the classic memory design and showed that subjective probabilities also decreased when participants encountered foresight instructions after hindsight instructions, demonstrating that previously induced outcome knowledge did not prevent unbiased judgments. The constructive impact of self-generated and communicated judgments ("saying is believing") was apparent after a 2-week consolidation period: Not outcome knowledge, but rather the last pragmatic response (either biased or unbiased) determined judgments at the third measurement. These findings highlight the short-term malleability of hindsight influences in response to task pragmatics and has major implications for debiasing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In opposition to the natural view that observer perspective memory is bound to be inauthentic, McCarroll (2018) argues for the surprising conclusion that memories in which the subject sees himself in the remembered scene are, in many cases, true to the subject's original experience of the scene. By means of a careful reconstruction of his argument, this paper shows that McCarroll does not succeed in establishing his conclusion. It shows, in fact, that we ought to come to the opposed conclusion that, while it may be possible in principle for observer perspective memory to be authentic, this is unlikely ever to happen in practice. The natural view, in short, is more or less right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The constructive nature of memory implies a possible confusion between details of similar events. Memory interventions should thus target the reduction of memory errors. We postulate that a brief intervention called Episodic Specificity Induction (ESI) facilitates the sensorimotor simulation of event-related details by improving the distinctiveness of the event memory trace. As such, ESI should reduce memory errors only when event memory traces are strongly overlapping based on their sensorimotor features. Participants memorised videos showing characters performing an action on a given object. The characters were either visually very similar to each other or very distinct (low vs. high distinctiveness condition). Next, participants performed either an imagination version of the ESI or a control induction. Finally, a voice announced one of the actions seen and a character was then briefly displayed. The participants had to indicate whether the association was correct. For incorrect associations, in the low distinctiveness condition, false alarms were more likely than in the high distinctiveness condition and were reduced after the ESI. It suggests that facilitating the simulation of specific details through the ESI increased trace distinctiveness and reduced memory errors at the critical time of event reconstruction. Future clinical applications might be possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature on memory research shows that when memorizing,people may blend two situations, i.e. when memorizing onestory, they add elements from another story. Most of thecognitive models assume that the superficial similaritybetween two episodes is the primary factor for blending.However, there is evidence that people blend dissimilarstories as well, if these stories share the same relationalstructure. We contrasted the two factors in a single study andperformed experiments with the same design and stimuli withadults and with 4-5-year-old children. The results show thatthere is no qualitative difference between the performance ofadults and children. Also, both adults and children blendeither pictures that have surface or structural similaritydepending on the abstractness of the objects in them.

Intrusive mental images associated with autobiographical memories or depicting imagined scenes are common in psychological disorders. Although there is a growing body of literature on their contribution to psychopathology and their role in therapy, to date there have been limited attempts to categorise the different types of images that patients experience. In this article, we present a taxonomy which ranges from veridical to non-veridical intrusive images. We highlight the fact that many types of images consist of a blend of veridical and imagined details. After presenting some of the main explanations for the existence of blended and non-veridical images, we reflect on what the evidence on the content and origin of intrusive images tells us about the nature of human memory. We argue that it supports the idea of memory being constructive and briefly discuss what this means for clinical and non-clinical settings in which intrusive images have to be evaluated and used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memory serves critical functions in everyday life, but it is also vulnerable to error and illusion. Two decades ago, I proposed that memory errors could be classified into seven basic categories or "sins": transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias, and persistence. I argued that each of the seven sins provides important insights concerning the fundamentally constructive nature of human memory, while at the same time reflecting its adaptive features. In this article I briefly summarise some key developments during the past two decades that have increased our understanding of the nature, consequences, and adaptive functions of the memory sins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We examine how people remember stories about climate change and how they communicate these stories to others. Drawing on theories of reconstructive memory and cultural theory, we assume that recollection is systematically affected by an individual’s world view as well as by the world view of the target audience. In an experimental study with a Norwegian representative sample (N = 266), participants read a story about three politicians, in which each protagonist was described as holding a specific world view and as trying to tackle climate change with a corresponding strategy (individualistic/free market oriented, hierarchical/technology-oriented, or egalitarian/sustainability-oriented). After 1 day and then after 1 week, participants were asked to retell the story as if to somebody who was characterized as being either an individualist, a hierarchist, or an egalitarian; in addition, a neutral recall control condition without a specified audience was included. Participants’ own world view was assessed and they were classified as endorsing individualism, or hierarchism, or egalitarianism. We hypothesized that retellings would be selectively reconstructed according to the world view of the participant, as well as tuned to the audience’s world view. We assessed the cognitive structure of the recollected story, and, using methods from computational text analysis, we computed similarities among retellings and the original narrative, and among retellings and world views. Results suggest that (i) retellings become less accurate over time, (ii) retelling to an audience with an explicit world view leads to more strongly filtered retellings than recalling without a specified audience, but the filter operates in a non-specific manner with respect to world views, (iii) the cognitive structure of the recollected story shows small but systematic differences concerning the link between story problem and solution as a function of the participant’s and the audience’s world view. No interaction was found between the world view of the participant and that of the audience. Results emphasize the role of world views in communicating climate change, and might help to better understand phenomena such as polarization and echo chamber effects.

Confabulation is a symptom central to many psychiatric diagnoses and can be severely debilitating to those who exhibit the symptom. Theorists, scientists, and clinicians have an understandable interest in the nature of confabulation—pursuing ways to define, identify, treat, and perhaps even prevent this memory disorder. Appeals to confabulation as a clinical symptom rely on an account of memory's function from which cases like the above can be contrasted. Accounting for confabulation is thus an important desideratum for any candidate theory of memory. Many contemporary memory theorists now endorse Constructivism, where memory is understood as a capacity for constructing plausible representations of past events (e.g., De Brigard in Synthese 191:155–185, 2014; Michaelian in Philos Psychol 24:323–342, 2012, 2016). Constructivism's aim is to account for and normalize the prevalence of memory errors in everyday life. Errors are plausible constructions that, on a particular occasion have led to error. They are not, however, evidence of malfunction in the memory system. While Constructivism offers an uplifting repackaging of the memory errors to which we are all susceptible, it has troubling implications for appeals to confabulation in psychiatric diagnosis. By accommodating memory errors within our understanding of memory's function, Constructivism runs the risk of being unable to explain how confabulation errors are evidence of malfunction. After reviewing the literature on confabulation and Constructivism, respectively, I identify the tension between them and explore how different versions of Constructivism may respond. The paper concludes with a proposal for distinguishing between kinds of false memory—specifically, between misremembering and confabulation—that may provide a route to their reconciliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper evaluates a well‐known argument for a self from episodic memories—that remembering that I did something or thought something involves experiencing the identity of my present self with the past doer or thinker. Shaun Nichols argues that although it phenomenologically appears to be the case that we are identical with the past self, no metaphysical conclusion can be drawn from the phenomenology. I draw on literature from contemporary psychology and Buddhist resources to arrive at a more radical conclusion: that there is no phenomenological sense of identity with a past self; the sense of self in episodic memory depends on narrative construction of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present commentary explores the implicit and explicit role of power in shaping what is remembered and why. By addressing the three papers in this section it argues for the need to more openly consider how power relations, particularly asymmetrical power relations, come to shape the construction of memory. Implications of acknowledging power in memory studies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The claim that memory is constructive or reconstructive is no longer controversial in psychology. However, in the last decades it has generally been taken to mean that our memories are inaccurate or distorted. In the locus classicus of the constructive memory idea—Bartlett’s Remembering—we find a different meaning: Constructive is there understood as a future-oriented and adaptive characteristic of remembering, which can also lead to accuracy. His notion of constructiveness was even earlier elaborated in relation to group dynamics in his book Psychology and Primitive Culture. How did we get from one meaning of constructive to another? This question is explored through a serial reproduction analysis of experiments purporting to replicate Bartlett’s study. The focus is on the transformation of terminology used to describe qualitative changes introduced by subjects into reproductions. In this history a diversity of terms, coming from different intellectual sources, is gradually subsumed under the single term ‘distortion’. Thus, psychologists have reconstructed Bartlett’s work based on their own background, other influences and their own project for the discipline, illustrating the very constructive processes Bartlett theorized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Archival and Constructive views of memory offer contrasting characterizations of remembering and its relation to memory errors. I evaluate the descriptive adequacy of each by offering a close analysis of one of the most prominent experimental techniques by which memory errors are elicited—the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Explaining the DRM effect requires appreciating it as a distinct form of memory error, which I refer to as misremembering. Misremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. It differs from both successful remembering and from confabulation errors, where the representation produced is wholly inaccurate. As I show, neither the Archival nor the Constructive View can account for the DRM effect because they are insensitive to misremembering’s unique explanatory demands. Fortunately, the explanatory limitations of the Archival and Constructive Views are complementary. This suggests a way forward. Explaining misremembering—including how it differs from both successful remembering and confabulation—requires a hybrid theory of memory, combining the Archival commitment to discrete retention with the Constructive approach to retrieval. I conclude the paper with the beginning sketches of such an account. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Naturally occurring memory processes show features which are difficult to investigate by conventional cognitive neuroscience paradigms. Distortions of memory for problematic contents are described both by psychoanalysis (internal conflicts) and research on post-traumatic stress disorder (external traumata). Typically, declarative memory for these contents is impaired – possibly due to repression in the case of internal conflicts or due to dissociation in the case of external traumata – but they continue to exert an unconscious pathological influence: neurotic symptoms or psychosomatic disorders after repression or flashbacks and intrusions in post-traumatic stress disorder after dissociation. Several experimental paradigms aim at investigating repression in healthy control subjects. We argue that these paradigms do not adequately operationalize the clinical process of repression, because they rely on an intentional inhibition of random stimuli (suppression). Furthermore, these paradigms ignore that memory distortions due to repression or dissociation are most accurately characterized by a lack of self-referential processing, resulting in an impaired integration of these contents into the self. This aspect of repression and dissociation cannot be captured by the concept of memory as a storage device which is usually employed in the cognitive neurosciences. It can only be assessed within the framework of a constructivist memory concept, according to which successful memory involves a reconstruction of experiences such that they fit into a representation of the self. We suggest several experimental paradigms that allow for the investigation of the neural correlates of repressed memories and trauma-induced memory distortions based on a constructivist memory concept.

The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader 'information effect'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines adaptive constructive processes (APC), functional for memorizing and cognition and can also create distortions, errors and illusions. It discusses different types of memory errors that are produced by APCs. In particular, it focuses on the process of imagining or simulating events which may occur in a person's own future. The author lists the adaptive aspects and pitfalls of future event simulation. The pitfalls include misprediction of future and planning fallacy and also instability of future simulations. Some of the evidences that support an adaptive role for future simulation indicates that they can benefit objective cognition and also enhance prospective and retrospective memory.

Extensive research shows that post-event suggestions can distort the memory for a target event. In this study we examined the effect of such suggestions as they interact with the products of a spontaneous memory process: instantiation of abstract information to an intermediate level of abstractness, the basic level (Pansky & Koriat, 2004). Participants read a narrative containing items presented at the superordinate level (e.g., FRUIT), were exposed to suggestions that referred to these items at the basic level (e.g., APPLE), and were finally asked to recall the original items. We found that the tendency to instantiate spontaneously in the control (non-misleading) condition, particularly over time, increased following exposure to suggestions that were likely to coincide with those instantiations. Exposure to such suggestions, either immediately or following a 24-hour delay, reduced subsequent correct recall of the original items only if the suggested information coincided with the information one tends to instantiate spontaneously in a given context. Suggestibility, in this case, was particularly pronounced and phenomenologically compelling in terms of remember/know judgements. The findings are taken to imply that effects of post-event suggestions can be understood in terms of the constructive processes that set the stage for their occurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for philosophical theories of the metaphysics of memory and for a central question in the epistemology of memory. I first develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. I then argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of Martin and Deutscher's influential causal theory of memory. I conclude by sketching the implications of this updated theory for the question of memory's status as a generative epistemic source. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Influential models of visual working memory treat each item to be stored as an independent unit and assume that there are no interactions between items. However, real-world displays have structure that provides higher-order constraints on the items to be remembered. Even in the case of a display of simple colored circles, observers can compute statistics, such as mean circle size, to obtain an overall summary of the display. We examined the influence of such an ensemble statistic on visual working memory. We report evidence that the remembered size of each individual item in a display is biased toward the mean size of the set of items in the same color and the mean size of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory is constructive, encoding displays at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating across these levels, rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item independently. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article focuses on the neural and cognitive processes that support imagining or simulating future events, a topic that has recently emerged in the forefront of cognitive neuroscience. We begin by considering concepts of simulation from a number of areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to place our use of the term in a broader context. We then review neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and cognitive studies that have examined future-event simulation and its relation to episodic memory. This research supports the idea that simulating possible future events depends on much of the same neural machinery, referred to here as a core network, as does remembering past events. After discussing several theoretical accounts of the data, we consider applications of work on episodic simulation for research concerning clinical populations suffering from anxiety or depression. Finally, we consider other aspects of future-oriented thinking that we think are related to episodic simulation, including planning, prediction, and remembering intentions. These processes together comprise what we have termed “the prospective brain,” whose primary function is to use past experiences to anticipate future events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To fully appreciate the opportunities provided by interactive and ubiquitous multimedia to record and share experiences, we report on an ethnographic investigation on the settings and nature of human memory and experience at a large-scale event. We studied two groups of spectators at a FIA World Rally Championship in Finland, both equipped with multimedia mobile phones. Our analysis of the organization of experience-related activities in the mass event focuses on the active role of technology-mediated memories in constructing experiences. Continuity, reflexivity with regard to the Self and the group, maintaining and re-creating group identity, protagonism and active spectatorship were important social aspects of the experience and were directly reflected in how multimedia was used. Particularly, we witnessed multimedia-mediated forms of expression, such as staging, competition, storytelling, joking, communicating presence, and portraying others; and the motivation for these stemmed from the engaging, processual, and shared nature of experience. Moreover, we observed how temporality and spatiality provided a platform for constructing experiences. The analysis advocates applications that not only store or capture human experience for sharing or later use but also actively participates in the very construction of experience. The approach conveys several valuable design implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Slogans are generally considered to be useful in building brand equity. In today's cluttered environment, however, consumers often match slogans with brands other than the actual sponsoring brand. Still, research on slogans has mainly focused on slogan effects when the brand is given (for example, in controlled experiments). By using real slogans and brands, this study increases our understanding of how slogans work in the presence of several competing slogans and brands. It is found that mismatching of slogans and brands can be explained by the different memory processes used by consumers. The cued retrieval process generally leads to the correct brand being identified, whereas the constructive memory process is sensitive to memory distortions. However, constructive memory allows for a larger influence of the slogan on the brand than does cued retrieval. The study adds to research on slogans and on source identification. Suggestions on how to use slogans in a cluttered environment, such as creating annoying and irritating slogans or using variations of slogans, are given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From earliest times, humans have developed strategies for increasing their ability to remember and commemorate significant events in the history of their communities. Epics have been created, memorized, and passed on through generations even before the development of written records. Monuments have also been built to commemorate important events. Stratagems for helping people to retain information, mnemonics, have allowed us to develop what has been termed memoria technica —‘artificial’ memories. In this essay, while recognizing that new technologies support people and organizations in their remembering processes, I wish to stress that other complementary human activity that constitutes the duality of memory, namely forgetting . This is a topic that has been relatively neglected or treated in a cursory fashion in much academic discourse to date. I note some examples of the scattered but intriguing work on the subject, from very different disciplinary perspectives, before turning attention to the potential relevance of judicious forgetting in the context of new technologies and visions of the future. Examining the role of forgetting opens up some interesting possibilities. We should re-frame our discourse and expand the design space concerning ubiquitous computational technologies in our everyday life to incorporate aspects of this forgetting dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an extension of "The Future Orientation of Constructive Memory" published in 2008 (Rossi, Erickson-Klein & Rossi). In a context of neuroscience, questions were raised regarding retrospective functions of dreaming. This paper summarizes the ideas from the original article and provides updates relevant to studies that have been conducted in the interim. The 4-Stage Creative Process model is used to conceptualize the manner in which activity-dependent genomic stimulation contributes to future adaptive behaviors. Neurophysiological constructs are discussed with their relevance to clinical practice. Two case summaries illustrate the application of the 4-Stage Creative Process as a framework for therapeutic hypnosis and permissive suggestion. The collaboration between Ernest Rossi and Milton Erickson offers an increasingly relevant and nuanced understanding about the interface of behavior, genomic expression, and activity-dependent gene expression.

We explore a new distinction between the future, prospective memory system being investigated in current neuroscience and the past, retrospective memory system , which was the original theoretical foundation of therapeutic hypnosis, classical psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy. We then generalize a current evolutionary theory of sleep and dreaming, which focuses on the future, prospective memory system , to conceptualize a new evolutionary perspective on therapeutic hypnosis and brief psychotherapy. The implication of current neuroscience research is that activity-dependent gene expression and brain plasticity are the psychobiological basis of adaptive behavior, consciousness, and creativity in everyday life as well as psychotherapy. We summarize a case illustrating how this evolutionary perspective can be used to quickly resolve problems with past obstructive procrastination in school to facilitate current and future academic success.

We examine how people remember stories about climate change and how they communicate these stories to others. Drawing on theories of reconstructive memory and cultural theory, we assume that recollection is systematically affected by an individual's world view as well as by the world view of the target audience. In an experimental study with a Norwegian representative sample ( N = 266), participants read a story about three politicians, in which each protagonist was described as holding a specific world view and as trying to tackle climate change with a corresponding strategy (individualistic/free market oriented, hierarchical/technology-oriented, or egalitarian/sustainability-oriented). After 1 day and then after 1 week, participants were asked to retell the story as if to somebody who was characterized as being either an individualist, a hierarchist, or an egalitarian; in addition, a neutral recall control condition without a specified audience was included. Participants' own world view was assessed and they were classified as endorsing individualism, or hierarchism, or egalitarianism. We hypothesized that retellings would be selectively reconstructed according to the world view of the participant, as well as tuned to the audience's world view. We assessed the cognitive structure of the recollected story, and, using methods from computational text analysis, we computed similarities among retellings and the original narrative, and among retellings and world views. Results suggest that (i) retellings become less accurate over time, (ii) retelling to an audience with an explicit world view leads to more strongly filtered retellings than recalling without a specified audience, but the filter operates in a non-specific manner with respect to world views, (iii) the cognitive structure of the recollected story shows small but systematic differences concerning the link between story problem and solution as a function of the participant's and the audience's world view. No interaction was found between the world view of the participant and that of the audience. Results emphasize the role of world views in communicating climate change, and might help to better understand phenomena such as polarization and echo chamber effects.

According to Aby Warburg, the aesthetic experience is informed by a pendulum-like movement of the observer's mind that allows him to immerse as well as to take distance from the artwork's composing elements. To account for Warburg's definition, we are proposing embodied simulation and associative processing as constitutive mechanisms of this pendulum-like movement within the aesthetic experience that enable the observer to relate to the displayed artistic material within aesthetic spaces. Furthermore, we suggest that associative processing elicits constructive memory processes that permit the development of a knowledge within which the objects of art become part of memory networks, potentially informing future ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving in real-world situations, as an individual or collectively., (© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Naturally occurring memory processes show features which are difficult to investigate by conventional cognitive neuroscience paradigms. Distortions of memory for problematic contents are described both by psychoanalysis (internal conflicts) and research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; external traumata). Typically, declarative memory for these contents is impaired - possibly due to repression in the case of internal conflicts or due to dissociation in the case of external traumata - but they continue to exert an unconscious pathological influence: neurotic symptoms or psychosomatic disorders after repression or flashbacks and intrusions in PTSD after dissociation. Several experimental paradigms aim at investigating repression in healthy control subjects. We argue that these paradigms do not adequately operationalize the clinical process of repression, because they rely on an intentional inhibition of random stimuli (suppression). Furthermore, these paradigms ignore that memory distortions due to repression or dissociation are most accurately characterized by a lack of self-referential processing, resulting in an impaired integration of these contents into the self. This aspect of repression and dissociation cannot be captured by the concept of memory as a storage device which is usually employed in the cognitive neurosciences. It can only be assessed within the framework of a constructivist memory concept, according to which successful memory involves a reconstruction of experiences such that they fit into a representation of the self. We suggest several experimental paradigms that allow for the investigation of the neural correlates of repressed memories and trauma-induced memory distortions based on a constructivist memory concept.