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Widespread frontoparietal activity is consistently observed in recognition memory tests that compare studied (“target”) versus unstudied (“nontarget”) responses. However, there are conflicting accounts that ascribe various aspects of frontoparietal activity to mnemonic evidence versus decisional processes. According to Signal Detection Theory, recognition judgments require individuals to decide whether the memory strength of an item exceeds an evidence threshold—the decision criterion—for reporting previously studied items. Yet, most fMRI studies fail to manipulate both memory strength and decision criteria, making it difficult to appropriately identify frontoparietal activity associated with each process. In the current experiment, we manipulated both discriminability and decision criteria across recognition memory and visual detection tests during fMRI scanning to assess how frontoparietal activity is affected by each manipulation. Our findings revealed that maintaining a conservative versus liberal decision criterion drastically affects frontoparietal activity in target versus nontarget response contrasts for both recognition memory and visual detection tests. However, manipulations of discriminability showed virtually no differences in frontoparietal activity in target versus nontarget response or item contrasts. Comparing across task domains, we observed similar modulations of frontoparietal activity across criterion conditions, though the recognition memory task revealed larger activations in both magnitude and spatial extent in these contrasts. Nonetheless, there appears to be some domain specificity in frontoparietal activity associated with the maintenance of a conservative versus liberal criterion. We propose that widespread frontoparietal activity observed in target versus nontarget contrasts is largely attributable to response bias where increased activity may reflect inhibition of a prepotent response, which differs depending on whether a person maintains a conservative versus liberal decision criterion.

Decisions are often based on memory, but memories are often vague and ambiguous. Therefore, one must establish some standard for how strong a memory must feel before it is accepted as part of one’s past. This standard of evidence, called a decision criterion, should be adapted to the demands of a given situation: Sometimes it is critical to accept only strong memories as legitimate, whereas at other times it is more appropriate to act on the basis of relatively weak memory evidence. The ability to shift between these two standards as circumstances warrant is a critical element of successful decision making. We review recent work examining criterion shifting in recognition memory and argue that the true nature of criterion shifting may be seen only at the individual level: Whereas some people shift their criterion quite adaptively, others do not shift at all.

When old-new recognition judgments must be based on ambiguous memory evidence, a proper criterion for responding "old" can substantially improve accuracy, but participants are typically suboptimal in their placement of decision criteria. Various accounts of suboptimal criterion placement have been proposed. The most parsimonious, however, is that subjects simply over-rely on memory evidence - however faulty - as a basis for decisions. We tested this account with a novel recognition paradigm in which old-new discrimination was minimal and critical errors were avoided by adopting highly liberal or conservative biases. In Experiment 1, criterion shifts were necessary to adapt to changing target probabilities or, in a "security patrol" scenario, to avoid either letting dangerous people go free (misses) or harming innocent people (false alarms). Experiment 2 added a condition in which financial incentives drove criterion shifts. Critical errors were frequent, similar across sources of motivation, and only moderately reduced by feedback. In Experiment 3, critical errors were only modestly reduced in a version of the security patrol with no study phase. These findings indicate that participants use even transparently non-probative information as an alternative to heavy reliance on a decision rule, a strategy that precludes optimal criterion placement.

The prevalence effect is a phenomenon whereby target prevalence impacts performance in visual search (e.g., baggage screening) and visual comparison (e.g., face‐matching) tasks – people more often 'miss' infrequent target stimuli. The current study investigated prevalence effects in fingerprint identification – an important visual comparison task used in criminal investigations. Participants (N = 287) judged 100 fingerprint pairs where the prevalence of match trials was either 10% (low), 50% (equal), or 90% (high), and half received trial‐level feedback on their performance. As predicted, low match prevalence increased errors on match trials (i.e., misses), whereas high match prevalence errors on non‐match trials (i.e., false alarms) – but only when participants received feedback. These effects were largely driven by changes in bias (C), rather than sensitivity (d'). These results suggest that the combination of feedback and match prevalence can impact the types of errors that fingerprint examiners may make in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals should strategically shift decision criteria when there are disproportionate likelihoods or consequences for falsely identifying versus missing target items. Despite being explicitly aware of the advantages for criterion shifting, people on average do not shift extremely, leading many theories to conclude that people are generally suboptimal at placing decision criteria. However, assessments of individual differences reveal that some people actually do criterion shift quite well while others fail to shift entirely. These individual differences may carry meaningful information about the nature and consistency of a person's decision-making strategies, but no studies have systematically assessed the stability of strategic criterion shifting within individuals over time. We assessed criterion shifting stability by administering test–retest recognition memory and visual detection tests where we induced decision biases through instruction, payoff, and base rate manipulations. Criterion shifting tendencies proved to be stable within and across decision domains regardless of the inducement. Individual differences in criterion shifting could not be explained by personality characteristics, metacognitive sensitivity, motivation, or performance on other cognitive tasks. Reports of confidence ratings, which are used to assess various criterion placements, showed no relationship to the extent of criterion shifting unless participants received instructions to make certain response types with high confidence only. Participants who inadequately shifted criteria still tended to set extreme criteria for reporting high confidence, suggesting that these individuals are capable of shifting to greater extents, but appear unwilling to do so. These findings demonstrate that strategic criterion shifting tendencies are a stable and uniquely individualistic cognitive trait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Maintaining a conservative vs. liberal criterion drastically affects target > nontarget response contrasts during recognition memory and visual detection tests. • Changes in discriminability show virtually no differences in activity in target > nontarget response or item contrasts when controlling for the decision criterion. • A similar frontoparietal network associated with the decision criterion is observed across recognition memory and visual detection tasks (though the magnitude and spatial extent is more robust during recognition memory tests). Widespread frontoparietal activity is consistently observed in recognition memory tests that compare studied ("target") versus unstudied ("nontarget") responses. However, there are conflicting accounts that ascribe various aspects of frontoparietal activity to mnemonic evidence versus decisional processes. According to Signal Detection Theory, recognition judgments require individuals to decide whether the memory strength of an item exceeds an evidence threshold—the decision criterion—for reporting previously studied items. Yet, most fMRI studies fail to manipulate both memory strength and decision criteria, making it difficult to appropriately identify frontoparietal activity associated with each process. In the current experiment, we manipulated both discriminability and decision criteria across recognition memory and visual detection tests during fMRI scanning to assess how frontoparietal activity is affected by each manipulation. Our findings revealed that maintaining a conservative versus liberal decision criterion drastically affects frontoparietal activity in target versus nontarget response contrasts for both recognition memory and visual detection tests. However, manipulations of discriminability showed virtually no differences in frontoparietal activity in target versus nontarget response or item contrasts. Comparing across task domains, we observed similar modulations of frontoparietal activity across criterion conditions, though the recognition memory task revealed larger activations in both magnitude and spatial extent in these contrasts. Nonetheless, there appears to be some domain specificity in frontoparietal activity associated with the maintenance of a conservative versus liberal criterion. We propose that widespread frontoparietal activity observed in target versus nontarget contrasts is largely attributable to response bias where increased activity may reflect inhibition of a prepotent response, which differs depending on whether a person maintains a conservative versus liberal decision criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A decision criterion establishes the minimum amount of memory evidence required for recognition. When a liberal criterion is set, items are recognized based on weak evidence whereas a conservative criterion requires greater memory strength for recognition. The decision criterion is a fundamental aspect of recognition memory but little is known about the underlying neural mechanisms of maintaining a criterion. We used continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) with the goal of inhibiting prefrontal cortex excitability while participants performed recognition tests. We hypothesized that inhibiting the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG), and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) would cause participants to establish less conservative decision criteria without affecting recognition memory performance. Participants initially performed recognition memory tests while maintaining conservative decision criteria during fMRI scanning. Peak activity in the successful retrieval effect contrast (Hits > Correct Rejections) provided subject-specific cTBS target sites. During three separate sessions, participants completed the same recognition memory paradigm while maintaining conservative and liberal decision criteria both before and after cTBS. Across two experiments we failed to significantly alter decision criteria placement by applying cTBS to the rIFG, rMFG, and rDLPFC despite efforts to precisely target individualized brain areas. However, we unexpectedly improved discriminability following cTBS to the rDLPFC specifically when participants maintained a liberal criterion. Although this finding may guide future studies investigating the neural mechanisms underlying discriminability in recognition memory, cTBS proved ineffective at altering decision criteria.

A decision criterion establishes the minimum amount of memory evidence required for recognition. When a liberal criterion is set, items are recognized based on weak evidence whereas a conservative criterion requires greater memory strength for recognition. The decision criterion is a fundamental aspect of recognition memory but little is known about the underlying neural mechanisms of maintaining a criterion. We used continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) with the goal of inhibiting prefrontal cortex excitability while participants performed recognition tests. We hypothesized that inhibiting the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG), and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) would cause participants to establish less conservative decision criteria without affecting recognition memory performance. Participants initially performed recognition memory tests while maintaining conservative decision criteria during fMRI scanning. Peak activity in the successful retrieval effect contrast (Hits > Correct Rejections) provided subject-specific cTBS target sites. During three separate sessions, participants completed the same recognition memory paradigm while maintaining conservative and liberal decision criteria both before and after cTBS. Across two experiments we failed to significantly alter decision criteria placement by applying cTBS to the rIFG, rMFG, and rDLPFC despite efforts to precisely target individualized brain areas. However, we unexpectedly improved discriminability following cTBS to the rDLPFC specifically when participants maintained a liberal criterion. Although this finding may guide future studies investigating the neural mechanisms underlying discriminability in recognition memory, cTBS proved ineffective at altering decision criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When old-new recognition judgments must be based on ambiguous memory evidence, a proper criterion for responding old can substantially improve accuracy, but participants are typically suboptimal in their placement of decision criteria. Various accounts of suboptimal criterion placement have been proposed. The most parsimonious, however, is that subjects simply over-rely on memory evidence – however faulty – as a basis for decisions. We tested this account with a novel recognition paradigm in which old-new discrimination was minimal and critical errors were avoided by adopting highly liberal or conservative biases. In Experiment 1, criterion shifts were necessary to adapt to changing target probabilities or, in a security patrol scenario, to avoid either letting dangerous people go free (misses) or harming innocent people (false alarms). Experiment 2 added a condition in which financial incentives drove criterion shifts. Critical errors were frequent, similar across sources of motivation, and only moderately reduced by feedback. In Experiment 3, critical errors were only modestly reduced in a version of the security patrol with no study phase. These findings indicate that participants use even transparently non-probative information as an alternative to heavy reliance on a decision rule, a strategy that precludes optimal criterion placement.

Abstract: Results of recent computational modelling studies suggest that a general function of the striatum in human cognition is related to shifting decision criteria in selection processes. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 21 healthy subjects to examine the hemodynamic responses when subjects shift their response criterion on a trial-by-trial basis in the lexical decision paradigm. Trial-by-trial criterion setting is obtained when subjects respond faster in trials following a word trial than in trials following nonword trials — irrespective of the lexicality of the current trial. Since selection demands are equally high in the current trials, we expected to observe neural activations that are related to response criterion shifting. The behavioural data show sequential effects with faster responses in trials following word trials compared to trials following nonword trials, suggesting that subjects shifted their response criterion on a trial-by-trial basis. The neural responses revealed a signal increase in the striatum only in trials following word trials. This striatal activation is therefore likely to be related to response criterion setting. It demonstrates a role of the striatum in shifting decision criteria in visual word recognition, which cannot be attributed to pure error-related processing or the selection of a preferred response. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The non-veridical experiences associated with hypnosis, which are clearly at variance with reality, are a clue that the hypnotized person has ceased to test the validity of experiences. Recent brain-mapping studies implicate the anterior cingulate gyrus as a key region in the establishment of hypnotic misperceptions. Significantly, when that region of brain is damaged patients experience difficulty in distinguishing the imaginary from the real. Taken together, these observations support the claim that hypnosis entails an abandonment of reality testing. It is argued that an altered state of consciousness is an inevitable consequence of ceasing to test reality. Possible ways of researching this altered state are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When old-new recognition judgments must be based on ambiguous memory evidence, a proper criterion for responding "old" can substantially improve accuracy, but participants are typically suboptimal in their placement of decision criteria. Various accounts of suboptimal criterion placement have been proposed. The most parsimonious, however, is that subjects simply over-rely on memory evidence - however faulty - as a basis for decisions. We tested this account with a novel recognition paradigm in which old-new discrimination was minimal and critical errors were avoided by adopting highly liberal or conservative biases. In Experiment 1, criterion shifts were necessary to adapt to changing target probabilities or, in a "security patrol" scenario, to avoid either letting dangerous people go free (misses) or harming innocent people (false alarms). Experiment 2 added a condition in which financial incentives drove criterion shifts. Critical errors were frequent, similar across sources of motivation, and only moderately reduced by feedback. In Experiment 3, critical errors were only modestly reduced in a version of the security patrol with no study phase. These findings indicate that participants use even transparently non-probative information as an alternative to heavy reliance on a decision rule, a strategy that precludes optimal criterion placement.