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Climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic are global challenges in which scientists play a crucial role, and immediate political actions are necessary. However, in contrast to climate change, strong governmental actions have been taken during the pandemic. While climate change has been on the public agenda for several decades, the pandemic is a rather new issue. In such cases, social media offer scientists the potential to disseminate scientific results to the public and express calls to action and their personal views towards politics. Thus far, little is known about the extent to which scientists make use of this option. In this study, we investigated the similarities and differences between visible German climate experts and visible German Covid-19 experts regarding advocacy and assessments of policies and political actors on Twitter. We conducted a manual content analysis of tweets (N = 5,915) from 2021 of the most visible climate experts (N = 5) and the most visible Covid-19 experts (N = 5). The results show that climate experts addressed politics more often than Covid-19 experts in their tweets. The selected climate experts more often expressed negative evaluations, the degradation of competence and blaming. The Covid-19 experts, however, made more political calls for action. We assume that an issue’s history and context will affect scientists’ public assessments of politics. Our comparative study provides insight into the interrelations between science and politics in digital communication environments and elucidates visible scientists’ communication behaviours towards different socio-scientific issues.

This research discusses socio-political movements in Papua as a result of the implementation of special autonomy policies (Otsus) by the government for almost two decades. Theoretically, indigenous Papuans should support it but in empirical reality, Otsus has been considered "fail" by the indigenous Papuan people because there are still many problems that have not been resolved by Otsus. This negative response indicates public dissatisfaction towards the development planning process in Papua. This dissertation aims to examine these issues; why these policies and development plans failed and are protested, why protests against them are prolonged, how do protests develop into social movements, and whether indigenous Papuan movements can be classified as social movements. The study uses qualitative approach, through case study methods. Data are collected through interviews, observations and documentation studies. The research finds that the presence of Otsus in Papua in addition to being a source of new conflict, also triggers conflicts in the form of protests and resistance movements against the government of Indonesia, both physical and political. This research discovers that, indeed the Otsus management has succeeded in changing the face of Papua because of the many physical projects but the development of human aspects and supporting instruments has not been touched at all. Thus, only a small percentage of indigenous Papuans feel the benefits of Otsus, while most of them are still struggling. This paper finds that protests against Otus are due to the growing resentments from the community so long as their demands are not met. This study suggests that the presence of the state in Papua through the Otsus policy must be re-evaluated. The state must ensure that in the Otsus era, the indigenous Papuans should not be marginalized, so that aspirations for the welfare of all indigenous Papuans through Otsus can be realized.

The literature has described trade unions’ positions towards both precarious workers and migrant workers as ambivalent. By studying an extreme case, the meat-processing industries in the United Kingdom and in Germany, we show how trade unions were decisive in both countries in bringing exploitative working conditions on the political agenda and in advancing policy change. However, the strategies through which trade unions contributed to this differed remarkably, highlighting different causal pathways in both countries. The British case can clearly be seen as an example of successful union revitalisation by relying on innovative strategies. In contrast, the German story exhibits a strong reliance on a more traditional approach to improving workers’ rights, which was only successful after employers were willing to improve working conditions in the sector as well. Our analysis shows that policy change can happen despite unfavourable conditions and weak actors, especially if these actors make strategic use of situational conditions.

This dissertation explains when and how non-state actors (NSA) apply informality in the EU’s policy making in the area of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Many analyses have acknowledged the increasing role of informal governance applied by state actors in global policy making, yet less is known about the nature of informality used by NSAs to counsel state actors. Combatting the challenges posed by migration, the EU institutions have increasingly established formal channels to facilitate consultation by NSAs. In some cases, NSAs prefer informality to advice the EU institutions over formal channels, but it is unclear when and how this takes place. The dissertation introduces the concept of informality in International Relations and European Union research and further defines informality as an instrument used by actors to bypass non-responsive formal policy making. Based on assumptions of rational choice institutionalism the analysis shows that NSA overcome formal institutional restrictions to increase their benefits by the application of informality. It also identifies variance in types of informality depending on the policy stage applied in., Die Dissertation erklärt wann und wie nichtstaatliche Akteure (NSA) Informalität in der Politikgestaltung der EU im Bereich Justiz und Inneres anwenden. Viele Analysen haben die zunehmende Rolle informeller Governance durch staatliche Akteure in der internationalen Politikgestaltung anerkannt. Informalität, die NSA zur Beratung staatlicher Akteure entwickeln, ist jedoch wenig untersucht. Um den politischen Herausforderungen im Bereich Migration zu begegnen, haben die EU Institutionen Möglichkeiten der formalen Beratung durch NSA zunehmend ausgeweitet. In einigen Fällen ziehen NSA informelle Formen der Beratung vor, allerdings ist unklar, wann und wie dies geschieht. Die Dissertation erklärt das Konzept der Informalität in den Internationalen Beziehungen und der EU-Forschung. Sie definiert Informalität weiter als ein Instrument, das von Akteuren genutzt wird, um den eigenen Nutzen innerhalb formaler Strukturen zu erhöhen. Basierend auf Annahmen des Rational Choice Institutionalismus zeigt die Analyse, wie NSA formale institutionelle Beschränkungen überwinden, um ihre Präferenzen zu realisieren. Die Arbeit identifiziert Varianz dieser Typen von Informalität in Abhängigkeit von der Phase des Politikgestaltungsprozesses, in der sie angewandt werden.

Seit Frankfurts Aufstieg zum europäischen Finanzmarktzentrum gilt die Metropole als einer der wichtigsten Verkehrsknotenpunkte Europas. Infolge der Zunahme des regionalen und des nationalen Transitverkehrs wurde die kommunale Verkehrspolitik über einen langen Zeitraum nach dem Leitbild einer autogerechten Stadt ausgerichtet. Bereits im Jahr 1990 hat sich Frankfurt als Gründungsmitglied des Klima-Bündnisses der europäischen Städte jedoch dazu verpflichtet, die CO2-Emissionen alle fünf Jahre um zehn Prozent zu verringern. In der Diskussion über die Entwicklung der Verkehrspolitik wird das Vorliegen eines normativen Grundsatzkonflikts als wahrscheinlich erachtet, in dem die Stakeholder die Probleme auf der Grundlage ihrer eigenen Überzeugungen und Werte interpretieren. Zunächst wurde davon ausgegangen, die wertebasierten Vorstellungen der Stakeholder stehen entweder aufgrund der über einen langen Zeitraum institutionalisierten Interessen der Straßenbau- und Automobilindustrie mit einer investitionsgeleiteten Verkehrspolitik im Einklang oder orientieren sich an einer sozial-ökologischen Perspektive, die sich aus Frankfurts Weg in Richtung einer „Green City“ ergibt. Für die Untersuchung der Koalitionsbildung im Transformationsprozess der Frankfurter Verkehrspolitik wird das Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) angewandt, das auf der Annahme basiert, Koalitionen würden eine Reihe von normativen und kausalen Überzeugungen teilen. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht darin, neue Möglichkeiten der theoretischen Weiterentwicklung des ACF vorzuschlagen, mit denen die Rolle von Gruppenidentitäten bei der Bildung von Koalitionen untersucht werden kann. Im ersten Teil wird anhand der vier foundations überprüft, welche Erklärungskraft das ACF für die Bildung von Koalitionen im normativen Grundsatzkonflikt der Frankfurter Verkehrspolitik besitzt. Dafür wird (1) das Subsystem der Verkehrspolitik rekonstruiert, (2) die Überzeugungssysteme erfasst, (3) die Akteure zu Advocacy-Koalitionen gruppiert und (4) die Entwicklung des Subsystems über einen Zeitraum von mehr als zehn Jahren analysiert., Since Frankfurt's rise as a European financial market center, the metropolis has been considered one of the most important transportation hubs in Europe. As a result of the increase in regional and national transit traffic, municipal transport policy has been oriented over a long period of time towards the vision of a car-friendly city. However, as early as 1990, Frankfurt as a founding member of the Climate Alliance of European Cities committed to reducing CO2 emissions by ten percent every five years. In the discussion on the development of transport policy, the presence of a normative conflict of principle is considered likely, in which stakeholders interpret the problems based on their own beliefs and values. Initially, it was assumed that stakeholders' value-based perceptions are either in line with an investment-led transport policy due to the institutionalized interests of the road construction and automotive industries over a long period of time, or are oriented towards a social-ecological perspective resulting from Frankfurt's path towards a "Green City". To study coalition formation in the transformation process of Frankfurt's transport policy, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is applied, which is based on the assumption that coalitions share a set of normative and causal beliefs. The aim of this paper is to propose new ways of theoretically advancing the ACF that can be used to investigate the role of group identities in coalition formation. In the first part, the explanatory power of the ACF for the formation of coalitions in the normative conflict of principles in Frankfurt's transport policy is examined on the basis of the four foundations. For this purpose, (1) the subsystem of transport policy is reconstructed, (2) the belief systems are identified, (3) the actors are grouped into advocacy coalitions, and (4) the development of the subsystem is analyzed over a period of more than ten years.

Julika Bürgin untersucht den Vorstoß der »Extremismusprävention« in politische Bildung und demokratische Praxis. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die Strategien staatlicher Förderprogramme, die in die Autonomie freier Träger eingreifen. Gestützt auf Dokumentenanalysen, Interviews und eine interdisziplinäre Literaturstudie wird die These formuliert, dass Bildungsarbeit präventionspolitisch, und flankiert durch den Verfassungsschutz, in eine polizeiliche Ordnung eingepasst wird. Die Extremismusprävention wird als Element der sogenannten »wehrhaften« Demokratie kritisiert, die behauptet, Demokratie durch ihre Verkürzung zu verteidigen.

This paper shows that the field of migration management features a politics of expertise through which migration is enacted as a reality that can be managed because it can be precisely quantified. For instance, the International Organization for Migration maintains a “Global Migration Flows Interactive App.” This interactive map suggests that the number of people migrating from country A to B can be exactly known at any point in time. This enactment of migration sits in contrast with the widely acknowledged unreliability and noncoherence of migration statistics. This paper investigates how this tension is negotiated through the production of “strategic ignorance” (McGoey) about the known limits of quantifying migration. Drawing on work from ignorance studies we highlight four practices producing strategic ignorance: (1) omission of the significant gap between recorded immigration and emigration events, (2) compression of different accounts of migration into one “world migration map,” (3) deflection of knowledge about the specifities of different methods to production sites of statistical data, and (4) usage of metadata for sanitizing the statistical production process of any messy aspects. Our analysis shows that the politics of expertise in the field of migration management are intertwined with a politics of ignorance.

Jahrbuch der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2020Jahrbuch 2020 der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2020, p. 231

The literature on the security implications of climate change, and in particular on potential climate-conflict linkages, is burgeoning. Up until now, gender considerations have only played a marginal role in this research area. This is despite growing awareness of intersections between protecting women’s rights, building peace and security, and addressing environmental changes. This article advances the claim that adopting a gender perspective is integral for understanding the conflict implications of climate change. We substantiate this claim via three main points. First, gender is an essential, yet insufficiently considered intervening variable between climate change and conflict. Gender roles and identities as well as gendered power structures are important in facilitating or preventing climate-related conflicts. Second, climate change does affect armed conflicts and social unrest, but a gender perspective alters and expands the notion of what conflict can look like, and whose security is at stake. Such a perspective supports research inquiries that are grounded in everyday risks and that document alternative experiences of insecurity. Third, gender-differentiated vulnerabilities to both climate change and conflict stem from inequities within local power structures and socio-cultural norms and practices, including those related to social reproductive labor. Recognition of these power dynamics is key to understanding and promoting resilience to conflict and climate change. The overall lessons drawn for these three arguments is that gender concerns need to move center stage in future research and policy on climate change and conflicts.

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 04

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Deliverable, vol. D3.3b

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Deliverable, vol. D3.3a

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 07_DE

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 08

This essay deals with the concept of enmity and its representation in Athenian drama and modern rhetoric. It analyses the dynamics of friendship and enmity and its prominent opposition, as well as the limits of the moral standard of helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. This dichotomous pattern proved problematic not only in Ancient Athens, but also in today‘s politics.

Am 5.7.2019 habe ich in der Plenarsitzung der BWG einen Vortrag gehalten mit dem Titel „Der Umbruch der Parteienlandschaft und der Niedergang der Volksparteien. Empirische Befunde und Analyse der Ursachen und Folgen“. Dieser Vortrag basierte auf einem Aufsatz, der in den Abhandlungen des Jahrbuchs 2018 der BWG erschienen ist. Der Berichtszeitraum von Vortrag und Aufsatz und der darin verwendeten Graphiken und Tabellen endet mit dem Jahr 2017. Da es keinen Sinn macht, das Manuskript eines Vortrags, das bereits erschienen ist, im selben Jahrbuch ein zweites Mal zu veröffentlichen, ist im nachfolgenden Beitrag in Absprache mit der Schriftleitung des BWG-Jahrbuchs eine Fortschreibung der Daten zur Mitgliederentwicklung der Parteien und den Wahlergebnissen der Jahre 2018 und 2019 vorgenommen worden. Da in beiden Jahren keine Bundestagswahl stattgefunden hat, werden hier ersatzweise die Ergebnisse der Europawahl vom 26.5.2019 für die Bundesrepublik und der Landtagswahlen in Brandenburg und Sachsen vom 1.9.2019 und Thüringen vom 27.10.2019 herangezogen. Der Berichtszeitraum endet mit dem Eklat der Wahl des Ministerpräsidenten im Thüringer Landtag am 5.2.2020 und der dadurch ausgelösten Rücktrittskaskade., Jahrbuch der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2019Jahrbuch 2019 der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2019, p. 80

In view of events such as the public denial of climate change research by well-known politicians, the effects of postfactual disinformation and emotionalisation are discussed for science. Here, so-called ‘fake news’ are of focus. These are considered problematic, particularly in a high-choice media environment as users tend to show selective behaviour. Much research has demonstrated this selective exposure approach, which has roots in the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957). However, research on the processes of coping with dissonance is still considered sparse. In particular, communication scholars have overlooked emotional states and negotiations. This article analyses the affects that are aroused when users are confronted with opinion-challenging disinformation and how they (emotionally) cope by using different strategies for online information. For this, we used the context of climate change that is widely accepted in Germany. The innovative research design included pre- and post-survey research, stimulus exposure (denying ‘fake news’), observations, and retrospective interviews (n = 50). Through this, we find that perceptions and coping strategies vary individually and that overt behaviour, such as searching for counter-arguments, should be seen against the background of individual ideas and motivations, such as believing in an easy rejection of arguments. Confirming neuroscientific findings, participants felt relieved and satisfied once they were able to dissolve their dissonant state and negative arousal. Dissatisfaction and frustration were expressed if this had not been accomplished.

In dieser Dissertation wird die Frage untersucht, unter welchen Umständen Akteure im Advocacy Coalition Framework Policy Core Beliefs erwerben, verändern oder löschen beziehungsweise ihre Policy Core Beliefs unverändert beibehalten. Die Antwort darauf wird im Zusammenspiel zweier Faktoren gesehen: Zum einen der Lern-fördernden oder -hemmenden Wirkung der sogenannten ego-, alter- und Objekt-zentrierten Variablen. Darunter werden verschiedene Effekte verstanden, beispielsweise geteilte wissenschaftliche Vorstellungen oder das Ausmaß an sozialem Druck hin zu einem bestimmten Belief. Zum anderen der Intentionen, das heißt der Summe der Beliefs eines Akteurs, welche er zu einem bestimmten Subsystem entwickelt. Diese umfassen nicht nur die an das Subsystem gebundenen Policy Core Beliefs und Secondary Aspects, sondern auch Beliefs, die von außerhalb in das Subsystem hineinwirken. Ein Akteur wird einen Policy Core Belief nur dann verändern, seinem Belief-System hinzufügen oder löschen, wenn sowohl die ego-, alter- und Objekt-zentrierten Variablen als auch die Intentionen für einen solchen Lernprozess sprechen. Umgekehrt wird er seine Policy Core Beliefs nur dann aufrechterhalten, wenn die Beharrungskräfte stärker ausgeprägt sind als die herausfordernden Phänomene und er seine Intentionen mit ihnen weiterhin optimal umsetzen kann. Die individuelle Bedeutung der Policy Core Beliefs für den Akteur macht sich auch an der Annahme fest, dass sie aus unterschiedlichen Deep Core Beliefs oder den Beliefs übergeordneter Subsysteme abgeleitet werden können. Diese Gedanken bilden zusammen das Variablen-Intentionen-Modell für grundlegendes Policy-Lernen und Policy-Beharren im Advocacy Coalition Framework (VIM). Um die Variablen messen und die Intentionen von zehn Beispiel-Akteuren bestimmen zu können, wurden Beliefs aus Schriftquellen kodiert und in einer Datenbank abgelegt. Auf diese Weise zeigte sich, welche Beliefs die Beispiel-Akteure und die übrigen Subsystem-Mitglieder ignorierten, vertraten oder ablehnten und in welchem Ausmaß Lernen auf der Ebene der Policy Core Beliefs stattfand. Bei sechs der zehn Beispiel-Akteure konnten Veränderungen auf der Ebene der Policy Core Beliefs erfasst werden. Dabei war die Verfeinerung der Belief-Systeme durch die Aufnahme neuer Policy Core Beliefs das vorherrschende Phänomen gegenüber Löschung und Veränderung. Als Konsequenz sollten Policy Core Beliefs vom Attribut unbedingter Stabilität befreit werden., This dissertation examines the question of what circumstances drive the acquisition, change or deletion of actor’s policy core beliefs in the scope of the Advocacy Coalition Framework and vice versa the reasons to keep up policy core beliefs unchanged. The interaction of two factors is the key to answer this question: On the one hand we have the so-called ego-, alter- and object-centred variables that stimulate or impede policy learning. These variables comprise different effects, for example shared scientific conceptions or the extent of social pressure towards a certain belief. On the other hand, we have the intentions, that is the sum of all beliefs an actor develops concerning a certain subsystem. They comprise not only the policy core beliefs and secondary aspects bound to the subsystem, but also beliefs that have an impact on the subsystem from outside. An actor will only delete, change or add a policy core belief to his belief system, if both the ego-, alter and object-centred variables and the intentions favour such a learning process. Vice versa, he will only upkeep his policy core beliefs if the forces of persistence are developed stronger than the challenging phenomena and if he can realize his intentions with them in an optimal way. The individual importance of policy core beliefs for an actor is also a consequence of the assumption that they can be deduced from different deep core beliefs or the beliefs of higher-ranking subsystems. Together, these thoughts constitute the variables intentions model for fundamental policy learning and policy persistence within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (VIM). To measure the variables and to ascertain the intentions of ten sample actors, beliefs from written sources were coded in the empiric part and stored in a database. In this way, it became clear which beliefs were ignored, supported or rejected by the sample actors as well as the other subsystem members and to which degree learning on the level of the policy core beliefs took place. For six out of the ten sample actors, changes on the level of the policy core beliefs could be measured. In these learning processes, the amelioration of the belief systems by acceptance of new policy core beliefs was the prevalent phenomenon compared to belief deletion and change. As a consequence, policy core beliefs should be relieved from the attribute of absolute stability.

The new strategy “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership” aims at strengthening research cooperation between Europe and Central Asia. It also seeks to address the lack of Central Asia expertise among European decision-makers. Based on assessments of the current state of affairs of Central Asian Studies in Europe and European Studies and Central Asia, the “SEnECA Agenda for Future Research Cooperation” provides concrete recommendations for policy-makers, university managements and researchers on how to improve research cooperation between the EU und this region of increasing importance to Europe., SEnECA - DELIVERABLE: Strengthening and Energizing EU-Central Asia Relations, vol. 1.3

NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 02_PL

This policy paper provides recommendations for the implementation of the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia with regard to the first and second parts of the Strategy – “Partnering for resilience” and “Partnering for prosperity”. It follows the first part of recommendations (paper No 14) which gave a general assessment of the new Strategy and the recommendations on the tasks provided in the third part of the Strategy “Working better together”. This paper provides a set of recommendations to the EU on the implementation of the tasks from the new Strategy ranked the highest in the SEnECA scorecard (discussed in detail in Paper No. 14). Among those are the tasks aimed at “Partnering for resilience” – border management, strengthening cooperative mechanisms on the environment, water management and climate change, as well as support in legal and judicial issues, human rights, labour standards, governance, electoral process, reform and women's rights. Tasks related to scientific aspects of climate and water issues, as well as high-level political and security dialogue also scored high among the experts. These recommendations are expected to bring the EU’s experience in the respective fields to Central Asia while also expanding the EU’s normative power in the region. Among the tasks aimed at “Partnering for prosperity”, those related to the promotion of business and investment environment and support to the private sector in Central Asia scored the highest in the SEnECA scorecard, followed by the tasks devoted to development of transport corridors, supporting mobility of students and tutors, participation in science programs, as well as standardisation and quality issues for trade facilitation. SEnECA experts came forth with multiple recommendations for the implementation of the aforementioned tasks. In general, these recommendations suggest that the EU should focus on the direct counterparts (paying less attention to intermediaries) in Central Asia, pay particular attention to the different needs and situations in each of the Central Asian countries, make the communication with the relevant subjects more efficient, use assistance of other external like-minded actors and take particular note and lessons from similar actions of not like-minded actors.

This policy paper provides a reflection on the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council “The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership” (hereafter – the 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia). The paper contains a general assessment, recommendations and a SEnECA Scorecard of the tasks set forth by the Strategy. It also gives a more detailed assessment of the Strategy’s third part – “Working better together” and offers recommendations on its implementation. The 2019 EU Strategy on Central Asia is a timely and necessary document during the period of changes in Central Asia. It is setting out a comprehensive approach and it signals a clearer understanding of the region, putting the emphasis on “working together” instead of “teaching how to live”. It also gives due attention to the expanding regionalisation trends and Afghanistan as a shared source of risks and opportunities. On the other hand, the strategy signals less ambitions compared to some expectations. The narrative of the EU’s approach is unclear since many tasks mentioned are rather general. Methods and tools for measurement and the underpinning financial resources for the implementation seem to fall short of the necessity. The potential of cooperation with the EU member states and like-minded external actors has not been sufficiently addressed. Also, insufficient emphasis on universal human rights upsets some in the EU and Central Asia, whereas too much emphasis on Afghanistan upsets others in the region. The aim of the SEnECA experts’ assessment is to support the implementation of the new strategy as constructively and concretely as possible.

In the aftermath of the large inflow of asylum seekers in 2015, questions pertaining to values and norms in Swedish integration work have become more salient. Many integration providers experience an increased importance to communicate and con-vey norms and values in their daily work. This development, however, leaves many integration providers with question marks on how to best communicate, transmit, or argue for certain values and norms. This policy research alert spells out some of the recent developments and highlights a number of areas of integration to improve., Efter det stora inflödet av asylsökande 2015 har många frågor om normer och värderingar kommit i förgrunden i det svenska integrations‐ och inkluderingsarbetet. Många av de som arbetar med integration och inkludering upplever att det blivit allt viktigare för dem att kunna kommunicera och förmedla normer och värderingar i sitt dagliga arbete. Det reser många frågor om hur man bäst kommunicerar, för vidare eller argumenterar för normer och värderingar. I denna policy research alert sammanfattar vi den senaste tidens utveckling och pekar ut några områden där arbetet med normer och värderingar behöver bli bättre., NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee CrisisNoVaMigra - Policy Research Alert, vol. 03

Efter det stora inflödet av asylsökande 2015 har många frågor om normer och värderingar kommit i förgrunden i det svenska integrations‐ och inkluderingsarbetet. Många av de som arbetar med integration och inkludering upplever att det blivit allt viktigare för dem att kunna kommunicera och förmedla normer och värderingar i sitt dagliga arbete. Det reser många frågor om hur man bäst kommunicerar, för vidare eller argumenterar för normer och värderingar. I denna policy research alert sammanfattar vi den senaste tidens utveckling och pekar ut några områden där arbetet med normer och värderingar behöver bli bättre. In the aftermath of the large inflow of asylum seekers in 2015, questions pertaining to values and norms in Swedish integration work have become more salient. Many integration providers experience an increased importance to communicate and con-vey norms and values in their daily work. This development, however, leaves many integration providers with question marks on how to best communicate, transmit, or argue for certain values and norms. This policy research alert spells out some of the recent developments and highlights a number of areas of integration to improve.

Friedenspolitik steht mehr denn je im Blickfeld öffentlicher Debatten. Der Beitrag der Friedenswissenschaft zu den aktuellen Auseinandersetzungen um Krieg und Frieden ist jedoch außerordentlich bescheiden. Dies ist nicht zuletzt auf deren geringe Theorieorientierung zurückzuführen. In dem hier vorgelegten Arbeitspapier werden in drei Kapiteln einige Perspektiven für die Weiterführung friedenstheoretischer Ansätze entwickelt: bezogen auf friedenstheoretische Begriffe, insbesondere den Gewalt-Begriff, zu einzelnen Theorieansätzen (Demokratischer Frieden, Zivilisatorisches Hexagon) und zu den erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der Friedensforschung. Damit soll ein Beitrag geleistet werden für eine intensivierte Theorieorientierung friedenswissenschaftlicher Arbeiten, die der Praxisorientierung einer modernen Friedenswissenschaft nicht entgegensteht, sondern vielmehr ihre Grundlage stärkt und Praxisrelevanz erst ermöglicht: Nur die theoretisch fundierten Antworten der Friedensforschung können sich von friedenspolitischen Meinungen unterscheiden und im öffent-lichen und politischen Diskurs als Beiträge der Wissenschaft wahrgenommen werden.

It is likely that the current positive trends in political, societal and economic development will continue in all five Central Asian countries, though at a different pace. A decade from now, the Central Asian countries probably will be slightly better off and most of them will be economically more open, while freedoms and liberties will progress much slower. However, sudden and unexpected changes can also occur and change the course of development of one or more countries of the region. Intra-regionally, Central Asia in 2030 will most likely be a more cooperative region, if the development of the region continues on the current path. Bilateral and multi-lateral relations could improve if new domestically and externally facilitated engagements develop. The enhanced cooperation, however, will most likely not amount to regional integration. Issues of tension among the region’s countries will remain, especially regarding water and borders. In 2030, the EU will still be an important player in Central Asia. Economic engagement will remain a central driver for cooperation, having impact also on other sectors. At the same time, the EU’s comparative role in the region will decrease due to the growing economic and political influence of the People’s Republic of China and the persistent political, economic, military and cultural influence of Russia. Growing influence of both will predominantly shape the region. The role of other external powers, especially of India, Turkey, Iran, Arab countries is set to rise.

This paper assesses the implementation of the EU’s Central Asia policy and its perception in Central Asia since 2007. It analyses the EU’s economic and trade policies, as well as tangible outcomes in the relationship between the EU and Central Asian countries. It also compares the EU’s approach and results with other external powers in the region such as Russia, China and Turkey, and examines how the EU is perceived in Central Asia as an economic and trading partner. This paper concludes that for the EU and its member states to assist Central Asian countries in improving their economic development and regional stability, existing economic engagement must be maintained and built upon through tailor-made economic initiatives. In particular, the EU could continue to support small and medium enterprises, improve its explanations of EU trade and business regulations and increase awareness of the kind of trade agreements available to Central Asian countries. The EU could also further support Central Asian countries by providing technical and English language training, promoting good governance in business, assisting the countries with agricultural practices, as well as border management to facilitate cross-border trade.

The international conference „Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship“ took place from August 27-29, 2018 on the Essen Campus of the University of Duisburg-Essen. The conference was jointly hosted be the Special Interest Group Moral and Democratic Education of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI SIG 13) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research of the University of Duisburg-Essen (InZentIM).

While the last twenty years have seen the development of global rankings for corruption, allowing comparison between countries and shaming of corrupt governments, the measurements remain based largely on the perceptions of experts, and so lack both specificity and transparency. New research, based on a comprehensive theory of governance defined as the set of formal and informal institutions determining “who gets what” in a given context, allows for more specific and objective, albeit indirect, measurement of control of corruption. To uncover the institutional setting which empowers public integrity, such research tests numerous anti-corruption tools and good governance strategies in a comparative framework. The end result is an evidence-based national framework for control of corruption and a clear measure able to indicate both current status and change in corruption control from year to year or as a result of policy intervention.

Jahrbuch der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2018Jahrbuch 2018 der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 2018, p. 281

This paper examines the EU’s comparative advantages and disadvantages in its political and security engagement with Central Asian countries. The EU’s and its member states’ political and security engagement with Central Asia has been restricted by regional rivalry between the countries, occasional mismatches in their political and security priorities, as well as the dominance of external powers. The EU’s main security priorities in Central Asia are counter-narcotics and counter-extremism measures, and some of the more successful EU programmes in the region have addressed specific issues such as drug addiction and border security. However, the EU’s strategies to promote their ideas of democratisation and their anti-corruption agenda are often viewed by Central Asian countries as an attempt to exert regime change or influence the distribution of power, negatively impacting on how the EU is viewed in the region. Moreover, the EU’s Western understandings of how Central Asia’s domestic political environment works is also likely to restrict deeper cooperation between them. Most Central Asian countries have personalised, and centralised governments controlled by small groups of influential stakeholders, making it difficult for political outsiders to affect decision-making. More broadly, there is a general lack of information in Central Asia about the EU’s intention towards the region, and locals can be mistrustful of the EU’s influence. This view, reinforced by the pervasive Russian-language and Russian state media, is likely preventing the EU from deeper engagement with Central Asian countries.

This paper examines why despite increasing corruption since the 1980s, China's development has advanced so rapidly. The author argues that a strong developmental state, the prevalence of "developmental corruption" over "predatory corruption" and a temporary and relative acceptance of leading local cadres' corrupt practices by the Chinese leadership contributed to a high level of economic development. The development model of purely quantitative growth has meanwhile been replaced by one in favor of more sustainable development. However, social groups benefitting from corrupt practices or having invested heavily in social relationships are opposing such a step. Therefore, the central political leadership resorts to a combination of fighting at the same time both political corruption and political opposition of individuals and organizations against its new development policies and anti-corruption drive. Thus, combating corruption is also a mechanism to enforce the new reform and development program.

Almost four years have passed since the emissions scandal of September 2015, when it was revealed that the German auto industry has deceived millions of customers for more than a decade and caused irreparable harm to the environment. The scandal was not a product of the “misconduct of individuals,” but rather due to the extreme competition into which the auto industry has manoeuvred itself. How do employees feel about the fraud? Today, the crisis is being passed on to the workforce. The union has no effective strategy by which to link job interests and human interests, and by which to achieve breakthroughs on either front.

There are several regional and external actors that are currently engaged in intense competition over the future of Central Asia’s culture (education, media, tourism), social life (people-to-people contacts, civil society) and identity (including politics of memory), to win over the “hearts and minds” of the Central Asian people. However, this issue has been underestimated in previous research of the region. The European Union (hereafter the EU) and its member states are underperforming in this area in comparison to several key external powers, especially Russia. Despite the EU’s claims that Central Asian countries are important partners to them, the EU has not provided sufficient financial commitments and ways of supporting these claims. The paper concludes that the new EU strategy for Central Asia, due to be approved in 2019, should provide a more efficient response to the cultural policies and identity narratives of the key external powers and Central Asian countries. Aside from increasing financial and institutional engagement, the EU should establish a new and innovative identity narrative that would address both how the Union is perceived in Central Asia, as well as how Central Asia is perceived in the EU. The leading theme of this new EU identity narrative should be promoting the importance of a Central Asian cul-tural heritage to the EU and its contribution to the Union.

Initiated under the Presidency of Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is still a young, yet a fast-developing and most ambitious regionalist project. Despite BRI’s great potential to shape international trade and – more broadly – international relations amongst participating countries and beyond, scientific studies so far have largely neglected the question of how BRI goes together with contemporary approaches of regionalism and regional integration. This article argues that BRI constitutes a type of hybrid regionalism that seems to largely elude the old-new-regionalism divide and instead, it embraces elements of both traditions. In order to elucidate this double nature of the project, we will first discuss the idea of integration theory that has been developed in the context of the European integration process as well as such approaches that came up in the context of approaches of new regionalism. On this basis, and by referring to central elements of BRI as well as current developments in the framework of the project, we will shed light on the parallels and differences of BRI with “old” and “new” regionalism.

The SEnECA Stakeholder Analysis aims at listing relevant stakeholders for the EU’s Central Asia Policy and categorising them according to their power and interest. This will enable the project to communicate more effectively to different groups of stakeholders, tailored to their power and interest. The document also provides insights, gathered through semi-structured interviews, on how stake-holders communicate their work to the European public and on how stakeholders are or are not involved in EU decision-making. The SEnECA Stakeholder Analysis gathered information of 521 stakeholders and categorised them in four types (type 1: Monitor, type 2: Keep informed, type 3: Keep informed and engaged, type 4: Involve in the project) according to their power and interest.

This paper addresses the vicious remarks in one of Karl Marx’s letters, which have been frequently used to denounce Marx as a committed anti-Semite. In contrast, the paper points out, firstly, that the letter in question combines two racisms (directed against Jewishness and black-ness). Secondly, it is emphasized that Marx always took a principally emancipatory position. He did not however subject the two racisms to critical scrutiny. As a result, he neither conceptually penetrated nor intellectually superated the codes of anti-Semitism and colonial racism current in his day, but rather reproduced them, at least in part, as is, thirdly, documented. Fourthly and finally, it is concluded that this analytic deficit has proved an obstacle for the development of a Marxist theory of racism and has a negative impact on Marxist discussions of racism to this day.

The so-called Japan Conference is the most notable right-wing organization in Japan today. It aims to rebuild the totalitarian system of the prewar period, which it considers the ideal, “originally Japanese” state. It also intends to revise the current constitution, considering this constitution an obstacle to achievement of that goal. Since the fall of 2015, the Japan Conference has been building a putatively democratic movement, a right-wing network that has been rapidly expanding. At the same time, criticism of the Japan Conference by Japanese citizens is also growing.

Aufzeichnung des Vortrags vom 07. November 2018

Aufzeichnung des Vortrags vom 27. November 2018

My thesis makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the understanding of international society and governance by comparing the development pathways of Europe and North East Asia and these regions' respective responses to the financial crisis and to the climate change challenge. The novelty of my approach lies in conceiving of nationalism and multilateralism as competing but compatible principles of order in international society. These two organising principles form ideological institutions of international society and have shaped constitutive institutions such as sovereignty, international law and the economy. They determine role and power relationships between states. I start by researching how these ideological beliefs have changed the world: how was Confucianism replaced by nationalism in NE Asia and nationalism by multilateralism in Europe? The anarchy of Westphalian Europe has evolved into a syndicated supranational hierarchy in the EU, while the Confucian hierarchy in pre-modern NE Asia has given way to nationalist rivalry and territorial conflicts between Japan, China and Korea. Today the two regions – one integrated, one conflicted – play leading roles in global governance of a complex world of issues. The EU is guided by its multilateralist DNA, while NE Asia handled the financial crisis and the climate change challenge with a nationalist approach. In the theoretical part I am taking the English School's approach beyond its euro-centrism and also examine the contributions of the new Chinese school of International Relations. Dissertation, Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2017

In this Policy Paper, actual issues of cultural ties of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) with three world powers (Russia, China and the United States) are gradually analysed. These cultural relations consist of the following areas: shared identity and values, leadership links, foreign media outlets operating in Central Asia, cultural influence, diasporas, financial support to cultural activities and people-to-people cooperation. Each of the above world powers has its own mechanisms and channels for establishing, maintaining, and sometimes strengthening cultural ties with specific countries individually, or with the region in its entirety. The countries of the region in turn have their own preferences and approaches in maintain-ing cultural ties with each of these three world powers.