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Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine ist für Polen Zäsur und Bestätigung: Zäsur, weil gegen Polens wichtigsten östlichen Partner ein Angriffskrieg im großen Maßstab erfolgte; Bestätigung, weil sich Warschau in seiner pessimistischen Einschätzung hinsichtlich des russischen Aggressionspotentials bekräftigt sieht. Polens außen- und sicherheitspolitische Großziele haben sich durch den Krieg keineswegs verändert, aber sie stehen in einem neuen, dramatisch veränderten Kontext. Nach wie vor geht es darum, die Sicherheit Polens im transatlantischen Geflecht zu gewährleisten und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Landes im Gefüge der europäischen Integration voranzubringen. Weiterhin, wenn auch mit immenser Dringlichkeit, geht es darum, Russlands Ausgreifen zurückzudrängen sowie die Ukraine und andere östliche Nachbarn zu schützen. Und immer noch geht es darum, Polens Gewicht in der Europäischen Union und der NATO auszubauen, um beide Organisationen im Sinne Warschaus zu festigen und fortzuentwickeln. Ob dies gelingt, hängt davon ab, wie Polen sich in das Nordatlantische Bündnis, in die Ostpolitik des Westens und in die Europäische Union einfügt. Die seit 2015 in Polen regierende Partei Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) treibt in diesem Zusammenhang traditionelle Elemente polnischer Außenpolitik weiter, hat aber, gerade in der Europapolitik mit ihrem offensiven Kurs zur Wahrung nationaler Interessen, auch Neuausrichtungen vorgenommen.

Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit den Machtverhältnissen im Kontext mehrerer Immobilienprojekte in einem als "Downtown" Colombo bezeichneten Gebiet. Solche Urbanisierungsprojekte versinnbildlichen die historisch gewachsenen postkolonialen Beziehungen in der sich globalisierenden Welt. Im Zentrum steht das von der chinesischen Regierung und Sri Lankas Ministerium für Megapolis und Westliche Entwicklung unterstützte "Colombo Port City"-Projekt, für das die Insel um 575 Hektar erweitert wurde. Es basiert auf einem 99-jährigen Pachtvertrag mit China für das "John Keels Cinnamon Life"-Projekt. Geplant sind ein großes Hotel, Wohnungen, Einkaufsmöglichkeiten, Restaurants und ein Casino. Durch das Projekt kam es zu Vertreibungen von Einzelpersonen oder Gemeinschaften aus dem Stadtteil "Slave Island", die entweder durch behördliche Eingriffe erzwungen wurden oder Folge steigender Preise waren. Die Autorinnen zeichnen die Politik der Urbanisierung Colombos unter dem Prinzip der "Rückgewinnung" nach. Dabei bezeichnet "Rückgewinnung" sowohl die physische Aufschüttung und Trockenlegung von Land (physical reclaimed land) als auch die Rückforderung von Land aus den Vertreibungen (land reclaimed from the Slave Island evictions) und die weiter bestehende Möglichkeit, außergewöhnliche Herrschaftsgewalt für das "öffentliche Wohl" auszuüben. Solche Investitionen und Partnerschaften deuten auf fortbestehende koloniale Machtverhältnisse ebenso hin wie auf den Versuch der sri-lankischen Regierung, eine Position als geostrategischer Partner in den internationalen Beziehungen erneut einzufordern. Nur eine von den makroökonomischen Ebene bis hin zur Mikroebene der Individuen reichende Sichtweise kann eine postkoloniale Kritik an der Globalisierung und der zeitgenössischen Geopolitik üben und alternative Modelle zu Fortschritt und südasiatischer Moderne bieten. This paper considers the geopolitical and geoeconomic power relations around several recent high rise, commercial, and tourism-based projects in what can be described as a future site of a "downtown" Colombo. These urbanisation projects also provide examples to critique and imagine the historically developed postcolonial relations of globalisation. The paper specifically discusses the Colombo Port City project - a reclaimed land project that is backed by the Chinese government and Sri Lanka's Ministry for Megapolis and Western Development, and includes a 99-year lease for the 575 acres added to the island for China - and John Keel's Cinnamon Life project - a project supported by both local investors and American hedge funds, that contributes not only another large hotel, but also apartments, shopping, restaurants, and a casino. Similar to other hotel developments, such as Shrangi-La, the evictions of Slave Island for the Cinnamon Life developments indicate a trend whereby individuals and/or communities are forced out either by government interference or rising prices. The authors suggest, first, that the politics of Colombo's urbanisation can be traced through the theme of "reclaiming", which includes not only the physical reclaimed land of the Colombo Port City project, but also the land reclaimed from the Slave Island evictions and the ongoing possibility to exercise eminent domain power for the "public good". In addition, this theme asks: do these different investments and partnerships indicate reclaimed or ongoing colonial power relations, or is Sri Lanka re-claiming their position as a geo-strategic partner within international relations? Second, and towards these questions, the authors argue that a dynamic and multi-scale lens - from the macro-economic and political international investments, to the micro-level of individuals - is necessary in order to engage a postcolonial critique of globalisation and contemporary geopolitics. Indeed, such a lens helps interrogate if these projects offer alternative models and relations to progress and South Asian modernity than what has come before in urban, postcolonial development narratives or not?

This research examined the effect of Jordan's humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Syrian refugees on its foreign policy and attempted to determine whether the strategy is financially sustainable. Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision-makers and leaders worldwide to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interest of vulnerable populations by completely respecting fundamental humanitarian principles. Jordan has allowed many Syrian refugees to cross over and settle in Jordan. This study used a qualitative systematic literature review and quantitative data from the UNHCR to determine the effect of the strategy on Jordan’s foreign policy and whether the strategy could be sustained. The findings showed that Jordan’s stature in terms of its foreign policy has grown, leading to bilateral agreements and participation in international negotiations. However, its humanitarian strategy may not be sustainable with the current level of funding. The funding from foreign countries and international organizations has been insufficient to support the growing number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The literature on this topic is limited, and comprehensive quantitative research is recommended to determine the future effect of the strategy on health care and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

This article aimes to shed light on the rich, but rather enigmatic relationship between Finland and the Mediterranean world. These interactions have been approached since Antiquity, but this paper’s focus has been on 19th and 20th centuries and especially on the last three decades. About thirty years ago, when Finland was preparing itself to join the European Union, it also had to build up a real Mediterranean policy of its own. It was in the Corfu European Council in June 1994 when the then-president realised that the country needed such a policy. Thus, in 1995, when Finland joined the EU, it also participated in the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference and signed the Barcelona Declaration that established the Barcelona Process forming the structures for European Union cooperation with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The participation into this structural process was felt important for Finland mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the country wanted to be a full and active member of the EU and thus contribute to every fi eld of activity that are important for the union. Secondly, we Finns realised that if we wanted the southern European countries to understand and to cooperate with our own ambitions in the northern part of Europe, we needed to show solidarity towards the aims and needs of our southern partners in the Mediterranean. All this resulted in Finland being surprisingly active in all Euro-Mediterranean cooperation environments. This concerned not only offi cial state activities, but also other public sectors as well as civil society actors and NGOs. These EuroMediterranean activities became so many and so multiform that we can deal only with a few of them here as examples.

The role of the EU in sustainable development has been generally seen as influential so far. The EU has proven its commitment to promoting sustainability abroad, and the EU has embarked on a transition to a low-carbon society at home. The Middle East lags behind all regions regarding sustainability due to ravaging economic, security, and social challenges, particularly in Iraq and Syria. As the economic nature of the petro-states, the petroleum price influences the GDP and economic growth not only for Iraq and Syria but the majority of resource-based economies. This creates fragile economies that are less resistant to international financial crises. Moreover, petro-states have few economic characteristics, including; high capital intensity, centralization and control of revenues, and low demand for labor. At the same time, oil has special effects on domestic conditions like authoritarianism and the temptation for civil war. This study focuses on the role of the EU in sustainability policy towards Iraq and Syria. This study highlights how the European Green Deal (EGD) influences the path to sustainability in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq and Syria. In line with this, the analytical framework discusses the logic of social actions (consequentialism and appropriateness), which are at play in EU-Middle East relations. Thus, it contributes to the role of the EU as a leading actor in global sustainability governance, focusing on a region that has been largely neglected.

Southeast Asia is one of the places where fierce rivalry is taking place between the two leading powers in the world today - the US and China. The US-China rivalry in this region takes place in key fields, from politics - diplomacy, economy, security - defense to "soft power", the most prominent of which is the South China Sea issue. This article analyzes the strategic importance of the South China Sea in the policy of the US and China, the competition between the US and China in Southeast Asia in general, and the South China Sea in particular. To achieve this goal, the authors use research methods in international relations to analyze the main issues of the study. In addition to reviewing previous scholarly research and reviews, the authors use a comparative approach to assess the interactions between theory and data. The authors believe the data is important for accurately assessing the strategic competition between the US and China in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The rise of China in the early years of the XXI century strongly influenced the adjustment of the US policy in Southeast Asia and the powerful US-China rivalry in this region and the South China Sea. This rivalry is becoming increasingly complicated, and geopolitical conflicts between major powers are possible in the following years.

The goal of this article is to explore the role of mobilization in the foreign policies of populists in power. To do so, we focus on the main features and changes of Bolivia’s foreign Policy under its populist president Evo Morales (2006-2019) with regard to its two most prominent conflictive bilateral relations, with the US and Chile. In both domains, Morales departed from the foreign policy of previous governments. By ending cooperation with the US, the Morales government sought to establish a sovereign counternarcotics policy in line with its core constituency’s demands of legalizing coca crops. On the key issue of relations with Chile seeking to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the Morales government exhibited more continuity initially. However, by referring the stalemated conflict to the International Court of Justice, Morales eventually changed his country’s approach to finding a resolution. Tracing Morales’ discourse over time reveals an intensification of populist as well as hostile rhetoric in periods of domestic political instability. Thus, our findings support the theoretical expectation of a particularly close link between domestic politics and foreign policy under populists in power. Thereby, populism may lead to a more conflictive foreign policy in some cases. However, neither does populist mobilization over foreign policy matters necessarily drive foreign policy change, nor does it preclude genuine bilateral dialogue.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, Türkiye’s role in NATO has once again become a topic of intellectual discussion, with many observers arguing that a revival of Russian power would lead to Türkiye’s return to the alliance as a good-standing member, while others questioned the likelihood of such a scenario due to the country’s political transformation. This is not the first time Türkiye’s role within the alliance has become a subject of debate. Türkiye is often described as a valuable and dedicated partner of NATO. Yet, since the beginning of its membership, the country’s role in the alliance has been questioned more than that of any other member state. This article seeks to analyse NATO’s relations with Türkiye and the country’s role within the alliance from a historical perspective. It aims to understand the debates on Türkiye’s role within NATO by focusing on the moments of transformation in relations. The main assumption of this article is that, from the beginning of Türkiye’s membership process, TurkishAmerican relations have been the main determinant of Türkiye-NATO relations. Türkiye’s role, defence, and identity have always been questioned by European members. But these debates on Türkiye had, until as recently as the 2010s, been directed and/or suppressed by the US in accordance with its own interests. The US had been the main supporter of Türkiye in the alliance against the opposition and criticism of Europeans in exchange for Türkiye’s commitment to US policies. While differences on interests and values between the US and Türkiye became more visible after 2010, Türkiye failed to secure the support of the alliance’s European members to fill the gap left by the waning US support. Indeed, the differences between them grew from security-based issues, to wider, more major identity issues.

This article refers to the economic diplomacy of Türkiye and illustrates some changes during the history of the country’s political and economic diplomacy. The background of the economic diplomacy process has been clarified and detailed information has been included. Bipolar and unipolar periods are analysed within the framework of economic and political diplomacies in their natural state. The development process of the Turkish economic diplomacy strategy is identifi ed during particular periods in Turkish history. The structural transformation of Türkiye as regards its inward-oriented to outward-oriented economic policies has been evaluated. The mechanisms of Türkiye’s multi-directional foreign policy, bilateral trade, and diplomatic relations between Türkiye, the EU and other countries are examined. The role of dependence and interdependence in economics are given in the context of economic globalisation. For this research, the historical methodology has been used. It is suggested that collaborative problem solving with all the institutions involved in economic and political decisions could lead to better outcomes for the country in the international arena.

Türkiye’s EU membership negotiation process has been comatose since its early years. Now, in 2022, the seventeenth year of negotiations, the final destination of Türkiye’s EU journey is still far from certain. And recent debates on Türkiye–EU relations focus on whether Türkiye should be an EU member rather than why or when. There has been increasing criticism directed at each other and waning interest in Türkiye’s EU integration while the EU and Türkiye have faced major crises in the last two decades. This article aims to analyse key factors and issues influencing Türkiye’s EU accession process on the road to the current stalemate since the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005: (a) the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue (the role of EU Member States and conditionality), (b) deEuropeanisation in Türkiye (the role of conditionality), (c) the return of geopolitics (the role of security considerations and contextual changes), and (d) the July 15th failed coup attempt (the role of conditionality and contextual changes). It finally explores the EU’s commitment to enlargement and debates on its alternatives (the role of Member States, and EU institutions and narratives).

Der Lebensmittel- und Agrarhandel hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem geopolitischen Schlachtfeld entwickelt. In der Tat wirft die stärkere chinesisch-russische Zusammenarbeit in diesen Bereichen angesichts der zunehmenden Spannungen mit dem Westen die Frage auf, ob dieser Sektor zu einem neuen Brennpunkt ihrer strategischen Partnerschaft wird. Der gestiegene Handel und der erweiterte Marktzugang täuschen über die Tatsache hinweg, dass die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Mächten in diesem Bereich durch eine Reihe von Zollbarrieren und nicht auf Zolltarifen beruhender Handelshindernisse getrübt sind und die Marktprofile wohl eher nicht zueinander passen, als dass sie sich ergänzten. Darüber hinaus wiederholt der Sektor viele der asymmetrischen Entwicklungen, die für die breiteren Wirtschaftsbeziehungen kennzeichnend sind. In dem Maße jedoch, in dem die Regierungen diesen Sektor zunehmend als strategisch wichtig betrachten, stellt der chinesisch-russische Handel in diesem Bereich wohl einen nützlichen Indikator dar, an dem sich die Möglichkeiten und die Grenzen einer breiteren bilateralen Annäherung ablesen lassen.

Der Agrarhandel zwischen Russland und den USA hat einen beträchtlichen Wandel erfahren. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den bilateralen Handel mit landwirtschaftlichen Lebensmitteln, insbesondere für die Zeit nach 2000. Die Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass US-amerikanische Exporte für die russische Nahrungsmittelsicherheit jetzt weniger bedeutsam sind als jemals zuvor seit 1992. Russlands Invasion in die Ukraine im Februar 2022 macht eine Erholung des bilateralen Handels mit landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen in der nahen Zukunft unwahrscheinlich.

This article discusses the International Monetary Fund’s recent effort to garner legitimacy by incorporating the reduction of economic inequality in its lending programs. It argues that the impact of the US as a major shareholder on conditionality and geopolitical considerations beyond objective and measurable economic necessities detract from these efforts to expand legitimacy. Using a panel data analysis of International Monetary Fund programs between 1980 and 2013, the article shows that US-allied left-wing governments receive a larger number of labor conditions in their programs compared to non-allied and right-wing governments. The article argues that this is part of left-wing governments’ strategy of maintaining their alliance with the US and demonstrating ideological proximity. In exchange, the US uses its influence to secure fewer conditions in total for its allied governments. This not only shifts the burden of adjustment on labor groups but also harms the Fund’s procedural legitimacy, as conditions are not objectively determined. It also has adverse implications for outcome legitimacy by distorting economic policies and outcomes and increasing income inequality.

Political psychology has a pivotal role in the discipline of international relations, particularly in handling the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict severely affects all global aspects, from the economic to security, including Indonesia’s G20 Presidency. This study aims to analyze how political psychology contributes to reducing or becoming the key to the performance of the Indonesian G20 Presidency in conjunction with the Russia–Ukraine conflict and diplomatic bluff by some countries. With descriptive qualitative research methods, and data collection techniques with literature studies from books, journals, and webpage news, data were analyzed, and conclusions were drawn. The Russia–Ukraine conflict not only threatens international peace and security order but also challenges Indonesia’s G20 presidency as Russian Vladimir Putin gets invited to attend the summit. This article used the Tree Model, offering three mechanisms by prioritizing psychopolitics and psychoanalysis, which can be a reference for conflict resolution. This tree model is expected to be applied in response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, bridge differences between all G20 members, and help Indonesia be well-prepared and successful for the summit.KEYWORDSDiplomatic Bluff; G20 Presidency; Political Psychology; Russia–Ukraine Conflict

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments, and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign, and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on these issues and identifies future avenues of inquiry. In this editorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: (a) challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance, (b) the impact of territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, and (c) the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance.

Der Artikel analysiert die geopolitische und strategische Dynamik der Kooperation zwischen der Volksrepublik Mosambik und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR) im Bereich Erziehung und Ausbildung im Kontext des Staats- und Freundschaftsvertrags vom Februar 1979. Wichtiger Teil dieses Abkommens war die Gründung der Schule der Freundschaft in Staßfurt bei Magdeburg. Der Beitrag diskutiert, inwieweit die heutige Staatspartei FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) und der damalige Präsident Samora Machel ihre Vision verwirklichen konnten, durch die Schaffung des "Neuen Menschen" eine marxistisch-leninistisch geprägte sozialistische Gesellschaft und einen Einparteienstaat unter FRELIMO zu etablieren. Teil dieses Projekts war es, das politische und ideologische Modell der DDR zu übernehmen und gleichzeitig die enormen Staatschulden bei der DDR zu bezahlen. Ein starkes Interesse der deutschen Seite war neben dem Bestreben nach internationaler Anerkennung die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, welche die Lieferung von Rohstoffen und von Arbeitskräften beinhaltete. Mit den politisch-ideologischen Veränderungen in Mosambik aufgrund zahlreicher interner und externer Einflussfaktoren sowie mit Machels Tod 1986 verlor das Projekt seine Bedeutung. So gab es keinen Plan für die Integration der zurückgekehrten Absolvent*innen aus der DDR. Die meisten wurden direkt zum Militär eingezogen und endeten später frustriert in der Arbeitslosigkeit. Letztendlich ist Machels Projekt gescheitert. This article analyses the geo-political and strategic dynamics of co-operation in the field of education between the People's Republic of Mozambique and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It focuses specifically on the Friendship and Co-operation Agreement of February 1979, which led to the creation of the Friendship School in Staßfurt. In this context, the paper discusses to what extent President Samora Machel’s vision of creating a Marxist-Leninist socialist society and establishing a one-party-state under FRELIMO's (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) rule included the formation of elite 'New Men' through international education in the GDR. Part of Machel’s socialist project included adopting the political ideological model of the GDR and paying Mozambique's enormous debt to the GDR. In the context of the Cold War, the GDR was highly interested in economic co-operation with Mozambique, which included the supply of raw materials and manpower, and enjoyed the international appreciation. Yet, as a result of internal and external factors, which led to political-ideological transformation in Mozambique, and Machel’s death, the socialist project lost its significance. As there was no plan for the reintegration of the Mozambique graduates from the GDR, most of them were drafted directly into the army and later ended up frustrated and unemployment. Machel’s vision finally collapsed.

Debatten um Kolonialität haben sich in der Vergangenheit zumeist ausschließlich auf die Kontinuitäten westlicher Kolonialismen und Imperialismen konzentriert. Dies trifft, wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Weise, sowohl auf postkoloniale als auch auf dekoloniale Diskurse zu. Ausgehend von einer Kritik der Vernachlässigung nicht-westlicher Kolonialismen sind in den letzten Jahren jedoch vermehrt Ansätze entwickelt worden, die post- und dekoloniale mit postsozialistischen Perspektiven verbinden. Das Anliegen dieses Artikels ist es, diese Debatten für den Kontext der (ehemaligen) DDR fruchtbar zu machen und mit Hilfe der daraus gewonnen Einsichten eine kritische Untersuchung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der Republik Ghana unter Kwame Nkrumah vorzunehmen. Unsere konkreten empirischen Bezugspunkte sind das in den 1960er Jahren verfolgte Forschungsprojekt an der Universität Halle-Wittenberg zum Schwarzen Aufklärungsphilosophen Anton Wilhelm Amo sowie die im gleichen Kontext geschaffene und noch heute im öffentlichen Raum der Stadt Halle a.d. Saale befindliche Plastik „Freies Afrika“. Die Analyse dieser Phänomene offenbart die Ambivalenz sozialistischer kolonialer Logiken, die den Annäherungen zwischen der DDR und Ghana eingeschrieben waren. In the past, debates around coloniality have almost exclusively focused on the continuities of Western colonialisms and imperialisms. This is true, even if to differing extents, within postcolonial and decolonial discourses. Following critique of the neglect of non-Western colonialisms, over the last few years a growing number of approaches have strived to combine post- and decolonial with post-socialist perspectives. The aim of this article is to adapt the insights from these debates to the context of the (former) German Democratic Republic (GDR) and to critically examine the diplomatic ties between the GDR and the Republic of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah. Our empirical points of reference are a research project about the Black Enlightenment philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo, which was pursued during the 1960s at the University of Halle-Wittenberg, and the public sculpture 'Free Africa', which was created in the same context. The analysis of these phenomena unveils the ambivalence of the socialist colonial logics that were inscribed into the relations between the GDR and Ghana.

How can we appreciate non-Western agency in theorising world politics without reintroducing parochialism and exceptionalism, thus reproducing the very problem that motivated global international relations (IR) in the first place? In this article, I explore an alternative approach to engaging with non-Western IR theories, which I refer to as the embedded observer approach. First, taking the scholarship on Chinese IR as an example, I argue that the present predicament of global IR is in part attributable to the way scholars engage with non-Western political thought. Drawing from discussions in critical IR and Comparative Political Theory, I propose a methodological adjustment for the study of non-Western theories. Specifically, I argue that by shifting focus from isolated scholars and texts to critical dialogues among autochthonous intellectuals, the researcher has the chance to learn about and appreciate the clashes of ideas, analytical perspectives, and methodological tools that together constitute the living intellectual tradition in a non-Western society. As a demonstration, I analyse the People’s Republic of China (PRC) scholars’ critical reaction to Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia System through the lens of three key topics in the debate over the thesis. The discussion highlights the need to rethink interlocutors in global IR and the utility of an embedded observer approach for engaging with knowledge traditions beyond the West, both in IR and beyond. 神奇理论在哪里？反思全球国际关系学中的对话者

The Balkans is considered a vital area in international relations. It has always attracted and is still attracting the interest of global and regional powers and factors on the international stage, including Turkey. Besides the political, economic, and defense aspects, the soft power of Turkish multidimensional diplomacy represents one of the most important segments of the relations between Turkey and the Balkan countries. Turkish government institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs), Yunus Emre, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), TIKA, Turkish State Media, Maarif education institutions, and various non-governmental organizations represent some of the most vital segments of the cultural, religious and educational expansion of the Turkish state in the Balkan countries. This paper is mainly based on the following research methods: historical, descriptive, and in-depth analysis. This study aims to answer the main question of this research: Do the above-mentioned soft power policy tools play a vital role in the further development of Turkey-Balkan countries relations? This paper concludes that the Turkish soft power policy in the Balkans faces a series of challenges that affect its expansion's functionality and success.

The article examines China's geo-economic interest in Africa. China intends to exercise its leverage over both coastal frontiers for trade and defense and its hinterland for rich mineral, metal, and fossil deposits. Furthermore, the debt trap seems to be one of the methods through which China intended to bargain with Africa to bag as much advantage as it could gain. The question that emerges from this critical engagement with China-Africa relations is to look into how the reality of Africa's narrative of development is projected both from outside and within and the contradiction embodied in that projection. China used the narrative of development to set its feet on African soil. This paper discusses China’s penetration into Africa by offering interest-free loans and its gradual emergence as a neocolonial power through expanding its network. The method used in the study to establish China’s monopoly and interfering streak in African affairs through BRI is the analysis of available data based on which the objectives and the conclusions are drawn.

The paper analyzed the challenges of poverty in Montenegro. It provided an overview of the structure and scope of UN action in Montenegro and general sustainable development policies and their national implementation. The objective was to research the contributions of the UN system to the sustainable development of Montenegro while focusing on the role of the UNDP in eradicating poverty. The methodology consisted of the literature overview and the case scenario analysis of integrated social protection and employment policies. In addition, secondary data analysis has been employed to complement the research findings. The paper has identified the national socio-economic situation and the contributions of the UNDP in eradicating poverty through the design and implementation of integrative policies. The research proved the importance of the UNDP in fighting poverty in Montenegro and the effective role of the UN in achieving sustainable development.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine's foreign policy evolved in the geopolitical sphere of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, the new Ukrainian interests were built on a sense of national identity. They looked to Russia and Europe to find a sense of national identity. However, Ukraine's Eurasian and Central-European ancestry caused a distinct rift in society about national identity, which influenced the formulation of foreign policy. Those trying to co-exist with Russia find it difficult to develop a Ukrainian identity completely different from Russia, justifying the togetherness through the Pereyaslav agreement. On the contrary, the nationalist-minded Ukrainians, those who want to cultivate an identity distinct from the Russians and, more specifically, look for a Central-European identity, try to influence the course of the foreign policy formation of Ukraine by citing their historicity of Europeanness with the medieval princedom of Kiev and viewing the Pereyaslav memory as disastrous for Ukraine’s independent existence. Thus, national identity is one of the main causes of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. This study aims to uncover significant events in Ukrainian foreign policy toward Russia that led to modern-day conflict.

Amidst multiple foreign policy flip-flops of the Turkish government, the Middle East is where observers agree most about the explanatory priority of ideational factors over realpolitik calculations. The assertive foreign policy activism to extend the country's role in the region has largely been linked to the Islamist leanings of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). This study revisits Turkey's Middle East policy with a particular focus on the AKP's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimin), which marked Turkish foreign policy formulation and implementation in multiple theatres from Yemen to Egypt to Libya. Using a neoclassical realist approach, it argues that the AKP's ideological ties to the Ikhwan are significant for the availability of new resources but Turkish foreign policy behavior in the Middle East, including relations with the Ikhwan, reflects a grand strategy to respond to systemic and sub-systemic stimuli.

This article focuses on the links between transatlantic relations—a structured array of markets, hierarchies, networks, ideas, and institutions—and broader elements of international structure and world order. It argues that the changing state of transatlantic relations reflects changes in the structure of the relations themselves, but also structural change in the global and domestic arenas and how such change shapes or reflects the actions of a wide variety of agents. The first part of the article briefly explores the importance of international structure in order to identify the global forces that shape the context for transatlantic relations. The article then examines the key mechanisms in transatlantic relations which interact to create forms of transatlantic order; these create spaces for a wide variety of agents, operating within broader elements of international and domestic structure, and the article illustrates this through the ways in which the EU’s “new agenda for EU–US relations” sought to shape transatlantic interactions during the first year of the Biden presidency. The article examines the implications of transatlantic responses to the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, and concludes that despite the move to enhanced EU–US cooperation in the short term, the interaction of structures, mechanisms, and actors will contribute to continuing differentiation of transatlantic relations, at least in the medium term, whatever the preferences of US and EU policy-makers.

This article summarizes the thematic issue findings, focusing on the factors that contribute to stabilize or weaken EU–US relations. Seen together, the articles have systematically documented that there is a growing pressure on transatlantic relations both in multilateral institutional settings as well as in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, transatlantic relations within NATO are strengthening in the context of Russia’s new war in Ukraine, pushing Europe closer to the US and papering over disputes among European nations about the course of intra-European security cooperation. Shared norms and institutions as well as non-state actors with an interest in keeping the relationship strong for economic, strategic, or more normative reasons also serve to stabilize the relationship. On the other hand, longer-term geopolitical and economical structural changes together with domestic factors, particularly in the US, and in some cases diverging interests, suggest a parallel longer-term weakening of the relationship.

The presidency of Donald Trump represented an unprecedented low point in transatlantic relations. When Joe Biden took power in early 2021, his administration launched several policy initiatives suggesting that the new administration would continue to allow the seemingly long-term weakening of the transatlantic relationship to continue. A significant part of the literature on recent developments in transatlantic relations points in the same direction, namely that a weakening of the cooperation across the Atlantic has taken place. This article proposes an alternative view, arguing that the relationship has strengthened in recent years despite Donald Trump and his erratic policy. The article applies a theoretical framework combining international as well as domestic variables. Based on an analysis of four cases—NATO, the US pivot to Asia, the sanctions policy towards Russia, and the Afghanistan debacle—it is concluded that the transatlantic relationship is strong.

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU’s role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Europe and the US quickly joined in a strong and coordinated response. But how significant is the Ukraine crisis response for longer-term trends in transatlantic relations? This thematic issue addresses this question by focusing on the factors that affect the strength of the transatlantic relationship. Only by exploring the impact of various structural, strategic, economic, institutional, and domestic factors can we better understand the current and future state of EU–US relations—both in normal times and in times of crisis. Two questions are explored across cases: First, is the EU–US relationship changing in various fields? Second, how can the putative changes (or stability) in EU–US relations be explained? For this purpose, the articles also operationalize and apply a common explanatory framework. This Introduction sets out and justifies the overall research questions, develops the analytical framework, and briefly explains the empirical focus of the articles that follow.

Diese Dissertation analysiert den Zusammenhang von neokonservativer Logik und der Idee des „American Decline“ in der außenpolitischen Debatte der USA von den 1960er-Jahren bis 2021 mit einem Fokus auf der Obama-Präsidentschaft (2009-17). Unter Anwendung der Imperiumstheorie untersucht sie Texte führender neokonservativer Plattformen und Denker_innen, die sich mit dem Wesen, den Aufgaben, den Kosten, dem Nutzen und der Zukunft amerikanischer Weltmacht befassen. Die Studie enthüllt die Niedergangsidee als einen integralen Bestandteil der neokonservativen Logik, der US-Superiorität legitimiert und stabilisiert. Sie vermittelt den Amerikaner_innen einen höheren Zweck und Orientierung, unterdrückt aber alternative Pfade für die Vereinigten Staaten durch die Gleichsetzung von US-Superiorität mit Weltordnung., This dissertation examines the relationship between neoconservative logic and the idea of „American Decline” in the U.S. foreign policy debate from the 1960s until 2021 with a focus on the Obama presidency (2009-17). Building on imperial theory, the project analyses texts from leading neoconservative platforms and thinkers, dealing with the nature, tasks, costs, benefits and future of American world power. The study reveals the idea of decline as integral to neoconservative logic, as an element that legitimizes and stabilizes U.S. superiority. It provides Americans with a sense of mission and orientation and suppresses alternative paths for the United States due to its equation of U.S. superiority with world order.

Recent studies of the liberal international order have tended to use a crisis-laden vocabulary to analyse US withdrawal from multilateral institutions and Chinese initiatives to create new institutions. In these analyses, the consequences of such a crisis for developing countries are largely overlooked because of the greater emphasis that is placed on the role of great powers in the international system. We argue that more attention should be paid to the position of developing countries in the liberal international order and that the effects of the presumed crisis for those countries should be studied. The articles in this thematic issue focus on a variety of topics related to the places occupied by developing countries in the international order.

Die widersprüchliche Haltung der belarusischen Regierung zur russischen Invasion in der Ukraine wird heute viel zu oft übersehen. Durch den Durchmarsch russischer Truppen hat Minsk definitiv seinen neutralen Status verloren, allerdings ist seine Interaktion mit dem Kreml in diesem Krieg unfreiwillig und begrenzt. Weder belarusische Streitkräfte noch belarusisches Territorium sind aktiv in die Moskauer Kriegsführung verwickelt. Mittlerweile ist die praktische Politik von Minsk trotz der demonstrativen Wiederholung mehrerer Kreml-Narrative in den staatlichen Medien und durch Staatsbeamte in Belarus weiterhin eher auf eine Vermeidung jeglicher direkten Beteiligung an der Invasion ausgerichtet. Dieser Kurs kann sich sowohl auf Lukaschenkas gegenwärtige politische Manöver stützen wie auch auf die langjährige Politik einer gewissen Demilitarisierung gegenüber der Ukraine. Nach dem August 2020 ist die belarusische Regierung sehr viel abhängiger von Russland geworden. Die präzedenzlose russische Militärpräsenz im Lande beeinflusste Moskaus offensive Pläne gegenüber der Ukraine. Minsk verfügt aber nach wie vor über eine gewisse strategische Autonomie, die ausgebaut werden kann - im Interesse einer friedlichen Zukunft für die Völker in der Region zwischen Ostsee und Schwarzem Meer.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic remains a global security threat, as the result of the emerging and exacerbated security challenges that have impacted on the national security policies of various regional economic communities (RECs). This study analyses SADC and ECOWAS’ responses to the Covid-19 pandemic under their respective existing peace and security structures and explores if both RECs, SADC and ECOWAS have been efficient. This article discusses the Southern African and West African security setting, how its security architecture emerged and whether it has been successful in overcoming the security ramification in the region under the Covid-19 pandemic. Coincidentally, both SADC and ECOWAS have been confronted with existing and emerging human security threats, such as increased poverty, inequality, and the spread of diseases, such as Covid-19. The Covid-19 pandemic, a non-traditional security threat, has exposed how RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, respond to non-traditional and emerging security threats, suggesting for the transcendence of their security architecture that caters equally for non-military and emerging human security threats, alike military threats. This article explores the regional security experiences, challenges, and responses of both the SADC and ECOWAS under the Covid-19 pandemic.

Trade policy is generally considered to be a key leverage in the pursuit of labor norms, environmental standards, and human rights. This is even more so for the European Union (EU), which exerts an extensive market power and exclusive competences in trade while lacking a full-fledged foreign policy. In recent years, there has been a growing demand for making sustainable development provisions “enforceable” and for more frequently applying trade sanctions. Taking a post-development perspective, we interrogate the EU’s enforceability discourse around the trade–sustainability nexus. We focus specifically on the conditionality behind the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). The EU GSP regime bears the “carrot” (reduced tariffs), the “stick” (preferential tariff withdrawals), and increasingly intrusive “monitoring” mechanisms. Drawing on the post-development literature, we problematize the discourses that fundamentally enframe the EU GSP conditionality regime: development through trade, performance of power, and epistemic violence. Empirically, we analyze these frames by looking at public-facing texts produced by policy elites in the EU as well as in Cambodia and the Philippines during the two most recent GSP reform cycles since 2014. We argue that the dominant discursive acts of policy elites in the EU and the two target countries congeal into a global presupposition that there is no alternative to the EU GSP regime, thereby effacing counterhegemonic perspectives and stripping emancipatory notions such as “dialogue” and “partnership” of their radical potential. This formulation demands a genuine commitment to researching with the very people the EU is intent on regulating, reforming, and rescuing to unsettle taken-for-granted views about EU trade sanctions.

In the wake of unsettling conflicts and democratic backsliding, states and organisations increasingly respond with sanctions. The European Union (EU) is one of them: Brussels makes use of the entire toolbox in its foreign policy, and its sanctions appear in different forms—diplomatic measures, travel bans, financial bans, or various forms of economic restrictions. Yet, there is little debate between different strands in the literature on EU sanctions, in particular concerning measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and those pertaining to the development and trade policy fields. Our thematic issue addresses this research gap by assembling a collection of articles investigating the design, impact, and implementation of EU sanctions used in different realms of its external affairs. Expanding the definition of EU sanctions to measures produced under different guises in the development, trade, and foreign policy fields, the collection overcomes the compartmentalised approach characterising EU scholarship.

Faced with growing Chinese engagement in the Pacific, the two traditional regional powers in that world region, Australia and New Zealand (NZ), unveiled major policy initiatives in the late 2010s. Both Australia's 'Pacific Step-up' and NZ's 'Pacific Reset' featured substantial increases in terms of development cooperation, diplomatic posts, and high-level exchanges and thus credibly signalled the two allies' desire to remain partners of first choice for Pacific Island Countries. Alignment does however not mean that Australia and NZ's Pacific policies are alike. A paired comparison highlights significant differences with respect to security and migration. I argue that the strong focus in Australia's Pacific policy on hard security reflects not only the country's more pronounced military profile and its alliance with the United States but also the country's greater sense of vulnerability which derives in part from its geographic and historical linkages with Melanesia. This contrasts with NZ's more unburdened traditional focus on Polynesia. I then trace the very different Pacific population profiles of the two Australasian states back to NZ's much greater openness to permanent migration from the region - reflecting both constitutional obligations and the development of distinct migration pathways for Pacific people. These differences are of a structural nature and are bound to shape Australia and NZ's policy approaches to the Pacific in the longer term.

Currently, more than 20 million Russians permanently reside outside Russia. As migration trends show, their number will be increasing in the future. The Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States is an essential part of the Russian community abroad. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia used to be a single state with Russia for a long time. It could not but affect the formation of these countries as subjects of international politics. Since May 2004, the Baltic States have been members of the European Union. Together with Finland, they constitute the EU’s border space with Russia. To a large extent, it determines their geopolitical role in Europe. The article examines the Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States. It substantiates the factors facilitating its stability and the preservation of the Russian cultural space, analyses the socio-economic and legal status of different groups of Russian-speaking residents, and identifies the peculiarities of various groups of the Russian-speaking population as well as prospects for the development of the diaspora.

After the end of the Cold War, the new conjuncture that appeared in the region of the Black Sea turned into an important place on the international scene. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkish diplomacy played a significant role in this region and international relations based on its new ‘active neutrality’ strategy. Turkiye's extensive efforts at a ceasefire through implementing the mediatory role between Russia and Ukraine were its more significant diplomatic endeavors throughout the war. Simultaneously, one of the more critical segments that marked the Ukrainian resistance against invasion is the success of the Turkish armed drone Bayraktar TB2. Turkiye plays a vital role in the so-called 'grain corridor' function with the aim of activization of Ukrainian export of grain and mitigating the world's grain crises.

The XXI is considered by major countries in the Asia-Pacific region as ‘the century of sea and ocean' and is accompanied by fierce competition among the nations to gain interest in the sea regions. On the basis that previously only considered the competition for military objectives, geostrategic bases and traffic channels through the straits, nowadays, countries worldwide have stepped up the competition for economic interests and marine resources. The development of military power and the competitive activities for resources at sea show clear the tendency to use the sea to contain the continent. In that context, the Indian Ocean, as the world's third largest ocean, has an important geographic location and rich and diverse natural resources; the arterial sea route is gradually becoming the center of new world geopolitics and an important area in the strategic competition between two 'Asian giants' - India and China. The competition between these countries in the Indian Ocean is growing and profoundly impacts the region's stability and security. This article focuses on the position and important role of the Indian Ocean in the policies of India and China, the fierce competition between the two countries in nearly two decades of the XXI century.

This article tracks how relations between two neighbouring states of the Baltic region, Po­land and Lithuania, developed over the last decades. These relations cannot be described in unambiguous terms. On the one hand, common aspirations for European integration created conditions for rapprochement and cooperation. On the other, the partnership has been complicated by disagreements and mutual claims. The main problem is the situa­tion of the correspondent ethnic minorities in the two countries: Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Poland. According to the Polish authorities, the interests of Lithuania’s Polish residents are not safeguarded, and their rights are infringed. Similar complaints are voiced by Vilnius regarding the situation of ethnic Lithuanians in Poland. These contradictions are partly smoothed by common political interests: cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance, defiance of the notorious ‘threat from the East’ and joint support for the pro-­Western opposition in the neighbouring Belarus.

The increased territorial conflicts in the center of the maritime South and East China Seas have ramifications for Asian regional stability. The area is resource-rich, strategically placed along waterways, and has indisputable oil and natural gas reserves. There had also been a perceived change in the international system built by the United States during World War II, with China attempting to replace it as the regional power. China's behavior toward the remaining claimants, as well as to some extent toward other foreign parties in the conflicts, is examined using ideas from International Relations and case studies from International Law. Employing a qualitative research design, the author attempted to analyze the territorial dispute in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. This paper explains how the islands are strategically located near commercial fishing grounds, major shipping channels, and undiscovered oil and gas potential and how the issue is linked to China's preservation of national sovereignty, while the remaining claimant states perceive it as an incursion by the approaching menace of China. Whoever gains control of the islands eventually gains control of a major portion of East China and South China Seas' economic resources.

The European Union (EU) states in its 2016 Global Strategy that it intends to be a “responsible global stakeholder” and to “act worldwide to address the core causes of war and poverty, as well as to promote the indivisibility and universality of human rights” (European Union Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 5–8, 18). However, the Global Strategy is silent on the credentials or prerequisites that give the EU the authority to act globally and address conflicts and violations of human rights, including through the use of sanctions against non-EU states. How far the EU has the authority to use sanctions, which are essentially coercive measures, is especially relevant when the EU resorts to unilateral sanctions based on obligations owed erga omnes, namely measures without explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation and based on obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Drawing on Habermas’s theory of communicative action, this article introduces an analytical framework—the “moral dimension” of EU authority—which maps the substantive and procedural standards to guide the assessment of whether the EU has the appropriate credentials to qualify as an authority with the right to intervene forcibly into the internal affairs of non-EU states. The analytical value of the framework is examined empirically in the case study of the EU’s restrictive measures (sanctions) imposed in response to state violence against anti-government protests in Uzbekistan in 2005.

Although sanctions targeting political regimes receive the most media attention, the EU can also sanction states for labour rights violations through its trade policy. Although in practice such sanctions are applied only in extreme cases, the possibility of suspending trade preferences increases the EU’s leverage. In modern trade agreements, the EU incorporates Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters for labour and environmental matters. However, trade sanctions for non-compliance with this chapter are absent. Instead, a dedicated dispute settlement arrangement exists, leading to recommendations by a panel of experts. In 2019 the EU launched proceedings against South Korea for failing to uphold commitments to ratify and implement International Labour Organisation core conventions regarding trade unions under the 2011 EU–Korea Trade Agreement. In 2021, the panel of experts sided with the EU’s interpretation of commitments under the TSD chapter. This initial case represents the EU’s intention to focus on the implementation of TSD chapters. Using data from official documents, this article process-traces the dispute with Korea. It argues that the outcome of the case, and Korea’s ratification of fundamental International Labour Organisation conventions in 2021, demonstrate the potential of the TSD chapter, when forcefully enforced, to partially redress the weak sanctioning capacity in TSD chapters. It also uncovers important caveats regarding state capacity and alignment with government objectives as conditioning the effectiveness of TSD chapters’ non-legally binding sanctioning mechanisms.

Am 1. März stellten die Bundesministerinnen Annalena Baerbock und Svenja Schulze bei einem gemeinsamen Auftritt die Leitlinien des Auswärtigen Amtes (AA) für eine feministische Außenpolitik (FAP) und die Strategie des Bundesministeriums für wirt­schaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) für eine feministische Entwicklungspolitik (FEP) vor. Trotz der Abstimmung zwischen den beiden Ressorts und ähn­licher Konsultationen mit der Zivilgesellschaft legten die Ministerinnen formal wie inhaltlich unterschiedliche Dokumente vor, die auch unterschiedlich stark auf femi­nis­tische Ansätze zurückgreifen. Aber gemeinsam haben sie eine Debatte in Deutschland über Ziele und Mittel internationaler Politik angestoßen. Damit aus dem an­gestrebten Kultur- bzw. systemischen Wandel mehr wird als Gleichstellung, bedarf es allerdings ressortübergreifender Anstrengungen. (Autorenreferat)

Seit in Iran im September 2022 landesweite Proteste ausgebrochen sind, steht die deutsche Iranpolitik auf dem Prüfstand. Doch noch immer ist keine konkrete Wei­chen­stellung für einen veränderten politischen Ansatz zu erkennen. Während Rücken­deckung für die Protestierenden sich bislang vornehmlich auf Symbolpolitik beschränkt, fehlt eine substanzielle Debatte darüber, wie deutsche Politik die iranische Bevölkerung unterstützen und zugleich die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen bewältigen kann, die von der Islamischen Republik ausgehen. Diese reichen vom Atomprogramm über die Regionalpolitik bis zur militärischen Kooperation mit Russ­land. Die veränderten Bedingungen im Land und die wachsende Gefähr­dung euro­pä­ischer Sicherheit durch das iranische Atom-, Raketen- und Drohnen­programm erfor­dern eine Umgestaltung der bisherigen Iranpolitik. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn die Bundesregierung ihrem Anspruch gerecht werden will, feministische Grundsätze in ihrer Außenpolitik zu verankern. (Autorenreferat)

Im Rahmen einer Begleitforschung zu der von Rotary Deutschland unmittelbar nach Beginn des russischen Angriffskrieges (24. Februar 2022) gestarteten Ukraine-Hilfe wurden zwei Online-Befragungen durchgeführt (Erhebungszeitraum: 7.9.-18.10.2022 und 21.10.-21.11.2022). Zum einen wurden Rotary und Rotaract Clubs zu ihren Aktivitäten und zum anderen jene Projekte und Initiativen befragt, die mit zentralen Spendenmitteln unterstützt wurden. Als Ergebnis konnten umfangreiche Angaben zu den Zielstellungen, zu Umfang, Ausrichtung, eingesetzten Mitteln und den eingegangenen Kooperationen der Rotary-Ukraine-Hilfe gewonnen werden. Darüber hinaus wurden in den Fragebögen Einschätzungen zum künftigen Umgang mit Soforthilfen in humanitären Notsituationen erbeten. Zusammenfassend zeigt sich, dass Rotary Deutschland sich außerordentlich umfassend und in vielfacher Hinsicht sehr aktiv sowohl in Deutschland, der Ukraine und, in etwas geringerem Umfang, in deren Nachbarländern mit zahlreichen Hilfsprojekten und -initiativen engagiert hat. In fast neun von zehn Clubs wurden Aktivitäten im Rahmen von "Rotary für Ukraine" realisiert, und in mehr als der Hälfte davon gab es mehr als ein Projekt oder eine Initiative. Die Hilfen umfassten ein breites Spektrum: Medikamente und medizinische Unterstützung sowie Gegenstände und Artikel für den privaten Bedarf stellten dabei Schwerpunkte dar. Als Zielgruppen kam Geflüchteten, Kindern und Jugendlichen, Kranken und Verletzten sowie Frauen ein besonders hoher Stellenwert zu. Werden neben den finanziellen Mitteln Engagement und Sachleistungen mit einbezogen, kann ein hochgerechneter Wert von rund 29 Millionen Euro veranschlagt werden, der von Rotary bis Ende November 2022 für die Ukraine-Hilfe eingesetzt wurde. Eine deutliche Mehrheit der Rotary Clubs spricht sich explizit für künftige Aktivitäten von Rotary in humanitären Notsituationen aus. Gleichzeitig aber äußert fast ein Drittel - aus unterschiedlichen Gründen - Bedenken hinsichtlich eines solchen generellen Einsatzes. Dies wird damit begründet, dass Rotary sich nicht als handlungsfähige Hilfsorganisation versteht. Gefährdet sieht man zudem die Erfüllung der langfristig festgelegten Zielsetzungen von Rotary, die Alleinstellungsmerkmale und die Identität. Organisatorisch setzt man bei künftigen Notsituationen auf die Initiativen der Rotary Clubs und vor allem auf deren eigenständige Projekte - verbunden mit einer starken Führungsfunktion der Clubs.

There are no security "guarantees," but NATO membership is as close as it gets - and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine - and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.

In this paper, we draw on the concepts of in-betweenness and migration interdependence in order to investigate the vulnerability of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine due to their conflicting relations with Russia and the exposure of their economies to remittance flows from the latter. To achieve this goal, we explore whether and how migrant flows and remittance flows have diverged since 2014, when the three states signed their Association Agreements with the EU and their economic relations with Russia deteriorated. In this respect, we examine how interstate relations impact upon migration and remittances flows. After discussing in-betweenness and migration interdependence, we investigate the origin of the remittance inflows in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and the destination of the migration outflows. We map the development of remittances from the World, Europe, and Russia and relate it with the development of their GDP using longitudinal data. A comparative analysis of our findings suggest that the three cases differ from each other, but, in all three cases, Russia has not used migration interdependence as leverage. We conclude that remittance flows in the three in-between states are more affected by the state of the global economy, the economic situation of Russia, and domestic circumstances rather than from interstate relations.

The Open Balkan is the latest regional initiative in the Western Balkans (WB), firstly named as Mini-Schengen and then changed to Open Balkan Initiative (OBI), which aims to increase the regional economic cooperation among the WBs by going beyond the mere objective of creating a Common Regional Market (CRM). This paper using an analytical approach, taking into account data and information, has identified and highlighted the openly declared objectives of the OBI while comparing it with the previous Berlin Process. Also, the paper has shown that the disputes among the WB countries most inherited from the unresolved issues of the past are still present and hinder the progress towards a common future and EU membership perspective. The reactions to the OBI proved that even the creation of mere economic cooperation is hardly achieved in the case of other existing unresolved issues of the past and continues to remain open. This paper has highlighted the existence of mistrust among the WBs, the importance of increasing regional cooperation, and the role that the EU should inevitably play. The paper has concluded that to achieve the targets defined in the OBI, the WBs should enhance regional cooperation and overcome the challenges they have been facing.

Die nach wie vor mangelnde Geschlechtergerechtigkeit ist eine drängende globale Herausforderung. Vor diesem Hintergrund kündigte die Bundesregierung 2021 in ihrem Koalitionsvertrag eine feminist foreign policy an. Diese soll die Rechte, Repräsentanz und Ressourcen von Frauen und marginalisierten Gruppen stärken und die Anerkennung von Diversität fördern. Allerdings gibt es auf eine feministische Ausrichtung der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik in der politischen Debatte divergierende und auch kritische Perspektiven. Wie steht es aber um die Einstellung der Bevölkerung? Um dieser Frage nachzugehen, wurde im Rahmen des DEval-Meinungsmonitor Entwicklungspolitik 2022 die öffentliche Meinung zu feministischer Entwicklungspolitik untersucht. Dieser Policy Brief fasst die Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Befragung zusammen.