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With the rise of wood prices in Western Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, forest owners could increase their revenues. The duke of Arenberg, who owned large forests in the Southern Netherlands, France and the Rhine area, managed to grasp this opportunity. By managing internal and external challenges, the dukes of Arenberg improved the production of their forests considerably over time. This article identifies four managerial changes that contributed to this change. First, the administrative structure and processes in the ducal organisation were upgraded. Second, remuneration policies were adapted to better align the interests of stewards and dukes. Third, the property rights over the forests became more exclusive and lastly, scientific insights percolated through the ducal administration proved beneficial for the forest management practices., L’augmentation du prix du bois aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles en Europe occidentale fournit aux propriétaires de forêts l’opportunité d’augmenter leurs revenus. Les ducs d’Arenberg, propriétaires de vaste forêts dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux, en France et dans la région rhénane, réussirent à saisir cette occasion. En relevant les défis internes et externes, et en profitant de diverses opportunités, ils parvinrent à augmenter considérablement la production de leurs forêts au fil du temps. Cet article identifie quatre changements de gestion qui contribuèrent à cette amélioration. Premièrement, l’amélioration de la structure et des procédures administratives de l’organisation ducale. Deuxièmement, l’adaptation des politiques de rémunération pour mieux aligner les intérêts des intendants sur ceux des ducs. Troisièmement, une évolution des droits de propriété sur les forêts, allant dans le sens d’une plus grande exclusivité. Enfin, l’intégration des connaissances scientifiques au sein de l’administration ducale, qui permit d’améliorer les pratiques de gestion forestière avec un succès croissant., Op het moment dat de houtprijzen in West-Europa begonnen te stijgen tijdens de 17de en 18de eeuw, zagen veel boseigenaars nieuwe kansen om hun inkomsten te verhogen. De hertog van Arenberg, die eigenaar was van diverse grote bossen in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, Frankrijk en het Rijnland, wist gebruik te maken van deze opportuniteit. Door het oplossen van interne en externe problemen en het grijpen van kansen van allerlei aard, slaagden de hertogen van Arenberg erin om hun productie tijdens deze periode fors op te krikken. In dit artikel worden er vier beheerveranderingen besproken die bijdroegen aan verbeterde bosbouwpraktijken. Ten eerste werden de administratieve structuren en processen verbeterd. Ten tweede werd het verloningsbeleid aangepast zodat de belangen van rentmeesters en de hertog dichter bij elkaar kwamen te liggen. Ten derde werden de eigendomsrechten over de bossen exclusiever en strikter en ten slotte drongen nieuwe wetenschappelijke inzichten met betrekking tot bosbouw door in het beheer., Berghmans Sander. The Management of the Forests of the Dukes of Arenberg from 1600 until 1820. In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 98, fasc. 4, 2020. Histoire – Geschiedenis. pp. 1049-1082.

In zijn preadvies voor de Vereniging van Agrarisch Recht (gepubliceerd in Agr.r.2008, p. 118 e.v.) levert dr. Slangen kritiek op het advies van de Commissie Pachtnormen van 2006. Dit advies heeft, zoals bekend, ten grondslag gelegen aan het nieuwe pachtprijzenstelsel. De kritiek van Slangen is vermeld in de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 van het preadvies `Pacht: stand van zaken en toekomst¿ en houdt ogenschijnlijk geen verband met de inhoud van de overige hoofdstukken. In deze bijdrage willen wij ingaan op deze kritiek.

Achtereenvolgens wordt ingegaan op: ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal in de loop van de tijd, eigenschappen van pachtcontracten, waarborgen voor investeringen in grond en gebouwen, effecten van de bundel van eigendomsrechten op het grondgebruik en eigendom, de pacht in het Pachtprijzenbesluit, effecten van de ontwikkelde methodiek voor het berekenen van de pachtprijzen, en verwachte ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal

Ingegaan wordt op de nieuwe functies die, naast de landbouw, van het landelijk gebied in Nederland en Vlaanderen worden verwacht, en wie belang hebben bij deze nieuwe functies. Ook wordt de noodzaak voor de vorming van nieuwe coalities voor de nieuwe functies besproken, waarbij veranderingen in de institutionele omgeving optreden. Tenslotte komt de rol van overheid en van financiële instellingen ter sprake

Het hoofddoel van China’s landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid is behoud van voedselzekerheid in eigen land en bijdragen aan de voedselzekerheid in de wereld door duurzaam gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en verbetering van de landbouwproductiecapaciteit voor de lange termijn. In veel gebieden in China gaat de landbouwproductiecapaciteit op lange termijn echter achteruit door intensieve landbouw en de daarmee gepaard gaande degradatie van de hulpbronnen land en water. Het systeem van grondeigendom speelt, als fundamentele institutie die het gedrag van grondbezitters aanstuurt, een zeer belangrijke rol bij de landbouwproductie alsook bij het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, en heeft veel belangstelling genoten van onderzoekers in China en andere regio’s in de wereld. Sinds 1998 heeft de Chinese regering een reeks marktgeoriënteerde hervormingen in het grondeigendom ingevoerd die als doel hebben de eigendomszekerheid te verbeteren en de overdraagbaarheid van rurale grond te bevorderen. Relevante wetten behelzen de Wet Grondbeheer (Land Administration Law) uit 1998, de Wet Contracten Rurale Grond (Rural Land Contract Law) uit 2002, de Eigendomswet (Property Law) uit 2007, en de Wet Mediation en Arbitrage bij Geschillen inzake Contracten Rurale Grond (Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law) uit 2009. Ofschoon deze hervormingen bijgedragen hebben aan een verbeterde formele eigendomszekerheid, is het niet duidelijk in welke mate ze bijdragen aan landbouwproductie en duurzaam gebruik van de grond. In deze studie worden systematisch de relaties onderzocht tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, zoals die wordt beïnvloed door de recente marktgeoriënteerde eigendomshervormingen, en de landbouwproductie in China. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur worden er vier relaties onderzocht, namelijk de relaties tussen eigendomszekerheid en, respectievelijk, grondinvesteringen, marktontwikkelingen betreffende grondpacht, ruraal-urbane migratie, en landbouwproductiviteit en technische efficiëntie. De resultaten van de studie beogen een volledig beeld te verschaffen van de belangrijkste relaties tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, beslissingen op het niveau van huishoudingen, en de landbouwproductiviteit in China. Naar verwachting zullen de verkregen inzichten relevant zijn voor de voortgaande hervormingen van het rurale grondeigendomsysteem en voor gerelateerd landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid in China. Ze zouden tevens van nut kunnen blijken voor andere ontwikkelingslanden met vergelijkbare eigendomsystemen die als doel hebben om huishoudens op het platteland te voorzien van gewaarborgde formele landgebruiksrechten voor de lange termijn.

Het hoofddoel van China’s landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid is behoud van voedselzekerheid in eigen land en bijdragen aan de voedselzekerheid in de wereld door duurzaam gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en verbetering van de landbouwproductiecapaciteit voor de lange termijn. In veel gebieden in China gaat de landbouwproductiecapaciteit op lange termijn echter achteruit door intensieve landbouw en de daarmee gepaard gaande degradatie van de hulpbronnen land en water. Het systeem van grondeigendom speelt, als fundamentele institutie die het gedrag van grondbezitters aanstuurt, een zeer belangrijke rol bij de landbouwproductie alsook bij het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, en heeft veel belangstelling genoten van onderzoekers in China en andere regio’s in de wereld. Sinds 1998 heeft de Chinese regering een reeks marktgeoriënteerde hervormingen in het grondeigendom ingevoerd die als doel hebben de eigendomszekerheid te verbeteren en de overdraagbaarheid van rurale grond te bevorderen. Relevante wetten behelzen de Wet Grondbeheer (Land Administration Law) uit 1998, de Wet Contracten Rurale Grond (Rural Land Contract Law) uit 2002, de Eigendomswet (Property Law) uit 2007, en de Wet Mediation en Arbitrage bij Geschillen inzake Contracten Rurale Grond (Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law) uit 2009. Ofschoon deze hervormingen bijgedragen hebben aan een verbeterde formele eigendomszekerheid, is het niet duidelijk in welke mate ze bijdragen aan landbouwproductie en duurzaam gebruik van de grond. In deze studie worden systematisch de relaties onderzocht tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, zoals die wordt beïnvloed door de recente marktgeoriënteerde eigendomshervormingen, en de landbouwproductie in China. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur worden er vier relaties onderzocht, namelijk de relaties tussen eigendomszekerheid en, respectievelijk, grondinvesteringen, marktontwikkelingen betreffende grondpacht, ruraal-urbane migratie, en landbouwproductiviteit en technische efficiëntie. De resultaten van de studie beogen een volledig beeld te verschaffen van de belangrijkste relaties tussen grondeigendomszekerheid, beslissingen op het niveau van huishoudingen, en de landbouwproductiviteit in China. Naar verwachting zullen de verkregen inzichten relevant zijn voor de voortgaande hervormingen van het rurale grondeigendomsysteem en voor gerelateerd landbouw- en plattelandsbeleid in China. Ze zouden tevens van nut kunnen blijken voor andere ontwikkelingslanden met vergelijkbare eigendomsystemen die als doel hebben om huishoudens op het platteland te voorzien van gewaarborgde formele landgebruiksrechten voor de lange termijn.

Liquid biofuel from oil crops are broadly promoted globally, among which biofuel from perennial wood species, as well as from bushes and small trees such as jatropha. In China, oil-bearing small trees, which mainly grow on slope land, are applied as so-called bioenergy and oil forests for liquid biofuel production. The national government in China has devised a series of laws and policies to promote bioenergy and oil forest programs. In this study, the focus is on jatropha and camellia programs. Similar as other afforestation programs, bioenergy and oil forest programs may face similar institutional problems in their implementation. In addition, China experienced decentralization in forestry sectors. In investigating the institutional problems China faces in implementing bioenergy and oil forestry programs, this research concentrates on the role of three institutions: property rights, the governance structure and farmer incentives. The general objective of this research is to investigate how these three institutions impact on the implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and whether and how these institutions enable, constrain and condition farmers’ participation in these programs. Both qualitative institutional analyses and quantitative econometric analyses are employed, based on empirical fieldwork in China. The study has led to a number of interesting insights related to each of the three institutional aspects. First, good governance, which includes stakeholder participation, plays a crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. As forestry entails a long-term investment, how to set-up good and sustainable governance architecture is very important, but also challenging. The research shows that large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China are moving from government-organized, centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and individual farmers. Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be distinguished as those driven and implemented by the government and those driven and implemented by market arrangements. As such, this structure confirms that new roles and interaction patterns between government and markets are present in contemporary transitional China. Another finding is that jatropha’s failure in China can be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor implementation and enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the withdrawal of a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed. Finally, convergent “time perspectives” of different actors in forestry institutional arrangements is important in the success of large-scale forestry programs. The second set of results relates to the role of property rights and property rights reform. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest tenure in China. Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified in this research: Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual. The study indicates that the devolution process in tenure reform redistributed the user rights to local stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization process and the tenure reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms. Based on the New Property Rights Theory, it is hypothesized that the five forest tenure regimes differ in terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure security for farm households. The research findings confirm that in general tenure regimes with higher degrees of tenure security trigger higher household investment. Furthermore, the risk of future expropriation negatively affects farmers’ participation in forestry projects. Finally, the study addresses the question of farmer incentives and benefits. For large-scale forestry projects engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the success of the project, with respect to a balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. Forestry development potentially improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and poverty alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical services, some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of farmers in the camellia program was only 37%. Moreover, the participation level varied among counties and villages, because farmers’ participation is still constrained by their capacity in terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. Finally, forestry programs generate different benefit distribution impacts on farm households under different forest project implementation regimes. Results show that five implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. Individual, Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. Collective-individual, Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes perform better in terms of program access and equal benefit distribution than Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the former three regimes, village leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit reducing the benefits to and marginal smallholders.

Liquid biofuel from oil crops are broadly promoted globally, among which biofuel from perennial wood species, as well as from bushes and small trees such as jatropha. In China, oil-bearing small trees, which mainly grow on slope land, are applied as so-called bioenergy and oil forests for liquid biofuel production. The national government in China has devised a series of laws and policies to promote bioenergy and oil forest programs. In this study, the focus is on jatropha and camellia programs. Similar as other afforestation programs, bioenergy and oil forest programs may face similar institutional problems in their implementation. In addition, China experienced decentralization in forestry sectors. In investigating the institutional problems China faces in implementing bioenergy and oil forestry programs, this research concentrates on the role of three institutions: property rights, the governance structure and farmer incentives. The general objective of this research is to investigate how these three institutions impact on the implementation of large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs, and whether and how these institutions enable, constrain and condition farmers’ participation in these programs. Both qualitative institutional analyses and quantitative econometric analyses are employed, based on empirical fieldwork in China. The study has led to a number of interesting insights related to each of the three institutional aspects. First, good governance, which includes stakeholder participation, plays a crucial role in the success of large-scale forestry programs. As forestry entails a long-term investment, how to set-up good and sustainable governance architecture is very important, but also challenging. The research shows that large-scale bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China are moving from government-organized, centralized, top-down governance architectures to multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements, which involve market-based mechanisms and private actors such as private companies, NGOs, international agencies, communities and individual farmers. Large bioenergy and oil forestry programs in China can be distinguished as those driven and implemented by the government and those driven and implemented by market arrangements. As such, this structure confirms that new roles and interaction patterns between government and markets are present in contemporary transitional China. Another finding is that jatropha’s failure in China can be attributed to the institutional environment, such as poor implementation and enforcement of monitoring and sanctioning rules. Rules to prevent the withdrawal of a company and executing such rules are crucial to keep companies committed. Finally, convergent “time perspectives” of different actors in forestry institutional arrangements is important in the success of large-scale forestry programs. The second set of results relates to the role of property rights and property rights reform. Since 2003, there is a new trend of devolution in forest tenure in China. Five different forest tenure regimes have been identified in this research: Collective, Collective-Individual, Company, Partnership, and Individual. The study indicates that the devolution process in tenure reform redistributed the user rights to local stakeholders. It also confirms that the de-collectivization process and the tenure reform have resulted in a diversification of management forms. Based on the New Property Rights Theory, it is hypothesized that the five forest tenure regimes differ in terms of residual control and income rights, implying different degrees of tenure security for farm households. The research findings confirm that in general tenure regimes with higher degrees of tenure security trigger higher household investment. Furthermore, the risk of future expropriation negatively affects farmers’ participation in forestry projects. Finally, the study addresses the question of farmer incentives and benefits. For large-scale forestry projects engaging smallholders in forestry is vital for the success of the project, with respect to a balanced socio-economic development in poor rural areas and guaranteed long-term success. Forestry development potentially improves the livelihoods of famers by increasing their income, and poverty alleviation has always been an important objective of bioenergy and oil forestry programs. Although these programs often provide financial support and technical services, some farmers are still not able to join. For instance, the participation rate of farmers in the camellia program was only 37%. Moreover, the participation level varied among counties and villages, because farmers’ participation is still constrained by their capacity in terms of wealth, labour endowment and education. Finally, forestry programs generate different benefit distribution impacts on farm households under different forest project implementation regimes. Results show that five implementation regimes of camellia plantations can be distinguished, i.e. Individual, Partnership, Collective-Individual, Collective, Company, each having their own specifics of project access and benefit distribution among smallholders. Collective-individual, Collective, and Company forest implementation regimes perform better in terms of program access and equal benefit distribution than Individual and Partnership regimes. But also for the former three regimes, village leaders and companies may seize substantial project benefit reducing the benefits to and marginal smallholders.

Forest rights are of utmost importance for the future of forest initiatives, be it for resource use, management, and conservation, or for climate change adaptation and mitigation. The growing trend towards acknowledging the relevance of the sustainable use and conservation of forests is intertwined with the recognition of the forest rights of people who have traditionally depended on the forests for sustenance – especially marginal indigenous and tribal people. Consequently, any decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform must include those who have been marginalised from their traditional forest rights. Forest tenure reform is arguably different from previous agrarian reform, but it has to some extent the same underlying rights-based approach. Given that decentralised forest tenure policy reform is relatively new, there is increasing need to study its implications for the individual and collective rights of forest-dependent people and to analyse concepts such as tenure, property, and access. The implications of forest tenure rights are extremely important, especially in those countries where forest-dependent people’s rights have not been recognised by the state. India’s changing forest tenure reform may have several implications for forest-dependent ethnic minority communities – the Scheduled Tribes – dwelling in and around forest lands. This thesis takes an analytical as well as an empirical approach to show how decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform have created new forms of forest rights through new institutions and authority that have resulted in contrasting outcomes – individual and collective, including and excluding people, peaceful negotiations and conflicts, etc. – for forest-dependent Bhil tribal people. It encompasses the historical trajectory of the legislative and political mechanisms that contributed to the categorisations of the current day ‘forest land’ and ‘scheduled tribe’ (used interchangeably with ‘tribal people’). This thesis focuses primarily on the emerging – sometimes unintended – consequences of political decentralisation and new forest tenure legislation for marginalised tribal forest people in India. By analysing a variety of past and contemporary legislation on decentralisation and forest tenure reform in tribal India, such as Joint Forest Management, Panchayati Raj, and the Forest Rights Act, it initiates discussion on the consequences of these changes from the perspective of Bhil tribal people at different levels: the gram panchayat, the household, and the individual. In Chapter 1, I introduce the research topics – decentralisation and forest tenure reform – central to this thesis. I elaborate on the research problem and micro-politics as a conceptual framework to analyse the four key research questions that guide the individual chapters. I discuss the main contributions in the literature around the concepts of the micro-politics framework – governmentality, institutional pluralism, authority, citizenship, and access – to show what the chapters contribute analytically. In addition, I set out the methodology of this research, explaining the background of the forest-dependent Bhil tribal people from semi-arid western India, and the data used for individual chapters, along with the different outputs emanating from this research. Specifically, four key questions guide the research: How has the history of forest legislation shaped the current decentralisation process and forest tenure reform in tribal India (chapter 2)? To what extent does the new formal tenure arrangement add value to, contradict, or dominate existing local authority in collective forest management (chapter 3)? In what way does forest tenure reform influence tribal households’ perspectives on individual forest tenure claims and their idea of citizenship (chapter 4)? How are tribal women’s forest-related rights determined by the new decentralised forest tenure reform (chapter 5)? History plays a significant role in providing an in-depth understanding of the current state of affairs regarding decentralisation and forest governance. India’s British colonial past continues to linger in post-colonial modern society. Forestry is one such area that cannot be understood without reflecting on why British India established scientific forestry and how it continues to influence the current institutions governing India’s forests. Chapter 2 studies the process of governmentality behind the control over forest rights in tribal India. It analyses the historical influence of both British colonial rule and independent India to categorise scheduled tribes and forests in tribal areas. In doing so, it takes the micro-politics concept of Foucault’s notion of governmentality to argue that the history of the scheduled tribes’ subjectification and the related history of forest demarcation are indispensable for understanding the current politics of decentralised forest management in India. Within this micro-politics notion of ‘forest governmentality,’ the discussion focuses on three dimensions, namely, the history of categorisation, the politics of social identity, and the technologies of forest governance. These three dimensions allow us to show how recent efforts to politicise forest tenure rights have reinforced political control to appropriate and legalise forest and the tribal people through new forms of authority, inclusion, and exclusion. The process of forest governmentality is overt, but I argue that Bhil people internalise their ethnic identity. By internalising their political tribal identity, they are able to create countervailing power and room to manoeuvre within the current forest governance regime. Forest tenure recognition may originate from the top down or from the bottom up, each shaping different forms of collective rights. Chapter 3 examines the current forest tenure reform from the micro level of village-level committees. I use two relevant concepts for micro-politics analysis, namely, institutional pluralism and authority. Institutional pluralism has become a characteristic of local-level forest management in India’s twenty-first century tribal villages. Historically, the traditional forest rights of tribal people were denied. Recent attempts at decentralisation and forest tenure reforms to formalise and transfer traditional rights to forest people have created new institutions and new forms of authority. However, uncertainty about local institutions’ recognition, accountability, and representativeness, and the legitimisation of authority among multiple institutions, may hinder formalisation of forest rights. In this chapter, I show some unintended consequences of institutional pluralism and authority relations on tribal people’s struggle for forest rights. For example, multiple authority fragments the local forest management institutions and collective forest rights. Empirical evidence further indicates that institutional pluralism restricts Bhil people’s collective forest rights and democratic decentralisation, and in turn gives the elite and line ministries more discretionary authority to control forests. The forest tenure policy reform in tribal India provides a great opportunity to unravel the nature of individual tenure rights. Chapter 4 explains how the Forest Rights Act shapes tribal households’ claims to forest land rights. I analyse the micro-politics of this forest tenure reform using three dimensions, namely, individual tenure rights, citizenship, and conflict, to discuss the contested nature of household-level tenure rights to forest land. I illustrate how forest tenure reform has promoted the individualisation of forest right claims, which has had a direct influence on Bhil tribal inter-household conflicts. Negative consequences of the conflicts are explained, but I also explore how claiming individual tenure rights is justified by the Bhil primarily in terms of seeking formal recognition of their citizenship rights. The analytical debate in relation to citizenship in this chapter focuses on ‘belonging’ from both the customary and the current legal perspective. I argue that different forms of belonging to forest land create complexities in understanding rights and entitlements. I specifically examine why and how choices about specific forest tenure rights are made by tribal households. In what ways do tribal households’ notions of forest rights relate to citizenship? How do conflicts prompt and/or suppress households’ forest tenure and citizenship claims? I demonstrate that knowledge about the tribal people’s perceptions can help us understand individual households’ socio-political struggle for individual forest land tenure. Forestry is considered to be male biased, and this hinders the access rights of tribal women. The identity of a tribal woman is invisible within a community and within a household, mainly because she is dependent on her male relative or colleague to enact her rights, including forest rights. Chapter 5 focuses on the struggles of individual Bhil tribal women for their rights to access forest land and forest resources. The micro-political dynamics of women’s access rights as a consequence of changing individual and collective forest rights are illustrated. I argue that the identity-based categories promoted by the forest tenure reform have negative consequences for the marginal tribal women because their identity as tribal women is used to exclude them from forest committees. The current trend in forest tenure reform promotes identity-based categories on the assumption that this provides better access to forest resources for marginalised groups. This chapter shows that there is an interaction between the politics of individual and collective access to forest land and the political representation of Bhil tribal women. A rights-based access approach was used to analyse outcomes of forest tenure reform on tribal women’s access to forest land, and inclusion in, and/or exclusion from, collective decision making about forest land management. With empirical evidence, I demonstrate that the new identity-based forest tenure reform is mere tokenism and hinders rather than promotes tribal women’s political empowerment and access to forest-based resources. Finally, chapter 6 provides a synthesis and general discussion based on the findings discussed in the preceding chapters. The first part of the chapter discusses the four key research questions proposed at the start of this book, with emphasis on the key findings as well as their mutual relationships in the preceding chapters. Also, the central argument of this research as conducted from the micro-politics analytical perspective is presented. The final part makes an overall argument based on the chapters as well as on experiences from other outputs of this research: an international conference, a documentary film, and an infobrief. Taking into account lessons learnt, I propose the way forward towards decentralised forest tenure reform. Also, I highlight a number of research areas that were beyond the scope of this current research and discuss how they might be addressed.

Forest rights are of utmost importance for the future of forest initiatives, be it for resource use, management, and conservation, or for climate change adaptation and mitigation. The growing trend towards acknowledging the relevance of the sustainable use and conservation of forests is intertwined with the recognition of the forest rights of people who have traditionally depended on the forests for sustenance – especially marginal indigenous and tribal people. Consequently, any decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform must include those who have been marginalised from their traditional forest rights. Forest tenure reform is arguably different from previous agrarian reform, but it has to some extent the same underlying rights-based approach. Given that decentralised forest tenure policy reform is relatively new, there is increasing need to study its implications for the individual and collective rights of forest-dependent people and to analyse concepts such as tenure, property, and access. The implications of forest tenure rights are extremely important, especially in those countries where forest-dependent people’s rights have not been recognised by the state. India’s changing forest tenure reform may have several implications for forest-dependent ethnic minority communities – the Scheduled Tribes – dwelling in and around forest lands. This thesis takes an analytical as well as an empirical approach to show how decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform have created new forms of forest rights through new institutions and authority that have resulted in contrasting outcomes – individual and collective, including and excluding people, peaceful negotiations and conflicts, etc. – for forest-dependent Bhil tribal people. It encompasses the historical trajectory of the legislative and political mechanisms that contributed to the categorisations of the current day ‘forest land’ and ‘scheduled tribe’ (used interchangeably with ‘tribal people’). This thesis focuses primarily on the emerging – sometimes unintended – consequences of political decentralisation and new forest tenure legislation for marginalised tribal forest people in India. By analysing a variety of past and contemporary legislation on decentralisation and forest tenure reform in tribal India, such as Joint Forest Management, Panchayati Raj, and the Forest Rights Act, it initiates discussion on the consequences of these changes from the perspective of Bhil tribal people at different levels: the gram panchayat, the household, and the individual. In Chapter 1, I introduce the research topics – decentralisation and forest tenure reform – central to this thesis. I elaborate on the research problem and micro-politics as a conceptual framework to analyse the four key research questions that guide the individual chapters. I discuss the main contributions in the literature around the concepts of the micro-politics framework – governmentality, institutional pluralism, authority, citizenship, and access – to show what the chapters contribute analytically. In addition, I set out the methodology of this research, explaining the background of the forest-dependent Bhil tribal people from semi-arid western India, and the data used for individual chapters, along with the different outputs emanating from this research. Specifically, four key questions guide the research: How has the history of forest legislation shaped the current decentralisation process and forest tenure reform in tribal India (chapter 2)? To what extent does the new formal tenure arrangement add value to, contradict, or dominate existing local authority in collective forest management (chapter 3)? In what way does forest tenure reform influence tribal households’ perspectives on individual forest tenure claims and their idea of citizenship (chapter 4)? How are tribal women’s forest-related rights determined by the new decentralised forest tenure reform (chapter 5)? History plays a significant role in providing an in-depth understanding of the current state of affairs regarding decentralisation and forest governance. India’s British colonial past continues to linger in post-colonial modern society. Forestry is one such area that cannot be understood without reflecting on why British India established scientific forestry and how it continues to influence the current institutions governing India’s forests. Chapter 2 studies the process of governmentality behind the control over forest rights in tribal India. It analyses the historical influence of both British colonial rule and independent India to categorise scheduled tribes and forests in tribal areas. In doing so, it takes the micro-politics concept of Foucault’s notion of governmentality to argue that the history of the scheduled tribes’ subjectification and the related history of forest demarcation are indispensable for understanding the current politics of decentralised forest management in India. Within this micro-politics notion of ‘forest governmentality,’ the discussion focuses on three dimensions, namely, the history of categorisation, the politics of social identity, and the technologies of forest governance. These three dimensions allow us to show how recent efforts to politicise forest tenure rights have reinforced political control to appropriate and legalise forest and the tribal people through new forms of authority, inclusion, and exclusion. The process of forest governmentality is overt, but I argue that Bhil people internalise their ethnic identity. By internalising their political tribal identity, they are able to create countervailing power and room to manoeuvre within the current forest governance regime. Forest tenure recognition may originate from the top down or from the bottom up, each shaping different forms of collective rights. Chapter 3 examines the current forest tenure reform from the micro level of village-level committees. I use two relevant concepts for micro-politics analysis, namely, institutional pluralism and authority. Institutional pluralism has become a characteristic of local-level forest management in India’s twenty-first century tribal villages. Historically, the traditional forest rights of tribal people were denied. Recent attempts at decentralisation and forest tenure reforms to formalise and transfer traditional rights to forest people have created new institutions and new forms of authority. However, uncertainty about local institutions’ recognition, accountability, and representativeness, and the legitimisation of authority among multiple institutions, may hinder formalisation of forest rights. In this chapter, I show some unintended consequences of institutional pluralism and authority relations on tribal people’s struggle for forest rights. For example, multiple authority fragments the local forest management institutions and collective forest rights. Empirical evidence further indicates that institutional pluralism restricts Bhil people’s collective forest rights and democratic decentralisation, and in turn gives the elite and line ministries more discretionary authority to control forests. The forest tenure policy reform in tribal India provides a great opportunity to unravel the nature of individual tenure rights. Chapter 4 explains how the Forest Rights Act shapes tribal households’ claims to forest land rights. I analyse the micro-politics of this forest tenure reform using three dimensions, namely, individual tenure rights, citizenship, and conflict, to discuss the contested nature of household-level tenure rights to forest land. I illustrate how forest tenure reform has promoted the individualisation of forest right claims, which has had a direct influence on Bhil tribal inter-household conflicts. Negative consequences of the conflicts are explained, but I also explore how claiming individual tenure rights is justified by the Bhil primarily in terms of seeking formal recognition of their citizenship rights. The analytical debate in relation to citizenship in this chapter focuses on ‘belonging’ from both the customary and the current legal perspective. I argue that different forms of belonging to forest land create complexities in understanding rights and entitlements. I specifically examine why and how choices about specific forest tenure rights are made by tribal households. In what ways do tribal households’ notions of forest rights relate to citizenship? How do conflicts prompt and/or suppress households’ forest tenure and citizenship claims? I demonstrate that knowledge about the tribal people’s perceptions can help us understand individual households’ socio-political struggle for individual forest land tenure. Forestry is considered to be male biased, and this hinders the access rights of tribal women. The identity of a tribal woman is invisible within a community and within a household, mainly because she is dependent on her male relative or colleague to enact her rights, including forest rights. Chapter 5 focuses on the struggles of individual Bhil tribal women for their rights to access forest land and forest resources. The micro-political dynamics of women’s access rights as a consequence of changing individual and collective forest rights are illustrated. I argue that the identity-based categories promoted by the forest tenure reform have negative consequences for the marginal tribal women because their identity as tribal women is used to exclude them from forest committees. The current trend in forest tenure reform promotes identity-based categories on the assumption that this provides better access to forest resources for marginalised groups. This chapter shows that there is an interaction between the politics of individual and collective access to forest land and the political representation of Bhil tribal women. A rights-based access approach was used to analyse outcomes of forest tenure reform on tribal women’s access to forest land, and inclusion in, and/or exclusion from, collective decision making about forest land management. With empirical evidence, I demonstrate that the new identity-based forest tenure reform is mere tokenism and hinders rather than promotes tribal women’s political empowerment and access to forest-based resources. Finally, chapter 6 provides a synthesis and general discussion based on the findings discussed in the preceding chapters. The first part of the chapter discusses the four key research questions proposed at the start of this book, with emphasis on the key findings as well as their mutual relationships in the preceding chapters. Also, the central argument of this research as conducted from the micro-politics analytical perspective is presented. The final part makes an overall argument based on the chapters as well as on experiences from other outputs of this research: an international conference, a documentary film, and an infobrief. Taking into account lessons learnt, I propose the way forward towards decentralised forest tenure reform. Also, I highlight a number of research areas that were beyond the scope of this current research and discuss how they might be addressed.

Water is not only a source of life and culture. It is also a source of power, conflicting interests and identity battles. Rights to materially access, culturally organize and politically control water resources are poorly understood by mainstream scientific approaches and hardly addressed by current normative frameworks. These issues become even more challenging when law and policy-makers and dominant power groups try to grasp, contain and handle them in multicultural societies. The struggles over the uses, meanings and appropriation of water are especially well-illustrated in Andean communities and local water systems of Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, as well as in Native American communities in south-western USA. The problem is that throughout history, these nation-states have attempted to 'civilize' and bring into the mainstream the different cultures and peoples within their borders instead of understanding 'context' and harnessing the strengths and potentials of diversity. This book examines the multi-scale struggles for cultural justice and socio-economic re-distribution that arise as Latin American communities and user federations seek access to water resources and decision-making power regarding their control and management. It is set in the dynamic context of unequal, globalizing power relations, politics of scale and identity, environmental encroachment and the increasing presence of extractive industries that are creating additional pressures on local livelihoods. While much of the focus of the book is on the Andean Region, a number of comparative chapters are also included. These address issues such as water rights and defence strategies in neighboring countries and those of Native American people in the southern USA, as well as state reform and multi-culturalism across Latin and Native America and the use of international standards in struggles for indigenous water rights. This book shows that, against all odds, people are actively contesting neoliberal globalization and water power plays. In doing so, they construct new, hybrid water rights systems, livelihoods, cultures and hydro-political networks, and dynamically challenge the mainstream powers and politics.

Water is not only a source of life and culture. It is also a source of power, conflicting interests and identity battles. Rights to materially access, culturally organize and politically control water resources are poorly understood by mainstream scientific approaches and hardly addressed by current normative frameworks. These issues become even more challenging when law and policy-makers and dominant power groups try to grasp, contain and handle them in multicultural societies. The struggles over the uses, meanings and appropriation of water are especially well-illustrated in Andean communities and local water systems of Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, as well as in Native American communities in south-western USA. The problem is that throughout history, these nation-states have attempted to 'civilize' and bring into the mainstream the different cultures and peoples within their borders instead of understanding 'context' and harnessing the strengths and potentials of diversity. This book examines the multi-scale struggles for cultural justice and socio-economic re-distribution that arise as Latin American communities and user federations seek access to water resources and decision-making power regarding their control and management. It is set in the dynamic context of unequal, globalizing power relations, politics of scale and identity, environmental encroachment and the increasing presence of extractive industries that are creating additional pressures on local livelihoods. While much of the focus of the book is on the Andean Region, a number of comparative chapters are also included. These address issues such as water rights and defence strategies in neighboring countries and those of Native American people in the southern USA, as well as state reform and multi-culturalism across Latin and Native America and the use of international standards in struggles for indigenous water rights. This book shows that, against all odds, people are actively contesting neoliberal globalization and water power plays. In doing so, they construct new, hybrid water rights systems, livelihoods, cultures and hydro-political networks, and dynamically challenge the mainstream powers and politics.

In zijn preadvies voor de Vereniging van Agrarisch Recht (gepubliceerd in Agr.r.2008, p. 118 e.v.) levert dr. Slangen kritiek op het advies van de Commissie Pachtnormen van 2006. Dit advies heeft, zoals bekend, ten grondslag gelegen aan het nieuwe pachtprijzenstelsel. De kritiek van Slangen is vermeld in de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 van het preadvies `Pacht: stand van zaken en toekomst¿ en houdt ogenschijnlijk geen verband met de inhoud van de overige hoofdstukken. In deze bijdrage willen wij ingaan op deze kritiek.

This paper serves three purposes. First, it gives a short introduction to the concept of sustainability in relation to land use. Since the Brundtland report it has become clear that sustainability is a dynamic concept that changes when conditions in society change. Moreover, it is easier to assess what is ‘unsustainable’ than what is ‘sustainable’. But that will not suppress the demand for sustainable developments. Second, it elucidates a classification of different concepts developed within New Institutional Economics and applies these concepts to a number of typical problem areas in relation to land ownership and land use. Institutions change slowly and that holds most for informal rules, which are classified by Williamson as ‘social embeddedness’. Land ownership and land use often function partly under informal rules. But formal rules and institutional arrangements are also crucial: together with the informal rules they go here under the name ‘institutional setting’. Because the landowner — or the present user of land — is often not the best user from the perspective of the society, the relationship between ‘owner’ and ‘user’ has raised a lot of attention. Efficient exchange at the land rental market, but also contracts that are adjusted to the characteristics of owners and renters or to the specifics of multifunctional land use contribute to sustainable land use. Third, this paper provides the connection between the different papers of this special issue and shows where they fit into the basic theoretical framework. Most attention goes to ownership (including property rights), the land rental market and contract choice. Different functions of land use, however, are also covered with a clear link to informal rules.

Achtereenvolgens wordt ingegaan op: ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal in de loop van de tijd, eigenschappen van pachtcontracten, waarborgen voor investeringen in grond en gebouwen, effecten van de bundel van eigendomsrechten op het grondgebruik en eigendom, de pacht in het Pachtprijzenbesluit, effecten van de ontwikkelde methodiek voor het berekenen van de pachtprijzen, en verwachte ontwikkelingen in het pachtareaal

Contracts are mechanisms for carrying out transactions. Leasing land is a voluntary transaction in which property rights — such as user and income rights — are transferred from landowners to tenants. The bundle of property rights transferred within a lease transaction varies with the type of contractual arrangement. Analysis shows that for the landowner the value of the bundle of property rights to land is determined by the type of lease contract. Landowners prefer lease contracts with as little regulation as possible. Lease regulation can be characterized as a ‘handbook’ for concluding lease contracts. However, reducing regulation requires a shift in co-ordination mechanisms from that of the handbook to that of the ‘invisible hand’ (prices) and ‘handshake’ (e.g., mutual adjustment). Making use of the handshake and price as co-ordination mechanisms implies that the importance of trust and reputation will increase for both tenant and landowner. In 2007, the Dutch government introduced two new types of formal lease that rely less on handbook co-ordination. Whether a more liberalized lease system will lead to a change in the area leased not only depends on landowners but also on tenants, because contracts are two-sided mechanisms.

In genoemd arrest heeft het Hof van Justitie zich uitgesproken over de aanspraken van pachter en verpachter op het quotum. Het betreft de zaak Wachauf/Bondsrepubliek Duitsland

This study discusses the links between land access, property rights, and economic development, analyzing the results and limitations of a public intervention- Land Titling and Registration- that constitutes one of the main instruments for contemporary land policy in Peru. It starts with a global perspective, and then develops a meso (or regional) and micro level approach for the study of the Peruvian Land Tilting and Registration Program (PETT). The study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the importance of institutions, like land property rights, in the context of market liberalization reforms. In operational terms, this means verifying whether land titling constitutes a necessary and/or sufficient condition to promote investments and increase land values. To accomplish this objective, we use information at two different levels. We assembled a country-level panel dataset for the macro perspective, and rely on household’s surveys collected during the year 2004 as part of the evaluation of the PETT Program for the micro approach of this study. Our findings reveal that titling and registration can be considered as a necessary condition to improve investment opportunities when its implementation procedure is based on the recognition of previous informal land rights and community networks, because its effect on the reduction of transaction costs at a regional level improves the dynamics of land markets and facilitates the entrance of formal financial institutions. A decentralized program is more likely to understand and correctly assess local conditions, as well as to concentrate its work on poorer farmers confronting stronger limitations to acquire tenure security by other means. Targeting must be applied also at the regional level, identifying less-developed areas that can benefit from the externality effects provided by increased levels of titling density. However, the presence of other limitations that constrain the participation of small farmers in the formal credit market, and the inability of titling to solve them by itself, makes it difficult to consider this policy as a sufficient condition to improve the livelihood of poorer farmers.

This thesis is an enquiry into the persistent problem of water scarcity in the paddy growing regions in the southeastern part of Palakkad district, in the state of Kerala, in South India. It views the problem of scarcity as an outcome of the existing unsustainable and inequitable mode of water resources management and distribution. It therefore places the problem of scarcity in the particular irrigation and agricultural context of Kerala. Following the introductory chapter and the discussion on the conceptual framework, the first part of the thesis (Chapters 3-4) deals with the underlying approach towards the management of water resources, with a focus on the sustainability dimension. It provides a critique of the irrigation and agricultural policies implemented by the state of Kerala since the 1960s, for their neglect of local specificities. It also analyses the impact of single crop (paddy) focussed irrigation and agricultural policies on the micro-level land and water use practices in the study area. It also discusses the impact of supply oriented, large-scale canal projects and inter-basin transfers of water on the management of local water sources, primarily the tanks of the area. Finally, it analyses the extent to which the existing policy emphasis on local level water resource management and planning, as a part of the decentralisation agenda of the state, has ensured sustainable water management. The second part of the thesis (Chapters 5-7) is focussed on the distribution issue. The issue of equitable distribution of water has been located within the property rights framework. Rights to land explain the present distribution of access to water. The thesis has illustrated how the implementation of land reforms in the state (hailed as one of the most radical land reform initiatives in India), by neglecting the issue of water rights, resulted in an inequitable distribution of access to water. It also discusses how the increasing private control over water eats into public and common rights, giving rise to conflicts and contestations. Finally, the thesis critiques the existing formulation of property rights over land and water, for their neglect of issues related to ecological sustainability. While discussing the creation of public and private rights over a fluid and common pool resource such as water, it argues that issues of ecological sustainability should be central to the framing of property rights over both land and water. In conclusion, this thesis illustrates that the recurring problem of water scarcity necessitates a thorough re consideration of existing irrigation and agricultural policies that influence the management of water resources. It also argues for a re consideration of the existing property rights formulations that determine access to a scarce and critical resource.

This study discusses the links between land access, property rights, and economic development, analyzing the results and limitations of a public intervention- Land Titling and Registration- that constitutes one of the main instruments for contemporary land policy in Peru. It starts with a global perspective, and then develops a meso (or regional) and micro level approach for the study of the Peruvian Land Tilting and Registration Program (PETT). The study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the importance of institutions, like land property rights, in the context of market liberalization reforms. In operational terms, this means verifying whether land titling constitutes a necessary and/or sufficient condition to promote investments and increase land values. To accomplish this objective, we use information at two different levels. We assembled a country-level panel dataset for the macro perspective, and rely on household’s surveys collected during the year 2004 as part of the evaluation of the PETT Program for the micro approach of this study. Our findings reveal that titling and registration can be considered as a necessary condition to improve investment opportunities when its implementation procedure is based on the recognition of previous informal land rights and community networks, because its effect on the reduction of transaction costs at a regional level improves the dynamics of land markets and facilitates the entrance of formal financial institutions. A decentralized program is more likely to understand and correctly assess local conditions, as well as to concentrate its work on poorer farmers confronting stronger limitations to acquire tenure security by other means. Targeting must be applied also at the regional level, identifying less-developed areas that can benefit from the externality effects provided by increased levels of titling density. However, the presence of other limitations that constrain the participation of small farmers in the formal credit market, and the inability of titling to solve them by itself, makes it difficult to consider this policy as a sufficient condition to improve the livelihood of poorer farmers.

This thesis is an enquiry into the persistent problem of water scarcity in the paddy growing regions in the southeastern part of Palakkad district, in the state of Kerala, in South India. It views the problem of scarcity as an outcome of the existing unsustainable and inequitable mode of water resources management and distribution. It therefore places the problem of scarcity in the particular irrigation and agricultural context of Kerala. Following the introductory chapter and the discussion on the conceptual framework, the first part of the thesis (Chapters 3-4) deals with the underlying approach towards the management of water resources, with a focus on the sustainability dimension. It provides a critique of the irrigation and agricultural policies implemented by the state of Kerala since the 1960s, for their neglect of local specificities. It also analyses the impact of single crop (paddy) focussed irrigation and agricultural policies on the micro-level land and water use practices in the study area. It also discusses the impact of supply oriented, large-scale canal projects and inter-basin transfers of water on the management of local water sources, primarily the tanks of the area. Finally, it analyses the extent to which the existing policy emphasis on local level water resource management and planning, as a part of the decentralisation agenda of the state, has ensured sustainable water management. The second part of the thesis (Chapters 5-7) is focussed on the distribution issue. The issue of equitable distribution of water has been located within the property rights framework. Rights to land explain the present distribution of access to water. The thesis has illustrated how the implementation of land reforms in the state (hailed as one of the most radical land reform initiatives in India), by neglecting the issue of water rights, resulted in an inequitable distribution of access to water. It also discusses how the increasing private control over water eats into public and common rights, giving rise to conflicts and contestations. Finally, the thesis critiques the existing formulation of property rights over land and water, for their neglect of issues related to ecological sustainability. While discussing the creation of public and private rights over a fluid and common pool resource such as water, it argues that issues of ecological sustainability should be central to the framing of property rights over both land and water. In conclusion, this thesis illustrates that the recurring problem of water scarcity necessitates a thorough re consideration of existing irrigation and agricultural policies that influence the management of water resources. It also argues for a re consideration of the existing property rights formulations that determine access to a scarce and critical resource.

In Kerinci, on theislandofSumatrainIndonesia, different categories of collective property co-exist with different types of individual property. In this thesis, thedevelopment of two categories of collective property arestudied: the inherited property of ricelands and the common property of the village territory. The main question that this study seeks to answer is how towards the end of the 20 th century individual and collective forms of property interact in Kerinci in the context of commercial agriculture and in view of the need to produce foodcrops for family self-sufficiency.In Kerinci the standard mode of exploitation of inherited rice fields is gilir ganti or time-sharing. In essence, this means that heirs and co-owners of an inherited estate do not grant each other permanent, but only temporary rights of exploitation to rice fields. Time-shares to use the plots are distributed among each other instead of the plots in their entirety. In Kerinci such an individual time-share to use a certain plot of land to grow rice is called a giliran . A giliran always lasts for one year and runs from September to September. The time interval between the years that an individual heir is allowed to take his or her turn to one or more plots of the inherited estate is determined by the total amount of plots that make up the estate as well as by the total number of heirs. When there are many heirs and only a few plots of sawah , individual heirs will have to wait several years before they can take their turn, but when sawah are abundant the interval between the turns may be brief. For the next generation of heirs, the inherited giliran are equally distributed among the heirs in another set of time-shares.Since inheritance in Hiang is a post mortem affair, the actual owners of the time-shares always belong to the oldest living generation. Long before actual inheritance, the giliran and other fields of the properties to beinherited,are therefore often already used by the children and grandchildren of the owner. An arrangement between giliran -owners and giliran -users practised most widely in this respect is a type of sharecropping by which costs and yields are split evenly ( bagi dua ). As time-share owners tend to anticipate the future, they often arrange for a settlement with their (grand)childrenthat mimics the model of time-sharing and that creates a shadow system of rotation on the level of use. In addition, private arrangements between brothers and sisters occur on the level of giliran -owners. When, for instance, a brother is relatively well-off, it is not unusual for him to grant temporarily the use of his giliran to a sister, albeit without altering his inheritance position and that of his children. Borrowing a giliran is a strategy to bridge or to shorten the interval between two time-shares of poorer siblings. When all brothers and sisters need their giliran for survival they can deviate privately from the giliran schedule by pooling and sharing their giliran with one or two other siblings. In this way, production costs and rice yields are distributed more evenly over time. If the logic of the inheritance of giliran were continued indefinitely, Kerinci farmers would after three or four generations end up with giliran that have been used for 30 or 40 years. In practice, however, giliran of such a long duration do not exist in Kerinci. In Hiang the running time of giliran differs between three and six years, while the most common running time is three years. This is a consequence of the practice of selling and buying giliran within the circle of close relatives. The widespread practice of selling and buying giliran is one of the cornerstones of the system of gilir ganti , since it prevents time-shares from becoming too fragmented over generations. There are several ways to transfer giliran between heirs. They can decide, for example, to sell giliran inherited from father or mother to one or all of their parents' offspring. They can also decide that only one of the children will replace father or mother, and that only he or she will inherit the entire giliran . In that case, other heirs will have to be compensated either in money or through the exchange of other inherited assets. The most common strategy to transfer giliran among heirs, however, is for brothers and sisters holding together new inherited property to buy and sell each other's giliran in due course, which results in a gradual reduction of heirs and giliran holders. Furthermore, it must be noted that rice fields belonging to the individual property of the deceased father or mother may also enter the system of gilir ganti should the heirs so decide. Following the inflow of individual fields in the inherited estate, new time-shares may be created next to the inherited giliran of each generation. Following this mix of old and new giliran and due to the practice of selling and buying time-shares, the inherited properties in Kerinci that are exploited in the gilir ganti mode, are typically of an ad hoc nature as they are centredaroundclusters of sibling groups of one generation. In terms of property flows, then, the property of a certain generation is only related to the inherited estates of previous generations by the less economically valuable, but sometimes ideologically and strategically highly appreciated 'old' giliran .The social effects of the continuation of inherited property estates and the exploitation system of time-sharing are twofold. First, inherited estates provide for a social security and livelihood system within families. Second, since most farming families in Kerinci are still owners and users of giliran in the gilir ganti system, most families also still have access to rice production. The overall effect of gilir ganti in Kerinci is that many families stay in rice cultivation as - part-time - owners of rice fields. As participants in the system of gilir ganti these families also have relatively easy access to sharecropping and other labour relations that provide for alternative means to grow rice when there is no giliran to be used. From this perspective gilir ganti is the single most important social institution of food security in Kerinci. Further, it can be argued that the continuation of gilir ganti in Kerinci does not hamper but, instead, facilitates the commercial management of agriculture. After all, growing rice in a regime of time-shares and commercial production do not exclude each other. On the contrary, by keeping more farming families in rice cultivation through gilir ganti , these families are able to take more commercial risks in the producton of tree crops.The second category of collective property, the common property of the village territory, is characterized by a very different historical trajectory in Kerinci. In some villages in Kerinci, such as Hiang, the traditional village lands are still covered with forests. In most villages, however, theseforesthave already been transformed into dry fields ( ladang ) and orchards ( kebun ). This does not imply that there is a shortage of forests in Kerinci as approximately 60% of the territory of the Kerinci district still consists of forests. These forests surround the agrarianvalleyofKerinciand nowadays they are all part ofKerinciSeblatNational Park.In Hiang a forest of 800 ha.isstill located on village territory. This forest has become common property of the National Park and thevillageofHiangin 1993 and since then it is called a hutan adat ('customary law forest'). As a result of this transformation the villagers of Hiang now'own'theforest along with the National Park. In practice, this means that villagers have lost the right of individual exploitation of a forest plot ( arah ajun ) and that former individual property rights of ladang in the hutan adat are transformed into use-rights only. At the same time, however, all villagers are allowed to gather forest products for their own use. For their loss of autonomy the villagers have been compensated with infrastructural works. Whether this co-management of the Hiang forest has so far been profitable for the villagers is difficult to assess. However, the transformation of the forests on the tanah ulayat into hutan adat has definitely changed the destination of the forest from an agricultural exploitation reserve into a conservationarea,and from a common property resource of villagers to a common property regime of co-management with the aim of nature conservation.

In Kerinci, on theislandofSumatrainIndonesia, different categories of collective property co-exist with different types of individual property. In this thesis, thedevelopment of two categories of collective property arestudied: the inherited property of ricelands and the common property of the village territory. The main question that this study seeks to answer is how towards the end of the 20 th century individual and collective forms of property interact in Kerinci in the context of commercial agriculture and in view of the need to produce foodcrops for family self-sufficiency.In Kerinci the standard mode of exploitation of inherited rice fields is gilir ganti or time-sharing. In essence, this means that heirs and co-owners of an inherited estate do not grant each other permanent, but only temporary rights of exploitation to rice fields. Time-shares to use the plots are distributed among each other instead of the plots in their entirety. In Kerinci such an individual time-share to use a certain plot of land to grow rice is called a giliran . A giliran always lasts for one year and runs from September to September. The time interval between the years that an individual heir is allowed to take his or her turn to one or more plots of the inherited estate is determined by the total amount of plots that make up the estate as well as by the total number of heirs. When there are many heirs and only a few plots of sawah , individual heirs will have to wait several years before they can take their turn, but when sawah are abundant the interval between the turns may be brief. For the next generation of heirs, the inherited giliran are equally distributed among the heirs in another set of time-shares.Since inheritance in Hiang is a post mortem affair, the actual owners of the time-shares always belong to the oldest living generation. Long before actual inheritance, the giliran and other fields of the properties to beinherited,are therefore often already used by the children and grandchildren of the owner. An arrangement between giliran -owners and giliran -users practised most widely in this respect is a type of sharecropping by which costs and yields are split evenly ( bagi dua ). As time-share owners tend to anticipate the future, they often arrange for a settlement with their (grand)childrenthat mimics the model of time-sharing and that creates a shadow system of rotation on the level of use. In addition, private arrangements between brothers and sisters occur on the level of giliran -owners. When, for instance, a brother is relatively well-off, it is not unusual for him to grant temporarily the use of his giliran to a sister, albeit without altering his inheritance position and that of his children. Borrowing a giliran is a strategy to bridge or to shorten the interval between two time-shares of poorer siblings. When all brothers and sisters need their giliran for survival they can deviate privately from the giliran schedule by pooling and sharing their giliran with one or two other siblings. In this way, production costs and rice yields are distributed more evenly over time. If the logic of the inheritance of giliran were continued indefinitely, Kerinci farmers would after three or four generations end up with giliran that have been used for 30 or 40 years. In practice, however, giliran of such a long duration do not exist in Kerinci. In Hiang the running time of giliran differs between three and six years, while the most common running time is three years. This is a consequence of the practice of selling and buying giliran within the circle of close relatives. The widespread practice of selling and buying giliran is one of the cornerstones of the system of gilir ganti , since it prevents time-shares from becoming too fragmented over generations. There are several ways to transfer giliran between heirs. They can decide, for example, to sell giliran inherited from father or mother to one or all of their parents' offspring. They can also decide that only one of the children will replace father or mother, and that only he or she will inherit the entire giliran . In that case, other heirs will have to be compensated either in money or through the exchange of other inherited assets. The most common strategy to transfer giliran among heirs, however, is for brothers and sisters holding together new inherited property to buy and sell each other's giliran in due course, which results in a gradual reduction of heirs and giliran holders. Furthermore, it must be noted that rice fields belonging to the individual property of the deceased father or mother may also enter the system of gilir ganti should the heirs so decide. Following the inflow of individual fields in the inherited estate, new time-shares may be created next to the inherited giliran of each generation. Following this mix of old and new giliran and due to the practice of selling and buying time-shares, the inherited properties in Kerinci that are exploited in the gilir ganti mode, are typically of an ad hoc nature as they are centredaroundclusters of sibling groups of one generation. In terms of property flows, then, the property of a certain generation is only related to the inherited estates of previous generations by the less economically valuable, but sometimes ideologically and strategically highly appreciated 'old' giliran .The social effects of the continuation of inherited property estates and the exploitation system of time-sharing are twofold. First, inherited estates provide for a social security and livelihood system within families. Second, since most farming families in Kerinci are still owners and users of giliran in the gilir ganti system, most families also still have access to rice production. The overall effect of gilir ganti in Kerinci is that many families stay in rice cultivation as - part-time - owners of rice fields. As participants in the system of gilir ganti these families also have relatively easy access to sharecropping and other labour relations that provide for alternative means to grow rice when there is no giliran to be used. From this perspective gilir ganti is the single most important social institution of food security in Kerinci. Further, it can be argued that the continuation of gilir ganti in Kerinci does not hamper but, instead, facilitates the commercial management of agriculture. After all, growing rice in a regime of time-shares and commercial production do not exclude each other. On the contrary, by keeping more farming families in rice cultivation through gilir ganti , these families are able to take more commercial risks in the producton of tree crops.The second category of collective property, the common property of the village territory, is characterized by a very different historical trajectory in Kerinci. In some villages in Kerinci, such as Hiang, the traditional village lands are still covered with forests. In most villages, however, theseforesthave already been transformed into dry fields ( ladang ) and orchards ( kebun ). This does not imply that there is a shortage of forests in Kerinci as approximately 60% of the territory of the Kerinci district still consists of forests. These forests surround the agrarianvalleyofKerinciand nowadays they are all part ofKerinciSeblatNational Park.In Hiang a forest of 800 ha.isstill located on village territory. This forest has become common property of the National Park and thevillageofHiangin 1993 and since then it is called a hutan adat ('customary law forest'). As a result of this transformation the villagers of Hiang now'own'theforest along with the National Park. In practice, this means that villagers have lost the right of individual exploitation of a forest plot ( arah ajun ) and that former individual property rights of ladang in the hutan adat are transformed into use-rights only. At the same time, however, all villagers are allowed to gather forest products for their own use. For their loss of autonomy the villagers have been compensated with infrastructural works. Whether this co-management of the Hiang forest has so far been profitable for the villagers is difficult to assess. However, the transformation of the forests on the tanah ulayat into hutan adat has definitely changed the destination of the forest from an agricultural exploitation reserve into a conservationarea,and from a common property resource of villagers to a common property regime of co-management with the aim of nature conservation.

Ingegaan wordt op de nieuwe functies die, naast de landbouw, van het landelijk gebied in Nederland en Vlaanderen worden verwacht, en wie belang hebben bij deze nieuwe functies. Ook wordt de noodzaak voor de vorming van nieuwe coalities voor de nieuwe functies besproken, waarbij veranderingen in de institutionele omgeving optreden. Tenslotte komt de rol van overheid en van financiële instellingen ter sprake

Property conflicts have an enormous impact on relations between the members of farm households and their families. Given the long duration, frequency and intensity of these conflicts an investigation of how they arise and how they affect the daily lives of, and relationships between, landholders is certainly warranted. Conflicts over land visibly manifest themselves in destroyed fences, stolen crops, poisoned dogs, horses that are set free, bloody machetazos, hails of stones between children and murder. But there are also less visible symptoms of potential conflicts over property. Inside the walls of the farm household, hidden from public view, people discuss the consequences of migration or education on inheritance rights; they mull over the advantages and disadvantages of a land sale; they argue about the division of labour and they silently develop strategies to control income or products. These discussions and strategies generate and express conflicting views on how property rights should be distributed and who is entitled to obtain a particular right to property.Through detailed studies of land conflicts in the Santa Bárbara district, the ambiguities of the legal framework, and practices in the court of justice, this book explores the question: What is it about law and norms that enables them to generate conflicts about property rights to land? Land rights do not by definition consist of legally recognised full ownership, hence instead, we research who claims to have what right to the land. The book is an effort to test the usefulness of the notion of 'stacked laws and norms' for a better understanding of the constellation of land rights and the emergence of conflicts.Law experts and policymakers in Honduras tend to start from a 'law is reality' point of view, i.e. the goals of the law are achieved in practice by implementing the law. Starting from this perspective means that they find it difficult to deal with the unintended outcomes of the law, which they usually attribute to the law not being enforced, people having the wrong mentality or old-fashioned, customary practices. In the eyes of law experts and policymakers, property rights to land are an apparent 'disorder', a 'disorder' that plays an important role in the emergence of conflicts that has to be solved by implementing new laws.I used the notion of stacked laws and norms to visualise the processes that create the apparent 'disorder' of land rights. This book has described three processes of law and norms stacking in property rights arrangements: in state law, in practices of land rights transfer from the state to landholders, and in inheritance practices. Firstly, state law stipulations regarding land rights are not consistent or coherent, and its meaning confuses landholders, but also lawyers, judges, and policymakers. Agrarian laws have continuously been changed, replaced, amended and re-amended, which creates ambiguity in their message and makes it unlikely that the meaning and practical implications of these changes have been clearly passed on to the involved people and agencies. Moreover, the relationship between Civil Code and agrarian law notions of property is ambiguous. Agrarian law stipulations incorporate Civil Code constructions as possession, occupation or adverse acquisition. There is no unanimous stand among law experts and policymakers about the validity of Civil Code property notions versus agrarian law stipulations in Honduras.The process of stacking in state law becomes more clear by looking at practices of land rights transfer practices between the state and landholders in the village of El Zapote. The actual laws and legal articles are only one side of state regulation; the other side is that state agencies and officials interpret the law and create implementation rules during state interventions. Hence, metaphorically speaking, on top of the stacked legal regulations, they stack their own interpretations of the rules, which are adapted to the specific situation. Landholders, on the other side of the spectrum, interpret and adapt the parts of the law that they know or come in touch with, and they add their own norms to it as well. The different norms in the complex of stacked norms and laws do not completely merge and they do not become clearly demarcated hybrids. The renewed complexes of norms consist of the different elements that have been added in time and that can be distinguished and used by the involved landholders, national state agents and the municipality, or that may also be forgotten and disappear in the end. It is thus not a static situation; the process of stacking is continuous and will change the constellation of the complex.With regard to inheritance, the book shows that people are actively involved in making, changing and adding new norms through their dialogues and endeavours, while striving for certain goals at certain moments. The result is a complex of stacked norms, different elements of which the actors in inheritance practices (landholding parentsandtheir offspring) use in their strategies to obtain what they want. They are aware of the existence of different norms and they seek to legitimise the norm that best suits their own aims. The whole process of stacking inheritance norms contrasts with stacking in reference to land rights, in which people do not deliberately try to develop new norms.By using the notion of stacked laws and norms for describing norms about property and the land rights derived from it, I am able to describe the historical changes of these norms better. By deconstructing the empirical process of the stacking of norms as regard property rights to land, it has become clear that land rights arrangements are not 'customary', referring to a separate legal system that has developed in opposition to, and disconnected from, state law. It has taught us that landholders' notions of property coincide with civil code concepts of ownership and possession and that the rights that others consider as local or customary are derivatives of old Civil Code property concepts.'Stacking' in this book is not just a notion to explore an empirical situation of disorder. Its main value as an analytical concept is that it clarifies how 'plurality' of norms come into being, as well as the structure of this plurality and the elements it consists of. In the complex of laws and norms, divergent legal concepts and interpretations and re-interpretations of these concepts are assembled and serve as a basis for rights and claims to land, whereby in time, new elements and interpretations are continuously added to the complex while other elements disappear from it. Sometimes one element is more important, and sometimes another. Furthermore, the notion of 'stacking' makes clear that the constellation of norms surrounding land rights is constantly changing; it is a never-ending process. This process does not create a disordered pluralism, an untidy and random heap of norms without any sense or logic, but it leads to a certain stacked structure in which the separate elements have not merged into a kind of fluid constellation. Its stacked character implies that social actors may be able to recognise the different elements and to use them for their own purposes. They distinguish between different elements and exchange them, reinterpret them or discard them.State interventions in El Zapote have affected landholders' ability to maintain the idea that local property concepts are 'law'. Landholders have learnt from the clashes between their own norms and those of the state that the force of their own stacked constellation of property norms is limited. Although legitimate in their eyes, their own norms lacked validity vis-à-vis the state. The difference in how the state and landholders define property rights has distorted their relationship. The state itself, as the institution that defines and protects private property through its laws and legal system, has become an actor in land conflicts. Civil Code property notions are losing strength; the legitimacy of local property concepts has been seriously undermined and landholders have thus become even more insecure about their property rights.

Property conflicts have an enormous impact on relations between the members of farm households and their families. Given the long duration, frequency and intensity of these conflicts an investigation of how they arise and how they affect the daily lives of, and relationships between, landholders is certainly warranted. Conflicts over land visibly manifest themselves in destroyed fences, stolen crops, poisoned dogs, horses that are set free, bloody machetazos, hails of stones between children and murder. But there are also less visible symptoms of potential conflicts over property. Inside the walls of the farm household, hidden from public view, people discuss the consequences of migration or education on inheritance rights; they mull over the advantages and disadvantages of a land sale; they argue about the division of labour and they silently develop strategies to control income or products. These discussions and strategies generate and express conflicting views on how property rights should be distributed and who is entitled to obtain a particular right to property.Through detailed studies of land conflicts in the Santa Bárbara district, the ambiguities of the legal framework, and practices in the court of justice, this book explores the question: What is it about law and norms that enables them to generate conflicts about property rights to land? Land rights do not by definition consist of legally recognised full ownership, hence instead, we research who claims to have what right to the land. The book is an effort to test the usefulness of the notion of 'stacked laws and norms' for a better understanding of the constellation of land rights and the emergence of conflicts.Law experts and policymakers in Honduras tend to start from a 'law is reality' point of view, i.e. the goals of the law are achieved in practice by implementing the law. Starting from this perspective means that they find it difficult to deal with the unintended outcomes of the law, which they usually attribute to the law not being enforced, people having the wrong mentality or old-fashioned, customary practices. In the eyes of law experts and policymakers, property rights to land are an apparent 'disorder', a 'disorder' that plays an important role in the emergence of conflicts that has to be solved by implementing new laws.I used the notion of stacked laws and norms to visualise the processes that create the apparent 'disorder' of land rights. This book has described three processes of law and norms stacking in property rights arrangements: in state law, in practices of land rights transfer from the state to landholders, and in inheritance practices. Firstly, state law stipulations regarding land rights are not consistent or coherent, and its meaning confuses landholders, but also lawyers, judges, and policymakers. Agrarian laws have continuously been changed, replaced, amended and re-amended, which creates ambiguity in their message and makes it unlikely that the meaning and practical implications of these changes have been clearly passed on to the involved people and agencies. Moreover, the relationship between Civil Code and agrarian law notions of property is ambiguous. Agrarian law stipulations incorporate Civil Code constructions as possession, occupation or adverse acquisition. There is no unanimous stand among law experts and policymakers about the validity of Civil Code property notions versus agrarian law stipulations in Honduras.The process of stacking in state law becomes more clear by looking at practices of land rights transfer practices between the state and landholders in the village of El Zapote. The actual laws and legal articles are only one side of state regulation; the other side is that state agencies and officials interpret the law and create implementation rules during state interventions. Hence, metaphorically speaking, on top of the stacked legal regulations, they stack their own interpretations of the rules, which are adapted to the specific situation. Landholders, on the other side of the spectrum, interpret and adapt the parts of the law that they know or come in touch with, and they add their own norms to it as well. The different norms in the complex of stacked norms and laws do not completely merge and they do not become clearly demarcated hybrids. The renewed complexes of norms consist of the different elements that have been added in time and that can be distinguished and used by the involved landholders, national state agents and the municipality, or that may also be forgotten and disappear in the end. It is thus not a static situation; the process of stacking is continuous and will change the constellation of the complex.With regard to inheritance, the book shows that people are actively involved in making, changing and adding new norms through their dialogues and endeavours, while striving for certain goals at certain moments. The result is a complex of stacked norms, different elements of which the actors in inheritance practices (landholding parentsandtheir offspring) use in their strategies to obtain what they want. They are aware of the existence of different norms and they seek to legitimise the norm that best suits their own aims. The whole process of stacking inheritance norms contrasts with stacking in reference to land rights, in which people do not deliberately try to develop new norms.By using the notion of stacked laws and norms for describing norms about property and the land rights derived from it, I am able to describe the historical changes of these norms better. By deconstructing the empirical process of the stacking of norms as regard property rights to land, it has become clear that land rights arrangements are not 'customary', referring to a separate legal system that has developed in opposition to, and disconnected from, state law. It has taught us that landholders' notions of property coincide with civil code concepts of ownership and possession and that the rights that others consider as local or customary are derivatives of old Civil Code property concepts.'Stacking' in this book is not just a notion to explore an empirical situation of disorder. Its main value as an analytical concept is that it clarifies how 'plurality' of norms come into being, as well as the structure of this plurality and the elements it consists of. In the complex of laws and norms, divergent legal concepts and interpretations and re-interpretations of these concepts are assembled and serve as a basis for rights and claims to land, whereby in time, new elements and interpretations are continuously added to the complex while other elements disappear from it. Sometimes one element is more important, and sometimes another. Furthermore, the notion of 'stacking' makes clear that the constellation of norms surrounding land rights is constantly changing; it is a never-ending process. This process does not create a disordered pluralism, an untidy and random heap of norms without any sense or logic, but it leads to a certain stacked structure in which the separate elements have not merged into a kind of fluid constellation. Its stacked character implies that social actors may be able to recognise the different elements and to use them for their own purposes. They distinguish between different elements and exchange them, reinterpret them or discard them.State interventions in El Zapote have affected landholders' ability to maintain the idea that local property concepts are 'law'. Landholders have learnt from the clashes between their own norms and those of the state that the force of their own stacked constellation of property norms is limited. Although legitimate in their eyes, their own norms lacked validity vis-à-vis the state. The difference in how the state and landholders define property rights has distorted their relationship. The state itself, as the institution that defines and protects private property through its laws and legal system, has become an actor in land conflicts. Civil Code property notions are losing strength; the legitimacy of local property concepts has been seriously undermined and landholders have thus become even more insecure about their property rights.