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Copyright of GeSec: Revista de Gestao e Secretariado is the property of Sindicato das Secretarias e Secretarios do Estado de Sao Paulo (SINSESP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Angle Health Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Rapidly emerging generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) models stand at the epicentre of current public discourse. They demonstrate impressive abilities to generate various types of data promptly and cost-effectively. However, AI developers need to train their systems on massive volumes of data which is usually copyrighted. Therefore, the growth of copyright-related concerns in the field of GenAI comes as no surprise. The study introduces two solutions which could mitigate the tension between copyright holders and AI developers, one legal (text and data mining (TDM) exceptions of the CDSM Directive) and one technical (synthetic data), highlighting the promises and challenges of both. First, the article will discuss the capability of TDM exceptions to facilitate the fundamental right to information and the freedom of research in the context of AI development. Next, the paper will analyse how providers of GenAI models can leverage synthetic data to comply with copyright law while training their systems and what risks might be associated with this approach. The findings of this study will indicate what issues, in both legal and technical spheres, should be addressed to ensure a balance of powers in the digital environment and effective functionality of the EU AI sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this article is to carry out a legal study of the legal reform regarding the regulation of conscientious objection contained in Organic Law 2/2010, sexual reproductive health and voluntary interruption of pregnancy. In the same way, it aims to reflect on some aspects absent in the legal amendment, as well as make a series of ponderative proposals to resolve conflicts of rights that arise in practice. To do this, it shall be used the jurisprudence of the Courts (Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights) and the enormous and careful studies carried out by scientific doctrine on the matter. The main conclusion is that the legal reform has been convenient and constructive as it brings legal certainty to the system in comparison with the previous regulation, without prejudice to some shadows and nuances that are reflected in the writing.

The current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is the 1982 Constitution, which is the fourth constitution after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The provisions of the current Constitution on the fundamental rights of citizens are generally similar to those of the first Constitution of 1954, but are more specific, while the freedom of movement provided for in the 1954 Constitution is deleted. The 1975 Constitution and the 1978 Constitution are the second and third Constitutions, respectively. Because of their special historical period, the provisions on fundamental rights in these two constitutions are retrogressive and failing. The historical background of the revision of the Constitution, the possibility of realizing rights and the level of social development are the main reasons for determining the provisions of the basic rights of citizens in the 1982 Constitution. In 2004, the current Constitution was amended to include “the State respects and protects human rights,” which establishes the constitutional obligation of the State to guarantee human rights. In practice, there is still ongoing debate over how the State’s guarantee obligations are implemented and whether citizens can file lawsuits if they believe that their fundamental rights have been violated. In recent years, the recordation review has partially realized the supervision of legislation that may infringe on citizens’ basic rights by reviewing the constitutionality and legality of laws and regulations, but citizens have not been able to directly protect their rights through litigation. The changes in the basic rights of citizens in terms of constitutional provisions and legal guarantees over the past 40 years are the result of the development of the rule of law in China. In order to more effectively solve the problem of constitutional rights from text to reality, it is also necessary to further develop the constitutional review system.

This paper analyses L. 1/2023, which positions sporting activities among the values protected by the Italian Constitution. To that end, this same law adds a further paragraph to Article 33 of the Constitution which underlines: firstly, the educational value of sport and its links with the formation and development of the person; secondly, the social value of sporting activities, as sporting activities contribute to the aggregation and inclusion of individuals (or of groups of individuals) who face various kinds of disadvantage; and thirdly, the value of promoting the psychophysical well-being of individuals which connects sport to health, where health is intended in its broadest sense and not just as lack of disease. The last paragraph of Article 33 of the Constitution is generic in scope and does not take into account the type of activity carried out or the individuals engaged in it. Hence the deduction that sporting activities may be among the primary fundamental rights of the individual, as common interpretative guidelines had already stated before L. 1/2023. The new constitutional provision is also prescriptive in scope, in the sense that it commits the Legislator and other State powers (including social entities providing services of general interest) to pursue the implicit purposes deriving from the recognition of sport’s value, and may constitute a basis for invalidating legislative provisions that go against it. Finally, L. 1/2023 anchors the new wording of the Constitution to a wide range of sources in the supranational and national legal systems. In this regard, the acts, guidelines and instruments from the UN, the Council of Europe and the EU should be taken into account. While at a national level, the provisions of the recent reform that carried out a comprehensive and structural review of the sporting legal system in Italy are particularly interesting, the new constitutional framework equally appears consistent with the provisions relating to sport found in foreign constitutions.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 153-156 | Article | (Abstract) The functioning of the Schengen area and, more broadly, of European external borders, have been under considerable strain due to increased migration flows, the COVID-19 pandemic and security threats. These developments have tested Member States’ and EU agencies’ compliance with EU rules and principles, and the viability of the EU migration, asylum and border control policies. The future is equally challenging and will be marked by the reform EU migration, asylum and border control policies, with the recent adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the amendment of the Schengen Borders Code. The nine Articles – by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and William Hamilton Byrne, Violeta Moreno-Lax, Jorrit J. Rijpma and Henriet Baas, Niovi Vavoula, Věra Honusková and Enes Zaimović, Luisa Marin, Matija Kontak, Ana Kršinić and the editor, Iris Goldner Lang – contained within this Special Section, offer a contemporary and rich study of Schengen and European borders against the backdrop of recent challenges and future perspectives. They cast a new look on both the legal and political context of Schengen by discussing its infrastructure, Schengen accessions, externalisation, protection of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights, as well as the use of modern technologies at the EU’s external borders.

Starting with the years 1998-1999, Romania began to face a social phenomenon with deep criminal connotations – human trafficking. The Romanian authorities reacted, and in 2001 they adopted a law designed to define the phenomenon, punish the culprits, and create the institutional card designed to assist victims of human trafficking. Law 678 of 2001 is an important document from the perspective of combating and preventing the phenomenon of human trafficking. After almost a quarter of a century, we are far from having eradicated this phenomenon. In a continuous change, human trafficking continues to affect both persons from the vulnerable groups as well as those who do not belong to vulnerable categories. It is a phenomenon that does not take into account ethnic social affiliation, gender identity, or age of individuals. Due to its emotional consequences, health and well-being, respect for human rights, human trafficking represents one of the most serious phenomena of organised crime.

Public interest litigation (PIL) emerged as a distinct form of litigation originating from the historical trajectory and legal context of the United States. Initially shaped by America's legal associations and rooted in the civil rights movements of the mid-20th century, these litigations addressed the shortcomings in traditional democratic models. They serve as a mechanism to uphold the assurances enshrined in the legal framework, such as the Sani Law, catering to classes and individuals deprived of fundamental rights and human dignity. PILs are instrumental in granting marginalized segments of society access to judicial justice, primarily focusing on the safeguarding of their fundamental rights and the rectification of legal ambiguities. Moreover, they aspire to instigate 'social change,' where the outcomes extend beyond individual cases and can be applied to similar situations, amplifying their impact. Advocating for human rights principles stands as the underlying motive and impetus behind such petitions. Various nations, including India, have adapted and refined this litigation model to suit their distinct social contexts and legal structures. Notably, in India's legal system, the Supreme Court judges have spearheaded innovation, particularly in relaxing the stringent requirements for the plaintiff's general authority.

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Privado (0123-4366) is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departmento de Derecho Civil and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper focuses on the constitutional perspective of surrogacy in Colombia and identifies four key elements relevant to its analysis. It analyzes the autonomy of will as the basis of the surrogacy agreement; incorporation of the international principle of the child's best interests in surrogacy; guarantee of the fundamental rights of the participants in the surrogacy agreement, especially sexual and reproductive rights; and impact of surrogacy in the constitutional idea of family. Finally, the paper considers the situations wherein the constitutional elements may come into dispute. The potential legal regulation of surrogate motherhood represents a challenge for the legal system, as it involves various constitutional values, principles, and rights that may contradict each other in the practical development of the concept. This paper reveals what these values, principles, and rights entail and how they are defined within the framework of surrogacy, thereby contributing to the debate on the optimal legal framework of the full validity of these values, principles, and rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pre-natal existence has been protected in some way by every age, by every society, and mapped out in its system of rules. This is still the case today, but man's knowledge today is incomparably more complex than in previous ages due to the advances in medicine and biology of the last few decades. Through the practitioners of medicine, knowledge of the ontogenesis of man spans the entire period from conception to death. Life conceived but not yet born is protected by the State's duty to protect life. However, can the State today, with the instruments and concepts of the law, fully discharge this duty of protection? While medical science can account for almost every minute of the biology of embryonic development, jurisprudence cannot do the same for the objective institutional protection of the whole period of embryonic life. Catching up in this area is essential because the backlog is enormous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology qualifying as human mood enhancement can be developed, on the one hand, for the well-being and mental health of their users (therapy) and, on the other hand, for changing the mood of their users above levels of normality (enhancement). Such technology provokes debates concerning its societal, ethical and legal consequences for individuals and society as a whole. This paper's aim is twofold. It first aims to show an overview of the often-occurring arguments in the ethics debate about mood enhancement technology and outline which arguments should be considered relevant for supporting the legislative debate. The second aim of the paper is to highlight some of the main legal aspects concerning this technology through the human rights lens of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) has been approved in March 2024 and this article addresses some parts of this Act in relation to the fundamental rights, that the society is concerned with. It starts by looking at some of the critical aspects of the first version of this Act and then moves on to zoom in this Act’s vision of fundamental rights and argues that the fundamental rights are considered and articulated through different rights situated within a variety of contexts (labour relationships, consumer protection, etc.). However, the Act does not make explicit or sufficient reference to some fundamental rights which could be substantially impacted by AI: the article suggests some of the ways to improve this vision and increase the benefits of AI for citizens and their rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All countries in the world are currently witnessing a dramatic increase of organized criminality, the consolidation of national criminal structures and, what is worse, their international merger for criminal syndicates. In such circumstances, the use of state institutions to deal with the increasing force and spreading of crime in the world becomes inevitable. Under these conditions, the respect for the human being, the respect for his or her dignity and value, freedom of thought and action, and other fundamental rights and freedoms - all these are the general premise for the achievement of the goals of a contemporary world society and the foundation of the universal progressive development of any state, because the free person, as the axiom of development, can offer something more to society than the suppressed one. The last argument is what makes the idea of the freedom of the individual and the primacy of human rights relevant, including in the context of evidence proceedings in criminal trials. Each time when criminal proceedings are authorized, the limits on the rights of both the subjects of the proceedings and other persons will be considered and decided. In this context, the principle of proportionality is of major and undeniable relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia is the property of Revista de Direitos Fundamentais & Democracia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista CES Derecho is the property of Universidad CES and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal is the property of Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Processual Penal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the respect for fundamental rights withinthe scope of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC). Firstly, it does so in the lightof the current status quo, jurisprudential and normative. It then surveys theimpact of COVID-19 and of the unprecedented measures, with no clear legalbasis, that had to be improvised against the pandemic and which had a majorimpact on the SBC (closure of external borders, reintroduction of internal bordercontrols and changing prohibitions on ¿intra-Schengen¿ movements) as wellas on fundamental rights. Finally, and also from the perspective of respect forfundamental rights, the impact of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum on theCFS is addressed, through the proposal for amendment of the CFS presented bythe Commission, currently under consideration.

The European agency Frontex, created in 2004 and whose mandate has been reformed a couple of times, in particular after the migration crises, has had operational powers and a permanent contingent since 2019. The operations carried out in the framework of its new external border surveillance operations have revealed human rights violations. The aim of these reflections is not to offer a partisan or vindictive critique of the Agency¿s position, but rather a critique based on objective and concrete elements. Frontex has become the emblem of the dilemma of European external border management, crystallising all fears. However, changes are expected from Frontex, which is supposed to embody solidarity and unification of European migration policy.

The paper aims to highlight the decisive role of supranational and national courts in the recognition of a fundamental right to a healthy environment and in widening the scope of its protection. It analyses, in a critical sense, the doctrine that defines this trend as jurisprudential activism and that raises concerns regarding the principle of separation of powers.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1575-1597 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. New formulas in the regime of mutual recognition in the EIO. – III. The question of defining investigative measures and having recourse to a different one. – III.1. The applicability of the corrective mechanism in other cooperation systems. – IV. An increased extent of direct communication between the issuing and the executing authorities. – IV.1. Regulating greater communication between issuing and executing authorities as a form of institutionalised distrust. – V. The fundamental rights-based refusal ground and the question of its applicability. – V.1. Making the fundamental rights-based refusal ground the norm instead of it being the exception. – VI. Conclusion. | (Abstract) This Article concerns the European Investigation Order (EIO) and its relations to the principle of mutual recognition. The principle has been the engine of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between Member States of the European Union since the adoption of the Tampere conclusions in 1999. Member States rely on the principle in creating cooperation systems, thereby facilitating interaction among their criminal justice systems. Since Member States refrain from extensive criminal law harmonisation, the principle is of utmost importance. As such, a common regulatory technique was developed through which the principle is given effect in every cooperation system created so far. Although this regulatory technique was mostly followed in the directive establishing the EIO, it also introduced several novelties in the regime, notably the option to have recourse to another investigative measure, the possibility for a greater extent of communication, and the fundamental rights-based refusal ground. This Article argues that these rules make the EIO directive more protective of fundamental rights and show a new trend in the cooperation systems based on the principle of mutual recognition. In addition, while reviewing the applicability of these rules in other cooperation systems, it provides a proposal on how to apply them to enhance mutual trust between Member States through legislation.

This Article addresses the pressing issues surrounding the use of automated systems in public decision-making, specifically focusing on migration, asylum, and mobility. Drawing on empirical data, this Article examines the potential and limitations of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act in effectively addressing the challenges posed by automated decision-making (ADM). The Article argues that the current legal definitions and categorizations of ADM fail to capture the complexity and diversity of real-life applications where automated systems assist human decision-makers rather than replace them entirely. To bridge the gap between ADM in law and practice, this Article proposes to move beyond the concept of “automated decisions” and complement the legal protection in the GDPR and AI Act with a taxonomy that can inform a fundamental rights analysis. This taxonomy enhances our understanding of ADM and allows to identify the fundamental rights at stake and the sector-specific legislation applicable to ADM. The Article calls for empirical observations and input from experts in other areas of public law to enrich and refine the proposed taxonomy, thus ensuring clearer conceptual frameworks to safeguard individuals in our increasingly algorithmic society.

Fundamental rights to positive state action are costly. An allocation in favor of one individual rightsholder always results in lower allocations in favor of others. The dominant approach in fundamental rights doctrine assumes these conflicts can be resolved judicially by balancing competing rights and other public needs. In practice, carrying out an in-depth balancing in resource allocation cases proves challenging but constitutional courts developed different strategies and concepts to deal with costly rights. The European Court of Human Rights applies a “wide” margin of appreciation and requires that positive state obligations do “not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.” Following the German Federal Constitutional Court, several constitutional courts have applied a concept known as the “proviso of the possible.” The proviso of the possible constrains positive rights and results in a wide margin of discretion granted to political authorities. This article attempts to investigate the specific meaning of the “proviso of the possible” in the context of European fundamental rights law by comparing it against alternative doctrinal concepts. The investigation aims to identify common legal principles and methods to deal with fundamental rights conflicts over scarce public resources.

This study explores France's initiative to incorporate the right to voluntary termination of pregnancy into the Constitution, highlighting it as a world leader in protecting women's rights. In contrast to restrictions in the US and other European countries, France is strengthening its legislation to ensure women's autonomy, thereby responding to international political fluctuations and demonstrating the importance of adaptability in the protection of fundamental rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to the internet is analysed from the perspective of the fundamental rights of European citizens, as enshrined in treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The internet is a part, even a condition, of access to institutions and rights. The perspective is that of the digital transformation of Europe, through reforms initiated in recent years in several reference areas - data protection, digital markets, electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions, equitable access to data and fair use thereof (Data Act), digital security, access to documents, or the regulation of the single marketfor digital services. All these focus on the citizen, but the relationship is established through an instrument, a technology to which citizens must have non- discriminatory access: the internet. Access to the internet has a complex content that refers not only to the use of the internet, email addresses, as a means of identification and correspondence, but also to the respect and guarantee of citizen rights to information, expression, private life, and data protection. We will analyse the extent to which states might be obliged to ensure access to the internet and how they guarantee the fundamental rights of citizens. The research methodology considers the analysis of the European Union legislation which has the internet, platforms, and rights exercised by European citizens on the internet as the central element of regulation, as well as relevant national legislation. Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as relevant national jurisprudence or administrative practices, will be added to the research to examine the existence of the right to the internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Soochow University Law Edition is the property of Soochow University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Strategic Universe Journal / Univers Strategic is the property of Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Institute for Security Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

New tools are being explored to provide collective and participatory means of governing data to promote the management of data in ways that benefit those from whom data is collected. This paper discusses whether data trusts are feasible structures in an African context by outlining specific considerations that should be prioritised in the development of bottom-up and collective models of data governance on the continent. Making use of international instruments, principles and established values like Ubuntu, the paper analyses the importance of collective decision-making through collective and participatory governance, women's empowerment, and capacity-building, and how the alignment of data trusts to African contexts could help balance historical power differentials, and emphasise heterogeneity as the starting point of all discussions in the digital age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facial recognition technology represents the state of the art in modern criminal investigations. However, the legal position regarding its use in Europe remains unclear. This ambiguity is not because of a total lack of applicable norms. Rather, it occurs because the existing standards create a kind of legal patchwork distributed among European Union primary and secondary laws and norms from the Council of Europe. Although the recent European Commission proposal on a legal framework for artificial intelligence has clarified some issues, it has also added more complexity to an already unclear domain. Before launching an effort to build a specific set of norms for the use of FRT in criminal investigations, it is crucial to survey the norms already in place to avoid contradictions and overlaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that there are no individual rights and freedoms in societies ruled by absolute monarchy. In this study, the existence and scope of individual fundamental rights and freedoms in Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy were investigated. The rights and freedoms that Hobbes recognizes for individuals are also important as sovering power. It has been concluded that fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to life, private property, fair justice, and the freedom of religion are compatible with principles of contemporary human rights. However, the freedoms that Hobbes recognizes for individuals can be exercised in the field which not prohibited within positive laws. Although the absolute sovereign has right to restrict freedoms at any time in the public interest, this restriction isn't made without conditions. The good for individual is to prefer the good of the state and individuals are free as long as the state remains strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]