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In Aristotle's writings regarding the biology of embryology, especially in the Generation of Animals, he contends that the mother's menstrual fluids provide the material for the generation of the offspring, and the father's form determines its formation as a member of that species (e.g. human). The katamenia (menstrual fluids) of the mother are said to be potentially all the body parts of the offspring, though actually none of them. So, the fluids are potentially the offspring. But are they a first potentiality or second potentiality (first actuality) of a human, in the terminology of De Anima II? In this paper I will argue that katamenia are a first potentiality of a human. My first argument is that katamenia do not have the potential for human activities such as thinking, but rather the potential of becoming something having the potential for those activities. I answer the objection that katamenia are not even a first potentiality, by appealing to an important text contending that for any x whose source of becoming is external, x is potentially y if nothing in x with respect to matter needs to be changed in order for an external principle to make x into y. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Physics II. 4-6 Aristotle deals with the technical concept of chance (TO auxo|iaxov). Here a number of specific characteristics are ascribed to the chance happenings. At the same time, in his biological works Aristotle presents his notorious theory of 'spontaneous generation' (ai)xo|iaxo<; YEVECJK;). Most scholars assume that this theory ought to be in line with the doctrine of chance, as this is presented in his Physics. It is clear, however, that spontaneous generation lacks (at least some of) the features a chance happening ought to have. For instance, spontaneity is not unusual. My purpose here is to address the exegetical problem at hand, in particular to sketch out an argument according to which the discrepancy between Aristotle's doctrine of chance and his theory of spontaneous generation is merely an apparent one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the renewed interest in Aristotle's Generation of Animals in recent years, the subject matter of GA V, its preferred mode(s) of explanation, and its place in the treatise as a whole remain misunderstood. Scholars focus on GA I-IV, which explain animal generation in terms of efficient-final causation, but dismiss GA V as a mere appendix, thinking it to concern (a) individual, accidental differences among animals, which are (b) purely materially necessitated, and (c) are only tangentially related to the topics discussed in the earlier books. In this paper, we defend an alternative and more integrated account of GA V by closely examining Aristotle's methodological introduction in GA V.1 778a16-b19 and his teleological explanation of the differences of teeth in GA V.8. We argue for the unity of both GA V and of GA as a whole and present a more nuanced theory of teleological explanation in Aristotle's biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle, Generation of Animals 2.1, 735a4-22 speaks about semen and soul. The passage speaks about 'the soul' and 'the parts'. Against all current interpretations it is argued that Aristotle means 'the soul in its entirety' and 'the parts of the soul'. It is proposed that the Greek text edited by Drossaart Lulofs in 735a22 be corrected by accepting the reading of ms Z. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine Aristotle's account of sexual difference in Generation of Animals, arguing that Aristotle conceives of the production of males as the result of a successful teleological process, while he sees the production of females as due to material forces that defeat the norms of nature. My suggestion is that Aristotle endorses what I call the "degrees of perfection" model. I challenge Devin Henry's attempt to argue that Aristotle explains sex determination exclusively with reference to material necessity (in particular, levels of "vital heat" in the male semen), for Aristotle's notion of "sufficient" or "deficient" vital heat is itself teleological. If, as Aristotle is aware, male and female embryos appear with approximately equal frequency in most species, how, in light of Physics II, can he conceive of the former as in accordance with nature, and the latter as somehow contrary to nature? My proposal is that Aristotle's notion of what happens usually (ως; επì τò πoλυ) is bifurcated: the usual need not be more frequent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the level of gender bias in Aristotle's Generation of Animals while exercising due care in the analysis of its arguments. I argue that while the GA theory is clearly sexist, the traditional interpretation fails to diagnose the problem correctly. The traditional interpretation focuses on three main sources of evidence: (1) Aristotle's claim that the female is, as it were, a "disabled" (πεπηρωμℇνo;ν) male; (2) the claim at GA IV.3, 767b6-8 that females are a departure from the kind; and (3) Aristotle's supposed claim at GA IV.3, 768a21-8 that the most ideal outcome of reproduction is a male offspring that perfectly resembles its father. I argue that each of these passages has either been misunderstood or misrepresented by commentators. In none of these places is Aristotle suggesting that females are imperfect members of the species or that they result from the failure to achieve some teleological goal. I defend the view that the GA does not see reproduction as occurring for the sake of producing males; rather, what sex an embryo happens to become is determined entirely by non-teleological forces operating through material necessity. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle's view in GA II.5 that females have the same soul as the male (741a7) as well as the argument in Metaphysics X.9 that sexual difference is not part of the species form but is an affection (παθoç) arising from the matter (1058b21-4). While the traditional interpretation has tended to exaggerate the level of sexism in Aristotle's developmental biology, the GA is by no means free of gender bias as some recent scholarship has claimed. In the final section of the paper I point to one passage where Aristotle clearly falls back on sexist assumptions in order to answer the difficult question, "Why are animals divided into sexes?". I argue that this passage in particular poses a serious challenge to anyone attempting to absolve Aristotle's developmental biology of the charge of sexism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the theory of inheritance by philosopher Aristotle. This theory is governed by principles that deal on the interactions between the maternal and paternal movements. The outcome of this condition results in the identification of the pattern of inheritance for the offspring. The author questions the implications of Aristotle's biology for the theory of evolution by natural selection.