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Problem Statement: Soldiers in Small Units (squads/fire teams/crews) are physically overburdened, often carrying up to 130lbs; this degrades performance and may result in immediate, as well as, long term consequences. Near term (FY17): Reduce physical burden of Soldier and Small Unit, including the grenadier, SAW gunner and attached combat medic, so that load reduction of the carried weight equates to a percentage not exceeding 50% of individual s body weight across the central 90% of the male Soldier population., Presented at the OESA Technology Forum. Contains briefing charts only.

The AH-64 Apache helicopter currently utilizes an electro-optical system for tracking gunner and pilot head motion. A critical component of this system is the Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS) helmet. As part of the current "Block III" upgrade, Apache Product Management Office has opted to adapt the HGU-56/P Aircrew Integrated Helmet System (AIHS) to accept and utilize a "Magnetic Receiver Unit" to replace the current tracking system. The objectives of this study were to assess overall level of blunt impact head protection as well as parameters of weight and location of the center of mass (CM) of the AIHS when configured with the MRU. Whereas no definitive statement can be made as to the influence of the MRU installation on the blunt impact protection provided by the HGU-56/P when impacted in the rear, this configuration should provide adequate impact protection in survivable rotary-wing mishaps while providing improved impact protection in the rear headband region as compared to the IHADSS. Furthermore, installation of the MRU should not adversely affect the wearer's ability to identify and track targets., The original document contains color images.

This TOP describes procedures for determining the deviation of the line of sight (LOS) of a sighting system (integrated), or gun/turret drive with respect to initial alignment with a target, without external inputs, as a function of time. Level and canted vehicle orientations are investigated to determine if any interaction exists between azimuth and elevation. The reader is referred to TOP 3-2-836 (0) Combat Vehicle Fire Control Systems - Overview Document or International Test Operations Procedure (ITOP) 3-2-836 (0) Combat Vehicle Fire Control Systems - Overview Document., The original document contains color images. This TOP supersedes ITOP 3-2-836(2.2.2), dtd 27 Jun 1985.

This document describes the procedures for determining the coincidence window of a tank fire control system. The coincidence window is defined as the limits around exact sight/gun alignment within which the gun is permitted to fire (omitting the offsets imposed by a ballistic solution). Typically, a combat vehicle implements the coincidence windows based on the current alignment (static) and in some cases additionally the future alignment (dynamic) of the sight and gun. Procedures for determining coincidence window performance (with and without gunner input) against the tank's coincidence window and a standard test window of 0.3 mrad x 0.3 mrad are included. The reader is referred to TOP 3-2-836 (0) Combat Vehicle Fire Control Systems - Overview Document or International Test Operations Procedure (ITOP) 3-2-836 (0) Combat Vehicle Fire Control Systems - Overview Document., The original document contains color images. This TOP supersedes IToP 3-2-836(2.2.3), dated 29 Jun 1995.

In 1927, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune published a paper describing his beliefs regarding the role of engineers in the Marine Corps. He envisioned a service organization whose capabilities spanned the broad spectrum from performing military engineering as a member of a Marine Division in an amphibious assault operation to making cabinets for the garrison posts. As the remainder of the combat arms communities evolves, incorporating more modern weapon systems and rapid, highly dispersed maneuver tactics, the disparity between engineers and the infantry they support in terms of combined arms employment is increasing. Therefore, the Marine Corps should provide each combat engineer battalion with a Marine Corps infantry weapons officer, or "gunner," MOS 0306.

For centuries, artillerymen have dominated the battlefield with kinetic fires. The backbone of Marine Corps artillery are the 0811 Cannoneers, the Marines who have historically operated the howitzers night and day, rain or shine, to provide the fire support needed by maneuver units. For the last 20 years, a cannoneer's job has been fairly straightforward: employ the M198 155mm Medium Towed artillery piece in accordance with the technical manual. However, in recent years, the artillery community has seen its role on the battlefield change significantly due to emerging technology, operational tempo, and lessons learned in the current operating environment. An 0811 now faces the possibility of having to employ three different weapon systems throughout his career instead of one, all of which are significantly more complicated than the M198. Additionally, Marine artillerymen have officially been given the additional duty of performing civilian-military operations upon completion of the primary mission of providing fire support. Due to the new complicated equipment as well as new additional duties, the 0811 military occupational specialty (MOS) should have the minimum general technical (GT) score requirement raised from 90 to 95., EWS Contemporary Issues Paper.

Fires is a professional bulletin, is published bimonthly by Headquarters, Dept. of the Army under the auspices of the Fires Center of Excellence, Ft. Sill, OK. Articles including topics such as warfighting capabilities, leadership, weapon systems, ordnance, military operations, fire support and field artillery operations.

Fires is a professional bulletin that is published bimonthly by Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Fires Center of Excellence, Ft. Sill, OK. Articles include topics such as military operations, field army, field artillery, space artillery, military capabilities, and joint military activities

In this study, we simulated a generic mounted environment and conducted an experiment to examine the performance and workload of the combined position of gunner and robotics operator. Aided target recognition (AiTR) (via tactile and visual cueing) with imperfect reliability (false alarm-prone versus miss-prone) was provided to the participants to aid their gunnery task. Besides the gunnery task, participants performed robotics and communication tasks concurrently. Results show that when the robotics task was simply monitoring the video feed, participants had the best performance in the other two concurrent tasks and the lowest perceived workload, compared with the other robotics tasking conditions. Our data also show that there is a strong interaction between the type of AiTR unreliability and participants perceived attentional control. Overall, it appears that for high attentional control participants, false alarm-prone alerts were more detrimental than missprone alerts. For low attentional control participants, conversely, miss-prone automation was more harmful than false alarm-prone automation. Additionally, low spatial ability participants preferred visual cueing over tactile cueing, and high spatial ability participants favored tactile cueing over visual cueing., The original document contains color images. Project No. 62716AH70. Prepared in cooperation with Central Florida University.

Operators of future vehicles must perform many functions with a reduced crew size. Operator workload and stress will likely increase. This research examined the workload and stress of operators by: * Live versus virtual simulation * Two types of tasks * Autonomous versus standard driving * Driving speed * Two crew positions (driver and gunner)., See also ADM202526. Presented at the Military Operations Research Society Symposium (75th) held in Annapolis, Maryland on 12-14 June 2007. The original document contains color images.

In this study, we simulated a generic mounted environment and conducted an experiment to examine the performance and workload of the combined position of gunner and robotics operator. More specifically, we compared the performance and workload of the operator when his/her gunnery tasks were assisted by the aided target recognition (ATR) capabilities (delivered through tactile cueing or a combination of tactile and visual cueing) versus when the gunnery task was unassisted. While performing gunnery tasks, participants also had to control a semi-autonomous unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) or tele-operate a UGV. Participants also performed a tertiary communication task concurrently. Results showed that participants gunnery task performance improved significantly when it was assisted by ATR. The performance of those participants with higher spatial ability exceeded that of participants with lower spatial ability. It was also found that significantly fewer neutral targets (which were not cued) in the gunnery environment were detected (which implies less visual attention being devoted to the gunnery station) when participants concurrently tele-operated a robotic asset or when the gunnery task was assisted by ATR. Participants robotics (tele-operation) task improved significantly when the ATR was available to assist them with their gunnery task. It was also found that the performance gap between those participants with higher and lower spatial ability appeared to be narrower when the ATR was available. A similar pattern was also observed for the perceived attentional control factor. Participants communication task performance also improved significantly when the gunnery task was assisted by ATR. Participants robotics (tele-operation) task improved significantly when the ATR was available to assist them with their gunnery task., The original document contains color images. Prepared in collaboration with Central Florida University.

This study examined workload and stress of crews operating future manned vehicles during virtual and live simulation and varied threat conditions. The effects, for live simulation only, of autonomous driving, crew position, and driving speed on workload and stress were also examined. Because of the small number of participants, only descriptive statistics were used. Results suggest that for the task of operating a vehicle and searching for and discriminating between dismounted noncombatants and enemy forces, live simulation was more stressful. The two levels of threat for enemy forces did not seem to substantially affect workload or stress, perhaps because the task loads under the two threat levels were not sufficiently different. Autonomous driving did not reduce workload or stress, particularly for the driver. Higher stress levels in the autonomous driving condition suggests that the implementation of autonomous driving in the CAT (Crew Integration and Automation Test Bed) vehicle was not appropriate for a scouting mission that required a precise level of speed control. There was also evidence of the gunner off loading work to the driver during autonomous driving. The gunner had higher workload (and to a lesser extent stress) than did the driver, especially in the higher threat condition where the gunner's responsibilities were greater. Higher speed driving also resulted in higher stress and workload., The original document contains color images.

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) led a government-university-industry team that developed the "QuadGard" arm and leg body armor from initial concept to industrial production over a period of 17 months. QuadGard provides extremity protection against fragments from conventional munitions and improvised explosive devices (IED's) in an innovative flexible design, based on combat casualty trends. Weighing only 10 lb, it achieved a high level of acceptance during test and evaluation by warfighters for its flexibility and comfort. The first three design phases were performed under an Office of Naval Research program, from April to December 2004. The final design phase and preparation for production was performed for the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) in the spring of 2005. More than 4800 sets of QuadGard were then procured by MCSC for use by 50-caliber turret gunners and shipped forward for operations in Iraq between October 2005 and January 2006. An additional 300 sets were purchased by the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. These were delivered in November and December 2005 for test, evaluation, and operational use in Iraq by additional Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force units. Finally, 100 sets were purchased by the Naval Facilities Expeditionary Logistics Center in January 2006 for the Navy's Seabees in Iraq., Published in NRL Review, p73-81, 2006.

The Marine Corps needs to change the 0369 MOS designation process to prevent the loss of experienced staff noncommissioned officers in the Light Armored Reconnaissance community. In an interview with Colonel Powers, he stated that Light Armored (LAR) units are the "most versatile, diverse units in the Corps," they need a "high level of expertise, similar to Reconnaissance." Colonel Powers believes that the LAR community needs to retain its experienced SNCOs and that changing the MOS from 0369 to 0370, or keeping it at 0313 from Private to Master Gunnery Sergeant are ways this could be accomplished. Whichever method is chosen, a change in MOS designation at the SNCO ranks is vital to the LAR battalions in passing on the corporate knowledge to future generations. Not to do so is akin to re-inventing the proverbial wheel every time a prior 0313 staff sergeant walks out the door.

In response to the declining marksmanship of Marines, a conference was hosted by Training and Education Command's Marksmanship Programs Section (MPS) on April 12, 2005. Marine Corps Infantry Weapons Officers ("Gunners," MOS 0306) and Marine Corps Range Officers (MOS 9925) were invited to this conference as subject matter experts. Their task was to "fix" Marine marksmanship, specifically targeting the requalifying course or Sustainment-Level Rifle Marksmanship (SLR) course of fire. The eventual outcome resulted in getting rid of the SLR course and developing an entirely new approach and attitude toward "field" or combat firing. The new course of fire hit the fleet October 1, 2005 and will begin a one year review period. While Marines across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) will certainly notice that the rules and course have changed, it is yet to be seen whether their attitudes and overall proficiency will increase. Ultimately, the problems identified and changes implemented in the new course of fire will be an upgrade and will improve Marine marksmanship. However, it will fail to significantly improve the combat shooting skills of MAGTF Marines because Fleet commanders will not embrace the new plan and it will not break the individual Marines check-in-the-box mentality., EWS Contemporary Issues Paper.

From 1950 to 1953, with only a partial mobilization, the Army fought in Korea, bolstered its presence in Europe, and organized an air defense artillery system on the homefront. Success in these endeavors depended significantly on the capability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) army to stand and fight. Firepower, particularly field artillery, was an advantage that U.N. forces enjoyed during the war. Because the Koreans were lacking in artillery, American units were frequently tasked for support. U.S. artillery men had inadequate doctrine, combined operations training, and equipment. Moreover, they had to overcome differences in language, culture, and skill levels, and also fears that the Koreans would collapse when attacked, leaving the artillery men exposed to enemy infantry. Efforts to provide field artillery support were successful overall. American gunners often made the difference between victory and failure despite linguistic and cultural barriers even though firepower by itself could not always compensate for the weaknesses of ROK forces. Thus, a lot of emphasis was placed on expanding Korean firepower in the last two years of combat, especially field artillery, and improving the skill of the units employing it. American field artillery support for Korean units met with mixed results. In instances when both U.S. and Korean units were competent, had dynamic leadership, and developed a long-term relationship, like the association of 1st ROK Division and 10th Group, the results were equal to or superior to those found on average in U.S. units. U.S. firepower could often, but not always, prevent the collapse or destruction of Korean units which, because of weaknesses in firepower, skill, and leadership, became a focus of enemy offensives. American artillery men -- called upon to conduct missions for which they were unprepared in doctrine, training, and resources -- usually persevered, though not without extensive improvisation, hard work, and heavy losses., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, p71-77, Spring-Summer 2001.

The study of the Falklands Campaign provides an outstanding opportunity to analyze modern artillery in limited warfare. The unique terrain of the Falkland Islands combined with its harsh weather conditions provided many operational challenges to the British; however, the impact of these conditions on artillery functioning can be applied to other more common conditions throughout the world today. In the conduct of the campaign, British artillery usage provides three main lessons important to the United States Marine Corps Artillery community. First, it validated the need to have a lightweight gun in the inventory in order to support operations in areas of limited mobility. Second, the British practice of positioning the most senior artillerymen with the maneuver units proved to be an effective method of providing advice to the commander, conducting fire support planning, and making hasty adjusting to execution of plans. Finally, the campaign revealed the need to train artillerymen in realistic conditions in order to prepare them for the impact of combat operations.

During fiscal year 2000, efforts continued to develop improved gunner tracking models for the U.S. Army Research Laboratory's Combat Vehicle Engineering Simulation (CVES). By the proper selection of input, CVES can be used to determine the fire control performance of either a conceptual or specific combat vehicle. CVES has been configured to model the M1A1 combat tank and the A3 version of the Bradley fighting vehicle system (BFVS-A3). CVES contains engineering models of the fire control system, chassis, suspension, and the gunner. This effort addresses the gunner models for the BFVS-A3 CVES. Gunner models were developed via the interactive system identification algorithms from the MATRIXx(registered) software package, along with measured gunner tracking error and gunner handle position data. Tracking error is the gunner's input and handle position is the gunner's Output. The resulting gunner tracking models are shown to be more accurate than the existing gunner tracking models used in CVES. These new models were installed in CVES, and it was then shown that the CVES is an accurate simulation for predicting the fire control performance of the BFVS-A3., Original contains color plates: All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

A Cockpit Airbag System (CABS) is being developed for the UH-60A/L Black Hawk Helicopter. The U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory conducted tests to determine the risks to crewmembers and passengers associated with exposure to high impulse noise levels expected during an inadvertent system deployment. A series of 21 airbag deployment tests were conducted in a static UH-60A helicopter. Peak sound pressure levels ranged from 134 dB to 161 dB. Levels at pilot, copilot, and gunner stations exceeded 140 dB during all 21 deployments. Levels in the passenger compartment exceeded 140 dB during 9 of the 21 deployments. Army policy requires the aircrew in the UH-60 helicopter to wear helmets that provide hearing protection or a combination of helmet and earplugs. Passengers are required to wear protective earplugs or muffs or a combination of muffs and earplugs. This level of hearing protection also meets the requirements for protection against high impulse noise levels created by the deployment of airbags. Therefore, if the required hearing protective devices are worn, the potential of inadvertent deployment of the CABS in the UH-60 helicopter poses no additional risk to the hearing of crew and passengers.

During fiscal years 1998 and 1999, an effort was conducted as part of a technology program annex with the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command to develop gunner tracking models for the U.S. Army Research Laboratory's Combat Vehicle Engineering Simulation (CVES). CVES contains engineering models of the fire control system, chassis-suspension, and the gunner for the M1A1 combat tank and the A3 version of the Bradley fighting vehicle system. This effort addresses the gunner model for the M1A1. Gunner models were developed using the Xmath(TM) interactive system identification algorithms from the MATRIXx(registered) software package along with measured gunner tracking error and estimated target rate data (gunner handle control output). The resulting gunner tracking models are shown to be more accurate than the existing gunner tracking models used in CVES for two of the three maneuvering target paths that were considered in this study. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that usable models can be developed using the techniques discussed in this report.

The Target Identification Predictor Study (TIPS) was designed to determine the predictive utility of visual, cognitive, and training variables upon tracked vehicle identification performance within an operational context and to provide a reliable and valid basis for a model to select antitank gunner trainees. Regression analyses performed on the scores of 208 junior enlisted soldiers showed that scores from classroom vehicle identification training and scores on the Group Embedded Figures Test were significant predictors of identification skills. Thirty-three percent of the variability was predicted by this regression. A discriminant analysis showed that these three scores could be used to classify the soldiers into good or poor target identification groups. Results from a cross validation analysis correctly classified %8.9 percent of the soldiers, indicating that this classification scheme was highly reliable. Since target identification is a critical initial task within the engagement acquisition performance complex for many weapon systems, identification of predictors of superior target identification skills (and the selection of individuals with these skills) could be an important means of enhancing target acquisition effectiveness both directly and indirectly.

The leverage that technology offers depends on the circumstances which shape combat such as the theater, the opponent, and the objective. Guerrilla war, a test of national will, and the ability to endure negates many of the advantages of technology. The Russian Army, and its predecessor--the Soviet Army--fought the most recent, large-scale counterinsurgencies pitting technologically advanced mechanized forces against dedicated guerrillas. The Russians are publishing many of their lessons learned now. Although some of these have no direct application to the United States Army, others do, and military professionals need to be aware of how other militaries attempt to solve contemporary problems. The Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 with TO&E divisions equipped and trained to fight conventional, maneuver warfare on rolling plains. They came to replace an ineffective communist leader, not to fight an insurgency. They planned to stabilize the situation, occupy garrisons, and assist the Afghanistan government while the Afghan government forces fought the guerrilla resistance. Soon, however, mission creep set in, and Soviet forces were locked in a counterinsurgency fight in rugged mountains and desert--a fight for which they were neither equipped nor trained. The technologically superior Soviet Ground Forces were trained to rely heavily on massed artillery, firing normative fires to shatter the defenses of a stationary enemy prior to the attack. The mujahideen guerrilla did not accommodate the Soviet gunners by occupying linear defenses or staying in place. Throughout the war, the Soviet Army continued to rely on artillery and close air support as a substitute for ground maneuver and close combat. The Soviet 40th Army needed lots of light infantry, but chose instead to expend massive firepower to save soldiers' lives and to compensate for their lack of infantry. It was an expensive, indiscriminate, and ineffective policy.

The invention pertains to a shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapon having a modified spotting rifle with a top-mounted electrically fired rocket launcher tube is provided. The spotting rifle forms the base structure of the weapon and all weapon controls are located on the rifle. The rifle has several dual-function mechanisms which perform the combined functions of assembly and safing, bolt-locking back and cartridge ejecting, simultaneous adjustment of both open and optical sights, firing, selectively, of both the spotting round and the electrically fired rocket round. The combination of these dual-firing mechanisms provides a lighter weight, better-balanced and smaller weapon. The reduction in parts count improves reliability and lowers cost, Other improved features include an adjustable spotting rifle barrel used to match the boresight of the rocket tube and an improved locking mechanism. A dual function trigger assembly operated two sears from a single trigger. The primary sear operates a rotating style hammer while the secondary sear operates a plunger-style hammer. The hammers fire, respectively, the spotting rifle and the rocket tube as selected by the gunner., Supersedes PAT-APPL-667 170, AD-D018 213

The purpose of this study was to find instruments to improve the selection of anti-tank (AT) and anti-aircraft (AA) missile gunners. 109 conscripts in AA and 56 in AT missile units were tested with a battery of eight computerised spatial tests at the end of their compulsory military service. Also, a personality inventory was administered, and test data from the enlistment were available as predictors as well. About half of the tested conscripts had been assigned to the job as a missile gunner, while the other half had been screened out following simulator testings during the first few months of their service. Criterion data, in the form of missile simulation results and rank orders were collected for all conscripts tested. Multiple regression results indicated that performance as an AA missile gunner could be predicted by a newly constructed spatial test combined with two personality variables. In the AT case, no single test predicted performance, but two variables in the personality inventory showed a moderate correlation with the criterion. The study should be repeated on subjects at enlistment or calling-up.

The U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab have performed the first Battle Lab Warfighting Experiment that evaluated operational concepts for the Crusader system. The experiment was conducted during June and July of 1996 in the Janus Battle Simulation Center at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. The research addressed critical operation issues focused on the employment of the Crusader system on the 21st century digitized battlefield. Command and control, and ammunition logistics and resupply systems used by a direct support field artillery battalion when employing the simulated Crusader system were evaluated to identity innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures that could be introduced in conjunction with the fielding of the Crusader system. This research was conducted using a synthetic battlefield environment that placed field artillerymen into distributed interactive simulation technologies where they used actual tactical data processing equipment to perform fire support functions. There were four major outcomes of this research: (1) A preliminary set of tactics, techniques, and procedures that addressed command and control functions, situation awareness, fire order consistency, and sustainment was identified. This information will be evaluated further by the system developer and field artillery community and will be considered for additional testing during later experiments or closed loop studies. (2) Major findings were: (a) The Crusader system as currently specified, will deliver effective fires to defeat the projected threat and provide timely support to maneuver forces. (b) The pooled resupply concept was successfully demonstrated and shown to be a robust technique in the face of losses of individual resupply vehicles.

The Army is currently replacing the outdated Dragon medium antiarmor missile with the much more capable Javelin man-portable antiarmor missile. The new missile is a tremendous improvement over the old system, not merely a small step but a leap in capability for the dismounted infantry forces. The capabilities of this missile require that our Army examine how we intend to integrate it into our infantry forces and understand that the tactics of employing the Javelin are significantly different than those of the Dragon. This monograph compares the currently deployed Dragon medium antitank missile to the soon to be fielded Javelin medium antitank missile. The monograph also examines whether the current tactics and doctrine for employment of the Dragon are sufficient for the new missile. The premise is that the current tactics for use of the Dragon must be reevaluated in light of the greatly enhanced capability of the Javelin missile system. The monograph begins with a technical comparison and examination of the two systems through the use of six critical attributes of man-portable, antiarmor systems. These attributes are lethality, rate of fire, range, gunner survivability and protection, portability, and ease of training. Next, the monograph examines the coevolution of armor and anti armor systems in order to show the importance of organizational, tactical and doctrinal changes in maximizing the capabilities of any new weapon. The monograph then analyzes the use of the Dragon in Bradley infantry units with the purpose of illustrating how the weapon limits commanders and soldiers due to its capabilities. Tactical employment of the mechanized company team and the dismounted infantry element are considered. Finally, the monograph examines the Javelin and the leap in capability provided by this system. Retaining Dragon based tactics and thinking will prevent the realiza

Progress has been made on the topics of tank gunner skills, Morse code reception, color naming, instrument panel scanning, tests of the procedural reinstatement framework, mental calculation, memory for instances of categories, target detection, data entry, aspects of memory for lists, aspects of memory for course schedules, and vocabulary retention.

The research examined the incremental validity of a psychomotor tracking test when added to traditional Army measures of cognitive ability. In addition, the actual gunnery performance of 911 TOW Gunners assigned with current procedures from a pool of 10,852 Infantrymen was compared to the predicted performance of 911 TOW Gunners hypothetically assigned on the basis of general cognitive ability (g) and tracking ability. Increments in validity resulting from the use of the tracking test were found, although the magnitude of the increases were smaller than expected. However, the increments resulting from hypothetical assignment using tracking test were substantial. Whether TOW Gunner performance prediction was based on g. tracking score or both top down hypothetical assignment of Infantrymen as TOW Gunners resulted in a significant improvement in predicted TOW Gunner gunnery performance and successful completion of training. If assignment as a TOW Gunner was based on tracking ability and was made from the full applicant pool rather than from those first assigned as Infantrymen. It is likely that TOW Gunner performance could be improved with no loss in performance in other military occupations. This is true even if gunner performance in other Infantry occupations also depends on tracking ability. Implications for classification and job clustering are discussed.

This report describes a study designed to quantify the effects of vehicular induced motion on tank gunner performance using two different control handles. One control was a fixed yoke that incorporated a thumb-operated tracking button. The second control was a more conventional displacement yoke which functioned like that in the current M1A1 tank. The study was conducted on a ride motion simulator which had been programmed to impart four levels of ride motion. These ride levels were derived from a simulation of the M1 tank traveling over various test courses at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Generally, as vertical acceleration increased, performance decreased for both controls, but the vertical accelerations imparted to the gunners at the more severe ride levels effected a greater reduction in time on target using the thumb button than they did when using the displacement yoke. Performance using the thumb button was more affected by target motion.

This is a study of how a small British Protectorate in southern Africa went about the complex process of organizing its human and material resources for the Second World War. That process--the process of mobilization--is used as a lens for examining the evolution of British military policy in Bechuanaland and how it affected the employment of African soldiers. From the end of the nineteenth century, the British developed personal and military relations with Africans that cumulatively subordinated Africans to noncombatant in 'white men's wars'. British military needs and policies changed over time with the changing fortunes of its empire. In theory the British Regular Army was responsible for the defense of British strategic interests around the globe. However, Great Britain lacked the manpower to defend its possessions from foreign enemies. As a result, the British army heavily recruited colonial soldiers to augment its regiments during the Second World War. Botswana soldiers were recruited into British auxiliary support units primarily as laborers and anti-aircraft gunners. They served in North Africa, the Middle East and Italy throughout the war. Britain's colonial ideology regarding African soldiers was patronizing and cloaked in self-serving protectionism. Africans were to be protected from corrupting influences and wider global conflicts. The policy was unrealistic and difficult to implement as news of the Second World War spread. Botswana leaders responded quickly to the declaration of war, began recruiting campaigns, and helped organize military training facilities. However, African soldiers had fewer opportunities for advancement within the British army and cases of racial discrimination abounded.

Under assignment from the Royal Netherlands Army Materiel Directorate/Info. Systems Division (DMKL/Afdeling Info. Systemen), the TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory (TNO-PML) conducted a study to investigate the different system boundaries of the TOW weapon system. Both the gunner-related and not-gunner-related system boundaries were considered. An important goal of this study was to investigate the possibility of improving the SST evaluation session so that the SST instructors can conduct quick and correct assessment of the gunner's firing performance. The demanded SST modifications and the relevant output data are described in this report., Text in English. Summary in Dutch.

As the production of the Army's Long Range Antitank System, the TOW2B, ends, the investigation of new technologies for a replacement system is underway. A new system should have a greater range and lethality, while also providing greater survivability for the system gunner. Currently there are three technologies that appear to satisfy the above conditions. One candidate system uses a fire and forget technology, where the gunner is not required to guide the missile after firing. This system would be an extended range Javelin, the present Medium Range Antitank System. The second candidate is a command guided missile extending the range of the TOW2B. The last system is a hybrid in that it begins as a command guided missile and then at some range the command link is cut and the missile locks on the target without further command guidance required. This research examines the three technologies in both offensive and defensive scenarios using the TOW2B as a baseline for comparison. The three systems were modeled using the Janus Combat Simulation., Original contains color plates: All DTIC and NTIS reproductions will be in black and white.

Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide a shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapon having interchangeable rocket tubes. It is another object of the invention to provide a shoulder- launched multi-purpose assault weapon having an adjustable spotting rifle barrel for boresighting with the rocket tube. It is yet another object of the invention to provide a shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapon having dual- function assemblies for various functions including safing, firing, assembly and disassembly, bolt locking back, cartridge ejecting, and breech locking. It is a further object of the invention to provide a shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapon having a single sight adjusting mechanism which simultaneously adjusts both optical and open sight systems. It is a still further object of the invention to provide a shoulder-launched multi-purpose assault weapon having all gunner activated mechanisms including firing, reloading, clearing jams, sighting, disassembly, and safing located on a single side of the weapon, preferably the left side of the weapon, to be accessible to the gunner in a firing position.

A shoulder-launched multiple-purpose assault weapon having a modified spotter rifle with a top-mounted rocket launcher tube is provided. The spotter rifle forms the base structure of the weapon and all weapon controls are located on the spotter rifle. The spotter rifle has several dual-function mechanisms which perform the combined functions of assembly and safing, bolt-locking back and cartridge ejecting, simultaneous adjustment of both open and optical sights, firing, selectively, of both the spotter round and the rocket round. The combination of these dual-firing mechanisms provides a lighter weight, better-balanced and smaller weapon. The reduction in parts count improves reliability and lowers cost. Other improved features include an adjustable spotter rifle barrel used to match the boresight of the rocket tube and an improved locking mechanism. A dual function trigger assembly operated two sears from a single trigger. The primary sear operates a rotating type hammer while the secondary sear operates a plunger-type hammer. The hammers fire, respectively, the spotter rifle and the rocket tube as selected by the gunner.

This report evaluates battle rostering (pairing crew members on a long-term basis) by comparing AH-64 attack helicopter crews when flying in battle-rosterized and mixed crew compositions. Participants in the experiments were AH-64 attack helicopter standardization instructor pilots and 12 battle-rostered aircrews consisting of a pilot and a copilot gunner. All participants received training in-the Army's Aircrew Coordination Exportable Training Package as a prerequisite for the experiment. Participating aviators conducted two missions in a battle-rostered crew and two missions in a mixed crew. Discussion and analysis of crew performance are presented as measures of behavior, task performance, mission performance, and participant exit interview comments. The experiment concluded that minimal evidence exists to show that battle rostering provides meaningful improvements in the mission performance or flight safety of crew coordination-trained aircrews. Battle rostering drawbacks include overconfidence and increased reliance on implicit communication and coordination. The report recommends implementing actions to improve mission effectiveness and flight safety and follow-on research to better understand and capitalize on the strengths of crew and team coordination., Prepared in cooperation with Anacapa Sciences, Inc.

This study examines how successful the current heavy brigade fire support system is in facilitating the integration of close support indirect fires with maneuver. The research shows that the supply and demand sides of the current heavy brigade fire support system have many inherent weaknesses that inhibit the integration of indirect fires with maneuver. The major weakness of the system is found on the demand side. Institutional training of maneuver officers is not producing combined arms officers. Additionally, artillerymen are not being trained to understand maneuver doctrine or how to integrate effectively indirect fires with maneuver. Other weaknesses include, doctrinal-organizational disconnects and reality-doctrinal mismatches. Analysis of the system includes an examination of National Training Center heavy brigade rotations from 90-1 through 94-07. Additional research material consisted of an examination of the institutional training received by armor, infantry, and artillery officers. The heavy brigade fire support system was examined against the definition of close support fires, likely force projection battlefield environment, and types of indirect fires required by the heavy brigade in the expected environment.

For this report, the effects of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) on Avenger weapon system operation were tested in an engagement simulation facility. Two experiments were conducted, each using the Avenger system in a different mode of operation. The same teams participated in each experiment, but team members switched duty positions for the second experiment. The team chief's ability to identify aircraft was significantly impaired by the MOPP gear in both modes of weapon system operation. The reduced field of view (FOV) created by the chemical protective (CP) mask is believed to have caused the MOPP4 performance decrement. The gunner, on the other hand, was not affected by the CP clothing, regardless of mode of weapon system operation. The advanced technology available to the gunner (easily seen displays and aids) seems to overcome the adverse effects of the MOPP gear. Chemical protective (CP) clothing, Avenger, Forward area air defense (FAAD), Range target system (RTS), Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP)

This thesis studies various engagement strategies for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle's 25-mm automatic gun firing APDS-T ammunition against a BMP- type target. The Army currently provides only the broadest guidance for the structure of the 25-mm point target engagement which results in the employment of an assortment of strategies throughout the Bradley community. The goal of this research was to determine if a best method exists. Bradley gunnery is a complex set commander/gunner interactions which can be difficult to represent with the analytic models commonly found in the literature. A model, based on the simulation methods used by the US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), was developed to simulate the gunnery process in order to analyze the effects of firing a set pattern of single sensing rounds and multiple round bursts for the purpose of 'killing', the target. Analysis of variance techniques were used to characterize the effects of engagement strategies, precision and battlesight firing modes, and the burst on target (BOT) direct fire adjustment technique on the simulated Bradley gunnery process. Based on these results, conclusions and recommendations concerning the structure of the 25-mm point target engagement are discussed.... Bradley fighting vehicle, Gunnery, 25-mm APDS-T, Ballistics.

Under a previous contract, researchers used a composite scenario to conduct a comprehensive task analysis of the AH-64A attack mission. The analysis produced workload estimates and decision rules for developing an AH-64A workload prediction model. For this research, the task analysis/workload (TAWL) methodology was used to construct a workload prediction model. The TAWL Operator Simulation System (TOSS) was used to implement the model on an IBM-compatible microcomputer, and the original function and task analysis was refined to produce a more accurate simulation of crew task activity. In addition, the original workload rating scales used in the original analysis were replaced with equal-interval scales. The predictions generated by the model constructed for this research indicate that under optimum conditions (a) neither the pilot nor the copilot/gunner experiences excessive workload, (b) the pilot has higher overall workload than the copilot/gunner in most mission segments, and (c) AH- 64A workload is high relative to other Army aircraft that have been analyzed for workload. This model can be used as a baseline for analyzing future modifications to the aircraft.

Under a previous contract, researchers used a composite scenario to conduct a comprehensive task analysis of the AH-64A attack mission. The analysis produced workload estimates and decision rules for developing an AH-64A workload prediction model. For this research, the task analysis/workload (TAWL) methodology was used to construct a workload prediction model. The TAWL Operator Simulation System (TOSS) was used to implement the model on an IBM-compatible microcomputer, and the original function and task analysis was refined to produce a more accurate simulation of crew task activity. In addition, the ordinal workload rating scales used in the original analysis were replaced with equal-interval scales. The predictions generated by the model constructed for this research indicate that under optimum conditions (a) neither the pilot nor the copilot/gunner experiences excessive workload, (b) the pilot has higher overall workload than the copilot/gunner in most mission segments,, and (c) AH- 64A workload is high relative to other Army aircraft that have been analyzed for workload. This model can be used as a baseline for analyzing future modifications to the aircraft. Volume I (ARI Research Note 92-61) of the report summarizes the results of the research, and contains a 5.25-inch floppy diskette with model data files. This report (Volume II) contains the appendixes, which present the AH-64A mission/task/workload analysis, decision rules, and workload predictions.

This report describes research efforts to determine the ability to predict Table VIII performance from Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (COFT) proficiency and tank crew demographics and to develop cut scores for predicting Table VIII qualification. Tank commanders (TCs) and gunners in 24 Army National Guard Ml tank crews completed the COFT Test of Gunnery Proficiency (CTGP) before firing Table VIII during annual training. Hit Rate, based on 22 engagements from the CTGP, correlated positively with Table VIII scores. Gunner's age, TC vision, and crew years of military service also correlated with Table VIII. TC vision was positively related to Table VIII scores, whereas gunner's age was negatively related to both Table VIII scores and CTGP Hit Rate. The relationship between crew years of military service and Table VIII was curvilinear (crews with intermediate years of service outperformed those with either few or many years of service). When the three best predictor variables were combined in a multiple regression algorithm, they accounted for more than 60% of the variance in Table VIII scores. The results show that Table VIII performance can be predicted from a combination of COFT Hit Rate and other measures and support the viability of device-based training strategies for Army National Guard armor units. If the results are replicable, COFT cut scores can be constructed to serve as training guidelines. Crews trained to specified levels of COFT proficiency can be expressed (with known levels of probability) to qualify on Table VIII.

A collaborative pilot study between the U.S. Army Biomedical Research and Development Laboratory and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was designed to assess fecundity of male artillery soldiers with potential exposures to airborne lead aerosols. Many soldiers in the initial control population reported possible job-related microwave exposure as radar equipment operators. As a result, a third group of soldiers without potential for lead or microwave exposure, but with similar duty-associated environmental exposure conditions, was selected as a comparison population. Blood hormone levels and semen analyses were conducted on artillerymen (n=30), radar equipment operators (n=20), and the comparison group (n=31). Analysis of the questionnaire information revealed that concern about fertility problems motivated participation of some soldiers with potential artillery or microwave exposures. Data analysis was complicated by the small study population size and the confounding variable of perceived infertility. Although the small number of subjects and infertility concerns somewhat compromise the statistical power and general applicability of the study, several statistically significant findings were identified.

This report describes a study that evaluated the impact on crew workload of adding the Stingray system to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). Four BFV crews participated in force-on-force offensive and defensive missions in a baseline BFV (without Stingray) and a BFV with Stingray. Workload was assessed through operator ratings, post-mission debriefs, video and audio recordings, and an end-of-test questionnaire. Results indicated that workload was dependent on mission type (offensive or defensive) and mode of operation (baseline, Stingray-automatic, Stingray-semiautomatic, and Stingray-manual). Crew strategies to reduce workload included reallocation of some BFV commander tasks to the BFV gunner and driver. A significant negative relationship between workload and force effectiveness was demonstrated (i.e., increases in crew workload were associated with decreases in force effectiveness). The utility of the workload measurement techniques employed in the study is discussed in terms of the practical and procedural significance of study results. Workload, System performance, Measurement, Bradley fighting vehicle, Stingray.

The HEL counter-air program (HELCAP) is a program which focused on the soldier-machine interface issues related to combined arms counter-air operations. The thrusts of the HELCAP initiative were to (1) provide soldier- compatible interface designs for the command and control nodes which would demonstrate integration of counter-air operations between air defense and aviation units through interactive laboratory simulation, and (2) validate these soldier-interface criteria through laboratory testing of the command and control concepts. The laboratory demonstrations examined a small battalion slice which consisted of four nodes. This document provides an overview of the HELCAP simulation facility and HELCAP design specifics. The simulation equipment is described for each of the HELCAP nodes: (1) The helicopter node, describing the communications system and display, vertical situation display, tactical situation display, weapons systems equipment and displays, subsystem status monitoring display, aircraft survivability equipment display; (2) the tactical operations center nodes describing the battlefield situation display and data display; and (3) the integrated weapon's system display for the pedestal-mounted stinger node describing the simulator configuration and operation and the gunner's panel and controls. A symposium and demonstration of the HELCAP concept and simulation was provided to the Army on 17 and 18 July 1991.