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In many issue areas in international political economy (IPE), interstate cooperation is governed by a dense network of distinct but overlapping international institutions. Whether this environment of 'regime complexity' strengthens or undermines cooperation is a subject of intense debate. Some argue that overlapping institutions enhance legitimacy and flexibility, while others claim that opportunistic forum shopping enables states to escape compliance with rigorous rules. This article reconciles this debate, demonstrating that regime complexity has contrasting effects depending on the degree of value differentiation among institutions. In issue areas where undifferentiated institutions function as substitutes, forum shopping will reduce the regime's ability to discipline state behavior. However, in issue areas where institutions are differentiated by value - i.e. the benefits they provide increase as rules become more rigorous - institutional overlap can increase policy change among states. I demonstrate these dynamics formally and provide empirical evidence in a comparative analysis of the regime complexes for election observation and forest-related carbon offsets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows that the EU has exerted uneven influence within the global regime complex in shadow banking. Why? We seek to explain the variation in the EU’s ability to exert influence across different elemental regimes—those on hedge funds and securitization—in the broader regime complex over time. In hedge funds regulation, the EU has pursued more stringent international rules, to no avail. In securitization, the EU has been more successful in promoting more lenient regulation at the international level. We focus on the EU’s internal cohesiveness (which can change over time) as the key explanatory variable.

This article shows that the EU has exerted uneven influence within the global regime complex in shadow banking. Why? We seek to explain the variation in the EU's ability to exert influence across different elemental regimes--those on hedge funds and securitization--in the broader regime complex over time. In hedge funds regulation, the EU has pursued more stringent international rules, to no avail. In securitization, the EU has been more successful in promoting more lenient regulation at the international level. We focus on the EU's internal cohesiveness (which can change over time) as the key explanatory variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes that there is added value in moving beyond isolated studies of return-related migration policies in order to consider both deportations and so-called assisted voluntary returns under the common heading of ‘state-induced returns’. Based on official documents and interviews with staff members of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration, it argues that international actors working in the field of migrant return engage in a type of task-sharing that goes beyond functional complementariness. With regard to the return of rejected asylum seekers, for instance, they legitimise each other's engagement as well as the overarching return objectives of governments, and are, therefore, involved in norm-building regarding the acceptability of state-induced returns. In addition to setting certain minimum standards regarding states' treatment of their immigrant population, international actors assist states in upholding control over them. Rather than merely replacing state-led regulation, international actors thus support domestic governments in reaching their migration control objectives, and thereby contribute to a stabilisation of state sovereignty in the governance of migration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) intellectual property rights, and more specifically copyright, have become the subject of highly politicized conflicts. In this paper we analyze how these conflicts shifted from the political arena to private standard-setting sites, where two opposing coalitions of actors pursued competing initiatives – an industry coalition which aimed at enforcing copyright protection through Digital Rights Management and an emerging coalition of civil society actors which sought to develop a digital commons based on copyleft licenses. Paradoxically, the industry coalition, which had very successfully lobbied international organizations, ran into trouble developing and enforcing private regulation in the market place, while the civil society coalition proved to be more effective in the market than in the political sphere. The findings of our analysis indicate that the strategic use of organizational forms and collective action frames can be more decisive for the mobilization of users than material resources, and that the success of collective action frames depends on their compatibility with user practices. Based on the argument that regime shifting from intergovernmental to private governance can open up new and favorable spaces for weak actors to experiment with alternative forms of regulation, the paper contributes to the literature on the politics of regime complexity. The paper furthermore highlights the importance of studying non-elite actors and their day-to-day practices to gain a better understanding of changes within the international political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]