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In the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Azer­baijan achieved a decisive victory over Armenia. Quite sur­prisingly, Israel was a key player in this conflict, providing Azerbaijan with exten­sive support in the form of technology and arms. This support is part of a bigger research puzzle: How can Israel’s involve­ment in this conflict be explained? This report offers an explanation by showing how both geo­political factors and identity struggle are inter­twined. Using the lens of critical geo­political analysis, the report argues that not only realist factors, but also social con­structions of security as well as natio­nal and cul­tural iden­tity play into Israel’s inte­rest in the region.

Russia's war against Ukraine has accelerated international competition for influence in Africa. Structural weaknesses and post-pandemic instabilities continue to threaten achievements in the fields of democratic governance, peace and security, as well as development. We present a select list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2023. Politics: Democratic quality will depend on the nature of polls, as the electoral calendar is heavily packed. Important general elections that could trigger social unrest are scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Peace and security: Against the backdrop of continued structural-conflict risks, Jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions pose a major security challenge that may spill over to neighbouring states, especially from the Sahel to West African coastal countries. The recent ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region could be a first positive step towards peace. International arena: Amid Russia's war against Ukraine, many African governments were reluctant to join the international coalition condemning the Putin regime. Continued Western pressure on African countries to isolate Russia fosters African agency. At the same time, we expect to see an intensifying "new scramble for Africa" that includes both China and Middle Eastern countries. Socio-economic development: African countries will slowly rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic's socio-economic effects, but high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth. Progress on joint efforts to counter the climate crisis remains slow. Western support for African countries in their struggle for democracy, peace and security, as well as development requires a "new start" that focuses on prevention rather than ad hoc responses to current crises. The European Union and United States should avoid lapsing into Cold War habits of only assisting African governments if they "break away" from Russia. Germany needs to formulate a sound

Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is "effective." Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels' constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels' need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels' terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989-2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.

As diplomatic initiatives have thus far failed to achieve the objective of a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Demo­cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and given that a military solution is generally considered to be unfeasible, sanctions have become the central instrument of the international community in dealing with the threat from North Korea. While inherently linked to and built upon the respective resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU's sanctions regime against North Korea succeeds the former in terms of quantity and quality, constituting the most comprehensive sanctions regime of the EU currently in operation. Since its inception in 2006, the EU's sanctions regime against the DPRK developed in several episodes, which are built upon different logics and objectives: coercion, constraining, signaling. The political explanation for the EU's decision to adopt autonomous sanc­tions results from a set of interrelated factors, most notably the general sup­port for sanctions as an adequate tool for EU member states to use against North Korea, the influence of powerful member states, namely Germany, France, and (before Brexit) the UK, pushing for the imposition of autonomous EU measures, the lack of diplomatic engagement and eco­nomic interest, as well as third party pressure. While sanctions will remain an important aspect of the EU’s North Korea strategy in the foreseeable future, it is in Brussels' interest to supplement its sanctions-based strategy with more proactive initiatives vis-à-vis North Korea, as the current approach has distinct negative strategic implications for the EU. (author's abstract)

Im östlichen Teil von Europäischer Union und Nato wächst die Zahl regionaler Ko­ope­rationsprozesse. Zu etablierten Formaten wie der Vise­grád-Gruppe sind in den letzten Jahren weitere Zusammenschlüsse getreten, so die Drei-Meere-Initiative, das Lubliner Dreieck oder die mitteleuropäischen Central Five. Diese Initiativen verfolgen recht unterschiedliche Ziele. Manche sollen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen intensivie­ren, andere wollen mehr Einfluss in der EU, einige werden durch sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen angetrieben. Zwar werden nicht alle dieser Gruppen politische Schlagkraft gewinnen. Doch zeugen die minilateralen Entwicklungen in Europas Ostteil davon, dass die Staaten dort neben ihrem Zusammenwirken mit den USA und dem Zentrum der EU vermehrt nach selbstorganisierten Kooperationsformen in ihrer Umgebung streben. Der Krieg in der Ukraine bringt für die regionalen Formate einen spürbaren Versicherheitlichungsschub. (Autorenreferat)

The War in Ukraine has highlighted the divisions within and between Latin American countries. Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine goes against international norms endorsed by Latin American countries, the conflict seems remote and evokes long-standing rejection of United States policies. Notably, both regional powers, Mexico and Brazil, were reluctant to join the Western condemnation of Russia. Both the left-leaning Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador as well as Brazil's far-right president Jair Bolsonaro have maintained the traditional position of autonomy and neutrality that has characterised their countries' diplomatic histories. The Russian argument that NATO went too far in penetrating its security perimeter finds broad echo in Latin America. Paradoxically, such realist reasoning accepts the old geopolitical theory of great powers' "spheres of influence," which contradicts the autonomist theories historically endorsed by Latin American governments vis-à-vis US power. The war, and especially the sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons, have triggered fuel-price hikes, stimulated a rapprochement of the US with Venezuela, and altered the latter's tense relationship with neighbouring Colombia, easing conditions for the restoration of bilateral relations. Those interested in maintaining relations with Latin America should take note of the divide among the region's governments, many showing only reluctant support for the West's anti-Vladimir Putin policies. The insistence on foreign policy autonomy here cannot be understood as an articulated regional project but rather serves as a discursive framework which allows each government international room for manoeuvre, favouring relations with multiple external actors.

Am 2. März 2022 hat eine überwältigende Mehrheit von 141 Staaten der Vereinten Nationen den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine scharf verurteilt. Die Einigkeit verdeckt aber, dass der Krieg mit Russland im globalen Süden anders wahrgenommen wird, als es hier im Westen der Fall ist. Das zeigt nicht zuletzt, dass die Staaten in Afrika, großen Teilen Asiens, Nahost und Lateinamerika nicht bereit sind, die Sanktionen gegenüber Russland mitzutragen. Kleine und mittlere Staaten des globalen Südens sehen den russischen Einmarsch in der Ukraine als abschreckendes Beispiel eines mächtigen Staates, der über die Grenzen und Interessen seines kleineren Nachbarn hinweggeht. Für die allermeisten dieser Staaten ergibt sich daraus aber kein direktes Bedrohungsszenario. Der vom Westen ausgerufene "Epochenbruch" wird nicht geteilt. Russlands Rüstungskooperationen, der Export von Weizen, Düngemitteln und anderen Rohstoffen sind für viele Staaten im globalen Süden weiterhin von herausragender Bedeutung. Die Staaten des globalen Südens möchten wählen können, wo und mit wem sie kooperieren. So erhalten sie sich ihre Autonomie in einer zunehmend von Großmachtkonflikten geprägten, multipolaren Welt. Im globalen Süden ist Russland kein Pariastaat. Wenn die deutsche Außenpolitik das verkennt und ihre Partner im globalen Süden dazu drängt, sich dieser Einschätzung anzuschließen, muss sie mit Unverständnis rechnen. Das gilt umso mehr für China. Eine stärker geopolitisch ausgerichtete deutsche Außenpolitik ist dennoch möglich. Die meisten Staaten im globalen Süden wünschen sich deutsche und europäische Alternativen zu Russland und China, sowohl im Bereich der Rüstungskooperation als auch bei der Finanzierung von Infrastrukturmaßnahmen oder in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Zudem deckt sich die im Koalitionsvertrag der Bundesregierung festgehaltene, stärker wertebasierte Außenpolitik mit den Interessen kleiner und mittlerer Staaten an wirkmächtigen, multilateralen Institutionen, die allen Staat

Die stetige Entgrenzung der Macht des russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin ist die notwendige Voraussetzung für Russlands Angriffs- und Vernichtungskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Solange Putin an der Macht ist, wird sich das Regime nach innen und außen weiter radikalisieren.

Die Passportisierung, d. h. die extraterritoriale und massenhafte, in einem Schnellverfahren durchgeführte Einbürgerung von Bewohner:innen des Donbas seit April 2019, zeigt, dass die russische Invasion der territorialen Integrität und Souveränität der Ukraine ein gradueller und kontinuierlicher Prozess ist, der nicht nur mit militärischer Gewalt erfolgt.

While most Europeans lived through an exceptionally peaceful period of history, termed 'The Long Peace' by John Lewis Gaddis, the populations of other continents were decidedly less fortunate. What was a 'Cold War' for the Europeans was anything but 'cold' for the Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, for most Arab peoples, the Afghans, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians, the populations of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, and of most of Latin America. How, then, can one be so sanguine as to characterise this period as that of a 'Cold War' or a 'long peace'? The reason is that the long-expected Third World War has not (yet?) taken place. It was the prospect of such a Third World War, a 'total' and in all probability nuclear war, that attracted the attention of concerned minds in Europe and North America, the cultures that over centuries produced most publications on the subjects of war, strategy, military affairs and international relations.

Intensifying US-Chinese rivalry will increase pressure on Germany to support a more hawkish US geo-economic policy. The new ­German government should give Washington support in as far as US policies seek to create an economic level playing field vis-à-vis China. Given its dependence on international trade and investment, Germany should seek to resist a broader politicization of inter­national economic relations.

After military maneuvers near the borders, Moscow started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Before that, it has denied such an intent. It had been accusing Kiev of escalating the situation in the Donbas and the West of encouraging Ukraine to do so by taking sides in a biased manner. In mid-December 2021, it made clear in two draft treaties what it is after, namely preventing a further expansion of NATO to the east and obtaining binding assurances to this end. In doing so, it is in­voking the NATO-Russia agreements of the 1990s. Moscow voiced fears that Ukraine’s accession to NATO in particular would endanger Russia’s security and the strategic balance with the US. The US and NATO had signaled a willingness to engage in dia­logue on arms control issues, but they were not prepared to revise the principles of the European security order. Obviously, Moscow did not accept this and resorted to the use of force. It ignored the chance to embark on a new dialogue as an opportunity to de-escalate the situation and restore military predictability through arms control without abandoning principles. (author's abstract)

Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere due to structural constraints and contextual nuances. The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Ankara and Moscow can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though the institutional and elite ownership of Turkey’s Western relations has weakened, no similar institutional basis exists in Turkey’s relations with Russia. As such, the current Ankara-Moscow axis is to a great extent defined by the personal ties between the countries’ leaders and geopolitical imperatives. However, if the current shape of relations endures much longer, these personalised relations will gain structural foundations. A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically and structurally (energy-wise). Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. The close relations in recent years between Ankara and Moscow also point to the need for Turkey and the West to redefine the nature of their relations, as the Cold War framework of Turkey-US relations and the accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present realities. (author's abstract)

The recent debate about providing military assistance to Ukraine has relevance for the efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Minsk Process and the Normandy Format in particular, and thus the search for a resolution to the conflict regarding the Donbas. But it also concerns larger questions of Germany's role in Europe, and in security policy more generally. It touches on Germany's ability to adapt to situations in which other countries are willing to envisage military solutions to existing con­flicts. In this sense, it fits into discussions about a more geopolitical EU. And it offers Berlin a way to reinforce its commitment to European security and stability by more actively resisting the redrawing of international borders. (author's abstract)

Der Literaturbericht bietet eine Kontextualisierung, Auswertung und kritische Diskussion der akademischen Debatte über die Herausbildung eines "brasilianischen Ansatzes der Friedenskonsolidierung". Seit den 2000er Jahren hat Brasilien zunehmend Truppen für UN-Friedensmissionen bereitgestellt, vor allem in Haiti und Sub-Sahara Afrika. Dabei hat Brasilien sich bewusst gegen das vorherrschende liberale Paradigma der Friedenskonsolidierung positioniert und betont einen pragmatischeren, demokratischeren und nachhaltigeren Ansatz, der lokale Eigenverantwortung, nicht-militärische Mittel und den Verzicht auf politische Konditionen in den Vordergrund stellt. Das Working Paper untersucht Motivationen, Paradigmen und die Operationalisierung des brasilianischen Engagements und ergründet so, wie weit die Idee eines "brasilianischen Ansatzes" trägt und wie zwangsbasiert bzw. zwanglos Brasilien im Vergleich zu traditionellen westlichen Akteuren handelt. Zunächst wird der Aufstieg Brasiliens im Rahmen der wissenschaftlichen Debatte über sogenannte rising powers kontextualisiert und die historische Entwicklung des brasilianischen Engagements in UN-Friedensmissionen nachgezeichnet. Auf dieser Basis werden die konzeptionellen und normativen Debatten über den security-development nexus und die Responsibility to Protect/Responsibility while Protecting näher beleuchtet und die Erfolge und Misserfolge des brasilianischen Engagements in zwei konkreten Fällen vergleichend analysiert: Haiti und Guinea-Bissau. Mit Blick auf die allgemeine Frage nach einem "brasilianischen Ansatz der Friedenskonsolidierung" ergibt die Analyse kein eindeutiges Bild, da Brasilien durchaus auf zwangsbasierte Maßnahmen zurückgreift, die seinem friedlicheren Diskurs widersprechen. Nichtsdestotrotz ist die Anerkennung der Friedensbemühungen Brasiliens, welche das liberale Paradigma der Friedenskonsolidierung sowohl herausfordern als auch imitieren, entscheidend, um die potenziell transformativen Auswirkungen Brasil, This literature review contextualizes, reviews, and critically discusses the scholarly debate surrounding the emergence of a "Brazilian way of peacebuilding." Since the 2000s, Brazil has increasingly contributed troops to UN-led peacekeeping missions, specifically in Haiti and Sub-Sahara Africa. Opposing the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm, Brazil has staged itself as an advocate, promoting a more pragmatic, democratic, and sustainable peacebuilding approach that emphasizes local ownership, non-conditionality, and non-militarization. Investigating, whether portrayals of a "Brazilian way" are substantial, and how coercive Brazil acts in comparison to traditional Western actors, the paper examines motivations, paradigms, and the operationalization of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors. It first situates Brazil in the larger debate on rising powers and traces the evolution of Brazil's engagement in UN peacekeeping. This then allows to zoom in on conceptual and normative debates surrounding the security-development nexus and Responsibility to Protect vs Responsibility while Protecting, and to comparatively assess the successes and failures of Brazil's engagements in two concrete cases: Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. Overall, the findings are ambiguous, as Brazil does resort to coercion, hence contradicting its exceptionalist, pacifist discourse. Nonetheless, recognition of Brazil's efforts to contest and simultaneously mimic liberal peacebuilding is crucial to measure Brazil's transformative impact on multilateral operations. This, however, requires scholars to fill the substantial gap in empirical research concerning the concrete practices and consequences of Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on the ground.

Militärische Großübungen im Umfeld von Krisengebieten dienen nicht nur der Aus­bildung. Mit ihnen senden Staaten politische Signale. Solche Manöver verstärken Bedrohungsperzeptionen und bergen die Gefahr der Eskalation. Als Moskau ab Ende März 2021 seine Truppenpräsenz östlich der Ukraine und auf der Krim erhöhte, warnten der ukrainische Präsident Selenskyj und westliche Militärexperten, Russland könne die Ukraine angreifen. Moskau beschuldigte Kiew, die Lage im Donbass zu ver­schärfen. Die Nato versicherte Kiew ihrer Solidarität. Auch das Manöver Defender Europe 21, das im März unter US-Füh­rung begann, enthält eine politische Botschaft an Alliierte und Russland. Teile der bisher größten Militär­übung von Nato-Staaten auf dem Balkan finden in unmittelbarer Nach­barschaft zur Ukraine statt. Moskau erklärte am 22. April die "Ausbildung" für been­det und kündigte an, bis zum 1. Mai die Trup­pen zurückzuverlegen. Doch die Lage bleibt instabil. Um Berechenbarkeit wiederherzustellen, müssen gegenseitige militärische Beschränkungen vereinbart werden. Dazu sollte die Allianz das Gespräch mit Moskau suchen. (Autorenreferat)

Die jüngste Debatte über eine mögliche Verteidigungshilfe Deutschlands für die Ukraine ist von Relevanz, was die Bemühungen angeht, den gegenwärtigen Stillstand im Minsker Prozess wie im Normandie-Format zu überwinden und einer Lösung im Konflikt um den Donbas näherzukommen. Sie betrifft aber auch weitergehende Fra­gen zur Rolle der Bundesrepublik in Europa und ganz allgemein in der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik. Dabei geht es um die Fähigkeit Deutschlands, sich auf Situa­tio­nen einzustellen, in denen andere Länder bereit sind, Konflikte militärisch zu lösen. In diesem Sinne passt die Diskussion auch zu den Überlegungen für eine stär­ker geo­politisch ausgerichtete EU. Der Bundesregierung bietet sich hier ein Weg, der gewalt­samen Veränderung bestehender Grenzen aktiver entgegenzutreten und so ihrem Engagement für die Sicherheit und Stabilität Europas mehr Nachdruck zu verleihen. (Autorenreferat)

Die tschechische Regierung kündigte am 17. April an, sie werde 18 Mitarbeiter der russischen Botschaft in der Tschechischen Republik zur Ausreise auffordern. Prag wirft Moskau vor, russische Agenten seien verantwortlich für zwei Explosionen in einem Munitionslager im osttschechischen Vrbětice, die sich 2014 ereigneten. Russ­land reagierte mit der Ausweisung von 20 Botschaftsmitarbeitern, woraufhin Prag verkündete, das russische Botschaftspersonal weiter zu reduzieren. Auch hat Russ­land wohl kaum noch Chancen, beim geplanten Ausbau des Atomkraftwerks Dukovany zum Zug zu kommen. Angesichts des tiefsten bilateralen Zerwürfnisses mit Russland seit 1989 (bzw. seit der Unabhängigkeit des Landes 1993) wirbt die Tschechische Re­pub­lik nun um die Unterstützung der Verbündeten in Nato und EU. Deutschland sollte den Umgang mit Russland sowie das Thema hybride Bedrohungen zu einem sicht­baren Element des Dialogs mit Prag machen. (Autorenreferat)

Bangladesh continues to face a threat from Islamic terrorism. However, the drivers of this phenomenon remain under-studied. Research has traced terrorism in Bangladesh to wider processes of Islamization; a political context marked by conflict between the country’s two main political parties and by authoritarian governance; the institutional weakness of the Bangladeshi security and justice system; and international factors, such as the Afghanistan War, influences from the Gulf, and more recently the Rohingya refugee crisis, as well as the increased interest of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in South Asia. Based on an analysis of the literature and interviews, I argue that while the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh has been a complex process in which all of these factors have interacted, different constellations of them have been decisive at different historical stages.

The conflicts in the South China Sea have caught much attention in the past few years. The vast majority of academic studies focus almost exclusively on the Sino-Vietnamese and the Sino-Philippine conflicts in the South China Sea and the Sino-Japanese conflict in the East China Sea. By not considering the structurally fairly similar conflict between China and Malaysia and generally focusing on the past decade only those analyses neglect variation in Chinese conflict behaviour over time and between opponents. This article compares the high-profile Sino-Philippine conflict to the rather smooth relations between China and Malaysia. Whereas China has regularly challenged Philippine claims and activities in disputed regions, it has exhibited much more restraint towards Malaysia, even though the two countries' claims overlap and Malaysia, unlike the Philippines, has been extracting substantial resources (LNG) from regions disputed with China since the 1980s. I argue that much of the observable between-country and over-time variation in Chinese conflict behaviour is rooted in the approaches chosen by China's opponents for framing their overall bilateral relationships with China. Specifically, it is argued that China's opponents in territorial and maritime conflicts can assuage Chinese behaviour on the ground by signalling recognition and respect of China's overall self-role and world-order conceptions. Conversely, if they challenge the overarching Chinese self-role and world-order conceptions, China tends towards a coercive strategy. China will also tolerate higher levels of assertiveness of its opponent in the contest for sovereignty, when the opponent displays respect for China's recognition needs.

Since the Northern Mali war of 2012, the Sahel countries have seen substantial international aid and military involvement. Yet, the region is more fragile than ever. As jihadist groups have established themselves throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, violence has escalated dramatically and states have been pushed to the brink of collapse. In August 2020, after weeks of public unrest, Mali's government was toppled by a military coup. There is a palpable need to rethink international engagement in the Sahel region. Policymakers in Africa and Europe must realise that governments are involved in asymmetric conflicts that they cannot win militarily. Parts of the Sahel will remain ungovernable for the foreseeable future. As the situation takes a growing toll on societies, state legitimacy and social order are eroding. National policy and international assistance risk doing further damage, by narrowly focusing on counterterrorism, by taking sides in local conflicts, and by fuelling corruption through ill-designed development programmes. To prevent these unintended consequences, policymakers should adopt a holistic understanding of the Sahel crisis that explicitly considers the risks and consequences of military and development interventions. Governments and their international partners still lack coherent strategies to mitigate the impacts of violent jihadism on states and societies, to strengthen state-society relations and to address growing intercommunal violence. International involvement, including military assistance, is necessary to stop the spiral of violence and counter state fragility in the Sahel region. However, it must be centred on the objective of strengthening state-society relations. Preventing abuses against civilians and advocating for profound security-sector reform should be top priorities. Governments must begin to address growing injustices and economic grievances at the local level, to prevent further intercommunal violence. At the same time, ta

Im Juli 2020 nährte eine militärische Auseinandersetzung zwischen armenischen und aserbaidschanischen Streitkräften die Sorge vor einem Rückfall in regelrechten Krieg, wie ihn die beiden Seiten von 1992 bis 1994 geführt hatten. Der neuerliche Vorfall war der schwerste militärische Zusammenstoß in einer Grenzzone außerhalb Berg-Karabachs seit 1994. Doch im Mittelpunkt der prekären zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen steht nach wie vor der ungelöste Konflikt um diesen De-facto-Staat und sie­ben aserbaidschanische Provinzen in seiner Umgebung, die unter der Kontrolle armenischer Truppen stehen. Der jüngsten Eskalation war von 2018 bis zum Frühjahr 2019 eine Phase der Entspannung vorausgegangen. Während dieser Zeit hatten die Kon­takte zwischen Armeniens und Aserbaidschans Staatsführern zugenommen und diese ihre Bereitschaft bekundet, sich verstärkt auf eine friedliche Konfliktregelung ein­zulassen und die Bevölkerungen in diesen Prozess einzubeziehen. Bald darauf aber wurde der Ton wieder schärfer. (Autorenreferat)

After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.

Die seit Anfang Mai andauernde Konfrontation zwischen indischen und chinesischen Truppen im Himalaya hat sich zur schwersten Krise in den Beziehungen beider Staa­ten seit 45 Jahren zugespitzt. Am 15. Juni wurden erstmals seit 1975 bei einem Zwi­schenfall 20 indische und eine unbekannte Zahl chinesischer Soldaten getötet. Die gegenwärtige Krise hat im Unterschied zu früheren weiter reichende territoriale und politische Dimensionen. Sie erschüttert das bisherige Grenzregime und belastet das mühsam aufgebaute Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Premierminister Modi und Prä­sident Xi. Die Konfrontation ist aber auch eine Belastungsprobe für Indiens strate­gische Autonomie. Dieser Grundpfeiler der indischen Außenpolitik beinhaltet auch den Anspruch auf eine eigenständige Rolle in den geostrategischen Auseinander­setzungen zwischen China und den USA im Indo-Pazifik. (Autorenreferat)

In studying the global spread and implementation of liberal norms, scholars have moved from linear notions of norm diffusion and promotion to an emphasis on norm contestation. Contestation by the supposed beneficiaries and addressees has taken centre stage in both research on the norms that underpin global governance and in studies on democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding. While the impetus of this scholarship is normative - to overcome the taken-for-granted nature of liberal norms - the concept of contestation itself is mainly used with an analytical interest. Yet, as we show in this article, contestation also comes with - oftentimes implicit - normative connotations. Focusing on the seminal work of Milja Kurki, Oliver Richmond, Antje Wiener, and Amitav Acharya, we reconstruct these normative connotations. It turns out that the normative take on contestation is fairly conventional in all four approaches. Contestation is largely seen as a means to enable dialogue, as illustrated by Acharya's metaphor of the Banyan tree. Fundamental conflicts over liberal norms ('battle scenes') are either not considered or seen as normatively undesirable. As a way forward, we propose a typology that enables scholars to empirically analyse contestation in its different expressions and suggest two strategies to normatively assess practices of contestation.

The confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in the Himalayas, which has been ongoing since the beginning of May, has escalated into the most serious crisis in relations between the two countries in 45 years. On 15 June, for the first time since 1975, 20 Indian and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed in an inci­dent. The current crisis, unlike previous ones, has wider territorial and political dimensions. It shakes the previous border regime and strains the relationship of trust that was laboriously built up between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. The confrontation is also a test of India’s strategic autonomy. This corner­stone of Indian foreign policy also includes the claim to an independent role in the geostrategic tensions between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. (author's abstract)

Seit dem 11. Mai 1998 steht die internationale Staatengemeinschaft in Südasien vor einer neuen großen sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderung. An diesem Tag schockierte Indien die Weltöffentlichkeit mit der Explosion von drei nuklearen Sprengsätzen - zwei Tage später folgten zwei weitere Nukleartests. Die indische Regierung erklärte das Land ausdrücklich zum Kernwaffenstaat und zur Weltmacht mit einem Anspruch auf eine ständige Mitgliedschaft im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen.