Search

textabstractDecisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.

We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic) politics involves influence and collective decisions to a greater extent than markets for goods do. We develop and use a model to analyze different incentive schemes, credibility situations, and payoff and information structures. We discuss implications for the efficiency of democracy, voting, lobbying, committee decision making, and legislatures.

We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the individually-rational-core (IR-core) whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowments. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the IR-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose an IR-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the IR-core. We further show that the result cannot be generalized to supersets of the IR-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges, and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) in which students can only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by the experimental data, yet we find a number of behavioral differences between the mechanisms that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

The aim of this paper is the study of Tuscan municipalities public ex- penditure efficiency, with particular attention on the effect of the municipal size, through a DEA analysis. In line with the existing literature, the study includes a second stage analysis to explain municipal ineciencies through a Tobit regression. The results obtained through the DEA analysis and explained by the Tobit regression appear consistent and could represent a sound suggestion to correct the expenditure of the inefficient municipalities. The new evidences related to the efficiency analysis of local government described in the paper provide an important contribution to the current debate, being this the first study carried out on Tuscan municipalities and introducing a new indicator for the computation of the eciency scores which offer a new way of procedure. Moreover, the study addresses the long debated issue on municipal size proving that the municipal size really affects the effciency of the public expenditure (i.e. the bigger is a munici- pality, the greater is its level of public spending efficiency).

The rules and procedures of legislatures often provide legislators with information bearing on the identities of upcoming proposers. For a broad class of legislative bargaining games, we establish that Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer whenever the information structure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance. This result holds regardless of the recognition process and even if players vary in patience and risk aversion. It raises the possibility that procedures adopted in the interest of transparency may contribute to the imbalance of political power.

This paper analyses the political economics of the composition of taxes. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, with the median voter pivotal in the theoretical framework analysed. As in Meltzer and Richard (J Polit Econ 89:914–927, 1981), income taxes increase with inequality. Conversely, expenditure taxes first increase and then decrease with increasing inequality. The extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure unambiguously rises with inequality. In contrast to government size evidence, cross-country data exhibit a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to expenditure and inequality. Consistent with the theory, this relationship holds most significantly in stronger democracies.

We study the effect of direct democracy on local taxation. Our setting is the German federal state of Bavaria, where in 1995 a state-wide referendum introduced the possibility to initiate direct democratic legislation into the local government code. Relying on a sample of all Bavarian municipalities over the period 1980-2011, we hypothesize that complementing a representative form of government with direct democratic elements leads to (i) higher local tax rates and (ii) a shift of the local tax mix from taxes with broader (property taxes) to taxes with narrower bases (business taxes). For identification, we implement selection on observables and difference-in-discontinuity designs. Our results show that both actual direct democratic activity - measured by the number of initiatives - and the ease with which direct democratic legislation can be implemented - measured by signature and quorum requirements - increase local tax rates and shift the tax mix toward taxes with narrower bases.

We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, eciency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges. Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of dierent age groups.

There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American politics. While some argue that swing voters either do not swing or have a marginal impact on campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise of independents means that they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable commodity to candidates. Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters. A robust literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other states. This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection process. Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states. But these assertions notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some states compared to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be quantified? Relatedly, does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters? This study presents a new method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method that states use to allocate electoral votes. By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, we quantify how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in the voting power of citizens across states.

We analyze how having an incumbent among candidates affects electoral turnout. We use a rich data set providing information on the electoral results of Italian municipal elections over the period 1993-2011. Endogeneity issues are handled through an instrumental variable approach using the mayor term-limit as an instrument for the presence of the incumbent mayor among candidates. Controlling for electoral competition, we find that the impact of incumbency is heterogeneous across geographical areas: incumbency increases turnout in the South of Italy, whereas we do not find any statistically significant effect in the North. As the positive effect holds true only for southern municipalities endowed with low levels of social capital we speculate that this is the result of incumbent politicians using their resources to establish clienteles.

Unexplored stylized facts on OECD countries suggest that plurality electoral systems are associated with higher openness to immigration. We propose an explanation based on a retrospective voting model where immigration hurts voters but benefits a rent-seeking policymaker who appropriates part of the income generated by immigrants. To be reappointed, the policymaker must distribute the compensation. With respect to proportional systems, plurality systems make it possible to compensate only a few decisive districts and leave after-compensation rents higher, therefore producing higher immigration. In our model, non-decisive districts receive no compensation at all under both electoral systems, providing a rationale for widespread anti-immigration attitudes. Notably, our results also help to explain why governments often seem more pro-immigration than do voters. Finally, our model predicts that opposition to immigration is more geographically dispersed in plurality systems. Basic evidence supports this prediction.

A conservation good, such as the rainforest, is a hostage: it is possessed by S who may prefer to consume it, but B receives a larger value from continued conservation. A range of prices would make trade mutually beneficial. So, why doesn't B purchase conservation, or the forest, from S? If this were an equilibrium, S would never consume, anticipating a higher price at the next stage. Anticipating this, B prefers to deviate and not pay. The Markov-perfect equilibria are in mixed strategies, implying that the good is consumed (or the forest is cut) at a positive rate. If conservation is more valuable, it is less likely to occur. If there are several interested buyers, cutting increases. If S sets the price and players are patient, the forest disappears with probability one. A rental market has similar properties. By comparison, a rental market dominates a sale market if the value of conservation is low, the consumption value high, and if remote protection is costly. Thus, the theory can explain why optimal conservation does not always occur and why conservation abroad is rented, while domestic conservation is bought.

School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the same time, underrepresented minority students should be favored to close the opportunity gap. A common way to achieve this is to have a majority quota at each school, and to require that no school be assigned more majority students than its majority quota. An alternative way is to reserve some seats at each school for the minority students, and to require that a reserve seat at a school be assigned to a majority student only if no minority student prefers that school to her assignment. However, fair rules based on either type of affi rmative action suffer from a common problem: a stronger a ffirmative action may not benefi t any minority student and hurt some minority students. First, we show that this problem is pervasive: the problem disappears only if the minority students "mostly" have priority over the majority students. Then, we uncover the root of this problem: for some minority students, treating them as minority students does not benefit them, but possibly hurts other minority students. We propose a new assignment rule (Modified deferred acceptance with minority reserves), which treats such minority students as majority students, achieves a ffirmative action, and never hurts a minority student without benefiting another minority student.

The choice of transport infrastructure projects to include in the National Transport Infrastructure Plans in Sweden is often said to be motivated by the weighing of cost against social benefits. Examining the projects that are included in the Plans, it is clear, however, that not all projects have positive net present values, and are therefore more costly to build than the benefits they create. This paper studies alternative models that might explain the choice of projects. Two political economy models, the district demand and the swing voter with lobbying, are tested, and a model that accounts for the spatial distribution of the projects, as well as the possibility that priorities are based on welfare concerns, is estimated. No support is found for the political economy models. What explains investment volume is the existence of CBA results for a project, which may indicate that welfare benefits have an impact, as do the spatial spillovers from a project’s benefits and lobbying, especially by the municipalities concerned.

We investigate how increased electoral competition — by influencing the equilibrium policies of competing parties — affects the income distribution in society. Our model is embedded in a standard probabilistic voting setup where parties compete at two stages: (i) they allocate resources across various districts and (ii) then, for each district, they divide the resources among the different constituent groups. We show that an increase in electoral competition in a district results in a tendency towards equalization of incomes therein. We check for these relationships using data from the Indian national elections which are combined with household-level consumption expenditure data rounds from NSSO (1987-88 and 2004-05) to yield a panel of Indian districts. We find that districts which have experienced tight elections exhibit lower inequality and polarization which indicates a larger "middle class".

In this paper, we examine how candidate uncertainty affects the policy platforms chosen in a uni-dimensional, two candidate Downsian spatial model. The candidates, we assume, do not know the true distribution of voters. Following the robust control literature, candidates respond to this uncertainty by applying a max-min operator to their optimization problem. This approach, consistent with findings within the behavioral economics literature, protects the candidate by ensuring that her expected utility never falls too far, regardless of the true voter distribution. We show that this framework produces policy convergence between the two candidates but there is a multiplicity of possible policy platforms upon which the candidates could settle, some of which could be quite distant from the median voter. These results are robust to the timing of the game and the level of uncertainty faced by the candidates. We argue that our model explains drift, which is our term for changing political beliefs over time. While drift may be caused by shifting attitudes or demographics, we show that drift could also be the result of candidate uncertainty.

Utilizing an output based efficiency measure we investigate whether higher public revenues harm efficiency in the production of local public goods. Much variation in revenues among Norwegian local governments can be explained by revenues collected from hydropower production. This revenue variation, combined with good data availability, can be used to address a main concern in the resource curse literature; that public sector revenue, and in particular the revenue from natural resources, is endogenous. We obtain an exogenous measure of local revenue by instrumenting the variation in hydropower revenue, and thus total revenue, by topology, average precipitation and meters of river in steep terrain. We find support for what we term the Paradox of Plenty hypothesis—that higher local government revenue reduces the efficiency in production of public goods. We do not find support for what we term the Rentier State hypothesis—that revenue derived from natural resources should harm efficiency more than revenue derived from other sources such as taxation.

This paper investigates the effects of corruption on the emigration rate of low-, medium- and high-skilled individuals at the country level. Fixed-effects, system generalized method of moments (GMM) and instrumental variable estimations are used to establish a causal relationship between emigration and corruption. The empirical results indicate that as corruption increases, the emigration rate of high-skilled migrants also increases. The emigration rate of individuals with low and medium levels of educational attainment, however, increases at low levels of corruption and then decreases beyond a threshold of 3.4–4.0, where corruption is measured on a scale of 0 (not corrupt) to 10 (totally corrupt). Splitting the sample by income inequality suggests that increased inequality reduces the ability for medium- and low-skilled migrants to emigrate. Therefore, government action should focus on controlling corruption in order to prevent a brain drain.

This article examines the presence of political cycles inside the Portuguese governments’ aggregate expenditures by using annual data for 10 expenditure components. The results indicate that the choice of the expenditure components to be increased during election periods by Portuguese governments generally relates to more visible items such as general public services, social protection and health care., COMPETE, QREN, FEDER, FCT

Revolutions in genetic technology have heralded the age of population-scale genomic metadata. This article analyzes the tensions and gaps between traditional conceptions of personhood and international legal responses to a person’s right over disembodied data obtained from his/her body. The opportunities for breakthroughs in healthcare by interrogating population-scale genomic databases are accompanied by questions about privacy, property, dignity, and the nature of information regulation in a global economy. This article highlights instances where law and policy makers have grappled with these challenges, and foreshadows some emerging future challenges. It also highlights differences between jurisdictions, and calls for greater global participation in the development of a coherent framework, rather than continued reliance on a small number of stakeholders, to develop that framework.

The shipping industry, although relatively carbon-efficient, is projected to produce rising carbon emissions in the future as a consequence of increasing world trade. A number of candidate regulations designed to mitigate these emissions have been canvassed by the UN’s International Maritime Organisation and by the European Commission. Many of these schemes are focussed on the use of market measures—emission trading schemes or fuel levies. This paper draws on observational and interview data gathered to examine enforcement issues associated with the control of ships’ sulphur emissions in order to consider the possible enforcement problems that might be associated with projected market measures to control ships’ carbon emissions. Enforcement problems are shown to be associated with the globalised character of the industry and its polycentric governance structure.

Central to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is the claim that a conferral of incapacity may not be based on the wisdom of a decision alone. This paper problematizes this position. Values-based medicine is drawn on to explore the process of capacity assessment, highlighting the presence of preconceptions throughout assessment. Two cases before the Court of Protection are examined to bring into focus the complexity of conducting assessment without reference to wisdom. The paper proposes that every stage in the assessment of capacity is undertaken with reference to preconceptions and that an acknowledgement of these, along with transparency about when they are to be employed, would allow for greater clarity about what the MCA demands of practitioners.

Trends in international human rights law have challenged States globally to rethink involuntary mental health interventions from a non-discrimination perspective. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in particular prohibits laws that discriminate on the basis of disability. However, a key criterion for compulsory mental health treatment under typical mental health legislation is a psychiatric diagnosis (in conjunction with risk of harm and other criteria). Hence, for people with mental health disabilities, rights to liberty and consent in healthcare are held to a different standard compared to other citizens. A prominent law reform option being explored by some governments and commentators for achieving non-discrimination is to replace the diagnostic criterion for triggering involuntary intervention with an assessment of mental capacity. After all, every citizen is subject to restrictions on autonomy where they are deemed to lack mental capacity, such as where concussion necessitates emergency service. However, the use of mental capacity “testing” is seen by diverse commentators as wanting in key respects. A prominent criticism comes from the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which considers mental capacity assessments a form of disability-based discrimination. This article queries the call to replace the diagnostic criterion in mental health law with an assessment of mental capacity in the light of jurisprudence on equality and non-discrimination in international human rights law. Instead, we examine the doctrine of necessity as an area of law, which might help identify specific thresholds for overriding autonomy in emergency circumstances that can be codified in a non-discriminatory way. We also consider the need for deliberative law reform processes to identify such measures, and we suggest interim, short-term measures for creating a “supported decision-making regime” in the mental health context. The article focuses in particular on the Australian context of mental health law reform, though the analysis can be generalised to international trends in mental health law.

When it comes to economic reforms in developing countries, many economists agree on broad objectives (such as fostering outward orientation). Broad objectives, however, can be pursued in many di¤erent ways, and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works locally. We propose a simple model to study this societal learning process. The model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about “what works”. It suggests that this type of disagreement can stall the societal learning process and cause economic stagnation. Interestingly, this can happen even if everybody knows that Pareto-improving reforms do exist. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical observation of a negative relationship between disagreement and economic growth among poorer countries.

This study aimed to provide a diagnostic-analytic study of the characteristics of administrative reform experience in Jordan, through focusing on the structure of government in respect of size and complexity with a view to identify the pitfalls and shortcomings that accompanied it, based on assumptions in conducting reform. During the last twenty years, Jordan has witnessed a considerable effort in administrative reform. The result of such reform programs have fallen short of expectations and were rather limited in impact. Therefore, the analysis focused on the conditioned, under which the governing structure works efficiently, and how Jordan can direct its resources toward the achievement of efficiency in the public service with special emphasis on the bureaucracy structure. The study revealed that the private sector itself is unable to participate significantly in absorbing the labor force into the economy as a result of the monopoly problems existing in the public sector. Moreover, the lower share of spending on the capital category is vital in classifying the merits of government economic policies. Therefore adaptability is key to any reform and reorganization plan in which contingencies must be embedded in the process of organizational change and administrative action.

Recently, a political shift has been observed, in that some political conservatives are now advocating, adjusting, or abandoning draconian drug laws, including mandatory minimums, and funding diversion, re-entry, and drug programs. Vocal proponents of this movement include Grover Norquist, Rand Paul, Edwin Meese, and Mark Levin, from the Texas Public Policy Council. Any movement away from the mass incarceration that has characterized the U.S. correctional policy for the last 30 years is welcomed, however, it is important to note carefully the philosophical foundation of the conservative’s interest in shifting correctional policy. This paper explores the potential factors contributing to this philosophical shift.

This article proposes a change in public policy that promises to greatly reduce major crime in the United States, protect society, eliminate prison overcrowding, and save taxpayer dollars. This policy would employ electronic monitoring (EM) technology in a way that discourages individuals who might otherwise be tempted to commit crimes. The approach is arguably more effective, efficient, humane and ethical than any alternative strategy and potentially could revolutionize law enforcement and the American criminal justice system. Keywords: crime; policy; corrections; law; electronic monitoring; cost-benefit; criminal justice 1. Introduction Existing policies to “get tough” on crime have not only failed to control crime but have contributed to an enormous increase in the number of incarcerated individuals [1,2]. This suggests that the underlying premise—stiffer sentences deter criminals—may be incorrect. Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that incarceration rates could be tripled through a tripling of law enforcement and prison budgets, the available data suggest that the probability that an offender would be apprehended and incarcerated would remain low. As of 2004, the probability that an offender would be incarcerated was negligible for residential burglary (0.8 percent), vehicle theft (0.6 percent), robbery (1.7 percent), and assault (1.2 percent); and fairly small for rape (12.4 percent) [3]. This suggests that the deterrent effect of policies to “get tough” on crime would remain weak, and suggests a need to switch paradigms.

We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a given proposal, which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power. Competition undermines this agenda power, forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker. This beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences, because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals. (JEL D72, D73, D78, E61) During the early years of the New Deal, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced an enormous challenge. He believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues, including agriculture, trade, banking, employment, and social insurance. However, although Roosevelt was well versed in policy, crafting workable proposals for such a far-reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity, or that of his immediate advisors. Instead, the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies. Although these individuals shared some common goals (e.g., ending the Great Depression), they also had deep-seated ideological disagreements among themselves, and with the president, about what policies the federal government should pursue. Classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency. Weber (1991) famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a “mere dilettante” when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors. More recently, scholars

“Why workers’ rights are not women’s rights” is an argument whose purpose is to make clear why workers’ rights rest on a masculine embodiment of the labor subject and it is this masculine embodiment which is at the center of employment contracts and employment relations systems. By excavating the gender subjects implicit to and explicit in regulations of labor, the paper reveals the opposition of paired terms, masculinity and femininity privileging production over reproduction and naturalizing gender-based power relations. The paper identifies various laboring activities associated with differential rights and responsibilities. An examination of the treatment of part-time employment and waged caring labor, framed in labor, welfare, immigration, and citizenship policies and practices, locates exclusions from labor standards and exemptions from entitlements due to eligibility requirements and thresholds that assume the masculine embodiment of the worker-citizen. Gendering the analysis illustrates how contemporary labor laws and conventions grant rights on the basis of, and to, a rather abstract conception of the prototypical worker-citizen. Its origins lie in what classical political economy labeled a capitalist logic, as well as the historical practices in which free class agents entered into contracts for continuous, full-time work free of care responsibilities outside of the wage/labor nexus. Thus, it is this particular abstract construction of the proto-typical worker which instantiates the separation of “rights to” from “responsibilities for”, and it is this separation that allows the masculine embodiment of the labor subject. Modes of regulation privileging rights over responsibilities will valorize the masculine worker-citizen whose rights derive from their participation in wage labor and simultaneously devalue the feminine worker who is directly connected to caring labor.

This paper identifies the affiliation between the ending cash balance of the operating section in the cash flow statement and the bonds ratings. Our sample includes 600 companies from 26 countries. The study was conducted over a period of 18 years. An Ordered Probit regression analysis had been applied to identify how the positive cash balance of the operating section in the cash flow statement shapes the probability of escalating the bonds ratings. We find burly proof that the positive operating cash balance considerably affects the bonds ratings. In other words, when a company is able to generate enough cash from its main operating activities, the likelihood of having higher bonds ratings raises; this entails a low cost of debt since higher bond ratings have been proven to lessen the company’s cost for raising funds (in the form of bonds). The results add more confirmation to the creditors’ rights shields and how it affects the cost of debt.

The paper describes a theoretical contextualization of flexibility, sustainability, durability and resilience, in the context of the sustainable development goals. The main purpose is to identify the theoretical handles that may be used in the creation of a flexibility indicator. Thus, research questions related to the theoretical differentiation between durable and sustainable, flexible and resilient are answered. Further on, the paper describes the situation of the Romanian regions in terms of development indicators, based on Eurostat data, as a premise for further research on the possibility of their leapfrogging. This work was financially supported through the project “Routes of academic excellence in doctoral and post-doctoral research- REACH†co-financed through the European Social Fund, by Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, contract no POSDRU/59/1.5/S/137926.

Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, particularly as interpreted in the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities General Comment No. 1, presents a significant challenge to all jurisdictions that equate interventions permitted under their mental health and incapacity laws with mental capacity. This is most notable in terms of the General Comment’s requirement that substitute decision-making regimes must be abolished. Notwithstanding this, it also offers the opportunity to revisit conceptions about the exercise of legal capacity and how this might be better supported and extended through supported decision-making. This article will offer some preliminary observations on this using Scottish mental health and incapacity legislation as an illustration although this may also have relevance to other jurisdictions.

A team is assigned to accomplish a task in each infinitely-repeated period. The guide of the team and his followers are allowed to have asymmetric productivity; also the followers have either a hostile or favorable illusion toward the guide. Respective efforts and the followers' illusion are private information. At the end of each period, the output of the joint task emerges and the followers evaluate the guide. The analysis shows (1) that potential for an unreasonable evaluation suppresses the guide's effort down to an average level; (2) letting the followers inform the guide of their illusion in advance increases both sides' payoffs; (3) abolishing the evaluation reduces both sides' payoffs in general; and (4) however, if the magnitude of the followers' hostile llusion weighted by its relative probability is enormous, abolishing the evaluation increases the output and the guide's payoff.

Neuroscientific endeavours to uncover the causes of severe mental impairments may be viewed as supporting arguments for capacity-based mental health laws that enable compulsory detention and treatment. This article explores the tensions between clinical, human rights and legal concepts of “capacity”. It is argued that capacity-based mental health laws, rather than providing a progressive approach to law reform, may simply reinforce presumptions that those with mental impairments completely lack decision-making capacity and thereby should not be afforded legal capacity. A better approach may be to shift the current focus on notions of capacity to socio-economic obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Keywords: legal capacity; mental capacity; decision-making; mental health laws; neuroscience 1. Introduction Laws that enable the compulsory detention and treatment of individuals with severe mental impairments [1] have been enacted in many countries, including recently in China [2]. While the criteria for compulsory detention and treatment differ across jurisdictions, in general, there must be evidence of “mental illness”, generally defined according to certain symptoms, a need for treatment and some form of risk of harm to self or others [3]. Such mental health laws place decision-making about treatment primarily in the hands of clinicians, rather than the individual concerned, thereby enabling what is generally termed “substituted” decision-making. Some jurisdictions have mental health laws which also require evidence that the person concerned is unable or lacks “capacity” to consent to admission and/or treatment [4]. There have been calls by

Adequate cognitive and emotional capacity is essential to autonomous decision making by adult medical patients. Society often attaches legal consequences to decisional capacity evaluations. Even when the legal system is not formally involved in the competency evaluation of a particular individual, clinical practice and ethical conduct occur within and are informed by legal parameters. Using relevant statutory, court rule, and judicial opinion examples from a representative jurisdiction within the United States, this article argues that the law seldom provides much meaningful guidance to health care and human services providers to assist them regarding the content of capacity evaluation. The article concludes by asking how society ought to respond to the paucity of helpful guidance provided by the law in the decisional capacity evaluation context.

USP Marion is the first supermax federal penitentiary. Marionization refers to the experimental control program used at this prison. The prisoners speaking in this article suffered many years of solitary confinement. This research brief discusses some of what they experienced in their own words. These are the recollections of a few Marion prisoners that have summoned the courage to speak out and share their darkest memories.

This article explores the practice of gamete donation in the U.S. having in mind the larger question of what do we as a society owe children born as a result (donor-conceived children). Do recipient-parents have a duty to tell their donor-conceived child about his/her genetic origins? Should the identity of the donor be disclosed or remain anonymous? Does the child have a right to know her conception story and to receive information, including identifying information, about the donor? Furthermore, if a donor-conceived child has a right to know, who has the duty to tell her/him about it? The Article underscores the ethical, legal and social dilemmas that arise, comparing and contrasting with international developments in this arena. It highlights the market-based and more specific medical justifications for regulating this field, explores the emerging so-called right of the child to know his/her genetic origins (“the right to know”), and considers the challenges such a right evokes to existing legal culture and principles of medical ethics in the U.S. as well as other broader societal implications of such a right.

Policymakers have recently embraced Behavioral Economics as an alternative approach which recognizes the limits and consequences of human decision-making. Early applications of BE (“nudges”) produced notable successes and helped to set the stage for more aggressive applications aimed at the deeper causes of policy problems. We contend that policies that aspire to simplify products and incentives, rather than choice environments, aggressively protect consumers from behavioral exploitation, and leverage BE to enhance the design and implementation of traditional policy instruments offer solutions commensurate with contemporary challenges. Case studies in health insurance, privacy, and climate change illustrate the application of these ideas.

Canada recognizes young people’s constitutionally protected freedom of expression and consequently their right to engage in a narrow subset of consensual sexually expressive practices without being prosecuted as child pornographers. Nevertheless, numerous anti-sexting campaigns decry the possibility of voluntary and “safe sexting” let alone the affordances of adolescents’ self-produced and consensually shared sexual imagery. In this article, we argue that these actors have erred in their construction of youths’ risque imagery as inherently risky and thus governable. We propose that anti-sexting frameworks—which conflate consensual and nonconsensual sexting and which equate both with negative risks that purportedly outweigh the value and benefits of the practice—rely on a calculus that is fundamentally flawed. This article consists of two main parts. In Part I, we map and trouble the ways in which responses to consensual teenage sexting emphasize the practice’s relationship to embodied, financial, intimate and legal risks. In Part II, we suggest that research examining consensual adolescent sexting and young people’s rights to freedom of expression consider alternative theoretical frameworks, such as queer theories of temporality, when calculating the risk of harm of adolescent sexual imagery.

Why does torture persist despite its prohibition? Scholars, policymakers, and the public have heavily debated this topic in the past decade. Yet, many puzzles remain about the practice of torture. Scholarship on torture spans academic disciplines, which adds diversity in perspectives brought to these questions but also can lead to redundancy and stunted progress in research on the issue as a whole. This article assesses the state of the multidisciplinary literature on torture in counterterrorism with specific focus on why democracies torture despite prohibiting it, how public perception of torture is malleable, and why so few countries are able to move from commitment to compliance in the prohibition of torture. In each section, the article also identifies underexplored areas in the research and suggests avenues for future investigation.

Previous research suggests that social relations, in particular the forming of family ties and employment (social factors), self-efficacy (personal factors), and therapeutic interventions (institutional factors) constitute main contributors in post-release success. These studies, however, have largely been based on general delinquents serving relatively short prison terms. This study aims to shed light on the influence of social, personal, and institutional factors on post-release success versus failure among paroled lifers. We conducted in-depth life-history interviews with 64 individuals who had served a life sentence, who were either re-incarcerated for another crime or parole violation, or were currently out on parole. The role of social factors in desistance among long-term incarcerated offenders was minimal. Rather, self-efficacy appeared to be a key element in post-release success. These findings suggest that research based on short-term incarcerated offenders cannot be directly translated to long-term incarcerated offenders. This group does not experience the same traditional turning points, such as establishing family ties and employment. Accordingly, long-term prisoners may go through a different process post-release that determines their success versus failure compared to general delinquents who serve shorter sentences.

International audience; In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.

In the early 2000s the Inter-American Development Bank launched a visionary and influential research agenda that dramatically improved understanding of the policymaking process (PMP) in Latin America. It did so by detailing the role played by key actors in the PMP and how those actors interacted to produce public policy throughout the region in general, and, via the publication of a volume in English and an updated version in Spanish, in eight countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela) in particular. This paper reviews the degree to which these eight country-level analyses still accurately portray the actors and their role in the PMP today. It concludes that in a large majority of the countries the analysis is still broadly valid and accurately describes the political institutions and actors who are pivotal for the policymaking game, although in some areas the original analysis would benefit from revision and update.

We analyse a competitive research-oriented public programme established in Spain, the Ramon y Cajal Programme, intended to offer contracts in public research centres to high-quality researchers. We study the effects of the programme on the ex post scientific productivity of its recipients, relative to non-granted applicants with comparable curricula at the time of application. The full sample results demonstrate that the programme has a positive and significant effect on the scientific productivity of the recipients, as measured both by the amount of published contribution and by the impact of their publications. Consequently, receiving a contract affects the quantity, but also increases the quality, of the contract recipients' publications. Research funding from the Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness, Grant Nos. ECO2015-65204-P (Alonso-Borrego), ECO2014- 57442P (Romero-Medina), ECO2015-70331-C2-1- R (Sánchez- Mangas), MDM20140431 (Alonso-Borrego and Romero- Medina) and Comunidad de Madrid, Grant No. MadEco-CM S2015/HUM-3444 (all authors) is acknowledged

Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation, self-regulation by the Örm, and boycotts by the activists in a dynamic game. Our main results are the following. (i) The possibility to self-regulate saves on administrative costs, it therefore also leads to delays. (ii) The possibility to self-regulate benefits activists but harms the firm without the public regulator in place, the reverse is true with the regulator being present in the game. (iii) Without the public regulator, a boycott raises the likelihood of self-regulation, whereas if the regulator is present, it raises the likelihood of public regulation. (iv) Activism is a strategic complement to self-regulation, but a strategic substitute to public regulation. (v) In addition, the analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions regarding the regulatory outcomes and the duration of boycotts.

This article uses the debates surrounding the age of consent as a broad umbrella to question the continued usefulness of Queer Theory. The debates surrounding the age of consent illustrate that Queer Theory has not fulfilled its original promise and that it is not (and possibly never been), “fit for purpose”. Towards the end of 2013, the topic of lowering the age of consent in England and Wales was once again much in the news. This article suggests that much of that debate focused expressly or impliedly on the age of which men and boys have sexual intercourse (whether gay or straight), rather than when people have sexual intercourse. Queer Theory (originating from feminism), was intended to be a liberating phenomenon, but contrary to these hopes and intentions, Queer Theory evolved to become synonymous with white gay men, thus denying its origins and becoming distinctly anti-feminist. Those who argue for a reduction in the age of consent have used (whether knowingly or not) an approach which is consistent with this evolved version of Queer Theory. Consequently, the debate on the age of consent has ignored, or given insufficient attention to, the effect(s) a lowering of the age of consent will have on girls and women. This article, therefore, seeks to question, disrupt and unsettle, what Queer Theory has become, suggesting that, in several significant aspects, it fails to fully acknowledge patriarchy, render (lesbian) women visible, acknowledge and accommodate the lived experiences of women.

Over the last 40 years a number of scholars have called upon fellow criminologists to rethink the field’s priorities and methods, as well as the American criminal justice system and current punishment practices. Drawing on alternative criminologies, including constitutive and peacemaking criminologies, as well as the practice of reintegrative shaming, this paper presents a new model of criminal justice that combines aspects of adversarial, restorative, social, and transformative justice frameworks. The resulting “intersectional criminal justice” offers a holistic harm-reduction model that moves the focus of our criminal justice system away from “rough justice” and towards collective restorative healing and positive social change.

While boys who offend have been a dominant majority and primary concern of the juvenile court since its earliest days, the population of delinquent girls has increased in recent years at a far higher rate in the U.S. The special challenges presented by females, however, continue to be generally overlooked by the justice system. Moreover, while a few specialized programs now serve these girls, the field tends to view young female offenders as a homogeneous group, what distinguishes particular female subpopulations and the characteristics associated with different criminal trajectories have gone largely unexplored. Employing data from the state of Missouri, this study examines girls who offend, identifying models that predict subsequent violent behavior that include indicators such as parental substance abuse and incarceration, and offender substance abuse, mental health, and school behavior. Special attention is given to the effects of child maltreatment, which we find significantly, but weakly correlated with violent behavior. The authors conclude by considering the possibility that maltreatment may be correlated with other criminogenic factors, and by discussing the implications of findings for future research and practice, especially services that take into account the trauma experienced by young women who come to the attention of state authorities.