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We analyse the behaviour of the Norwegian unsecured overnight interbank market in response to heightened uncertainty and the central bank's liquidity support measures following the Covid-19 pandemic. The liquidity measures enabled banks to fulfil their liquidity needs primarily through participation in extraordinary liquidity auctions. The distribution of central bank reserves across banks did not change due to these measures, but interbank trading fell sharply. Ample liquidity support through the auctions and low interbank trading contributed to low and overly stable overnight rates. Actually, throughout our sample period from 2017 to 2021, the overnight rates remained largely unaffected by fluctuations in uncertainty and overall liquidity conditions.

In this paper, we examine how a trade conflict's impact on the real economy can be amplified by financial intermediaries. After the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, China in practice banned imports of Norwegian salmon. The ban was an unexpected trade shock to the Norwegian salmon industry. Using bank balance sheet and credit register data, we trace how this trade shock affected the lending behavior of banks highly exposed to the salmon industry when the shock occurred. We find that, in the years following the trade shock, highly exposed banks cut back lending to non-salmon firms and households by 3-6 percent more than other banks. Furthermore, we find that the reduction in lending was not driven by the erosion of bank capital, but rather by the shift in expectations about the performance of loans to salmon producers, which drove highly exposed banks to increase their loan loss provisions and reduce risk-taking.

This paper examines the impact of implicit guarantees and capital regulations on the behavior of a bank and on the expected losses for its depositors. I show that implicit guarantees increase the incentives of the bank to enhance leverage and/or risk taking and that this leads to higher expected losses for its depositors. To reduce the adverse effects of moral hazard, policy measures have to be taken. However, a simple leverage ratio is likely to increase expected losses further and risk adjusted capital requirements do not necessarily affect highly leveraged banks with very low risk assets. A combination of both requirements can be successful. Positive long-term effects can be achieved by a reduction of moral hazard and informational imperfections. However, it is difficult to achieve these reductions and potentially severe short-term effects have to be taken into account.

I study economies where banks do not fully internalize the social costs of default, which distorts their lending decisions. In all these economies, a common general equilibrium effect leads to aggregate over-investment. As a result, under laissez-faire, crises are too frequent and too costly from a social point of view. In response, the regulator sets a capital requirement to trade off expected output against financial stability. The capital requirement that ensures investment efficiency depends on the state of the economy. Because of the general equilibrium effect, the more aggregate banking capital the tighter the optimal requirement. A regulation that fails to take this effect into account exacerbates economic fluctuations and allows for excessive build-up of risk in the financial sector during booms. Government guarantees amplify this mechanism and, at the peak of a boom, even a small adverse shock can trigger a banking sector collapse, followed by an excessively severe credit crunch. JEL Classification: E44, G01, G21, G28

Using comprehensive data on bank lending and establishment-level outcomes from 1997–2010, this paper finds that small business lending is an unimportant determinant of small business and overall economic activity. A shift-share style research design is implemented to predict county-level lending shocks using variation in preexisting bank market shares and bank supply shifts. Counties with negative predicted lending shocks experienced declines in small business loan originations, indicating that it is costly to switch lenders. However, small business loan originations have an economically insignificant and generally statistically insignificant impact on both small firm and overall employment during the Great Recession and normal times. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G21, G32, L25)

We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing and expansion. We use French loan-level data and take advantage of the transition from Basel I to Basel II. While under Basel I the capital charge was the same for all firms, under Basel II, it depends in a predictable way on both the bank's model and the firm's risk. We exploit this two-way variation to empirically estimate the sensitivity of bank lending to capital requirement. This rich identification allows us to control for firm-level credit demand shocks and bank-level credit supply shocks. We find very large effects of capital requirements on bank lending: A 1 percentage point decrease in capital requirement leads to an increase in loan size by about 5%. At the firm level, borrowing also responds strongly although a bit less, consistent with some limited between-bank substitutability. Investment and employment also increase strongly. Overall, because the transition to Basel II led to an average reduction by 2 percentage points of capital requirements, we estimate that the new regulation led, in France, to an increase in average loan size by 10%, an increase in aggregate corporate lending by 1.5%, an increase in aggregate investment by 0.5%, and the creation or preservation of 235,000 jobs.

This paper studies the impact of the banks’ portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks’ individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. Using a sample of 95 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks’ contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that banks’ aggregate holdings of five classes of derivatives do not exhibit a significant effect on the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. On the contrary, the banks’ holdings of certain specific types of derivatives such as foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. Therefore, the derivatives’ impact plays a second fiddle in comparison with traditional banking activities related to the former two items.

We study the dividend payouts of U.S. banks during the 2008 financial crisis. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we shows that banks with higher share of short-term liabilities to total liabilities, which were thus more exposed to the rollover crisis that took place in 2008, increased their dividend payouts relative to less exposed banks. This relative increase in dividend payouts is concentrated in relatively cash-rich banks. The dividend payout increase was associated with a short-run increase in stock valuations. We argue that this front-loading of dividends of more exposed banks is consistent with a theory of dividend payouts, in which the payout policy has a (short-run) stabilizing role on the bank’s liquidity position by signaling information to short-term lenders about the bank’s available liquidity.

We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.

This paper specifies an empirical framework for estimating both technical and allocative efficiency, which is applied to a large panel of European banks over the years 1996 to 2003. Our methodology allows for self-consistent measurement of technical and allocative inefficiency, in an effort to address the issue known in the literature as the Greene problem. The results suggest that, on average, European banks exhibit constant returns to scale, that technical and allocative efficiency are close to 80% and 75% respectively, and that overall economic efficiency shows a clearly improving trend. We also show through the comparison of various estimators that models incorporating only technical efficiency tend to overestimate it.

This paper provides parametric estimates of technical change, efficiency change, economies of scale, and total factor productivity growth for large banks (those with assets in excess of $1 billion) in the United States, over the period from 2000 to 2005. This is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a Bayesian framework. We find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and/or cost shares, which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth. Our results from the regularity-constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large US banks grew at an average rate of 1.98% over the sample period. However, our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal Divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components – technical change, efficiency change, and economies of scale – indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline.

This study reviews and evaluates a particular aspect of the institution building process in the transition countries of Southeast Europe. The focus is the development of the banking sector. It is argued that banking sector development plays an integral and pivotal role in the successful completion of the transition process. It functions as a very strong integrating force contributing to the broader institution building process and as a pillar of future growth and development in the new market environment of the Balkan economies. This study concentrates on three main issues. First, it undertakes a brief literature review of regional integration approaches in the Balkans. Second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place in the banking sector. Third, it reviews some structural characteristics and performance indicators, all of which point to considerable advancements made in this sector in recent years. Empirical evidence is provided showing that a substantial harmonisation of ownership structures and performance indicators has been achieved in the banking sectors of these countries initiating a convergence process toward EU banking structures and functions. In this regard, this study complements the findings of other studies focusing on various sectors of economic activity, which clearly show that a de facto regional and, even more so, continental integration of the Southeast European countries is under way.

We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks’ leverage ratios when providing deposits to make sure they have enough “skin in the game” to opt for loan monitoring. When there is unobservable heterogeneity among banks with regard to their (opportunity) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding. With a suitable regulatory leverage constraint, the gains from higher lending by banks with a high repayment pledgeability outweigh losses from banks which are less diligent in monitoring. Bank-risk assessments, combined with appropriate risk-sensitive capital requirements, can reduce or even eliminate such losses.

During the housing bust of 2008–2009, housing prices and transaction volumes fell across the United Kingdom. Although the drop in prices was similar across housing types, transaction volumes fell more for units at the lower end of the market. I document this fact and provide panel and instrumental variable estimates showing its link with tightening credit conditions in England and Wales during 2008. I then use an overlapping-generation framework to relate the change in the composition of sales with the reduction in loan-to-value ratios by British banks and to derive additional predictions. As down-payment requirements increase, young households with scarce financial resources are priced out by older owners who retain their previous houses as rental properties when trading up. Recent changes in aggregate housing tenure, disaggregated changes in renting, and sales in areas with different age compositions, are consistent with these predictions. The results presented here show how the composition of sales changes over the housing cycle and may inform ongoing policy discussions about reduced access to home-ownership by the young.

This paper studies the welfare properties of mutual funds in a Diamond–Dybvig economy with two sources of aggregate risk: (i) shocks to long-term investment returns; and (ii) shocks to aggregate liquidity demand. Mutual funds are inefficient when the long-term investment is risky. Mutual funds improve upon autarky by introducing a wedge between the market and technological rates of return. However, the wedge distorts the decisions of consumers not facing liquidity shocks, and the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. If only aggregate liquidity demand is subject to shocks, mutual funds can implement the social optimum (even when liquidity demand is not directly observable) by means of a price-contingent dividend policy.

In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such bankingon- the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that banking-on-the-average rules ensure the build-up of bank equity capitals in booms and thus avoid excessive leverage. Prudent banks can impose prudency on other banks. In a simple model of a banking system, we show that a banking-on-the-average framework can deliver the socially optimal solution because it induces banks to abstain from gambling. Moreover, it alleviates socially harmful consequences of conventional equity-capital rules, which may induce banks to excessively cut back on lending or liquidate desirable long-term investment projects in downturns.

We study the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit when bank lending is denominated in foreign currencies. Accessing a comprehensive supervisory dataset from Hungary, we find that the supply of bank credit in a foreign currency is less sensitive to changes in domestic monetary conditions than the equivalent supply in the domestic currency. Changes in foreign monetary conditions similarly affect bank lending more in the foreign than in the domestic currency. Hence when banks lend in multiple currencies the domestic bank lending channel is weakened and international bank lending channels become operational.

COVID-19 brought about a shift in entrepreneurial opportunities and in the United States. In this paper, we proxy entrepreneurial processes by examining housing prices in different regions of the United States. Housing prices capture the movement in people, tax dynamics, and behavioral preferences for equity ownership in different regions and over time, all of which were drastically impacted by COVID-19. We examine all U.S. equity crowdfunding offerings starting with the very first offerings in 2016 Q2 until 2021 Q1 based on data from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The data indicate that regional housing prices post-COVID-19 are a strong predictor of the number of equity crowdfunding campaigns and the amount of capital raised. The impact of housing price changes on crowdfunding is more pronounced among more prosperous regions. The housing price effect is robust to numerous controls and consideration of outliers.

The purpose of the “counter-cyclical capital buffer” (buffer) is to dampen procyclicality in the financial system, absorb capital losses and prevent a credit crunch during recessions. In this paper, a stylized analytical expression for optimal buffer policy is presented. Results are derived within a minimalist model framework, useful for a transparent presentation of how authorities’ preferences and structural parameters have implications for optimal buffer policy. In the model, there is a risk of a financial crisis, and an ex ante higher buffer may counteract the effects of it on the economy. The buffer also affects output in the short term, and here the difference between banks’ actual capital coverage ratio and capital requirements plays a role. Under quite general conditions, authorities will want to lower the buffer and allow banks to be less well capitalized today if the output gap is negative. The model illustrates that unless authorities care also about a stable bank capital coverage ratio (in addition to output stabilization and the costs of crisis), optimal policy may prescribe a very volatile buffer. In particular, that is the case if the effect of the buffer on output is weak. This result highlights the importance of learning more about the effects of buffer policy in order to achieve good policy design.

The importance of agile methods has increased in recent years, not only to manage software development processes but also to establish flexible and adaptive organisational structures, which are essential to deal with disruptive changes and build successful digital business strategies. This paper takes an industry-specific perspective by analysing the dissemination, objectives and relative popularity of agile frameworks in the German banking sector. The data provides insights into expectations and experiences associated with agile methods and indicates possible implementation hurdles and success factors. Our research provides the first comprehensive analysis of agile methods in the German banking sector. The comparison with a selected number of fintechs has revealed some differences between banks and fintechs. We found that almost all banks and fintechs apply agile methods in IT-related projects. However, fintechs have relatively more experience with agile methods than banks and use them more intensively. Scrum is the most relevant framework used in practice. Scaled agile frameworks are so far negligible in the German banking sector. Acceleration of projects is apparently the most important objective of deploying agile methods. In addition, agile methods can contribute to cost savings and lead to improved quality and innovation performance, though for banks it is evidently more challenging to reach their respective targets than for fintechs. Overall our findings suggest that German banks are still in a maturing process of becoming more agile and that there is room for an accelerated adoption of agile methods in general and scaled agile frameworks in particular.

We investigate whether government credit guarantee schemes, extensively used at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, led to substitution of non-guaranteed with guaranteed credit rather than fully adding to the supply of lending. We study this issue using a unique euro-area credit register data, matched with supervisory bank data, and establish two main findings. First, guaranteed loans were mostly extended to small but comparatively creditworthy firms in sectors severely affected by the pandemic, borrowing from large, liquid and well-capitalized banks. Second, guaranteed loans partially substitute pre-existing non-guaranteed debt. For firms borrowing from multiple banks, the substitution mainly arises from the lending behavior of the bank extending guaranteed loans. Substitution was highest for funding granted to riskier and smaller firms in sectors more affected by the pandemic, and borrowing from larger and stronger banks. Overall, the evidence indicates that government guarantees contributed to the continued extension of credit to relatively creditworthy firms hit by the pandemic, but also benefited banks’ balance sheets to some extent.

We propose three governance mechanisms pertinent to equity crowdfunding and campaign success through mitigating pronounced information asymmetries and agency problems. First, unlike IPOs for which the effect of Delaware incorporation has declined or disappeared over time, we propose Delaware incorporation matters a great deal for success in the new setting of equity crowdfunding. Second, we propose that security design is a critical tool for equity crowdfunding success and even more important than the limited 2-year financial statement disclosure. Third, we propose that platforms as intermediaries between entrepreneurs and investors play an important role in mitigating and sometimes exacerbating information asymmetries and agency problems. The population of equity crowdfunding campaigns from market inception in May 2016 to Q2, 2021 in the United States provides strong support for these propositions.

We use administrative and supervisory data at the bank and loan level to investigate the impact of the introduction of covered bonds on the composition of bank balance sheets and bank risk. Covered bonds, despite being collateralized by mortgages, lead to a shift in bank lending from mortgages to corporate loans. Young and low-rated firms in particular receive more credit, suggesting that overall credit risk increases. At the same time, we find that total balance sheet liquidity increases. We identify the channel in a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence: Banks with low initial liquidity and banks with sufficiently high risk-adjusted return on firm lending drive the results.

We use unique data on banks' private risk assessments of corporate borrowers to quantify how competition among banks affect the risk sensitivity of interest rates in the Norwegian credit market. We show that an increase in competition makes corporate lending rates less sensitive to banks' own assessment of borrower risk and this is more pronounced in market segments with higher degree of asymmetric information. Our results are driven by banks with low franchise values, outlining a novel channel of how the competition-fragility nexus can operate.

We explore the impact of low and negative monetary policy rates in core world economies on bank lending in four small open economies – Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic and Norway – using confidential bank-level data. Our results show that the impact on lending in these small open economies depends on the interest rate level in the core. When interest rates are high, monetary policy cuts in core economies can reduce credit supply in small open economies. In contrast, when interest rates in core economies are low, further expansionary monetary policy increases lending in small open economies, consistent with an international bank lending channel. These results have important policy implications, suggesting that central banks in small open economies should watch for the impact of potential regime switches in core economies’ monetary policy when rates shift to and from the very low end of the distribution.

We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these firms started borrowing at lower interest rates immediately and permanently. This suggests that firms were held up and overcharged exante, and reveals the lower bound of their ex-ante switching costs. Opaquer firms were overcharged more, which suggests that information asymmetries significantly contribute to switching costs. In line with banks' reputational concerns, a healthy bank's closure revealed no overcharging. To policy-makers, our results suggest potential benefits of distressed banks' closures.

This paper explores whether foreign intermediaries stabilise or destabilise lending to the real economy in the presence of sovereign stress in the domestic economy and abroad. Tensions in the government debt market may lead to serious disruptions in the provision of lending (i.e., the so-called "doom loop"). In this context, the presence of foreign banks poses a fundamental, yet unexplored, trade-off. On the one hand, domestic sovereign shocks are broadly inconsequential for the lending capacity of foreign banks, given that their funding conditions are not hampered by such shocks. On the other, these intermediaries may react more harshly than domestic banks to a deterioration in local loan risk and demand conditions. We exploit granular and confidential data on euro area banks operating in different countries to assess this trade-off. Overall, the presence of foreign lenders is found to stabilise lending, thus mitigating the doom loop.

Bilateral payment flows between banks may provide private information about a borrowing bank's liquidity position. This paper analyses whether private information on the bilateral payment flow of central bank reserves foster peer monitoring or whether the information is used to reduce search costs in the unsecured interbank market. In the former, banks with outflows of liquidity are penalized by their counterparties, while in the latter, these banks benefit through reduced search costs to find a liquidity provider. I use data from Norges Bank's real time gross settlement system over the period 2012 to 2015 to identify unsecured overnight interbank loans and payment flows. The results suggest that banks are using private information from payment flows to reduce search costs and not for peer monitoring. This has important implications for regulators' assessment of the pros and cons of a centralized versus a decentralized interbank market.

As part of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) program, the European Commission has pledged to issue up to EUR 250 billion of the NGEU bonds as green bonds, in order to confirm their commitment to sustainable finance and to support the transition towards a greener Europe. Thereby, the EU is not only entering the green bond market, but also set to become one of the biggest green bond issuers. Consequently, financial market participants are eager to know what to expect from the EU as a new green bond issuer and whether a negative green bond premium, a so-called Greenium, can be expected for the NGEU green bonds. This research paper formulates an expectation in regards to a potential Greenium for the NGEU green bonds, by conducting an interview with 15 sustainable finance experts and analyzing the public green bond market from September 2014 until June 2021, with respect to a potential green bond premium and its underlying drivers. The regression results confirm the existence of a significant Greenium (-0.7 bps) in the public green bond market and that the Greenium increases for supranational issuers with AAA rating, such as the EU. Moreover, the green bond premium is influenced by issuer sector and credit rating, but issue size and modified duration have no significant effect. Overall, the evaluated expert interviews and regression analysis lead to an expected Greenium for the NGEU green bonds of up to -4 bps, with the potential to further increase in the secondary market.

Does household leverage matter for worker job search, matching in the labor market, and wages? Theoretically, household leverage can have opposing effects on the labor market through debt-overhang and liquidity constraint channels. To test which channel dominates empirically, we exploit the introduction of a loan-to-value ratio restriction in Norway that exogenously reduces household leverage. Focusing on a sample of displaced workers who bought a house before losing their jobs due to mass layoffs, we find that a reduction in leverage raises the subsequent wages of these workers. Lower leverage enables workers to search longer, find jobs in higher-paying firms, and switch into new occupations and industries. The positive effect on wages is persistent and more pronounced for young and highly-educated workers who are more likely to benefit from the effects of a reduction in leverage on job search. Our results indicate that in addition to reducing financial stability risks, policies limiting household leverage can improve workers’ labor market outcomes.

European comparisons for the 2000s show that Italy was among the EU countries where women were least represented in bank boardrooms. Using a unique dataset on Italian banks over the period 1995-2010, this paper investigates the effects of gender diversity in boards on bank riskiness and economic performance. Taking account of omitted variables and reverse causality problems, as a source of endogeneity, our main econometric findings suggest that gender diversity may have a positive impact on the quality of credit and, to a lesser extent, on profitability. Both results may be driven by women’s higher risk aversion and their attitude to monitoring activities. Our study therefore suggests that women are ‘gold dust’ for Italian banks and that increasing their presence may be beneficial to economic performance.

What is the relationship between entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment? We develop a model of entrepreneurial finance and show that entrepreneurial reinvestment decisions depend on the efficiency of saving practices. Utilizing a novel micro & small enterprise survey from Tanzania we test the empirical implications of this theory. We find (1) saving for business purposes and earnings reinvestment are positively related; (2) the practice of saving in a deposit account of a formal financial institution is more likely to facilitate a reinvestment compared to the practice of keeping savings within the household. We also show that the negative impact of saving within-the-household on investment is more pronounced for family members with inherently low intra-household bargaining power - such as females and non-head household members. Our work contributes to the recent debate on the implications of saving instruments in developing countries, and suggests informal saving practices as potential barriers to microenterprise performance.

In this paper, we analyse a novel panel data set to compare the relevance of alternative measures of capitalisation for bank failure during the 2007-10 crisis, and to search for evidence of manipulated Basel risk-weights. Compared with the unweighted leverage ratio, we find the risk-weighted asset ratio to be a superior predictor of bank failure when banks operate under the Basel II regime, provided that the risk of a crisis is low. When the risk of a crisis is high, the unweighted leverage ratio is the more reliable predictor. However, when banks do not operate under Basel II rules, both ratios perform comparably, independent of the risk of a crisis. Furthermore, we find a strong decline in the risk-weighted asset ratio leading up to the crisis. Several empirical findings indicate that this decline is driven by the strategic use of internal risk models under the Basel II advanced approaches. Evidence of manipulation is stronger in less competitive banking systems, in banks with low initial levels of Tier 1 capital and in banks that adopted Basel II rules early. We find tangible common equity and Tier 1 ratios to be better predictors of bank distress than broader measures of capital, and identify market-based measures of capitalisation as poor indicators. We find no relationship between the probability of a bank being selected into a public recapitalisation plan and regulatory measures of capital.

Banks create excessive systemic risk through leverage and maturity mismatch, as financial constraints introduce welfare-reducing pecuniary externalities. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints on banks' balance sheets, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. These can be implemented using the Liquidity Coverage and Net Stable Funding ratios of Basel III. When bank failures are socially costly, microprudential regulation of leverage is also required. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to changes in systematic risk and credit conditions over the business cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to both systematic and idiosyncratic risk.

The interwar years saw the rise of New York to challenge London as the world’s leading provider of financial services. This paper will show that the current explanations fail to identify a key factor in New York’s rise. The City was prevented from operating a full capacity by a capital issues embargo, imposed by the Bank of England to support the pound. As a result, New York was able to enter the sector with little competition from London, and expand rapidly to issue over half of the global capital exported abroad in the 1920s. Without the embargo, this would not have been possible, as the London merchant banks were the most productive producers in the industry, a position built up over the previous half century. This result challenges the consensus that the return to gold was good for the City. The merchant banks suffered and lost business, suggesting that this policy was even more disastrous than is currently thought.

In many countries, house prices are subject to boom/bust cycles and in some these are linked to severe economic and financial instability. Overheating can have both a price and a quantity dimension, but it is likely that they are linked by common drivers. However, much depends on the land-use planning regime which profoundly affects the supply response. It is helpful to make the distinction between overshooting of house prices due to extrapolative expectations and 'frenzy', given fundamentals, and shifts in possibly fragile fundamentals. The contribution of careful econometric modelling to estimating the effects of the former is demonstrated: central banks or other policy makers should institute quarterly surveys of house price expectations of potential housing market participants to help assess the first type of overshooting. Assessing the fragility or otherwise of the economic fundamentals is more complex. Credit supply conditions in the mortgage market are the 'elephant in the room'. Without taking a credit conditions measure into account, one simply cannot understand the behaviour of house prices, housing debt and consumption in countries such as Australia, the UK, the US, South Africa or France or understand vulnerability of some economies to high levels of household debt. Other financial and economic indicators of vulnerability are discussed, including high bank leverage ratios, high ratios of loans to deposits, debt, deficit and current account of ratios. Models of early warning of financial and economic crises estimated on large country panels need to be quite complex, for example, including some important interaction effects since shock transmission is very institution dependent.

What were the economic consequences of the usury doctrine in the Middle Ages? We examine how merchants attempted to evade the prohibition on interest and the attempts of the Church to clamp down on evasion. Contrary to the views of many economists and historians, the usury prohibition imposed different transaction costs on medieval merchants: increasing the cost of using capital markets for some merchants more than for others. Since only a subsection of the merchant population were able to write licit contracts, the prohibition had the effect of segmenting markets in which formal credit was important.

We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong - but not complete - tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks' risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.

We investigate the effects of the announcement and the disclosure of the clarification, methodology, and outcomes of the US banking stress tests on banks' equity prices, credit risk, systematic risk, and systemic risk during the 2009-13 period. We find only weak evidence that stress tests after 2009 affected equity returns of large US banks. In contrast, CDS spreads declined in response to the disclosure of stress test results. We also find that bank systematic risk, as measured by betas, declined in some years after the publication of stress test results. Our evidence suggests that stress tests affect systemic risk.

This article presents a comprehensive framework for valuing financial instruments subject to credit risk. In particular, we focus on the impact of default dependence on asset pricing, as correlated default risk is one of the most pervasive threats in financial markets. We analyze how swap rates are affected by bilateral counterparty credit risk, and how CDS spreads depend on the trilateral credit risk of the buyer, seller, and reference entity in a contract. Moreover, we study the effect of collateralization on valuation, since the majority of OTC derivatives are collateralized. The model shows that a fully collateralized swap is risk-free, whereas a fully collateralized CDS is not equivalent to a risk-free one. Supplemental material at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tim_Xiao/publication/337157228_The_Impact_of_Default_Dependency_and_Collateralization_on_Asset_Pricing_and_Credit_Risk_Modeling/links/5ef0a4fc299bf1faac6cada3/The-Impact-of-Default-Dependency-and-Collateralization-on-Asset-Pricing-and-Credit-Risk-Modeling.pdf, https:://ia801501.us.archive.org/12/items/default-dependency-collateralization-7/default-dependency-collateralization-7.pdf

We analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules within an agent-based model populated by heterogeneous, interacting firms. Agents have to cope with a complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change, imperfect information and coordination hurdles. In these circumstances, we find that neither individual nor macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naïve learning rules. In fact, more sophisticated, e.g. recursive least squares (RLS) expectations produce less accurate individual forecasts and also considerably worsen the performance of the economy. Finally, we experiment with agents that adjust simply to technological shocks, and we show that individual and aggregate performances dramatically degrade. Our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics are not a second-best option: rather they are “rational” in macroeconomic environments with heterogeneous, interacting agents and changing “fundamentals”.

We exploit historically determined variation in local credit markets to identify the impact of bank lending on innovation across Russian firms. We find that deeper credit markets increase firms’ use of bank credit, their adoption of new products and technologies, and their productivity growth. This relationship is more pronounced in industries farther from the technological frontier, more exposed to import competition, and that export more. These impacts are also stronger for firms near historical R&D centers or railways and in regions with supportive institutions. Consistent with these results, credit markets contribute to economic growth in such regions.Authors have furnished a data set, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

An important question in banking is how strict supervision affects bank lending and in turn local business activity. Forcing banks to recognize losses could choke off lending and amplify local economic woes, especially after financial crises. But stricter supervision could also lead to changes in how banks assess loans and manage their loan portfolios. Estimating such effects is challenging. We exploit the extinction of the thrift regulator (OTS) – a large change in prudential supervision, affecting ten percent of all U.S. depository institutions. Using this event, we analyze economic links between strict supervision, bank lending and business activity. We first show that the OTS replacement indeed resulted in stricter supervision of former OTS banks. We then analyze the lending effects of this regulatory change and show that former OTS banks increase small business lending by approximately 10 percent. This increase stems primarily from well capitalized banks and those more affected by the new regime. These findings suggest that stricter supervision operates not only through capital but can also overcome frictions in bank management, leading to more lending and a reallocation of loans. Consistent with the latter, we find increases in business entry and exit in counties with greater expose to OTS banks.

The development of shadow banking system in China catalyzes the expansion of banks’ off-balance-sheet activities, resulting in a distortion of China’s traditional credit expansion and underestimation of its commercial banks’ overall risk. This paper is the first to incorporate banks’ overall risk, endogenously into bank’s production process as undesirable by-product for the estimation of banks’ total factor efficiency (TFE) as well as TFE of each production factor. A unique data sample of 171 Chinese commercial banks, which is the largest data sample concerning with Chinese banking efficiency issues until now as far as we know, making our results more convincing and meaningful. Our results show that, compared with a model incorporated with banks’ overall risk, a model considering on-balance-sheet lending activities only may over-estimate the overall average TFE and under-estimate TFE volatility as a whole. Higher overall risk taking of banks tends to decrease bank TFE through ‘diverting effect’. However, significant heterogeneities of bank integrated TFE (TFIE) and TFE of each production factor exist among banks of different types or located in different regions, as a result of still prominent unbalanced development of Chinese commercial banks today. Based on newly estimated TFIE, the paper also investigates the determinants of bank efficiency, and finds that a model with risk-weighted assets as undesirable outputs can better capture the impact of shadow banking involvement.

We evaluate the impact of mortgage regulation on credit volumes, household balance sheets and the reaction to adverse economic shocks. Using a comprehensive dataset of all housing transactions in Norway matched with buyers' balance sheet information from official tax records, we identify causal effects of mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) limits. Our results show that LTV-requirements have substantial effects on credit volumes, especially on the extensive margin. As a result, such requirements contribute to dampening aggregate credit growth. We find that affected households lower their debt uptake and face lower interest expenses, thereby reducing their vulnerability to adverse shocks. However, affected households also deplete liquid assets when purchasing a home, in order to meet the new requirement. This negative effect on liquid savings persists in the years following the house purchase, suggesting that the impact on financial vulnerability at the household level is in fact ambiguous. We illustrate this further by documenting that households affected by the regulation are more likely to sell their home when becoming unemployed compared to non-affected households.

This paper examines banks’ disclosures and loss recognition in the financial crisis and identifies several core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks’ disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks’ exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, the recognition of loan losses was relatively slow and delayed relative to prevailing market expectations. Among the possible explanations for this evidence, our analysis suggests that banks’ reporting incentives played a key role, which has important implications for bank supervision and the new expected loss model for loan accounting. We also provide evidence that shielding regulatory capital from accounting losses through prudential filters can dampen banks’ incentives for corrective actions. Overall, our analysis reveals several important challenges if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.

Drawing on European Union data, this paper investigates the hypothesis that private credit and banking sector fragility may affect economic growth. We capture banking sector fragility both with the ratio of bank capital to assets and non-performing loans. We assess the effect of these three variables on the growth rate of GDP per capita, using the Solow growth model as a guiding framework. We observe that credit has no effect on economic performance in the EU when banking fragilities are high. However, the potential fragility of the banking sector measured by the non-performing loans decreases GDP per capita.

This paper investigates how balance sheet opacity affects banks' risk-taking behavior. We measure bank balance sheet opacity according to two metrics: the ratio of available-for-sale (AFS) securities and the ratio of off-balance sheet items. We show that balance sheet opacity is positively correlated with realized bank risk. Specifically, banks with more AFS securities have lower realized risk, while banks with more off-balance sheet items have higher realized risk. The correlation between opacity and risk depends on both macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics. The positive relationship between bank opacity and bank risk is weaker for better capitalized banks and banks that are subject to more market discipline. The relationship is also weaker during periods of favorable market conditions. Motivated by this analysis, we then investigate how regulation affects bank opacity. We show that higher capital requirements reduce bank opacity and bank risk through a portfolio rebalancing channel.

This paper contributes to the debate on the adequate regulatory treatment of non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI). It proposes an avenue for regulators to keep regulatory arbitrage under control and preserve sufficient space for efficient financial innovation at the same time. We argue for a normative approach to supervision that can overcome the proverbial race between hare and hedgehog in financial regulation and demonstrate how such an approach can be implemented in practice. We first show that regulators should primarily analyse the allocation of tail risk inherent in NBFI. Our paper proposes to apply regulatory burdens equivalent to prudential banking regulation if the respective transactional structures become only viable through indirect or direct access to (ad hoc) public backstops. Second, we use insights from the scholarship on regulatory networks as communities of interpretation to demonstrate how regulators can retrieve the information on transactional innovations and their risk-allocating characteristics that they need to make the pivotal determination. We suggest in particular how supervisors should structure their relationships with semi-public gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors and consultants to keep abreast of the risk-allocating features of evolving transactional structures. Finally, this paper uses the example of credit funds as non-bank entities economically engaged in credit intermediation to illustrate the merits of the proposed normative framework and to highlight that multipolar regulatory dialogues are needed to shed light on the specific risk-allocating characteristics of recent contractual innovations.

This paper studies the link between bank recapitalization and welfare in a dynamic production economy. The model features financial frictions because banks benefit of a cost advantage at monitoring firms and face costly equity issuance. The competitive equilibrium outcome is inecient because agents do not internalize the e↵ects banks' capitalization over the allocation of capital, its price and, in turn, firms investments. It follows, individual recapitalizations are sub-optimal and bailout policies may benefit social welfare in the long-run. Bailouts improve capital allocation in states where aggregate banks are poorly capitalized, therefore enhancing their market valuation, fostering investments, and stabilizing the economy recovery path.