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We show that, without strong auxiliary assumptions, it is impossible to rank groups by average happiness using survey data with a few potential responses. The categories represent intervals along some continuous distribution. The implied CDFs of these distributions will (almost) always cross when estimated using large samples. Therefore some monotonic transformation of the utility function will reverse the ranking. We provide several examples and a formal proof. Whether Moving-to-Opportunity increases happiness, men have become happier relative to women, and an Easterlin paradox exists depends on whether happiness is distributed normally or log-normally. We discuss restrictions that may permit such comparisons.

The causes of the USA's exceptional economic performance are investigated by comparing American wages and prices with wages and prices in Great Britain, Egypt, and India. Habakkuk's views on the causes of American industrial pre-eminence are reassessed. While the USA had abundant natural resources, they did not promote manufacturing since international trade equalized prices in Britain and the USA or American tariffs made resources dearer in the USA. Wages were higher in the USA than in Britain since labor markets were tightly integrated and labor was drawn to the USA as the continent was settled. Capital services were also more expensive in USA. American industrialization required tariffs since virtually all input prices were higher than in Britain and industrial productivity was comparable. America's comparative advantage shifted from agriculture to manufacturing after 1895 was industrial productivity soured. This was due to a fall in energy prices in the USA, the American policy of mass schooling which increased the supply of skilled adults and induced firms to invent technology to raise their productivity since the supply of child labor was restricted in comparison to Britain, and the great growth of manufacturing investment induced by the tariff which provide a large market for inventions and generated technical knowledge through learning by doing. Egypt and India could not have industrialized by following American policies since their wages were so low and their energy costs so high that the modern technology that was cost effective in Britain and the USA would not have paid in their circumstances. The development of Egypt and India required more draconian state intervention than a protective tariff, mass education, and infrastructure investment - the American model.

Az emberi gondolkodás jellemzője, hogy narratívákban és metaforákban fogalmazza meg a világ törvényszerűségeit. A dismal science kifejezést első ízben Thomas Carlyle használta a korabeli politikai közgazdaságtan epitheton ornansaként. A tanulmány a kifejezés etimológiáját kutatva bemutatja azokat a ma is tetten érhető különbségeket, amelyek megosztanak bennünket a társadalom és a gazdaság szerveződését meghatározó erőkről vallott nézeteinkben. Az itt felidézett Carlyle-Mill-vita és az Edward Erye-William Gordon-polémia során a modern gazdasági növekedés korszakába való belépés három alapvető jellemzője találkozott térben és időben. Az első a szabadpiaci viszonyokra épülő gazdaság jogi kereteinek megteremtése. A második a sikeres gazdaság alapvető intézményi előfeltétele: a törvények mindenkire érvényes kényszerítő ereje. A harmadik a közbeszéd, a szabad kereskedésről, a szabad vállalkozás méltóságáról és sérthetetlenségéről való közvélekedés átalakulása. Az események alakulásában meghatározó szerepük volt azoknak, akik vállalták ezeknek az elveknek a következetes képviseletét mind a közgazdaság-tudományban, mind a polgárjogi mozgalmakban. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: N3, O1, Z1., We are naturally inclined to seek stable patterns and meaning in the chaotic world around us. This assists in our efforts to understand the past and forecast the future. The starting point of this essay is the phrase dismal science", an oft-used epithet for economics. While retracing the origins of this epithet, the author also sheds light on the differences in interpretation of the dominant forces that shape our economy and society. The stories evoked from the age of the industrial revolution, such as the Carlyle- Mill Debate and the Edward Erye-William Gordon Controversy, point out the necessary coincidence of three main ingredients in modern economic growth. One is the essential legal framework of a free market economy, the second the rule of law - one of the main institutional prerequisites - and the third the change in rhetoric over the much-needed requisites of the market economy, such as the principle of private property, free trade, unfettered entrepreneurship and fair labour-market relations. The author emphasizes the dominant roles of the individuals who bear the burden for consistent representation of these values in the academic sphere and in civil society.

We present the preliminary results of our analysis of top incomes in Brazil from 2006 to 2012. We describe the evolution of the income shares of the top 1% and the top 5% and estimate a “tax-corrected†Gini coefficient. The data come from personal income tax returns, national accounts and household surveys. The results show that the levels of income inequality in Brazil are higher than those estimated using household surveys, and, contrary to what these surveys show, inequality did not fall over this period: the current trend is one of stability.

This paper tests the hypothesis that government spending crowds out charitable activity, using data from two years before and after 1800 at the time of the early system of welfare provision in England known as the Poor Laws. A number of papers have found evidence for the ‘crowding out hypothesis’, although the size of the impact varies (see for example Roberts, 1984; Payne, 1998; Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Andreoni and Payne, 2011). Others have, however, suggested that if similar preferences drive the desire to provide through taxes or directly through charity, then the crowding out effect might be insignificant or even reversed. The idea of crowding out is quite popular, particularly on the conservative side of the policy debate. In the United Kingdom, a comparison with the far higher levels of charitable giving in the United States seems to have been a large part of the inspiration for the Conservative Party leader David Cameron’s concept of a ‘Big Society’ from 2009, when he claimed that ‘the once natural bonds that existed between people – of duty and responsibility – have been replaced with the synthetic bonds of the state – regulation and bureaucracy’. We present a novel way of testing the ‘crowding out hypothesis’, making use of the fact that welfare provision under the Poor Laws in England was decided on the parish level, thus giving the heterogeneity we need to test for the impact of different levels of welfare support within a single country. Our data on Poor Law spending per capita is from 1785 and 1815 and is taken from Marshall (1834). Combined with information on per capita income of charities by county for 1787 and 1815 published by the British Parliament (BPP 1810 and 1820), we use this to test for the impact of public spending on welfare on the income of charities. The causality could conceivably run either way, so we instrument for public welfare provision with the suitability of the county for arable agriculture, as given by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [1] . As is argued by Boyer (1990), welfare provision was more generous in areas with arable rather than pastoral agriculture. The seasonal nature of arable farming meant that the politically powerful labor hiring farmers would have an interest in mitigating low season costs of labor by diversifying them onto other rate payers through the Poor Law system. We fail to find evidence of a crowding out effect - in fact we find a positive relationship. A one percent increase in Poor Law spending per capita results in a 1.5 percent increase in charitable income per capita. Our results provide, we believe, considerable backing to those who argue that a ‘big society’ does not necessarily require ‘small government’. [1] ‘Crop suitability index (class) for low input level rain-fed cereals’, i.e. using traditional methods of agriculture, from GAEZ, Global Agro-Ecological Zones, at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

We document the existence of a distinctive national naming pattern for African Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We use census records to identify a set of high-frequency names among African Americans that were unlikely to be held by whites. We confirm the distinctiveness of the names using over five million death certificates from Alabama, Illinois and North Carolina from the early twentieth century. The names we identify in the census records are similarly distinctive in these three independent data sources. Surprisingly, approximately the same percentage of African Americans had “black names” historically as they do today. No name that we identify as a historical black name, however, is a contemporary black name. The literature has assumed that black names are a product of the Civil Rights Movement, yet our results suggest that they are a long-standing cultural norm among African Americans. This is the first evidence that distinctively racialized names existed long before the Civil Rights Era, establishing a new fact in the historical literature.

This article considers the relevance of hypotheses developed in the “law and economics” literature regarding settlement-trial decisions in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, it explores the applicability of the “selection principle” and “50 percent plaintiff win-rate” formulated by George Priest and Benjamin Klein. The article also demonstrates how existing research based on Ottoman court records can contribute to the “law and economics” scholarship, which is dominated by research based on modern, Western contexts. The article utilizes the court records from eighteenth-century Kastamonu to make observations about settlement/litigation decisions in an Ottoman context.

Available online 12 May 2013 We document and suggest a rationale for the durability of seasonal migration from Poland to Germany, a phenomenon persisting for more than a century. We refer to the role of the tradition of engaging in seasonal migration as a force that helped invigorate the process and contribute to its sustainability even when, to different degrees and at different times, the process was interrupted by a shifting political, regulatory, and legal environment. Evidence in support of the role of tradition is provided, among other things, by the continuation of the seasonal flow of migrants from once border regions - which became internal regions following WWII - despite the fact that since the redrawing of the German-Polish border, proximity is no longer a factor encouraging repeated, short-term seasonal moves. © 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: F22 J22 J43 J61 N3 N33 N34 N93 N94

This paper explores how technological changes affected labor allocations within the U.S. Navy. During the latter nineteenth century, the officer corps was highly specialized, split between groups of line and staff officers. Developments in general purpose technologies created a dilemma for the organization, as it balanced between the benefits of a specialized workforce implementing increasingly complex technologies with rising communication and coordination costs. We first document the nature and extent of labor specialization in the mid-nineteenth-century Navy—engineers worked more with newer and larger vessels, while line officers worked more with unskilled personnel. The Navy endeavored to destroy this distinction, forcing generalized training and tasks for all officers. We suggest that the Navy’s phased-in approach was an effective strategy, helping the U.S. to become a world-class naval power.

This article studies temporal variations in wealth levels and distribution in an Ottoman context during the eighteenth century. By analysing the probate estate inventories of the Muslim deceased in Kastamonu, located in north-central Anatolia, we demonstrate that real wealth levels generally declined over the course of the century. Our analysis also suggests that the economic conditions of poor men, if not women, deteriorated more so than those of the rich, fuelling growing inequality. The article explores the factors that contributed to these trends and discusses the relevance of our findings for long-term economic development patterns in the region from a comparative perspective.

With the help of binary logistic regression model present attempt examines the impact of business organization’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices on buying behavior of the consumers. By taking the responses of 197 consumers in the Jammu and Kashmir province of India, the study highlights that how different dimensions of CSR practices and selected demographics of the organizations are significantly associated with the buying behavior of consumers. The study finds negative relationship between both legal responsibilities and environment friendly practices of companies with the consumer buying behavior. The results have implications for marketing practitioners and strategic management professionals who would like to use their organisation’s CSR practices as a tool to positively influence consumer behavior. Findings suggest that business organizations should be more transparent on their legal aspects and philanthropic activities.

What were income trends before the Industrial Revolution? Clark (2007b) argued both theoretically and empirically that pre-industrial income fluctuated, but was not trending upwards, a position Persson (2008) labeled “the Malthus Delusion.” Clark (2010a), in particular, estimated that pre-industrial English income was as high on average as in 1800. In contrast, Broadberry et al. (2011) estimate that income tripled between 1270 and 1800. One test of early income estimates is the share employed in farming. This paper, focusing on the poll tax returns of 1379–1381, shows that only 56–59% of the English population was in farming or fishing. This small share implies incomes in 1381 equivalent to those of 1800.

The debate about the long-term economic development of China compared with Europe has taken a new turn with the publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’ book on ‘The Great Divergence’, in which he maintains that before the Industrial Revolution the most advanced parts of China (in particular the Yangzi Delta) was in terms of real incomes on par with the richest regions in Western Europe (Great Britain, the Netherlands). His tentative results were very different from the estimates produced by Maddison (2001) who concluded that there was already a large gap in real per capita GDP between these two extreme parts of Eurasia. Using the method of historical national accounting, this paper tests these ideas on the basis of a detailed comparison of the structure and level of GDP in part of the Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands in the 1820s, also taking into account differences of purchasing power of the two currencies involved. The results are that Dutch GDP per capita was already almost twice the level in the Yangzi Delta, which is more or less consistent with Maddison’s point of view. The level of agricultural productivity in this part of China was, however, at about the same level as in the Netherlands (and England), but large productivity gaps existed in industry and services (with the exception of government services). We also attempt to explain the patterns found, and conclude that differences in factor costs may have been behind the observed differences in labour productivity.

We present the first attempt to construct a long-run historical measure of subjective wellbeing using language corpora derived from millions of digitized books. While existing measures of subjective wellbeing go back to at most the 1970s, we can go back at least 200 years further using our methods. We analyse data for six countries (the USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain). To highlight some results, we find a positive short-run effect for GDP and life expectancy on subjective wellbeing. An increase of 1% life expectancy is equivalent to more than 5% increase in yearly GDP. One year of internal conflict costs the equivalent of a 50% drop in GDP per year in terms of subjective wellbeing. Public debt, on the other hand, has a short-run positive effect. Our estimated index of subjective wellbeing generally does not feature any positive trend, which is consistent with the Easterlin paradox, although we caution against long term analysis given the historical variation of written texts (which parallel similar issues with historical GDP statistics).

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the nature of globalization in the context of the innovative development process. Modern globalization is explained through qualitative changes in the internationalization processes under the influence of innovative and technologic factors. The dynamics of KOF Index of Globalization in 1990-2008 is analyzed. The stable long-term trend of the Globalization Index growth is revealed for all countries. The correlation between the KOF Index of Globalization and the Global Innovation Index developed by INSEAD for factor- driven, efficiency - driven and innovation- driven economies demonstrates the high interdependence for innovation - driven economies, and substantially diminishes for the factor-driven economies. The transition to “innovation and globalization” model of development is an important attribute of a new stage of evolutional process. The conceptual basis of such a model is created by a systemic synergetic interaction of globalization and innovation development.

The scale of the persistent, concentrated immigration from Mexico is a source of concern to many in the United States. The perception is that Mexicans are not assimilating into mainstream America as previous generations of immigrants did. In this paper, we look at the emigration of approximately 1 million French-Canadians who moved to the United States, with the bulk of the migration occurring between the end of the Civil War and 1930 and with most settling in neighboring New England. What makes this episode particularly interesting is the fact that the French-Canadian immigrants exerted considerable efforts to maintain their language and to replicate their home century institutions, most notably the schooling system, in their new country. This explicit resistance to assimilation generated considerable attention and concern in the U.S. over many years. The concerns are strikingly similar to those often invoked today in discussions of policy options regarding immigration from hispanic countries, notably Mexico. We look at the convergence in the educational attainment of French Canadian immigrants across generations relative to native English-speaking New Englanders and to other immigrants. The educational attainment of Franco-Americans lagged that of their fellow citizens over a long period of time. Yet, by the time of the 2000 Census, they eventually, if belatedly, appeared to have largely achieved parity. Additionally, we show that military service was a very important factor contributing to the assimilation process through a variety of related channels, namely educational attainment, language assimilation, marrying outside the ethnic group, and moving out of New England. Finally, when we compare Franco-Americans to French-speaking Canadians of the same generations, it is clear that Franco-Americans substantially upgraded their educational attainment relative to what it would have been if they had not emigrated. This suggests that the pull factor eventually exerted a dominating influence.

A plethora of studies, analyses and practice in communication management has emerged considerably over last years, and experienced a massive shift in form and function within a rapidly changing environment. Lately, the role of communication in management tried to solve the puzzle of the communication upheaval by offering a comprehensive mechanism to ease a communication process. Based on a case study of three high schools, this research has two objectives. First, to present a conceptualized framework of the integrated role of communication in combination with the management process is mapped out. In the same time, it tries to investigate some depth of understanding of the manner how the executives perceive the communication process in the three high schools in order to reveal the manager-staff communication. Second, such a framework has been theoretically explored and empirically demonstrated to examine the process of strategic formulation of institutional communications in accordance with diverse phases of management to the three high schools. Quantitative analysis and numerical data analysis with major managers are duly conducted. Last but not least, implications are discussed.

Demographic change across the globe puts pressure on labour markets and public finances. Most studies on ageing focus on the projected development of the old age dependency ratio, being the ratio of persons 65 or older relative to the working age population. This ratio gives a very incomplete picture of the (fiscal) pressure from demographic changes. In this study, besides the share of the dependent population composed of the young and the old, we also include the share of the working age population that is not active on the labour market, labelled as the labour market space. By analysing 21 developing and 29 developed economies across the globe, we cover 75% of the 9.3 billion people that the United Nations projects for the whole world in 2050. A new indicator, relating demographic pressure from fiscal spending to the available space at the labour market, enables us to quantify and compare the pressure-to-space across countries over the time span 2010-2050. The indicator points out that Poland, Turkey and Greece are most under pressure. Developing countries, such as Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania will experience a very low pressure up to 2050 in case their fiscal spending per young and elderly person remains at the current levels. In most of the countries under high pressure there seems to be room for using the labour market space by, for instance, working more hours or increasing the retirement age, as this will alleviate the fiscal pressure. This suggests a policy trade-off between maintaining publicly financed services to the dependent population and maintaining labour market space.

This paper analyses and compares the first and the second program of burden sharing (Lastenausgleich): which were enacted after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany 1948/49, and after the reunification of Germany 1990, respectively. The first program of burden sharing, firstly, aimed at redistribution from population groups which were less affected by war damages to those which were more affected or had completely lost their property and livelihood. Secondly, it should help to integrate about 14 million people who until 1985 had reached the Federal Republic as refugees from the former German Eastern regions and from the German Democratic Republic into the West German society. The second program of burden sharing also served as compensation for war damages and expropriations in the former German Democratic Republic as well as to improve the living standard and the economic strength of the new regions of Germany. Both programs were enormous social achievements. Relative to the respective gross national product of West Germany the second program that is still going on required even more financial means that the first one. Both programs were based on the principle of solidarity, but the second one showed a stronger restorative tendency than the first one. This is mainly due to the restitution of property in real terms without a special contribution to the costs of the program. In diesem Beitrag werden der erste Lastenausgleich, der im Zusammenhang mit der Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1948/1949 stattfand, und der - nicht so benannte - zweite Lastenausgleich nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung 1990 analysiert und verglichen. Beim ersten Lastenausgleich ging es einerseits um einen solidarischen Ausgleich der Kriegsschäden zwischen stärker und weniger stark betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen und andererseits um die Integration von etwa 14 Millionen Menschen, die bis 1985 als Vertriebene, Umsiedler und Spätaussiedler in die Bundesrepublik gekommen waren. Mit dem zweiten Lastenausgleich sollten ebenfalls Kriegs- und Sozialisierungsverluste entschädigt und teils befristete, teils dauerhafte Hilfen zur Angleichung der Wirtschaftskraft und der Lebensverhältnisse zwischen den alten und den neuen Bundesländern gewährt werden. Im Verhältnis zum jeweiligen Bruttoinlandsprodukt Westdeutschlands bewegte der erste Lastenausgleich deutlich geringere Mittelvolumina als der zweite. Obwohl beide Lastenausgleiche mit großen Umverteilungsvorgängen verbunden waren, zeigten sich doch deutliche Unterschiede. Der erste Lastenausgleich war sowohl auf der Aufbringungsseite als auch auf der Leistungsseite viel stärker vom Solidaritätsprinzip geprägt als der zweite. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Naturalrestitution von Grundvermögen und Unternehmen. Dementsprechend war die restaurative Tendenz des ersten Lastenausgleichs weit geringer als jene des zweiten.

To shed light on the economic-demographic mechanisms operating in the epoch of pre-industrial economic stagnation, a two-sector Malthusian model is formulated in terms of a cointegrated vector autoregressive model on error correction form. The model allows for both agricultural product wages and relative prices to affect fertility. The model is estimated using new data for the pre-industrial period in England, and the analysis reveals a strong, positive effect of agricultural wages as well as a nonnegative effect of real agricultural prices on fertility. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that there is strongly decreasing returns to scale with respect to labour in the agricultural sector and approximately constant returns to scale in the manufacturing sector. The analysis provides evidence in favour of the usual Malthusian model, as invoked by unified growth theories such as e.g. Galor and Weil (Am Econ Rev 90:806–828, 2000).

The historical fertility transition is the process by which much of Europe and North America went from high to low fertility in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This transformation is central to recent accounts of long-run economic growth. Prior to the transition, women bore as many as eight children each, and the elasticity of fertility with respect to incomes was positive. Today, many women have no children at all, and the elasticity of fertility with respect to incomes is zero or even negative. This paper discusses the large literature on the historical fertility transition, focusing on what we do and do not know about the process. I stress some possible misunderstandings of the demographic literature, and discuss an agenda for future work. (JEL I12, J13, N30)

Worldwide demographic changes and their implications for governments, corporations, and individuals have been in the focus of public interest for quite some time due to the fiscal risk related to adequate retirement benefits. Through a more detailed analysis of mortality data an additional type of risk can be identified: differences in mortality improvements by birth year, also known as “cohort effects.” Previous contributions have, however, not formalized a suitable measure to further investigate mortality improvements but rather relied on graphical representations without particular focus on individual cohorts but groups of the overall population. No criterion to identify single birth year cohorts as select has been established. A simple criterion for identifying select cohorts is proposed and used here to analyze what country mortality data reveals about the mortality and longevity experience of cohorts. Select cohorts are rare but can be quite different from surrounding cohorts and so may generate financial risks that need to be hedged naturally or artificially with new ART instruments.

The study of the life expectancy of a population is important for the evaluation of the degree of economic and social development of a region. The identification of the determinant factors of life expectancy and of the specificity of their actions by regions could offer useful information of making decisions for regional development. In the last decades, life expectancy has significantly increased, but with regional variations according to the specific development conditions. In this paper, we aim at identifying the determinants of life expectancy in Romania, by regions. The study is based on the data registered in each administrative department of Romania, for the year 2008. We used regression analysis in order to identify the factors with significant influence on life expectancy in Romania and the cluster analysis to identify the homogenous groups of counties based on the variation of life expectancy and its determinant factors. The study showed that the determinants with a positive impact on life expectancy are wages, the number of beds in hospitals, the number of doctors, and the number of readers subscribed to libraries, while the determinants with a negative impact on life expectancy are the ratio of the Roma population and the ratio of the illiterate population. In addition, we noticed that the Romanian counties have similarities with respect to the level of the life expectancy and its determinants, forming homogenous groups of counties with specific characteristics.

Using survey data on migrant workers in urban China, this paper carries out a positive study on the impact of inner-industrial and inter-industrial job shifts on earnings growth of migrant workers. Results show that low human capital, low employment grades and low income are the most important reasons for migrant workers to switch jobs. The migrant workers who are young, unmarried new entrants with low level of education, no training and low income tend to change their jobs within the industry. And those who have high income and who find their jobs by themselves are more likely to switch jobs inter-industrially. Inner-industrial job switches have a significant positive impact on earnings growth of low-income migrant workers and a significant negative one on that of high-income migrant workers. Moreover, inter-industrial shifts have a significant negative impact on earnings growth of migrant workers of all income levels. The inner cause for the positive effect of inner-industrial shifts lie in the fact that the cumulative effect of years of service within enterprises is not obvious while continuing engagement in the same type of job within an industry will lead to accumulation of qualifications, which has a significant augmentation effect on earnings of migrant workers.

Using previously unexploited data, this paper explores the ages at which slaves were manumitted. OLS estimates reveal that mixed-race slaves, slaves in the tobacco-producing Piedmont, and female slaves of female slave owners were manumitted at younger ages. Weibull proportional hazards estimates imply that the same groups were more likely to be manumitted. The results also reveal a markedly diminishing likelihood of manumission after Nat Turner’s 1831 insurrection in south-central Virginia. The results are consistent with a principal–agent model in which slave owners contracted with slaves over consumption and future manumission to elicit effort and control shirking or other unproductive activities.

A taboo subject for Arabian economists is freedom deficit or non-democratic regimes. It is questionable if Arabian region has registered substantial increase in economic and social development for more than two decades and a half; since 1960’s, we know that these growths have not been associated with political rights, nevertheless with democracy. Because the Islamic frame of reference offers politic leaders with limited possibilities of choosing, when they are being disputed, rarely measures of reform are being taken in country’s institutions. The question if religion can block the economic development and institutional changes or if it is just a native factor, requires giving a special importance today, because of Islamic movement and low economic performances in these Muslim countries. Some studies among immigrants settled in other countries have noticed that over time, because of changes and culture assimilation, exist transformation of perception and even emotional alterations. This article takes an empirical approach ad asks two questions: how differ economic systems and the actual Muslim institutions toward the other countries at the same level of economic development? And what is the impact of Islam and migration upon economic and social performance of these countries?

In the late 1900s unemployment became a special sociopolitical and economic problem in Germany. On the one hand, the discussion on this problem dealed with the economic way to achieving sociopolitical goals. On the other hand, the participants recognized the labour market and unemployment as an independent allocation problem. This paper provides a survey of economic arguments put forward at that time for a labour market policy and partly used by participants today for example asymmetrical information, moral hazard, idea of a ‘third labour market’. Zusammenfassung Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bildete sich in Deutschland die Arbeitslosigkeit als eigenstandiges Problemfeld heraus, das nicht nur aus sozialpolitischer, sondern zunehmend aus okonomischer Perspektive beleuchtet wurde. Dabei wurde zum einen gefragt, ob und wie sozialpolitische Ziele okonomisch sinnvoll erreicht werden konnen. Zum anderen wurden Arbeitsmarkt und Arbeitslosigkeit als eigenstandiges allokationspolitisches Problem erkannt und e...

Expansion opportunity of functional foods on market is positive and consumer interest relatively high. The growth of the functional foods market is related to an aging population, increasing consumer awareness of health issues and a rise in lifestyle related diseases. Functional foods and food components may be available in the market place but in order for consumers to access the benefits of functional foods, they must be informed about them. This study attempted to identify the importance for consumer purchase and consumption of functional foods, but also identify their attitudes about the need for scientific justification and communication of health benefits for functional food. Research results have shown that consumers are beginning to attach greater importance to healthy eating, 32.99% of respondents believing that this criterion is of great importance in their consumption habits. Most consumers have considered it very important to permit health claims for functional foods by authorized agencies (74.29%), the need for scientific support of health benefits (64.94%) and their communication to the public (89.35%).

A recent literature has advanced the use of Engel curves to estimate overall CPI bias. In this paper, I show that the methodology is sensitive to the modeling of household demography. Existing estimates of CPI bias do not account for the changing effect of household size on budget shares, and this can lead to omitted variable bias. Since the effect of household size on demand changes over time the drift in Engel curves attributed to CPI bias is partially explained by this effect. My estimates of the annual rate of CPI bias from 1888 to 1935 are changed by at least 25%, and usually more than 50%, once the changing effect of household size is accounted for.

Resumen Lanzado como un lema hace veinte anos, el desarrollo sostenible se ha convertido en uno de los principales retos del siglo xxi. Presentado como la solucion a todos los problemas que se plantean a la humanidad, el desarrollo sostenible aparece como un enigma: ?Como es posible aumentar el bienestar de la poblacion mundial, luchar contra las desigualdades sociales y, simultaneamente, salvaguardar la dinamica de la biosfera? ?Conviene confiar en el capitalismo y la regulacion por los precios, crear nuevas normas que enmarquen el capitalismo y, si es el caso, deben estar producidas por actores publicos o privados? La problematica del desarrollo sostenible nos conduce a preguntarnos sobre las nociones de crecimiento, desarrollo, bienestar asi como sobre la pertinencia del descrecimiento, por lo menos en las regiones mas prosperas del planeta.

This is the first paper to document the effect of health on the migration propensities of African Americans in the American past. Using both IPUMS and the Colored Troops Sample of the Civil War Union Army Data, I estimate the effects of literacy and health on the migration propensities of African Americans from 1870 to 1910. I find that literacy and health shocks were strong predictors of migration and the stock of health was not. There were differential selection propensities based on slave status - former slaves were less likely to migrate given a specific health shock than free blacks. Counterfactuals suggest that as much as 35% of the difference in the mobility patterns of former slaves and free blacks is explained by differences in their human capital, and more than 20% of that difference is due to health alone. Overall, the selection effect of literacy on migration is reduced by one-tenth to one-third once health is controlled for. The low levels of human capital accumulation and rates of mobility for African Americans after the Civil War are partly explained by the poor health status of slaves and their immediate descendants.

This study extends the analysis of causality by Husain and Rashid (2008) by examining the shift in the variables due to the price hikes in Pakistan in the early 1970s. We investigate the causal relations between real money and real income, between nominal money and nominal income, and between nominal money and prices using the annual data set from 1959-60 to 2003-04. Moreover, we examine the stochastic properties of the variables used in the analysis, and take care of the shifts in the series due to price hikes and liberalisation measures through dummy variables. The results indicate significant shifts in the variables during the sample period. In this context, the shift that occurred due to price hikes in the early 1970s seems to be more important to be incorporated in the analysis. The study finds the active role of money as the leading variable in changing prices without any feedback. In the earlier studies on income the feedback mechanism of money is found missing perhaps because of overlooking the shift in the macro economic variables in the early 1970s. JEL classification: E3, E4, N3 Keywords: Money, Income, Prices, Price Hikes, Causal Relations, Pakistan

Attempt has been made to investigate the Islamic Economics System from the perspectives of Maulana Maududi. He is one of the greatest thinkers that Islamic world has ever produced. He was a great scholar, and has written a large number of books, articles and booklets on different aspects of Islam. Economics has been one of the fields of his interest. It may be said that at least in the Sub-Continent, he was the person, who has established “Economics of Islam” as a separate branch of knowledge. In this context, he has highlighted the characteristics, principles and objectives of this system. On the pattern set by him, a large number of Muslim economic thinkers have followed his line of thinking. According to Maulana Maududi basic principles of Islamic economic systems are: private ownership, limits of halal and haram, economic equality, free economy and welfare role of state. Whereas this system is established to achieve the objectives of human liberty, simultaneous development of material and moral growth, establishment of justice, equal distribution of wealth, fulfillment of basic needs of people and co-ordination between different groups of society.

Has leisure increased over the last century? Standard measures of hours worked suggest that it has. In this paper, we develop a comprehensive measure of non-leisure hours that includes market work, home production, and schooling for the last 104 years. We also argue for a more consistent definition of “per capita.” The new measures reveal a number of interesting 20 th Century trends. First, more consistent measures of “per capita” and “potential labor force” suggest a less dramatic decline in hours worked. Second, half of the decline in hours worked per capita has been offset by an increase in hours spent in school. Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, hours spent in home production are actually higher now than they were in the early part of the 20 th Century. Finally, leisure per capita is approximately the same now as it was in 1900

The question we address in this paper is why the Japanese miracle didn't take place until after World War II. For much of the pre-WWII period, Japan's real GNP per worker was not much more than a third of that of the U.S., with falling capital intensity. We argue that its major cause is a barrier that kept agricultural employment constant at about 14 million throughout the prewar period. In our two-sector neoclassical growth model, the barrier-induced sectoral mis-allocation of labor and a resulting disincentive for capital accumulation account well for the depressed output level. Were it not for the barrier, Japan's prewar GNP per worker would have been close to a half of the U.S. The labor barrier existed because, we argue, the prewar patriarchy, armed with paternalistic clauses in the prewar Civil Code, forced the son designated as heir to stay in agriculture.

This study estimates what fraction of the rise in family income inequality in the United States between 1968 and 2000 is accounted for by change in each of the family income components such as wages, employment, and hours worked of family heads and spouses, family structure, and other incomes. The increased disparities in other incomes and labor supply account for, respectively, 29 percent and 28 percent of the rise in the difference in income between the top 10th and bottom 10th families. Structural changes in wages, largely regarded as the major culprit of the increase in income inequality, explain less than a quarter of the rise in the measure of family income inequality. Changing fraction of families with both husband and wife and changes in the composition of the income sources account for 11 percent and 16 percent, respectively, of the widening of the income gap. The relative importance of the effect of changing labor supply declined over time, while that of wage changes increased. For the upper half of the income distribution, wage changes were the dominant cause of the increase in the gap between the richest 10th and middle-income families. For the lower half of the income distribution, in sharp contrast, changes in labor supply and other incomes were the principal causes of the growing distance between the poor and middle-income families.

The eects of inflation on real wage dispersion and welfare are studied in a cash-in-advance economy with a Walrasian goods market but a labor market with search friction in which firms enjoy monopsony power. In the labor market, firms post wages and both the employed and the unemployed workers search among the posted wages. In equilibrium, a higher inflation rate reduces the dispersion in real wages. This result is consistent with both the observed trends in wage dispersion and the inflation rate witnessed in the 1980’s and the 1990’s in the U.S. and the empirical literature linking reduced inflation to greater wage dispersion. While higher inflation always lowers consumption, output, and employment, the optimal inflation rate exceeds the Friedman rule.

The world we live in is extraordinarily dynamic and forces us daily to face numerous changes in all areas of life. Although the relationship between private and state property was considered and compared by classics in economics, it is only over the last couple of decades that the privatization processes have become a part of everyday economic life. Privatization reaches all industrial branches and the most recent trend is to involve private sector into public administration. Education system is not immune to privatization either, however, due to its specifi c nature the privatization processes have to be handled very cautiously. This paper examines the meaning of privatization in education, the factors causing privatization in higher education and how it is implemented. It also looks at the issue of advantages and disadvantages of privatization in education, i.e., higher education.

We study the causes of inequality in human capital accumulation across ethnic and religious groups. An overlapping generations model in which agents decide how much time to invest in human capital versus ethnic capital shows that the demand for human capital is affected positively by parental and group's older cohort human capital, and negatively by group size. Two ex-ante identical groups may diverge in human capital accumulation, with the divergence mostly occurring among their low-ability members. Furthermore, group and ethnic fragmentation increases the demand for human capital. We validate these predictions using household data from Nigeria where ethnicity and religion are the primary identity cleavages. We document persistent ethnic and religious inequality in educational attainment. Members of ethnic groups that historically converted to Christianity outperform those whose ancestors converted to Islam. Consistent with theory, there is little difference between the high-ability members of these groups, but low-ability members of historically Muslim groups choose Koranic education as an alternative to formal education, even when formal education is free. Moreover, more religiously fragmented ethnic groups fare better, and local ethnic fragmentation increases the demand for formal education. Our analysis sheds light on the political context that underlines the recent violent opposition to "western education" in the country.

Female labor force participation has increased 10 percentage points between 1990 and 2010. This paper analyzes the possible determinants of this increase. Among those determinants are changes in education, family structure, fertility, as well as changes in socioeconomic environment including wages, returns to working at home, preferences, and technology, among others. We discuss the mechanisms behind those determinants by organizing the very large theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. We then assess the relative importance of the determinants in two ways. We compute treatment effects estimated in the literature and combine them with information about the changes in the causing variables. We also use data from household surveys and combine them with a dataset of determinants to find correlations in the data that reinforce or reject the analysis of the literature review., Facultad de Ciencias Económicas

This paper investigates the association between personality traits and charitable behaviour, namely donations of time and money, using data from Understanding Society, the most recent large scale UK household longitudinal survey. Due to the censored nature of the outcome variables, i.e. some individuals do not engage in charitable behaviour, we employ censored quantile regression models. Personality traits are classified according to the 'Big Five' taxonomy: openness to experience; conscientiousness; extraversion; agreeableness; and neuroticism. The quantile approach allows us to explore the effect of personality traits across the entire distribution of charitable behaviour rather than just at the mean, which has generally been the case in the existing literature. In general, after conditioning on an extensive set of controls, conscientiousness and neuroticism are found to be inversely related to donating time and money, whilst openness to experience, which has a positive effect, is the dominant trait in terms of magnitude. Interestingly, personality traits are found to have a stronger association with donations of time and money at the extreme points of the distribution of donations relative to that at the median, thereby highlighting the additional information revealed by quantile approach.

This paper investigates whether compulsory licensing – which allows governments to license patents without the consent of patent-owners – discourages invention. Our analysis exploits new historical data on German patents to examine the effects of compulsory licensing under the US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act on invention in Germany. We find that compulsory licensing was associated with a 28 percent increase in invention. Historical evidence indicates that, as a result of war-related demands, fields with licensing were negatively selected, so OLS estimates may underestimate the positive effects of compulsory licensing on future inventions.

We explore the first period of decline in infant mortality in the U.S. and provide estimates of the independent and combined effects of clean water and effective sewerage systems on infant mortality. Our case is Massachusetts, 1880-1915, when state authorities developed a sewerage and water district for municipalities in the Boston Greater Metropolitan area. We find that the two interventions were complementary and together accounted for approximately 37 percent of the total decline in log infant mortality among treated municipalities during the 36 years considered. Considerable research has documented the importance of clean water interventions for improvement in population health, but there is less evidence on the importance of sewerage systems. Our findings are directly relevant to urbanization in the developing world and suggest that a dual-pronged approach of safe water and sewerage is important to improving infant and early child survival.

I develop a method to estimate intergenerational mobility (IM) in education on large cross-sectional surveys and apply the method to U.S. census data from 1940 to 2000. The method estimates IM directly for children age 26-29 who still live with parents and adjusts for independent children using a procedure that I validate extensively. Estimates imply large post-1940 gains in IM that were (1) driven primarily by large IM gains in the South for both whites and blacks, (2) larger for blacks due to their greater concentration in the South, and (3) driven by high school rather than college enrollment.

However much we appreciate the enormous scientific contribution by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who initiated the international data collection of the World Values Survey, our re-analysis of the very World Values Survey data [“roll-outs” of the World Values Survey data wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav] brought us to question Inglehart’s theories, with which he and his associates interpret the mass of the World Values Survey data. Their theoretical approach does not use a sufficiently number of hard-core indicators how global publics view central issues of economic policy, and their theories overemphasize a secularistic view of the religious phenomenon in modern society. Their theories predict the gradual waning of the religious phenomena in parallel with the increase of human security, and even cherish at times the tendencies brought about by such a waning of the religious element in advanced democracies. Inglehart spells them out: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et cetera. Is that really something to cherish? Today, societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family values can be an important assett in the stability of capitalist development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina’s and Paola Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents et cetera coincide with the global map of economic growth today. Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the World Values Survey project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from the World Values Survey project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth. Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes. In our re-analysis, we use the advanced statistical multivariate analysis technique of the Promax factor analysis, which allows for correlations between factors. It is available to the global public via the IBM-SPSS statistical package XXI. We eliminated missing values by listwise delition. In our first re-analysis, there were 92289 interview partners from around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. Our main model explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. We highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions: a) economic permissiveness b) traditional religion c) racism d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the generations) e) distrust of the army and the press f) authoritarian character g) tolerance and respect h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as values in education) i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy We also look at the trajectory of global society by analyzing the factor scores along the path of the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP (“human security indicator”, also used by Inglehart and his associates). - Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary economic theory of growth. In statistical terms, it is the most important of all the resulting factors. - Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic permissiveness. We also look at the exceptional performers (“residuals”) which best avoided economic permissiveness on each stage of secularization. We also present Chropleth maps of human values across the globe, and show the regional implications of our analysis. Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in this work. Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia. While in general terms our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike. In a second factor analysis, we re-analyze the question of Islam and feminism, based on an analysis of all respondents from the World Values Survey. The Muslim population covered in this survey comprises representatives of 62.6% of the Muslim population of our globe. The data were based on the following variables: - Age - Education level (recoded) - Highest educational level attained - How important is God in your life - How often do you attend religious services (never?) - Important child qualities: religious faith - Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject) - Sex (Gender) - University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject) - Acceptancy of woman as a single parent The respondents (all denominations) comprised n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories. After Promax factor analysis, three factors explained 53.8% of total variance. While the distance to religious practice is explained to some 4% by the education level (correlation between the two factors is 0.192), one can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. And while gender determines feminist convictions, contained in our analysis to some 40%, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also increasingly by enlightened men, non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Interestingly enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of the acceptancy of women as a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. only 12.39% of variance explained). Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common now in Western countries: the argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et cetera. Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance towards religion around the globe (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained). Data emerging from the World Values Survey in the first decade of the 2000s also seem to suggest that the precariousness, which more and more characterizes the economies of leading Western countries leads toward an implosion of what Inglehart and his sociological school of thought interpreted as “self-expression values”. Our analysis of the time series element in the World Values Survey data shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To this end, we calculated which countries – in descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over preceding World Values Survey surveys from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54). The very idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other regions of the world they are rising, is a challenge to existing value theories. The world, described by Inglehart and Baker, 2000, where in advanced industrial societies people pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures no longer seems to exist for the “1.000 Euro” generation born after 1975, which experiences more and more job insecurity and hardly finds full-time tenured work opportunities, let alone the financial means to travel to long-distant countries. No wonder then that “self-expression” is dramatically declining in the West. We also highlight the fact that the latest wave of World Values Survey data, wave 6, from 2010 - 2014, released in May 2014 contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the R^2 between the two variables is almost 20%. Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-expression tendencies, there is a greater number of Muslim countries (i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: according to the World Values Survey data, among the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-expression we find Jordan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Egypt; and Uganda! The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in western democracies. The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in the world system. Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self expression, and economic growth during the crisis years. Our Choropleth maps in this part of our article underline our contentions. Even a pure Inglehartian world values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is eroding. So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it. With all the extensions of the World Values Survey project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, the Inglehart world map of global values recedes into the memory about a world order, which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we try to show in this article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the North Atlantic arena. In addition, we present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in relationship to the other variables contained in the World Values Survey data. Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the World Values Survey from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy. The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 representative respondents in 70 countries are the following: - moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) - acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’) - distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) - educational values: independence and imagination - distance to market economy values - education values: responsibility and tolerance - educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving - right wing acceptance of inequality - educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated with one another and with the loss of religious values. Table 5.3 of our article shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained) confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-market. In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following: a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social decay Table 5.4 shows the correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor scores”) as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the secularistic and permissive logic, proposed by Inglehart. In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Schwartz dimensions and our results. In many ways, we can show that Hofstede’s Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart’s main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-expression, which we can well interpret in our own system. In all cases, however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research by Hofstede and Inglehart. Schwartz’s factors Affective Autonomy and Harmony do not achieve any correlations which have more than 25% of variance in common with our own factors, and in addition, the following dimensions from our own research are untapped, it seems, by the Schwartz’ factors (to judge from the less than 25% of variance they have in common with the Schwartz factors). In addition, the following factors from Hofstede and Inglehart are untapped; it seems, by Schwartz’s theories (again to judge from the less than 25% of variance they have in common with the Schwartz factors) Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index Inglehart: Self-Expression Values (WVS 1-4, 2006) Table 5.8 shows the correlations of the country scores from Schwartz’ work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the Schwartz factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”. We then debate current contentious political cleavages, especially in Europe in the light of the empirics, as suggested by the World Values Survey. These days, in the leading world newspapers we read stories which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? The French socialists, it seems, for example seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the World Values Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa. Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally applicable message of our article on the drivers of “effective democracy”: a sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, and economic freedom will be conducive to “effective democracy”. Nevertheless the path towards “effective democracy” will be one of ups and downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits for a too rapid economic liberalization in terms of “effective democracy”. As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the World Values Survey, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages of this article – tolerance and democracy. In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of the World Values Survey: - People who speak a different language - People of a different religion - Immigrants/foreign workers - People of a different race According to the World Values Survey data, the most tolerant nation on earth today is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia. Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country Romania. Some Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance. Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the World Values Survey results for the average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis. Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy. Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don’t assign a great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue. Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification could be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article.

However much we appreciate the enormous scientific contribution by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who initiated the international data collection of the World Values Survey, our re-analysis of the very World Values Survey data [“roll-outs” of the World Values Survey data wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav] brought us to question Inglehart’s theories, with which he and his associates interpret the mass of the World Values Survey data. Their theoretical approach does not use a sufficiently number of hard-core indicators how global publics view central issues of economic policy, and their theories overemphasize a secularistic view of the religious phenomenon in modern society. Their theories predict the gradual waning of the religious phenomena in parallel with the increase of human security, and even cherish at times the tendencies brought about by such a waning of the religious element in advanced democracies. Inglehart spells them out: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et cetera. Is that really something to cherish? Today, societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family values can be an important assett in the stability of capitalist development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina’s and Paola Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents et cetera coincide with the global map of economic growth today. Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the World Values Survey project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from the World Values Survey project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth. Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes. In our re-analysis, we use the advanced statistical multivariate analysis technique of the Promax factor analysis, which allows for correlations between factors. It is available to the global public via the IBM-SPSS statistical package XXI. We eliminated missing values by listwise delition. In our first re-analysis, there were 92289 interview partners from around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. Our main model explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. We highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions: a) economic permissiveness b) traditional religion c) racism d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the generations) e) distrust of the army and the press f) authoritarian character g) tolerance and respect h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as values in education) i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy We also look at the trajectory of global society by analyzing the factor scores along the path of the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP (“human security indicator”, also used by Inglehart and his associates).  Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary economic theory of growth. In statistical terms, it is the most important of all the resulting factors.  Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic permissiveness. We also look at the exceptional performers (“residuals”) which best avoided economic permissiveness on each stage of secularization. We also present Chropleth maps of human values across the globe, and show the regional implications of our analysis. Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in this work. Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia. While in general terms our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike. In a second factor analysis, we re-analyze the question of Islam and feminism, based on an analysis of all respondents from the World Values Survey. The Muslim population covered in this survey comprises representatives of 62.6% of the Muslim population of our globe. The data were based on the following variables: * Age * Education level (recoded) * Highest educational level attained * How important is God in your life * How often do you attend religious services (never?) * Important child qualities: religious faith * Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject) * Sex (Gender) * University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject) * Acceptancy of woman as a single parent The respondents (all denominations) comprised n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories. After Promax factor analysis, three factors explained 53.8% of total variance. While the distance to religious practice is explained to some 4% by the education level (correlation between the two factors is 0.192), one can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. And while gender determines feminist convictions, contained in our analysis to some 40%, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also increasingly by enlightened men, non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Interestingly enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of the acceptancy of women as a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. only 12.39% of variance explained). Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common now in Western countries: the argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et cetera. Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance towards religion around the globe (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained). Data emerging from the World Values Survey in the first decade of the 2000s also seem to suggest that the precariousness, which more and more characterizes the economies of leading Western countries leads toward an implosion of what Inglehart and his sociological school of thought interpreted as “self-expression values”. Our analysis of the time series element in the World Values Survey data shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To this end, we calculated which countries – in descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over preceding World Values Survey surveys from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54). The very idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other regions of the world they are rising, is a challenge to existing value theories. The world, described by Inglehart and Baker, 2000, where in advanced industrial societies people pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures no longer seems to exist for the “1.000 Euro” generation born after 1975, which experiences more and more job insecurity and hardly finds full-time tenured work opportunities, let alone the financial means to travel to long-distant countries. No wonder then that “self-expression” is dramatically declining in the West. We also highlight the fact that the latest wave of World Values Survey data, wave 6, from 2010 - 2014, released in May 2014 contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the R^2 between the two variables is almost 20%. Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-expression tendencies, there is a greater number of Muslim countries (i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: according to the World Values Survey data, among the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-expression we find Jordan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Egypt; and Uganda! The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in western democracies. The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in the world system. Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self expression, and economic growth during the crisis years. Our Choropleth maps in this part of our article underline our contentions. Even a pure Inglehartian world values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is eroding. So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it. With all the extensions of the World Values Survey project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, the Inglehart world map of global values recedes into the memory about a world order, which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we try to show in this article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the North Atlantic arena. In addition, we present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in relationship to the other variables contained in the World Values Survey data. Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the World Values Survey from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy. The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 representative respondents in 70 countries are the following: • moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’) • acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’) • distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’) • educational values: independence and imagination • distance to market economy values • education values: responsibility and tolerance • educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving • right wing acceptance of inequality • educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated with one another and with the loss of religious values. Table 5.3 of our article shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained) confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-market. In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following: a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social decay Table 5.4 shows the correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor scores”) as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the secularistic and permissive logic, proposed by Inglehart. In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Ralston et al. dimensions and our results. Ralston et al. is an application of the Schwartz categories to global business people. There was an enormous reception of the works of Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem especially in the expanding field of international business studies. Our quantification of Schwartz’s theory relies exclusively on Ralston et al. The reason is simple: Ralston et al., 2011 – somewhat in the tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on business people (Hofstede: one company, IBM; Ralston et al., 2011: business people in general). Thus his sampling is restricted to a certain segment of society, while Schwartz’s categories are much more encompassing. To provide more encompassing tests of Schwartz’s theory in the framework of theories of overall global value change would be the theme for another essay, and is beyond the scope of this paper. In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the Ralston et al. business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede and the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already mentioned, a problem of limited country samples in Ralston et al., 2011. To understand the Ralston et al. framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern. His seven dimensions are 1. Embeddedness 2. Hierarchy 3. Mastery 4. Affective Autonomy 5. Intellectual Autonomy 6. Egalitarianism 7. Harmony In many ways, we can show that Hofstede’s Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart’s main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-expression, which we can well interpret in our own system. In all cases, however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research by Hofstede and Inglehart. Table 5.8 shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston et al.’ work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the Ralston et al. factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”. We then debate current contentious political cleavages, especially in Europe in the light of the empirics, as suggested by the World Values Survey. These days, in the leading world newspapers we read stories which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? The French socialists, it seems, for example seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the World Values Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa. Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally applicable message of our article on the drivers of “effective democracy”: a sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, and economic freedom will be conducive to “effective democracy”. Nevertheless the path towards “effective democracy” will be one of ups and downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits for a too rapid economic liberalization in terms of “effective democracy”. As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the World Values Survey, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages of this article – tolerance and democracy. In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of the World Values Survey:  People who speak a different language  People of a different religion  Immigrants/foreign workers  People of a different race According to the World Values Survey data, the most tolerant nation on earth today is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia. Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country Romania. Some Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance. Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the World Values Survey results for the average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis. Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy. Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don’t assign a great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue. Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification could be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article.

Using data from nationally representative household surveys, we test whether Indian parents make trade-offs between the number of children and investments in education and health of their children. To address the endogeneity due to the joint determination of quantity and quality of children by parents, we instrument family size with the gender of the first child which is plausibly random. Given a strong son-preference in India, parents tend to have more children if the first born is a girl. Our IV results show that children from larger families have lower educational attainment and are less likely to have ever been enrolled and to be currently enrolled in school, even after controlling for parents’ characteristics and birth-order of children. The effects are larger for rural, poorer and low-caste families and for families with less educated mothers. On the other hand, we find no evidence of a trade-off for health outcomes.

This short paper revisits two questions that were central to Joel Mokyr’s Why Ireland Starved (2nd edition, 1985). These are, first, what determined the variation in population change across Ireland during the Great Famine decade of 1841-1851 and, second, whether and in what sense can pre-famine Ireland be characterized as ‘malthusian’.

This paper introduces a new measure of residential segregation based on individual-level data. We exploit complete census manuscript files to derive a measure of segregation based upon the racial similarity of next-door neighbors. Our measure allows us to analyze segregation consistently and comprehensively for all areas in the United States and allows for a richer view of the variation in segregation across time and space. We show that the fineness of our measure reveals aspects of racial sorting that cannot be captured by traditional segregation indices. Our measure can distinguish between the effects of increasing racial homogeneity of a location and the tendency to segregate within a location given a particular racial composition. Analysis of neighbor-based segregation over time establishes several new facts about segregation. First, segregation doubled nationally from 1880 to 1940. Second, contrary to previous estimates, we find that urban areas in the South were the most segregated in the country and remained so over time. Third, the dramatic increase in segregation in the twentieth century was not driven by urbanization, black migratory patterns, or white flight to suburban areas, but rather resulted from a national increase in racial sorting at the household level. The likelihood that an African American household had a non-African American neighbor declined by more than 15 percentage points (more than a 25% decrease) through the mid-twentieth century. In all areas of the United States -- North and South, urban and rural -- racial segregation increased dramatically.

The present paper offers new knowledge of historical national accounting in Norway in several ways. Firstly, a new and novel set of annual gross domestic product series by industry are presented for the period 1830-1930. Secondly, the new estimates suggest revision of the historical national accounts published by Statistics Norway. Thirdly, this may lead to necessary revisions of both Norwegian industrial history and business cycle history.