1. Committee-Based Blockchains as Games between Opportunistic Players and Adversaries.
- Author
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Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley, Biais, Bruno, Potop-Butucaru, Maria, and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara
- Subjects
BLOCKCHAINS ,COMMITTEES ,GAMES ,COMPUTER network protocols ,ALGORITHMS - Abstract
We study consensus in a protocol capturing in a simplified manner the major features of the majority of Proof of Stake blockchains. A committee is formed; one member proposes a block; and the others can check its validity and vote for it. Blocks with a majority of votes are produced. When an invalid block is produced, the stakes of the members who voted for it are "slashed." Profit-maximizing members interact with adversaries seeking to disrupt consensus. When slashing is limited, free-riding and moral-hazard lead to invalid blocks in equilibrium. We propose a protocol modification producing only valid blocks in equilibrium. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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